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2014:HHC:11899
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 250 of 2009 Reserved on: 27.04.2026 Date of Decision: 30.06.2026
Ajay Kumar & others
...Appellants Versus Joginder Singh
...Respondents _____________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the appellants : Mr Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr Pranjal Munjal, Advocate, for appellants No. 1, 2 and 4. Name of appellant No.3 stands deleted on 14.06.2016. For the respondent : Mr Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr Athrav Sharma, Advocate, for the respondent. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 24.09.2008, passed by the learned Additional District Judge (1), Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (Learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2014:HHC:11899 24.01.2008, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. I, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial court). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking the possession of the land comprised in Khata No. 176, Khatauni No. 369, Khasra No. 1153, measuring 0- 03-99 Hectares, situated in Mohal and Mauza Larth (Nakodar) Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the suit land), as per the copy of the Jamabandi for the year 1995-96. It was asserted that the plaintiff was recorded as a non-occupancy tenant of the suit land. He automatically became the owner after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The defendants have no right, title or interest in the suit land. Their predecessor, Kailash Chand, got his name recorded as Kabiz in the revenue record without the plaintiff’s consent. The defendants obtained possession of the suit land in January 1997, taking advantage of the revenue entries in their favour. They constructed a structure over the suit land. They
3 2014:HHC:11899 have no right to retain possession; hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 3.
The suit was opposed by filing a written statement, taking preliminary objections regarding lack of locus standi, the suit being barred by limitation and Order 2 Rule 2, the defendants having become the owners by way of adverse possession, and the suit having not been properly valued for Court fees and jurisdiction. The contents of the plaint were denied on the merits. It was asserted that the suit land belonged to Kishore Chand, son of Vaid Daya Ram. Daya Ram gave 4 marlas of land to the plaintiff out of sympathy. The plaintiff constructed a house in Khasra No. 677/548. He got himself wrongly recorded as being in possession of the suit land. He never paid any rent to the owner of the suit land, and his status was recorded in the revenue record as possession with consent. Kailash Chand had purchased the suit land from Vaid Daya Ram. He constructed the house and started cultivating the land around the house. The entries in favour of the plaintiff were incorrect, and these were rightly corrected in favour of Kailash Chand. The suit was filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4 2014:HHC:11899
4. No replication was filed. 5. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 23.10.2002: -
1. Whether the plaintiff was Gair Marrusi Tenant over the suit land and has become the owner by operation of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act qua the suit land, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of possession, as prayed for? OPP
3. Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the suit? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD
5. Whether the defendants have become owners by way of adverse possession over the suit land, as alleged? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued, as alleged? OPD. 7.
Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of
Order II Rule 2 CPC, as alleged?OPD.
8. Relief.
6.
The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the plaintiff examined himself (PW-1). The defendant No.1- Ajay Kumar examined himself (DW-1), Suraj Prakash (DW-2) and Ilaichi Ram (DW-3).
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7.
The learned Trial Court held that the agreement (Ext DW2/A) produced by the defendants did not mention the description of the land and could not be connected to the suit land. The plaintiff was recorded to be in possession of the suit land continuously since 1956-57. An entry was recorded in favour of Kailash Chand during the settlement, which was a stray entry; such an entry would not confer any right upon Kailash Chand. The plaintiff was in possession and was wrongly dispossessed. He is entitled to recover possession from the third parties on the strength of his previous possession. The suit was within the limitation. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered issue No.1 partly in the affirmative. Issue No. 2 is affirmative. Issues Nos. 3 to 6 in the negative and decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff.
8.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the defendants filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra, at Dharamshala, H.P. (Learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the plaintiff was recorded to be in possession of the suit land in the revenue record. An entry in the copy of
6 2014:HHC:11899 Jamabandi carried with it a presumption of correctness and corroborated the plaintiff’s version regarding his possession. The writing produced by the defendants did not contain any Khasra number and could not be connected to the suit land. The plaintiff was in possession, and he was wrongly dispossessed. Therefore, he was entitled to recover the possession from a person who had no better right than himself. There is no infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.
9.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below, the defendants filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions on 01.03.2012:
1. When the claim of plaintiff-respondent to be the owner of the disputed property was negated by both the Courts below, could the suit for possession be
decreed by demolition of structure of defendants- appellants when the alleged tenancy of plaintiff- respondent was not proved? Are not the findings of both the Courts below holding plaintiff-respondent to be tenant over the suit land the result of a misreading of jamabandis entries, of which apparently negated such claim?
