1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA OSA No.01 of 2014 Reserved on : 28.04.2026 Decided on : 07.05.2026 Uploaded on : 07.05.2026 Manju Chawla …… Appellant Versus Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited …… Respondent Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant : Ms. Preetika, Advocate for Mr. Varun Chauhan, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Rakesh Sharma, Advocate. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge The present appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and decree dated 04.10.2013, passed by learned Single Judge, in Civil Suit No.38 of 2007, titled Manju Chawla vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., whereby, the suit for recovery filed by the present appellant, has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal at hand are that the appellant during the year, 1999-2000 was engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling tubes of various specifications required for use in the Telecom Industry. The Department of Telecom through its Chief General Manager, Himachal Pradesh 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 Telecom Circle invited offers for supply of different types of tubes vide tender dated 30.07.1999. In pursuance to the tender, the appellant had submitted her bid. The bid so made was accepted and a purchase order dated 01.12.1999 was placed on the appellant. 3. The Department of the Telecom was succeeded by the present respondent w.e.f. 01.10.2000. The respondent succeeded to all the rights and liabilities of the Department of Telecom, Government of India, including all commercial transactions undertaken by the Department of Telecom. 4. In pursuance to the purchase order dated 01.12.1999, the appellant had supplied the entire quantity of tubes with different specifications before 30.05.2000. Qua the supplies so made, 16 bills for a sum of Rs.2,56,26,256/- w.e.f. 27.12.1999 to 25.05.2000, had been raised by the appellant. Post making adjustments in the bills so submitted, vide memo dated 17.08.2000, final balance payment was paid to the appellant after deducting a sum of Rs.6,19,610/- on account of the liquidated damages, price variations and transit insurances. 5. On account of the aforesaid deduction so made, a dispute was raised by the appellant before the Arbitrator. The award in this respect was passed by the Arbitrator on 11.02.2002. By virtue of the award, the amount wrongly deducted by the respondent from the payment made to the appellant was ordered to be paid to the appellant. Award dated 11.02.2002 was assailed by way of filing a Section 34 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Objections so filed were 3 dismissed by the learned District Judge, Shimla vide judgment dated 22.06.2005. 6. In the suit filed, according to the appellant, as per the General Commercial Conditions of Contract, contained in Clause 8.3 of Section III of the tender document, the respondent was to supply “Form D” to the appellant in order to enable the appellant to claim reimbursement of the amount of sales tax paid by the appellant over and above 4%. Further in the suit filed, the appellant contended that the respondent failed to supply “Form D” within the stipulated time without any justifiable cause. 7. The appellant alleged that she had paid a sum of Rs.14,67,764/- over and above 4% to the concerned Sales Tax Authority against the supply made by her with respect to the purchase order dated 01.12.1999, for which she was entitled to a refund. On refusal of the Sales Tax Authority to refund the above amount, the appellant had suffered a loss, which according to the appellant was solely attributable to the plaintiff. 8. In the written statement filed, the respondent submitted that a demand for “Form D”, for the first time was made by the appellant on 21.02.2006. Since the matter pertains to an old record, therefore, after examining the record, “Form D” was sent to the appellant on 06.09.2006. It is further categorically stated in the written statement that “Form D”, in terms of Section 30 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975, was to be obtained within 12 months of the purchase order. In the aforesaid factual matrix, it 4 was averred in the reply that for the delay in raising a demand for “Form D”, the appellant is herself to be blamed. 9. Other than the aforesaid, in the written statement, it was averred that in terms of Clause 8.3 of Section III of the tender document, “Form D” was to be provided where ever required. Hence, as per the respondent, the demand for “Form D” was to be made by the plaintiff. It was further contended that no such issue qua non-supply of “Form D” was ever raised before the Arbitrator. Replication was filed, wherein, contents of the plaint were re-iterated and those to the contrary in the written statement were denied. 10. Based on the pleadings of the parties, four issues were framed and thereafter evidence was led. Subsequent thereto, post hearing the parties, the suit was dismissed vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 04.10.2013. 11. Learned Single Judge, in Paragraph-17 of the judgment has reproduced Clause 8.3 of Section III of the tender document (Ex.PW2/A). The controversy revolves around the interpretation of the said Clause. 12. The respondent, in the case at hand, had issued the tender, wherein, the aforesaid Clause is contained. The interpretation given to the said Clause by the maker of the tender, i.e., the respondent is contained in Paragraph-4, on merits, of the written statement filed by the respondent. The same reads as follows:- “4. … … ... The actual words used in clause 8.3 are as follows: 5 "(i)(a) The purchaser will provide Form-D/C wherever required for purchases made against this tender for availing Sales Tax concessions. (b) Any increase in taxes and other statutory duties/levies after the expiry of the delivery date shall be to the contractor's account. However, benefit of any decrease in these taxes/duties shall be passed on to the Purchaser by the supplier." It is submitted that the words used are "wherever required", meaning thereby that the supplier has to make request for the Form-D/C from the purchaser and "require" the said Form-D from the purchaser. However, in the present case, the supplier did not make request for Form-D for several years after the completion of the supply on 25.5.2000 for reasons best known to the supplier.” 