IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 63 of 2014 Reserved on: 17.12.2025 Decided on: 01.01.2026 M/s Studry Industries Ltd ...…. Appellant Versus M/s Sunil Enterprises & another …. Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr. P.S. Goverdhan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rakesh Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Subhash Sharma, Senior Advocate with Mr. Prantap Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.11.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kasauli, Court No.2, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes. 2 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that the complainant supplied the ACC sheets through various challans/invoices. An amount of ₹22,55,482.25 was due for the sheets supplied to the accused. The accused issued a cheque of ₹1,00,000/- to the complainant on 19.01.2011 towards the partial repayment of the amount. The complainant presented the cheque to his bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘payment stopped by the drawer’. The complainant served a notice upon the accused asking him to repay the amount, but he failed to do so. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence 3 punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined Vijay Prabhakar (CW-1) and Abinav Abrol (CW-2) to prove its complaint. 5. The accused, Sunil Abrol, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the complainant’s case in its entirety. He stated that no transaction took place between him and the complainant after 2006. He examined Pardeep Kumar (DW-1), Narender Pal Singh (DW-2) and himself (DW-3). 6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted his signature on the cheque; therefore, a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in favour of the complainant for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The burden would shift upon the accused to rebut the presumption. The cheque was issued to discharge the time-barred debt, which is not a legally enforceable debt/liability, and the accused cannot be held liable for its dishonour; hence, the complaint was dismissed. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in 4 appreciating the material placed before it. The accused admitted the issuance of the cheque and his signature on it. The accused had also attested the cuttings made in the body of the cheque, which falsifies the plea taken by the accused that a blank cheque was issued. The cheque book was issued in August 2006, which falsifies the plea of the accused that the cheque was issued in June 2006. The accused failed to produce the balance-sheet, account books and ledgers maintained in the ordinary course of the business to prove his plea that the cheque was issued to discharge time-barred debt, and the learned Trial Court erred in accepting this plea. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr P.S. Goverdhan, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Rakesh Thakur, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Mr Subhash Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Prantap Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr P.S. Goverdhan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in holding that the cheque was issued to repay time- 5 barred debt. The accused failed to produce the accounts to establish his plea that no transaction had taken place between the parties after 2006, and the learned Trial Court should not have accepted this plea. The issuance of the cheque and the signatures on the cheque were not disputed. A presumption would arise that the cheque was issued to discharge the existing liability/debt. The accused failed to rebut this presumption. Learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Subhash Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the accused/respondents, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that the cheque was issued to discharge time-barred debt, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6 12 The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: “ 12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, 7 the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Vijay Prabhakar (CW-1) stated in his cross- examination that billing was made to M/s Sunil Enterprises in 2005 to 2007 and no bills were issued between 2008 till 2011. 16. Article 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 provides the limitation of three years for the price of goods sold and delivered where no fixed period of credit is agreed upon. The limitation starts running from the date of delivery of the goods. 17. In the present case, the complainant has nowhere stated that material was supplied on a credit basis; therefore, the period of limitation would be three years from the date of delivery of the material. 18. In the present case, the material was supplied in the years 2006 and 2007; hence, the period of three years for recovery of the money expired in the year 2010, at the most, and 8 any cheque issued in the year 2011 would be barred by limitation. It was laid down by this Court in Social Leasing (India) Ltd. v. Rajan Kumar Kanthwal, 2025 SCC OnLine HP 3131, that a cheque issued to discharge a time-barred debt does not constitute a legally enforceable debt. Therefore, the cheque in the present case was not issued towards the legally enforceable debt, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held it to be so. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken on the material placed before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with it while deciding the appeal against acquittal. 19. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of 20. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a 9 Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court 21. A copy of the judgment, along with record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) 01st January, 2026 Judge (ravinder)