2. Whether the findings of both the Courts below are erroneous and perverse in ignoring Ex. DW-2/A writing on the basis of which defendants-appellants were put in possession as owners by the owners of the land in question? When the possession of defendants-
7 2014:HHC:11899 appellants was duly acknowledged by the settlement authorities after due investigation, could the suit be
decreed for possession when the plaintiff -respondent had no title to the suit property?
3. Whether both the Courts below have misread the revenue entries in holding that the entries in favour of defendants-appellants were stray? Have not both the Courts below ignored basic principles of law that later entries in the revenue record have presumption of truth, especially when they are substituted during the course of settlement proceedings? Are not the findings of both the Courts below erroneous and perverse, ignoring the classification of the land on which the claim was made by plaintiff-respondent?
4. Whether both the Courts below have exceeded jurisdiction in holding the suit to be within the period of limitation when the plaintiff -respondent failed to prove his alleged dispossession within 12 years of institution of the suit?
10.
I have heard Mr Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Pranjal Munjal, learned counsel for the appellants 1,2 and 4 (name of appellants No. 3 stood deleted vide
order dated 14.06.2016), and Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, with Mr Atharv Sharma, learned counsel, for the respondent.
11.
Mr Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, for appellants 1,2 and 4, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The revenue entries show the plaintiff was recorded to be in possession with the consent of the owner. Only a person paying rent to the
8 2014:HHC:11899 landlord can be called a tenant. The evidence of the plaintiff that he was paying rent to the landowner was not corroborated by any entry in the revenue record or the receipt. The agreement (Ext.DW 2/A) clearly showed that 23 Marla of land was sold to Kaliash Chand. Kailash Chand remained in possession, and the defendants inherited his estate after his death. The defendants are in possession of the suit land in their own right. Learned Trial Court erred in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to possession on the basis of his possessory rights. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in his submissions: - Kapil Dev vs Kalawati 1998 (2) CLJ (H.P) 326; Mangsharoo vs Sarfu 2011 (3) Him. L.R. 1412; State of H.P. vs Ajay Vij 2011(2) Shimla Law Cases 42; Ganga Devi vs. Ashok Kumar 2011 Latest Himachal Law Journal (H.P) 721; and Vidhya Devi vs. Kashmir Singh 2014 Latest Himachal Law Journal, H.P. 2026;
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12.
Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, for the respondents, submitted that both the learned Courts below have concurrently held the plaintiff to be in possession of the suit land with the consent of the real owners. The defendant had no right to take the forcible possession from the plaintiff, and the learned Courts below had rightly granted the relief of possession to the plaintiff. There is no infirmity in the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below. The plaintiff is assailing a pure finding of fact, which cannot be assailed in the regular second appeal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
13.
I have given a considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial question of law No.1. 14. The learned Trial Court held that the claim projected by the plaintiff that he had become the owner after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act could not be adjudicated before the Civil Court, and such a plea should be raised before the Land Reforms Officer. However, both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the plea of the
10 2014:HHC:11899 plaintiff that he was in possession of the suit land with the consent of the owners was duly proved. This finding is based on the material on record. 15. Joginder Singh (PW-1) stated that he has been in possession of the suit land since the year 1955-56 as a non- occupancy tenant. Earlier, Nihatu was the owner. She had never dispossessed the plaintiff. The entry in favour of Kailash Chand was wrongly made, and the defendants encroached upon the suit land in the year 1997. 16. His testimony is duly corroborated by the revenue record. Copy of Jamabandi (Ext.P-1) shows that Khasra No. 548 min measuring 1 Kanal 17 marlas was recorded in possession of the plaintiff as a non-occupancy tenant. The column of rent mentions that the plaintiff was cultivating the land with the consent of the owner without the payment of any rent. There is an entry in the column of remarks that, as per mutation No. 481, Nihatu had sold the land to Kishore Chand, son of Daya Ram. The entry in the copy of the Jamabandi for the year 1954-55 (Ext.P- 2) also shows that the plaintiff was in possession of old Khasra No. 880 and new Khasra No. 548. Copy of the Jamabandi for the year 1956-57 shows the plaintiff to be in possession of Khasra
11 2014:HHC:11899 No. 548 min, and the name of the owner has been mentioned as Nihatu. 17. Misal Haquiat for the year 1981-82 shows that Khasra No. 677 /548 min (old) and Khasra Nos. 1153 and 1155 (new) are recorded in possession of Kailash Chand. There is an entry that name of Kailash Chand was recorded as per the file No. 765/84 decided on 05.01.1983. Copy of the jamabandi for the year 1975-76 (Ext.PX-4) mentions that the plaintiff is in possession of Khasra No. 677/548 min measuring 1 Kanal 17 marlas.