13. The interpretation so given by the maker of the tender is manifestly in consonance with the language of the tender document. The said interpretation so given by the maker of the tender has been accepted by the learned Single Judge. Hence, on this account, no infirmity can be found with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 14. Other than the aforesaid, it is an admitted position that inter se the parties, on account of a deduction of Rs.6,19,610/- from the amount payable to the appellant for the material supplied, the appellant had initiated proceedings before an Arbitrator. The said deduction had been made in the final amount paid to the appellant by the respondent vide memo dated 17.08.2000. The arbitration proceedings had concluded vide an award made in favour of the appellant dated 11.02.2002 directing refund of the aforesaid wrongly deducted amount from the final bill 6 payable to the appellant. The objections filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act preferred against the award were dismissed by the learned District Judge on 22.06.2005. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to reproduce Paragraph-15 of the plaint, which pertains to cause of action, as under:- “15. That cause of action for filing the suit has arisen in favour of plaintiff continuously since 30.5.2000 when the supplies were completed. Cause of action is continuing thereafter as the defendant supplied the “D-Forms” on 6.9.2006. Cause of action again arose on 9.4.2007 when the Sales Tax Officer, Ward 61, Delhi returned the original “D-Forms” to plaintiff without reimbursement.” 15. From a perusal of the same, it is evident that as per the appellant, cause of action had arisen in favour of the appellant ever since 30.05.2000 when the entire supplies, as per the purchase order dated 01.12.1999, had been made. Subsequent thereto on account of deduction made in the final bill dated 17.08.2000, a dispute inter se the parties had arisen, as a result whereof, arbitration proceedings had been initiated by the present appellant. Surprisingly, no dispute in the arbitration proceedings with respect to non supply of “Form-D” by the respondent was ever raised, despite non supply of the same prior to initiating arbitration proceedings. In Paragraph-4 of the written statement, the respondent has categorically stated that the appellant never raised a dispute with respect to non supply of “Form-D” before the Arbitrator. 16. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, all claims that arose after supplies having been made on 30.05.2000 should 7 have been raised before the Arbitrator. This having not been done, the suit filed by the appellant before this Court raising the remaining dispute is clearly barred. In this context reference can also be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.V. George vs. Secretary to Government, Water and Power Department, Trivandrum and another (1989) 4 SCC 595. The relevant extract whereof is being reproduced here-in-below:- “13. With regard to the submission that the issues that have been raised in the second claim petition before the Arbitrator is barred under the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is convenient to refer to a passage in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure (Volume II, Fourteenth Edition) at page 894: " .... This rule does not require that when several causes of action arise from one transaction, the plaintiff should sue for all of them in one suit. What the rule lays down is that where there is one entire cause of ac- tion, the plaintiff cannot split the cause of action into parts so as to bring separate suits in respect of those parts." 14. It is pertinent to refer in this connection to the decision in Muhammad Hafiz and Anr. v. Mirza Muhammad Zaka- riya and Ors., AIR 1922 (PC) 23 wherein a mortgage deed provided that if the interest was not paid for six months the creditor should be competent to realise either the unpaid amount of the interest due to him or the amount of principal and interest, by bringing a suit in court without waiting for the expiration of the time fixed, and the Plaintiff, more than 3 years after (i.e. time fixed), brought a suit for interest alone and got a decree. It was held that the second suit for principal and arrears of interest was not maintainable as under Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. he must be deemed to have relinquished his claim for further relief, he having exercised the option of suing for interest alone. It was further held that 8 the cause of action referred to in the rule is the case of action which gives occasion to, and forms the foundation of, the suit, and if that cause enables a man to seek for larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent proceedings. 15. In the instant case, the contract was terminated by the respondents on April 26, 1980 and as such all the issues arose out of the termination of the contract and they could have been raised in the first claim petition filed before the Arbitrator by the appellant. This having not been done the second claim petition before the Arbitrator raising the remaining disputes is clearly barred.” 17. Except the bald statement of the husband of the appellant, i.e., power of attorney holder, on her behalf, no documentary evidence has been placed on record to show that a request for issuance of “Form- D” Certificate was made by the appellant to the respondent. The respondent has placed on record letter dated 16.09.2002, i.e., Ex.DW1/B. A perusal of the same reflects that the same is qua reimbursement of additional Central Sales Tax over and above 4% made by the appellant to the respondent. The same contains no request for issuance of “Form-D” Certificate, rather to the contrary seeks reimbursement of the Central Sales Tax amount from the respondent. 18. In the aforesaid backdrop, learned Single Judge has correctly placed reliance on Sub Section (3) of Section 30 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, wherein, it is provided that a claim for refund of excess sales tax deposited will have to be made within a period of twelve months from the date of the order. The purchase order, in the case at hand, was 9 made on 01.12.1999. Hence, a claim for refund before the Tax Authorities was required to be filed on or before 01.12.2000. 19. In view of the aforesaid, we see no infirmity in the impugned judgment dated 04.10.2013, passed by learned Single Judge, in Civil Suit No.38 of 2007, titled Manju Chawla vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., hence calls for no interference from this Court. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed, being devoid of merits. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (G.S. Sandhawalia) (Bipin Chander Negi) Chief Justice Judge May 07, 2026 (KS)