IN THE HIGH Court OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH ÇR No.4676 of 2014 (O&M) Mukand Singh . . . Pe--oner vs. Sukhwinder Singh . . . . Respondent * * ** Reserved on: August 11, 2026 Pronounced on: August 13, 2026 Pronounced fully/opera-ve part : Fully * * * * CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued By:- Mr. Vijay Sharma, Advocate for the peoner. Mr. Amit Dhanda, Advocate for Mr. Jasbir Mor, Advocate for the respondent. DEEPAK GUPTA, J. The peoner-defendant has approached this Court under Arcles 226/227 of the Constuon of India assailing the order dated 11.03.2014 passed by the learned Addional District Judge, Paala, whereby his applicaon under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the wri2en statement during the pendency of the first appeal has been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated, respondent-plainff Sukhwinder Singh instuted a suit for specific performance in respect of 5 bighas 8 biswas of land on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 04.07.2002 executed by the peoner- defendant Mukand Singh. It was pleaded that the agreed sale consideraon was 55,000/- per bigha and that the plainff had paid ₹1,69,000/- as earnest money. The sale deed was agreed to be executed on or before 05.02.2003. The plainff asserted his connuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement and alleged that the defendant failed to appear for execuon and registraon of the sale deed despite noce. A decree for specific performance was accordingly sought, with an alternave prayer for SARITA RANI 2026.08.13 14:37 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order ÇR No.4676 of 2014 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:111233 recovery of ₹2,97,000/-. Permanent injuncon was also sought to restrain the defendant from alienang the suit property. 3. The peoner contested the suit and denied execuon of the agreement to sell. His specific stand was that he was financially well placed and possessed sufficient agricultural land and, therefore, had no occasion or necessity to sell the land in queson. It was further pleaded that the plainff's father, Nand Singh, and the peoner were real brothers and that land of plainff's father and defendant was in two villages - one at village Sauja and the other in village Gobindgarh Jajjian, Tehsil Sunam, District Sangrur. Land at village Sauja is in possession of defendant as per oral exchange, whereas land at village Gobindgarh Jajjian is in possession of Nand Singh, the father of the plainff. It was also pleaded that on 04.07.2002, the peoner's son Dhanwant Singh had purchased land from Nand Singh, father of the plainff, and that the plainff might have obtained the peoner's thumb impression at that me, the marginal witnesses to the sale deed and the alleged agreement being the same. The agreement relied upon by the plainff was alleged to be the result of fraud, misrepresentaon and absence of consideraon. 4. On the pleadings of the pares, necessary issues were framed and evidence was led by both sides. Upon appreciaon thereof, the learned trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 18.11.2009, (Annexure P-4) decreed the suit in favour of the plainff. 5. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree, the peoner preferred an appeal, which is stated to be pending before the learned Addional District Judge, Paala. During the pendency of the appeal, the peoner moved an applicaon under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of his wri2en statement. By the proposed amendment, he sought to plead, inter alia, that there was no necessity for him to sell the land in queson as a residenal and furnished double-storey kothi, along with a pucca ca2le house and boundary wall, existed over an area of about 2 bighas forming part of the suit property; that he and his son and other family members had been residing therein since April 2008; and that electricity and SARITA RANI 2026.08.13 14:37 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order ÇR No.4676 of 2014 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:111233 telephone connecons were installed therein. He further sought to plead that he had been suffering from ill health and had remained under treatment for more than 20 years. On these asserons, he proposed to contend that the agreement was unconscionable and unreasonable and that the plainff was not entled to the equitable and discreonary relief of specific performance under Secon 20 of the Specific Relief Act. 6. The applicaon was opposed by the plainff. The learned Addional District Judge, Paala, by the impugned order, dismissed the applicaon primarily on the ground that the proposed amendment sought to introduce facts, which were already within the knowledge of the defendant and that the defendant had already taken the relevant pleas in the original wri2en statement and both pares had led evidence in support of their respecve stand. It was further noced that the applicaon had been filed at the appellate stage aEer conclusion of the trial and aEer the pares had already led their evidence. 7. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the peoner has contended that an amendment of pleadings can be permi2ed at any stage of the proceedings, including during the pendency of an appeal. It is argued that the proposed amendment is essenally explanatory and is necessary for bringing the real controversy between the pares before the Court. It is further submi2ed that the existence of a substanal residenal house over the suit land shows that the peoner had no necessity to sell the property. Learned counsel has also emphasised that the peoner is an illiterate person, was unable to understand the documents properly and, being the uncle of the plainff, was allegedly taken advantage of by him. On these premises, interference with the impugned order has been sought. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, has supported the impugned order and submi2ed that the proposed amendment is nothing but an a2empt to introduce a new defence aEer the peoner has suffered a decree on the basis of the evidence already led by the pares. SARITA RANI 2026.08.13 14:37 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order ÇR No.4676 of 2014 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:111233 9. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the pares and has perused the record. 