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2015 DIGILAW 271 (GAU)

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhuban Ch. Borah

2015-03-04

P.K.SAIKIA

body2015
P.K. Saikia, J.:-- This appeal is directed against the award dated 15.03.2012 rendered by the Member, learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Dibrugarh in MACT case No.82/2006 awarding an amount to the tune of Rs.7,24,252/- in favour of the claimants in the aforementioned proceeding with interest @ 9% per annum to be paid within two (2) months from the date of award failing which such interest was to be paid @ 12% from the expiry of two (2) months from the date of award. 2. I have heard Mr. S. Dutta, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. G. Khandelia, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 3. The facts projected by the claimants which gave rise to MACT case No.82/2006, in short, are that one Jitumoni Bora, son of claimants Sri Bhuban Chandra Bora and Smti. Niru Bora died at Bokul Tinali on National Highway 37 under Lahoal Police Station, Dibrugarh on 26.08.2006 at about 9:45 P.M.. At the time of accident, deceased Jitumoni Bora was proceeding to Dibrugarh as pillion rider on a motor cycle bearing registration No.AS-06/C-7657 and they were proceeding from Mohanbari to Dibrugarh. Said scooter was driven by one Sri Jitu Singh. 4. Unfortunately, at Bokul Tinali on the National Highway, they were knocked down by a speeding Mohindra Mini Truck bearing registration No.AS-01/Z-1175 as a result of which Jitumoni Borah, son of the claimants, died on the spot. In that connection, a claim petition on being filed before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (in short, MACT) at Dibrugarh, it took cognizance of the aforesaid claim petition and ordered issuance of process to the opposite party No.1 , 2 and 3, they being New India Assurance Co. Ltd., M/s Bohniman Ice Cream Pvt. Ltd. and Sri Diganta Das respectively. 5. Accordingly, notices were issued to the opposite party No.1,2 and 3. Opposite party No.2 and 3 did not contest the proceeding and hence, such a proceeding run ex-parte against them. However, being served with notice, the opposite party No.1 entered appearance and having filed Written Statement contested the proceeding. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed:- 1. Whether the claim is maintainable? 2. Whether the Mini Truck bearing No.AS-01/Z-1175 was driven by O.P. No.3 in a rash and negligent manner at the relevant time? 3. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed:- 1. Whether the claim is maintainable? 2. Whether the Mini Truck bearing No.AS-01/Z-1175 was driven by O.P. No.3 in a rash and negligent manner at the relevant time? 3. Whether the Motor Cycle bearing No.AS-06/C-7657 was driven by Sri Jitu Singh in a rash and negligent manner at the relevant time? 4. Whether the vehicle having registered No.AS-01/Z-1175 was insured with O.P. No.1 ? 5. Whether the claimants are entitled to get any compensation? 6. To what relief/reliefs the parties are entitled? 6. In order to prove the case, the claimants had adduced the evidence of two witnesses and exhibited some documents whereas opposite party No.1 adduced no evidence. On conclusion of enquiry and upon hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the learned Tribunal granted the award as aforesaid in favour of the claimants. 7. Being aggrieved, the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. had preferred this appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the award dated 15.03.2012 in MAC Case No.82/2006 passed by the learned Member, MACT, Dibrugarh alleging that the learned Tribunal awarded the compensation ignoring the laws and decisions holding the field in question. 8. According to Mr. S. Dutta, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant, in terms of the decision, rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Others reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the Tribunal was duty bound to deduct 50% from the income of the deceased while computing the compensation since at the time of his death, the deceased was admittedly a bachelor. The relevant portion of Sarla Verma (supra) is projected below: "31. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would and to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father." 9. It has also been contended that the multiplier, used by the Tribunal is also not correct. The Tribunal had used 17 as multiplier on the basis of the age of the deceased at the time of accident. However, in view of law, laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1996) 4 SCC 362 , in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others vs. Trilok Chandra and others and in (2008) 2 SCC 667 reported in Ramesh Singh vs. Satbir Singh, the Tribunal was duty bound to consider, not the age of the deceased, but, it had to focus on the age of the mother of the deceased also for the purpose of allowing the multiplier to be used for computation of the compensation. According to the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, amount should be awarded on the basis of the age of the mother of the deceased. The relevant portion is projected below: "18, We must at once point out that the calculation of compensation and the amount worked out in the Schedule suffers from several defects. For example, in Item 1 for a victim aged 15 years, the multiplier is shown to be 15 years and the multiplier is 16 years, the multiplier is shown to be 15 years and the multiplicand is shown to be Rs.3000. The total should be 3000 x 15 = 45,000 but the same is worked out at Rs.60,000. Similarly, in the second item the multiplier is 16 and the annual income is Rs.9,000; the total should have been Rs. 1,44,000 but is shown to be Rs. 1,71,000. To put it briefly, the table abounds in such mistakes. Neither the tribunals nor the courts can go by the ready reckoner. It can only be used as a guide. Similarly, in the second item the multiplier is 16 and the annual income is Rs.9,000; the total should have been Rs. 1,44,000 but is shown to be Rs. 1,71,000. To put it briefly, the table abounds in such mistakes. Neither the tribunals nor the courts can go by the ready reckoner. It can only be used as a guide. Besides, the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. For example, if the deceased, a bachelor, dies at the age of 45 and his dependants are his parents, age of the parents would also be relevant in the choice of the multiplier. But these mistakes are limited to actual calculations only and not in respect of other items. What we propose to emphasise is that the multiplier cannot exceed 18 years' purchase factor. This is the improvement over the earlier position that ordinarily it should not exceed 16. We thought it necessary to state the correct legal position as courts and tribunals are using higher multiplier as in the present case where the Tribunal used the multiplier of 24 which the High Court raised to 34, thereby showing lack of awareness of the background of the multiplier system in Davies case." 10. The relevant portion of the decision reported in (2008) 2 SCC 667 in the case of Ramesh Singh and Another vs. Satbir Singh and Another is reproduced below: "6. We have given anxious consideration to these contentions and are of the opinion that the same are devoid of any merits. Considering the law laid down in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Charlie it is clear that the choice of multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased or the claimants whichever is higher. Admittedly, the age of the father was 55 years. The question of mother's age never cropped up because that was not the contention raised even before the trial court or before us. Taking the age to be 55 years, in our opinion, the court below have not committed any illegality in applying the multiplier of 8 since the father was running 56th year of his life. 7. The learned counsel relying on the Second Schedule to the Act contended that the deceased being about 16 or 17 years of age, a multiplier of 16 or 17 should have been granted. 7. The learned counsel relying on the Second Schedule to the Act contended that the deceased being about 16 or 17 years of age, a multiplier of 16 or 17 should have been granted. It is undoubtedly true that Section 163-A was brought on the statute book to shorten the period of litigation. The burden to prove the negligence or fault on the part of driver and other allied burdens under Section 140 or 166 were really cumbersome and time consuming. Therefore, as a part of social justice, a system was introduced via Section 163-A wherein such burden was avoided and thereby a speedy remedy was provided. The relief under Section 163-A has been held not to be additional but alternate. The Schedule provided has been threadbare discussed in various pronouncements including Deepal Girishbhai Soni vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. The Second Schedule is to be used not only referring to the age of victim but also other factors relevant there for. Complicated questions of facts and law arising in accident cases cannot be answered all times by relying on mathematical equations. In fact in U.P. SRTC vs. Trilok Chandra Ahmedi, J (as the Chief Justice then was) has pointed out the shortcomings in the said Schedule and has held that the Schedule can only be used as a guide. It was also held that the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. If a young man is killed in the accident leaving behind aged parents who may not survive long enough to match with a high multiplier provided by the Second Schedule, then the court has to offset such high multiplier and balance the same with the short life expectancy of the claimants. That precisely has happened in this case. Age of the parents was held as a relevant factor in case of minor's death in a recent decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Syed Ibrahim. In our considered opinion, the courts below rightly struck the said balance." 11. Since at the time of the accident, the mother of the deceased was the woman of about 50 years of age, the Tribunal ought to have taken 14 as the multiplier for the purpose of computation of compensation instead of 17 as has been done by the Tribunal. Since at the time of the accident, the mother of the deceased was the woman of about 50 years of age, the Tribunal ought to have taken 14 as the multiplier for the purpose of computation of compensation instead of 17 as has been done by the Tribunal. Since the award of the learned Tribunal suffers from the infirmities, aforesaid, same needs to be interfered with by reducing the quantum of compensation granted by the Tribunal in accordance with the principles aforementioned. 12. These contentions were opposed to by the learned counsel for the respondents/opposite parties contending that the learned Court below did render the award in accordance with the requirement of law. In this connection, he has pointed out that in the terms of law laid down in Sarla Verma (supra), the Tribunal ought to have included in the compensation the future income, which the deceased could have earned had he been alive and that too in accordance with the law laid down therein. 13. However, the Tribunal did not do so. Since the Tribunal did not follow the law laid down by the Apex Court in matter of computation of compensation, this Court instead of reducing the amount of compensation payable to the claimants, needs to enhance such amount to the amount which claimants are entitled to. 14. He further submits that the learned court below while computing his monthly salary of the deceased, excluded the amount deducted towards the Provident Fund Account. According to the learned counsel for the respondents/opposite parties, such deduction is not permissible under the law and as such, same is illegal. 15. Therefore, this court needs to compute the compensation on the basis of the salary of the petitioner at the time of his death which includes the contribution he made towards P.F. Account. He, therefore, urges this Court to enhance the compensation awarded by the Tribunal instead of reducing such compensation, as prayed for by the appellant. 16. Mr. S. Dutta, learned senior counsel further submits that in an appeal, preferred by the opposite party/Insurance company in MACT Case No.82/2006, the claimant a- being respondent, herein, cannot set up a claim seeking enhancement of compensation unless the claimant prefer a cross objection in time. Since, it was not done, they are prevented from seeking enhancement of compensation in an appeal filed by the Insurance Company seeking reduction of compensation. 17. Since, it was not done, they are prevented from seeking enhancement of compensation in an appeal filed by the Insurance Company seeking reduction of compensation. 17. In that connection, my attention has been drawn to the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ranjana Prakash and Others vs. Divisional Manager and Another reported in (2011) 14 SCC 639 wherein it was held that unless an appeal is preferred seeking compensation at an enhanced rate, the appellate Court cannot grant compensation to the claimants at an enhanced rate in an appeal preferred by the opposite parties/Insurance Company in the original MACT case, questioning the correctness of the award rendered by the Tribunal. The relevant part of Ranjana Prakash (supra) is reproduced below: "8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. (If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer.) Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation." 18. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, conceded to the submissions, made by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents/opposite parties that while considering the monthly salary of the deceased at the time of his death, his entire salary including deduction towards the provident fund may be considered for the purpose of computation of the compensation to be paid to the claimants. 19. I have considered the rival submissions, advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also perused the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the evidences on regard. 20. 19. I have considered the rival submissions, advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also perused the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the evidences on regard. 20. On hearing the arguments, advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I have found that there is no dispute over the fact that son of the claimants died at Bokul Tinali on 37 National Highway under Lahoal P.S., Dibrugarh on 26.08.2006 at about 9:45 P.M.. There is no dispute that such accident occurred when the Motor Cycle bearing No.AS-06/C-7657 in which they were proceeding towards Dibrugarh town were knocked down by speeding Mahindra Mini Truck bearing registration No AS-01/Z-1175 which was insured with the New India Insurance Company Limited who is appellant herein. 21. There is also no controversy over the fact that the aforesaid accident had occurred as a result of negligent and rash driving on the part of the driver of the aforementioned Mini Truck which was insured with the appellant herein. However, on the perusal of the record, I have found that the deceased was a bachelor at the time of his death and as such, in terms of Sarla Verma (supra), the Tribunal was to have deducted 50% from his salary. 22. I have also found that in the terms of the law laid down in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others (supra), the Tribunal ought to have used multiplier of 14, basing on the age of mother of the deceased on the date of incident in question instead of using multiplier 17 on the basis of age of the deceased on the date of incident. 23. Therefore, in my considered opinion, not deducting 50% from the salary of the deceased and using multiplier of 17, the Tribunal has committed serious illegality. 24. Resultantly, it is held that 50% of the salary of the deceased at the time of his death needs to be deducted. So also multiplier of 14 is to be used in computing the compensation payable to the claimants. 25. It is worth noting here that there is no dispute over the fact that the salary of the deceased at the time of his death was Rs. 6,030/- out of which the deceased contributed Rs.835/- towards his GPF account. However, said amount, same being Rs. 25. It is worth noting here that there is no dispute over the fact that the salary of the deceased at the time of his death was Rs. 6,030/- out of which the deceased contributed Rs.835/- towards his GPF account. However, said amount, same being Rs. 835/- part of the salary cannot be deducted from the total salary for the purpose of computation of compensation to be paid to the legal representatives of the deceased. Accordingly, the computation of the salary after deducting the amount paid towards the GPF is held illegal. 26. Being so, the compensation to be paid to the legal representatives of the deceased is required to be calculated on the total salary of the deceased which he used to draw at the time of his death. As such, the compensation to be paid to the claimants needs to be calculated in the following manner: 1) Loss of dependency = Rs.6830A less 50% = Rs.3,415.00 p.m.x!2 = Rs.40,980/-p.a. Rs.40,980/- Multiplier of 14 = Rs.5,73,720.00 2) Funeral expenses = Rs. 25,000.00 3) Loss of consortium = Rs. 1,00,000.00 Total: = Rs.6,98,720.00 27. In the result, it is held that the claimants/respondents are entitled Rs.6,98,720.00/-only as being compensation and the New India Insurance Co. Ltd. is to pay such to the claimants. 28. Accordingly, the award in question stands modified accordingly. 29. Consequently, the present appeal is partly allowed. 30. The New India Insurance Co. Ltd. is directed to pay the award, less the amount, if any, already paid, within one (1) month from today failing which the aforementioned amount will carry an interest of @ 12% per annum from the date of expiry of one month till the realisation of entire amount. 31. The MAC appeal stands disposed of. --------