Thus, it is apparent that the plaintiff was continuously recorded in possession of the suit land. The name of Kailash Chand was incorporated as per an order passed by the settlement, Naib Tehsildar. The copy of the order was not produced to show why the Settlement Naib Tehsildar had recorded the entry in favour of Kailash Chand. Therefore, the change in favour of Kailash Chand has to be treated as unauthorised. It was laid down by the Hon'ble High Court in Suresh Chand & Others Versus Gurdas Ram and Others 2003 (3) Shim. LC 304 that where no material was brought on record to show as to how the change has taken place, the presumption of
12 2014:HHC:11899 correctness attached to the revenue record will stand rebutted, and such an entry cannot be relied upon. It was observed: -
“10. Admittedly, the revenue entries till Kharif 1972 record the defendants and their predecessors in interest as owners of the land in dispute and the plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest to be in possession thereof as non-occupancy tenants on payment of half of the agricultural produce as rent. Ex. P2 and P3 are the copies of jamabandies for the years 1959-60 and 1971-72, respectively, depicting the abovesaid position. The entries in favour of the plaintiffs showing them to be in possession as non-occupancy tenants came to be changed in Rabi 1973, and as a result of such change, the defendants have come to be recorded as in possession of the land in dispute as owners. Ex. P4 is the copy of khasra Girdawari for the period Kharif 1972 to Rabi 1974. A perusal of the same shows that possession of the plaintiffs is recorded as non-occupancy tenants till Kharif 1972, and from Rabi 1973, the defendants are recorded to be in possession.
The entries as to possession since Rabi 1973 are shown to have been changed in favour of the defendants on the basis of some document/writing dated
1.4.1973. Section 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act attaches a legal presumption of truth to the entries in the record of rights. Such a Section provides: -
"Any entry made in the record of rights in accordance with law for the time being in force, or a periodical in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and the rules thereunder, shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor."
11. There is no denying that the earlier revenue entries as per the record of rights (Ex. P3) till 1971-72 were in favour of the plaintiffs, showing them to be in possession of the land in dispute as non-occupancy tenants. Subsequent revenue entries since Rabi 1973 till date are in favour of
13 2014:HHC:11899 the defendants, showing them to be in possession as owners of the land in dispute. 12. Relying upon the provisions contained in Section 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act (quoted above) it was contended by the learned counsel for the defendants that presumption of truth is attached to the later revenue entries which are in favour of the defendants and as such the learned first appellate court has gravely erred in relying upon the earlier revenue entries by completely ignoring the documentary evidence comprising of Ex. Dl and D2, which evidence that the entries in favour of the defendants were lawfully changed. 13. Undisputedly, when there is variance between earlier and the later entries, the presumption of truth is attached to the later entries till such presumption is rebutted. 14.
The provisions contained in Section 45, H.P. Land Revenue Act are similar to the provisions of Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Durga Singh of Solan v. Tholu and others, 1962 PLJ 88 (SC), has held that these provisions give a presumptive value to the entries in the revenue record and where there is a conflict, it is the later entry which must prevail. It was further held that from the language of the Section itself, it follows that where a new entry is substituted for an old entry, it is that new entry which will take the place of the old one and will be entitled to presumption of correctness until and unless it is established to be wrong or substituted by another entry. 15. Again, while dealing with the similar provisions contained in Section 44, Punjab Land Revenue Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Durga (deceased) and others v. Milkhi Ram and others, 1969 PLJ 105 (SC), observed: -
"Where the earlier revenue entries were changed in the later revenue entries and the change was effected without any mutation and there was no
order of the revenue authorities showing how the change was made, although presumption (under Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act) would
14 2014:HHC:11899 be in favour of the later entries, but that presumption was a rebuttable one and it would stand rebutted by the fact that alteration in the later entries was made unauthorisedly or mistakenly, there being no material to justify the change of entries."(Emphasis supplied)
16. To the similar effect, it has been held by this Court in Chaudhary Sada Ram and others v. Chaudhary Amarnath, ILR 1984 H.P 509, and in Jahlu Ram v. Major Lai Singh, 1998(1) Shim. L.C. 343. 17. In the present case, as stated above, the revenue entries till Kharif 1972 (as per jamabandi) Ex. P3 for the year 1971-72) were in favour of the plaintiffs, showing them to be in possession of the land in dispute as non- occupancy tenants. Such revenue entries as per Ex. P4 came to be changed in favour of defendants with effect from Rabi 1973 on the basis of some alleged writing dated 1.4.1973.”
18. Therefore, the learned Courts had rightly ignored the entry in favour of Kailash Chand. 19. Suraj Parkash (DW-2) stated that he could identify the signatures of Kamala Devi. His testimony does not help in determining the possession. 20. Ilaichi Ram (DW-3) stated that he had not seen the plaintiff cultivating the suit land, whereas Kailash used to plant vegetables adjacent to his land. He volunteered to say that the plaintiff was residing in the suit land for 35-36 years. He also claimed that he is a resident of Jawali, which is a different
15 2014:HHC:11899 panchayat. He could not tell the names of the owners of the land located near the suit land. 21. His statement is not sufficient to show the possession of the defendants. He stated in his examination-in- chief that Kailash was in possession and in the cross- examination that the plaintiff was in possession. He could not describe the ownership and possession of the land located adjacent to the suit land. He has not mentioned any reason as to why he should be aware of the possession of the suit land alone. He is a resident of different village, and he has no special means of knowledge; hence, the learned Courts below had rightly discarded his testimony. 22.
Both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the plaintiff is in possession. This is a reasonable inference from the evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and there is no perversity in it. Once it was found that the plaintiff was in possession and the defendants had no right to retain the possession, the plaintiff would be entitled to the restoration of possession based on his possessory title. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya vs Anil Panjwani 2003 (7) SCC 350, that a person in
16 2014:HHC:11899 possession is entitled to protect his possession against the whole world except the true owner, and if he is wrongly dispossessed, he is entitled to the restoration of the possession. It was observed: -
36. So, the person in possession may not have title to the property yet, if he has been inducted into possession by the rightful owner and is in peaceful and settled possession of such property, he is entitled in law to protect the possession until dispossessed by due process of law by a person having a title better than what he has. A person in possession of the property cannot be forcibly dispossessed by another rank trespasser, and even if the latter does so, the former may be entitled to restoration of possession, because the law respects peaceful possession and frowns upon the person who takes the law into his own hands. 23. In the present case, the defendants had not shown any title in themselves, and the learned Courts below had rightly
decreed the plaintiff’s suit. 24
Learned Trial Court held that the civil Court cannot grant a declaration that the plaintiff had become the owner after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. This finding will not help the defendants. Even if the plaintiff was put in possession by the real owner without the payment of any rent, his possession is required to be protected.
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25.
The judgments cited at the bar deal with non- payment of rent, the status of the tenant, and tenancy on the Abadi deh. These questions do not arise in the present case, and no advantage can be derived from the cited judgments.
26.
Therefore, learned Courts below had proceeded based on the possessory right of the plaintiff. Since a person in possession cannot be dispossessed by any person unauthorisedly, the plaintiff was rightly held to be entitled to restoration of possession; hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
Substantial question of law No.2
27.
Learned Courts below had rightly held that the agreement (Ext.DW 2/A) did not mention any Khasra number. It merely mentioned 23 Marla of land, and there was no material to connect the agreement to the suit land. The evidence led by the defendants failed to show that their predecessor was put in possession by the owners of the land. The order passed by the Settlement Naib Tehsildar was not produced before the Court, and there is no material to show that the possession was acknowledged by the settlement authorities after due investigation. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly
18 2014:HHC:11899
decreed the suit based on the plaintiff's possessory title and the substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
Substantial question of law No. 3.
28.
The submission made on behalf of the defendants that the entries in the later revenue record carry with them a presumption of truth cannot be accepted because such presumption was rebutted in the present case as the order passed by the Settlement Naib Tehsildar was not produced, and the learned Courts below were right in not relying upon the revenue entries subsequently made in favour of Kailash Chand. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial question of law No.4.
29. The plaintiff asserted that the defendants had taken possession in January 1997. The defendants claimed that they had been in possession since 1967-68. The plea taken by the defendants was not corroborated by the entries in the revenue record, as the entries in favour of Kailash Chand were made for the first time in the Missal Haquiat for the year 1982-83 (Ext.P- 4) as per an order passed by the Settlement Naib Tehsildar. The evidence of Ilaichi Ram (PW-4) is not sufficient to prove the possession of the defendants for a long time. Therefore, the
19 2014:HHC:11899 learned Courts below were justified in relying upon the plaintiff’s version, duly corroborated by the entries in the revenue record. A person can recover possession based on his possessory title within 12 years of his dispossession under Article 64 of the Limitation Act. Hence, the suit filed on 19.04.2001 was rightly held to be within the limitation, and this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Final Order
30.
In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any.
31.
The record of the learned Courts below be returned along with a copy of this judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th June, 2026
(ravinder)