IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 324 of 2015 Reserved on: 19.08.2026 Date of Decision: 27.08.2028 State of H.P. .... Petitioner Versus Balram .... Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the appellant/ State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Aakash Thakur, Advocate, Legal Aid Counsel. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.11.2014, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.5, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned trial Court) was acquitted of the 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 commission of offences punishable under Section 279, 336, 337 and 427 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 177 and 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 336, 337, and 427 of the IPC and Sections 177 and 192 of the MV Act. It was asserted that the informant, Vikram Sharma (PW-2), was running a karyana shop at Summerhill Chowk, Bus Stand. He was present in the shop on 24.06.2010 at about 03.45 p.m. Nisha Devi (PW- 4) was present outside the informant’s shop. A bus bearing registration No. HP-51B-9999 was parked at the bus stand. No driver was present in the bus. The bus suddenly rolled back and hit Nisha. She was trapped between the bus and the shop. The informant shouted for help. The driver boarded the bus and moved it ahead. The driver identified himself as Balram (the accused). The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. The matter was reported to the police. SI Anil 3 Kumar (PW-8), Constable Narender Kumar and Sanjay Kumar went to the spot for verification. SI Anil Kumar (PW-8) recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW-2/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW-8/A) was registered. He filed an application (Ext.PW-8/B) for the medical examination of the injured and obtained the MLC and the X- ray report. He went to the spot, prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-8/B-1), and seized the broken indicator of the bus, broken pieces of bangles and scraps of red paint of the bus vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). These were put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with a seal. He seized the bus and the documents vide memo (Ext. PW1/A). He took the photographs (Ext.PW-8/E1 to Ext.PW-8/E8). Gian Chand (PW-5) mechanically examined the bus and found no defect in it that could have led to the accident. The bus was handed over on Sapurdari to the owner vide memo (Ext.PW-6/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of 4 accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 336, 337 and 427 of IPC and Sections 177 and 192 of the M.V Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. HHC Birbal (PW-1), informant Vikram Sharma (PW- 2), and Madhu Gupta (PW-3) are the eyewitnesses. Nisha Devi (PW-4) is the victim. Gian Chand (PW-5) conducted the mechanical examination of the bus. Shivani Sharma (PW-6) is the owner of the bus. Sandeep Kumar (PW-7) witnessed the recovery. SI Anil Kumar (PW-8) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that he was not present on the spot. He was called by the police telephonically. He did not produce any evidence in his defence 6. Learned trial Court held that the bus had rolled back on its own. The informant stated in his cross-examination that he was not aware how the accident had taken place. The report of the mechanic showed that the handbrake of the bus was not functioning properly. The prosecution did not 5 examine the Medical Officer, who had conducted the medical examination of the injured. All these circumstances made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Therefore, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. HHC Birbal (PW-1), Vikram Sharma (PW-2), Madhu Gupta (PW-3) and Nisha Devi (PW-4) proved the prosecution case. The learned trial Court rejected the testimonies of these witnesses without any cogent reasons. The accused was the driver of the bus, and it was his duty to ensure that the bus was parked properly. The accused had not disputed the injuries caused to the victim, and it was not necessary to examine the Medical Officer. The Learned Trial Court had taken a view that could not have been taken based on the evidence produced on the record. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the Learned Trial Court be set aside. 6 8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr Aakash Thakur, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State submitted that the driver had failed to apply the parking brake or Gutka to the rear tyres of the bus to prevent its rolling. The statements of the witnesses proved that the accused was the driver of the bus and he had moved the bus after the accident. The testimony of the owner also proved that the accused was driving the bus at the relevant time. The learned Trial Court ignored the statements of the witnesses. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Aakash Thakur, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the evidence on record. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that the driver was not present in the bus. The report of the mechanic showed that there was a defect in the hand brake and the possibility of the bus rolling because of the defective hand brake could not be 7 ruled out. There is no evidence that the accused was aware of the defect in the hand brake. The learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned trial court even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the 8 golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every 9 reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and 10 reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. It is an admitted version that the driver was not present in the bus. This fact was specifically mentioned in the statement (Ext.PW-2/A). HHG Birbal (PW-1) and Vikram Sharma (PW-2) stated in their examination-in-chief that the driver was not in the bus. Nisha Devi (PW-4) stated in her cross-examination that perhaps somebody was driving the bus, but she had not seen the driver. 14. Vikram Sharma (PW-2) stated in his cross- examination that the bus was properly parked on the spot. He was not re-examined to clarify this part of his statement. The 11 statement of this witness shows that there was no error in the parking. 15. It was submitted that the driver should have applied the hand brake or put the Gutka beneath the rear tyre of the bus to prevent its rolling. The submission will not help the state. No person stated that the driver had not applied the handbrake. The mechanical Report of the bus (Ex. PW-5/A) mentioned that the handbrake was not in working order. Therefore, the bus would not have stopped from rolling even if the handbrake had been applied. Hence, the conclusion drawn by the learned Trial Court that the accident had occurred because of the mechanical defect and not due to negligence was a reasonable conclusion that could have been drawn based on the evidence laid before the learned Trial Court and no interference is required with a reasonable conclusion of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 16. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 17. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish 12 personal bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court 18. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any 19. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 27th August, 2026. (Ravinder)