CWP No. 10629 of 2015 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (223) CWP No. 10629 of 2015 Date of Decision: 09.07.2026 Ashok Kumar ......Petitioner Versus Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak and Others .....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Present: Mr. Raj Kumar Rana, Advocate for the petitioner (Through V.C.). Mr. S.P. Chahar, Advocate with Ms. Savita Chahar, Advocate for respondents No.2 & 3. **** KIRTI SINGH , J. (ORAL) 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the impugned Award dated 11.07.2014 (Annexure P-7) passed by respondent No.1 and issuance of a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner-workman inter alia submits that the petitioner was appointed as a Driver with respondent No.1 on 09.04.2001 and rendered continuous service for about four years and eleven months. His services were terminated on 11.03.2005 without any notice and without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner served a demand notice, pursuant to which the dispute was referred to the Labour Court under Section 10(1) of the Act. It is submitted that although the RITIKA 2026.07.15 15:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 10629 of 2015 -2- defence of the respondent-management was struck off, the Labour Court wrongly dismissed the reference vide Award dated 11.07.2014 by holding that the case of the petitioner was covered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. Learned counsel contends that the management never pleaded that the petitioner was a backdoor appointee and its own witness admitted that his appointment was made after due verification of his documents. It is further submitted that no valid contract of employment was proved on record and, therefore, the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) were wrongly applied. Accordingly, the impugned Award is liable to be set aside. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents No.2 and 3- Management submits that the impugned Award is legal and well reasoned and calls for no interference. It is submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a driver purely on contractual basis for a period of 89 days and continued to work only intermittently w.e.f. 08.04.2001 to 18.10.2001, 03.06.2002 to 01.03.2004 and 09.06.2004 to 11.03.2005. His services came to an end on expiry of the contractual period and, therefore, his termination was valid and covered under the exception contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by this Court in CWP No.3324 of 1992 titled as Rakesh Kumr Saini Vs. The Engineer-in-Chief, Irrigation Department, Haryana and submits that where an employee is appointed purely on contractual basis, the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in service for some time due to administrative exigencies or delay in regular recruitment does not take the case outside the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. Heard learned counsel on either side and perused the judicial record with their able assistance. RITIKA 2026.07.15 15:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 10629 of 2015 -3- 5. Before proceeding further, a gainful reference can be made to the proposition of law as discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6511 of 2005 titled as Surendranagar District Panchayat Vs. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, relevant paras whereof reads thus:- “8. As per Section 25F, no workman who is in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer unless conditions laid therein are fulfilled. The retrenchment is defined in Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Under the definition termination of the service of a workman by the employer by any reason whatsoever, otherwise than, as a punishment, by way of disciplinary action, would constitute retrenchment except in cases accepted in the Section itself, they are :- i) a voluntary retirement of a workman; ii) retirement of a workman on reaching the age of superannuation; iii) termination of the service of a workman as a result of nonrenewal of the contract of employment; or iv) termination of the service on the ground of continued ill- health of the workman. Unless these reasons are existed and proved, termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason, would constitute retrenchment. Therefore, if the employer is to retrench the workmen employed in his industry who is in continuous service has to follow the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. To attract provisions of Section 25F, the workman claiming protection under it, has to prove that there exists relationship of employer and employee; that he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act; the establishment in which he is employed is an industry within the meaning of the Act and he must have put in not less than one year of continuous service as defined by Section 25B under the employer. These conditions are cumulative. If any of these conditions are missing the provisions of Section 25F will not attract. To get relief from the court the workman has to establish that he has right to continue in service and that his service has been terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The Section postulates three conditions to be fulfilled by an employer for getting a valid retrenchment, namely :- i) One month's clear notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or that the workman has been paid wages for the period of notice in lieu of such notice; ii) payment of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof, in excess of six months; iii) a notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner. 9. To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the conditions required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorised leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workman shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25B. However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in sub-section (1). The workman RITIKA 2026.07.15 15:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 10629 of 2015 -4- must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of sub-section (1) of Section 25B is that the workman should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. Subsection (2) of Section 25B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 25B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2). By the legal fiction of sub-section 2(a) (i), the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workman has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25F. 16. In Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, it is said by this Court that before a workman can claim retrenchment not being in consonance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he has to show that he has been in continuous service of not less than one year with the employer who had retrenched him from service. 17. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 - (At Page 26, Para 3), this Court held that "In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside." 19. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no coworker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the workman- respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards RITIKA 2026.07.15 15:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 10629 of 2015 -5- noncompliance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for non-compliance of provisions of the Act. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. In order to entitle the Court to draw inference unfavourable to the party, the Court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved. “ 6. It was the case of the petitioner that he was appointed as a Driver with respondent No.1 on 09.04.2001 and his services were illegally terminated on 11.03.2005 without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned Industrial Tribunal, after appreciating the pleadings and evidence led by the parties, recorded a finding that the petitioner had been appointed as a Driver purely on contractual basis for a period of 89 days, as was evident from his affidavit dated 11.04.2001 (Ex.M-1), wherein he had categorically conceded that his appointment was contractual till a regular employee joined, and had undertaken that he would not claim regularization or a regular pay scale. On the basis of the said document, the Tribunal held that the appointment of the petitioner was covered under the exception contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. It was further observed, based on the material on record, that the petitioner had worked only intermittently and had failed to establish that he had completed one year of continuous service or 240 days of service during the twelve months preceding his termination. Consequently, it was held that there was no violation of Section 25-F of the Act. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has otherwise also not been able to point out any perversity in the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal, nor has it been shown that the said findings are contrary to the pleadings and evidence brought on record. This Court while exercising RITIKA 2026.07.15 15:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 10629 of 2015 -6- jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India does not sit as a Court of appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court. This Court exercises only supervisory jurisdiction which is exercised for interfering with an award suffering from illegality or any error apparent on the face of the record, which has not been pointed out in the present case. 8. In view of the above, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed. 9. Civil miscellaneous application pending, if any, shall also stand disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE July 09, 2026 Ritika Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No RITIKA 2026.07.15 15:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 10629 of 2015 -7- 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned order dated 11.07.2014 (Annexure P-7) passed by respondent No.1 and for issuance of direction to respondents to re-instate the services of the petitioner with all consequential benefits. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner- workman inter alia submits that the petitioner was appointed as a driver on 09.04.2001 in the office of respondent No.1. Thereafter, on 11.03.2005, his services were illegally terminated without any notice. Thereafter, the petitioner served a demand notice dated 12.05.2005 and the appropriate Governor was pleased to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Tribunal. The petitioner filed claim statement before the learned Presiding Officer that he was appointed as a driver pm 09.04.2001 in DRDA Rohtak run by the State of Haryana and holds a heavy vehicle driving licence. It is alleged that the petitioner had performed his duties satisfactorily and had never given any chance of any complaint. However, his services were terminated on 11.03.2005 illegally without any prior notice and the action of respondents in terminating the services without any prior notice is illegal and the management did not comply with the mandatory provisions of the I.D. Act including Section 25-F. Although the workman was in continuous service for 04 years and 11 months which amounts to unfair trade practice. The defence of the appointing authority-respondent No.2 was struck down vide order dated 15.12.2008, hence there was no reply by the appointing authority. It is submitted that the learned Labour Court had erred in deciding the reference against the petitioner-workman vide its Award dated 11.07.2014 and the impugned order dated it liable to be set aside on the account that the respondent management has no where pleaded the back door entry. Rather the MW1 had admitted that the petitioner was appointed after verifying his documents/record etc. and the Labour Court has failed to appreciate that clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) is not applicable to the case of the petitioner as no contract was proved on record and the same amounts to unfair labour practice. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents No.2 & 3- Management submits that the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal is a well-reasoned order and there is no infirmity in the order so passed. The petitioner was appointed as Driver on contractual basis on 09.04.2001 for 89 days and it is further submitted that he had not worked continuously up to the date of termination i.e. 11.03.2005 as per the evidence on record, the petitioner worked intermittently which is from 09.04.2001 to 18.10.2001, 03.06.2002 to 01.03.2004 and 09.06.2004 to 11.03.2005 and his services were validly terminated on 11.03.2005 after the expiry of contractual period. Reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by this Court in CWP No.3324 of 1992 and submits that where his appointment is purely on contractual basis and the petitioner was allowed to overstay due to administrative exigencies resulting from the delay in recruitment does not take the case away from the exceptions to retrenchment in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the 1947 Act. Heard learned counsel on either side and perused the judicial record with their able assistance. This Court is of the view that the order passed by the Learned Industrial Tribunal has not been able to point out any illegality or perversity in the order passed by the learned Tribunal and it has been observed that at the time of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner-workman submitted that the workman worked with their management respondent as driver for 89 days as per his affidavit dated 11.04.2001 Ex.M-1 only till July 2001, which states that “That I am appointed by Chief Executive Office Zila Parishad Rohtak vide order dated Z.P. 2001/326-29 dated 05.04.2001 as Driver on RITIKA 2026.07.15 15:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 10629 of 2015 -8- contract basis for a period of 89 days as till a regular employee joins which will be less conditions mentioned in the above order. That I will not claim regularization of service or regular pay scale etc.” A perusal of the same shows that the appointment of the petitioner-workman as a driver by the management-respondent was purely on contractual basis, therefore, the workman-petitinoer was not appoinetd on a permanent or temporary basis. Therefore, it was held by the learned Industrial Tribunal that the appointment of the petitioner-workman as a driver by the management is covered by exceptions contained in Section 2(oo)(bb). Even otherwise it is come on record that in the last proceeding i.e. 09.06.2004 to 11.03.2005 the workman had not completed the continuous service for not less than one year preceding the date of termination of his service by the management-respondent. The workman too had failed to prove that he completed one year or 240 days of his service in a calendar year preceding the date of his termination. Therefore, there is no contravention of Section 25-F of the Act. Accordingly, the Court is of the view that there is no infirmity in the order so passed and the same is liable to be dismissed RITIKA 2026.07.15 15:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh