IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 31 of 2015 Reserved on: 26.02.2026 Date of Decision: 18.03.2026 Sanjay Verma ....Petitioner Versus State of H.P. .... Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1No For the Petitioner : Ms Sheetal Vyas, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 22.12.2014, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, District Shimla (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 24.06.2010 and order of sentence dated 28.06.2010 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 3, Shimla, District Shimla, HP (learned Trial Court) were upheld. 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279,336 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Bhavesh Kakkar (PW-8) was travelling in the bus bearing registration No. HP-07-3199. A passenger shouted at the driver to stop it because one boy had fallen at some distance from the bus. The driver stopped the bus. The informant got out of the bus and saw that a passenger had fallen and his head was bleeding. The doors of the bus were open, which caused the accident. The name of the injured was found to be Gurpreet Singh. The injured person was taken to the hospital, and intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ext. PW 15/A) was recorded in the police station. HC Jai Singh (PW-15), HC Sahab Singh(PW-9), and Constable Amar Nath (PW-10) were sent for verification. They went to IGMC, Shimla, where the informant Bhavesh made a statement (Ext. PW8/A), which was sent to the police station, where FIR (Ext. PW12/A) was registered. An application (Ext. PW3/A) was filed for medical examination of the injured. Dr S.K. Verma (PW-3) examined 3 the injured and found that he was unconscious and was not responding to deep stimuli. Blood pressure was not recordable. The injured was gasping, and blood was present in the mouth and nostrils. He referred the injured to the Department of Neurosurgery and issued MLC (Ext. PW3/B). HHC Govind Ram (PW-13) took the photographs (Ext. PW13/A to Ext. PW13/F), whose negatives are Ext. PW13/G to Ext. PW13/N. HC Jai Singh (PW15) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW15/B). He seized the bus along with documents vide memo (Ext. PW9/A). Gurpreet Singh succumbed to his injury. Dr Sangeet Dhillon (PW-11) conducted the post-mortem examination. He found that the cause of the death was injuries to the head and vital organs. He issued the report (Ext. PW11/A). Gian Chand (PW-16) mechanically examined the bus and found that it had no defect, which could have led to the accident. The statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court put notice of accusation to accused Sanjay Verma for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336 and 304-A of the IPC, and to accused Amar Singh for 4 the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304 A of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined sixteen witnesses to prove its case. Santosh Kumar (PW-1) took the photographs. Vivek Singh (PW-2) was travelling in the bus. Dr S.K. Verma (PW-3) examined the injured. Dr Ravinder Dhiman (PW-4) was the power of attorney of the bus owner. Vishal (PW-5) did not support the prosecution's case. Subhash Verma (PW-6) is the owner of the bus. Manjit (PW-7) and Amar Nath (PW-10) went to the hospital after learning about the accident. The informant, Bhavesh Kakkar (PW-8), was travelling in the bus. HC Sahab Singh (PW-9) accompanied the police party. Dr. Sangeet Dhillon (PW-11) conducted the post-mortem examination. SI Pyare Mohan (PW-12) signed the FIR. HHC Govind Ram (PW-13) took the photographs. HC Jai Singh (PW-15) investigated the matter. HC Gian Chand (PW-16) examined the bus. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused was the conductor of the bus. Bhavesh Kakkar (PW-8) stated that the bus was 5 overloaded and the passengers were hanging out of the open doors of the bus. The conductor was duty-bound to close the doors of the moving bus and not to allow the passengers to stand on the doors. He neglected to perform his duty, which led to the accident. The driver was driving the bus in a rash and negligent manner to endanger human life. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Name of the accused Section for which convicted Imprisonment Amount of fine Imprisonment in default Amar Singh Section 279 of IPC Six months Rs. 1000/- Five days Amar Singh Section 304- A of IPC One year Rs. 4,000/- Two months Sanay Verma Section 336 of IPC Three months Rs. 250/- Seven days Sanjay Verma Section 304- A of IPC One year Rs. 4,000/- Two months All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was a 6 conductor in the bus. The informant specifically stated that the accident would not have occurred but for keeping its doors open. He was bound to take all reasonable precautions to ensure the safety of the passengers. The accused failed to adhere to his duty, which was the proximate cause of the accident. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the prosecution had not examined other passengers in the bus to corroborate the informant's statement. The speed cannot be a criterion for determining the rashness or the negligence. A person cannot be punished simply because a death has taken place. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the appellant/accused and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in 7 appreciating the material on record. They heavily relied upon the informant’s statement, but he had not specified the negligence of the accused. The prosecution is required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, she prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. She relied upon the judgments of this Court in Bhupinder Sharma Vs. State of H.P. (2016) HHC 3779 and Chaina Ram Vs. State of H.P. (2025) HHC 25012 in support of her submissions. 11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court has rightly pointed out that the accused was under an obligation to ensure the safety of the passengers. He failed to do so, which led to the accident. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate 8 court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh 9 Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 10 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 11 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 12 the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Aynuddin v. State of A.P., (2000) 7 SCC 72 that a person can fall from a moving vehicle due to the accident, negligence of the passenger or negligent taking off the bus by the driver. A presumption of negligence cannot be drawn if the person falls off the bus. It was observed:- “5. What is the culpable negligence on the part of the bus driver in the above accident? A passenger might fall from a moving vehicle due to one of the following causes: it could be accidental; it could be due to the negligence of the passenger himself; it could be due to the negligent taking off of the bus by the driver. However, to fasten the liability with the driver for negligent driving in such a situation, there should be evidence that he moved the bus suddenly before the passenger could get into the vehicle or that the driver moved the vehicle even before getting any signal from the rear side. 6. A driver who moves the bus forward can be expected to keep his eyes ahead and possibly on the sides. A driver 13 can take the reverse motion when that driver assures himself that the vehicle can safely be taken backwards. 7. It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident, negligence of the driver should be presumed. An accident of such a nature as would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted to anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case, the driver has to explain how the accident happened without negligence on his part. Merely because a passenger fell from the bus while boarding the bus, no presumption of negligence can be drawn against the driver of the bus. 8. The principle of res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The said principle has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that, in the absence of negligence, the accident would not have occurred and that the thing that caused the injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer. 9. A rash act is primarily an overhasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still, a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution, guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution. 10. In the present case, the possible explanation of the driver is that he was unaware of even the possibility of the accident which happened. It could be so. When he moved the vehicle forward, his focus normally would have been towards what was ahead of the vehicle. He is 14 not expected to move the vehicle forward when passengers are in the process of boarding the vehicle. But when he gets a signal from the conductor that the bus can proceed, he is expected to start moving the vehicle. Here, no witness has said, including the conductor, that the driver moved the vehicle before getting a signal to move forward. The evidence in this case is too scanty to fasten him with criminal negligence. Some further evidence is indispensably needed to presume that the passenger fell down due to the negligence of the driver of the bus. Such further evidence is lacking in this case. Therefore, the Court is disabled from concluding that the victim fell down only because of the negligent driving of the bus. The corollary thereof is that the conviction of the appellant of the offence is unsustainable.” 19. In the present case the prosecution has arrayed the driver and conductor as the accused which means that prosecution was not sure whether the bus had moved without getting the signal or after getting signal because had the bus been moved without getting the signal from the conductor, the driver would be negligent and if the bus had moved after getting the signal from the conductor, the conductor would be negligent because he had failed to ensure the safety of the passengers before giving the signal to move the bus. 20. The FIR is silent regarding the signal. The informant Bhavesh (PW-8) stated that the bus started from Summerhill, and some people shouted after some distance to stop the bus because a person had fallen. The bus was stopped. He got off the bus and saw 15 that one of the passengers had fallen and was bleeding. The door of the bus was open. The injured person was taken to IGMC, Shimla. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver and the conductor. The accident would not have occurred had the doors been closed. 21. This witness has not stated anything about the signal given by the conductor. Therefore, the negligence of the driver or conductor cannot be determined by his statement. 22. The informant stated that the bus had moved a certain distance ahead of Summerhill, and the accident occurred. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the conductor had failed to signal the driver to stop the bus after noticing that its doors were open. Hence, his testimony does not establish the negligence of the conductor. 23. Vivek Singh (PW-2) stated that he was travelling in a private bus and saw a bus bearing registration No. HP-07-3199 parked on the spot. He admitted in his cross-examination that the accident had not occurred in his presence. Therefore, he is not the eyewitness, and his testimony will not help the prosecution. 24. Vishal (PW-5) stated that he was the driver of the Maruti Van bearing registration No. HP-03A-1970. A boy was injured, and 16 he carried the injured to the hospital. Therefore, he was also not a witness to the incident, and his testimony does not establish the negligence of the accused. 25. Manjit (PW-7) stated that he was told about the incident by Sandeep. He went to the hospital where the injured person was lying unconscious. He admitted in his cross-examination that the accident had not occurred in his presence. He is also not an eyewitness to the accident, and his testimony does not establish the negligence of the accused. 26. There was no other witness to the accident, hence, there was no evidence to establish that the accused had signalled the driver to start the bus without ensuring the safety of the passengers. This aspect was ignored by the learned Courts below, and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below cannot be sustained. 27. In view of the above, the present revision petition is allowed. The judgment of conviction dated 24.06.2010 and order of sentence dated 28.06.2010, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 3, Shimla, District Shimla, HP, as affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, District Shimla vide judgment dated 22.12.2014, are ordered to be set aside. The accused is acquitted 17 of the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 336 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The fine, if deposited, be refunded to the accused after the expiry of the limitation in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 29. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th March, 2026 (Sushma)