10. There can be no dispute regarding the general proposion that Order VI Rule 17 CPC empowers the Court to permit amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings, if such amendment is necessary for determining the real quesons in controversy. The expression “at any stage”, however, cannot be read in isolaon. AEer commencement of trial, the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 places a specific restricon on the exercise of jurisdicon and requires the Court to be sasfied that, despite due diligence, the party seeking amendment could not have raised the ma2er before commencement of trial. Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that this proviso is a substanve restricon on the Court's power to permit an amendment aEer commencement of trial. Reference may be made to Vidyabai and others v. Padmalatha and another, (2009) 2 SCC 409; and Revajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons and others, (2009) 10 SCC 84. 11. The requirement of due diligence assumes parcular significance in the facts of the present case. The agreement to sell was allegedly executed on 04.07.2002. The suit was instuted in January 2004. The peoner filed his wri2en statement in the suit, specifically denied execuon of the agreement and pleaded circumstances according to which, as per him, he had no necessity to sell his agricultural land. The pares thereaEer went to trial, led their respecve evidence and the suit ulmately came to be decreed on 18.11.2009 (Annexure P-4). The applicaon for amendment was thereaEer filed only in December 2011, i.e. aEer conclusion of the trial, aEer pronouncement of the judgment and during the pendency of the appeal. 12. Significantly, there is no explanaon whatsoever as to why the facts now sought to be incorporated could not have been pleaded in the original wri2en statement. The peoner seeks to plead that a residenal double-storey house, ca2le house and boundary wall existed over the suit land and that he and his family were residing therein. These are not facts, which could have subsequently come into existence, so far as the case of the SARITA RANI 2026.08.13 14:37 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order ÇR No.4676 of 2014 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:111233 peoner is concerned, nor is there any explanaon that the peoner discovered them only aEer the trial. On the contrary, these are ma2ers which were peculiarly within his own knowledge. The peoner was, therefore, required to plead these facts at the earliest opportunity. 13. The plea of illiteracy or lack of understanding of the document also does not furnish any sasfactory explanaon for the delay. The peoner was represented in the proceedings and had the benefit of legal advice. More importantly, the proposed amendment is not confined to correcng a technical or inadvertent omission. It seeks to introduce addional factual circumstances and to build upon them a further defence against the grant of specific performance. The plea of illiteracy, by itself, cannot dispense with the statutory requirement of due diligence. 14. It is equally important to noce that the proposed amendment is being sought aEer the pares have already completed their evidence. PermiKng such an amendment at this stage would necessarily require the plainff to meet the new factual asserons and would potenally necessitate further evidence. Thus, the amendment cannot be regarded as a mere formal or explanatory alteraon having no bearing upon the course of the ligaon. 15. The contenon that the amendment is merely explanatory is also not borne out from the proposed pleadings. The original wri2en statement did contain a general asseron that the peoner was financially well placed and had sufficient land and, therefore, had no necessity to sell the suit property. The proposed amendment, however, seeks to introduce specific factual circumstances concerning the existence of a residenal house, the alleged residence of the peoner and his family therein, installaon of electricity and telephone connecons and the peoner's alleged prolonged illness, and thereaEer seeks to draw a legal consequence that the agreement was unconscionable and unreasonable and that specific performance ought to be refused. Thus, the proposed amendment is not merely elaborave of an exisng factual plea; it seeks to substanally strengthen the defence aEer the evidence has already been concluded. Page 5 of 9 SARITA RANI 2026.08.13 14:37 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order ÇR No.4676 of 2014 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:111233 16. The principles governing amendment of pleadings also require the Court to consider whether the amendment is bona fide, whether it causes prejudice to the other side which cannot adequately be compensated by costs, whether it fundamentally changes the nature of the defence, and whether it is being sought merely to overcome an adverse situaon emerging from the evidence. Revajeetu Builders (supra) lays down these consideraons while emphasising that an amendment should not ordinarily be permi2ed where it is mala fide or causes prejudice to the opposite party or is sought aEer an unexplained delay so as to defeat the course of the trial. 17. The peoner has also sought to rely upon the fact that the amendment is being sought in the wri2en statement and that amendments to a wri2en statement are generally considered more liberally than amendments to a plaint. There is no dispute with the said principle. A defendant may, in appropriate circumstances, be permi2ed to explain, elaborate or even take an addional defence. But such liberality does not obliterate the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Once the trial has commenced, the defendant must sll establish due diligence. The power to permit amendment is discreonary and cannot be exercised to enable a party to introduce facts which were within his knowledge throughout and which were deliberately or negligently omi2ed at the appropriate stage. 18. The argument that the amendment should be allowed because the appeal is sll pending also does not advance the case of the peoner. The fact that an appeal is pending does not confer an unrestricted right upon a party to amend pleadings as a ma2er of course. The appellate stage cannot be treated as a second opportunity to recast the defence or to fill up omissions in the pleadings aEer the party has tested the case at the trial on a parcular factual foundaon. 19. In the present case, the proposed amendment is parcularly inappropriate because the trial Court has already rendered its judgment aEer appreciaon of the evidence led by the pares. The peoner cannot be permi2ed, merely because the appeal is pending, to introduce a fresh factual foundaon which was available to him from the very beginning. Such an SARITA RANI 2026.08.13 14:37 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order ÇR No.4676 of 2014 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:111233 exercise would not advance the determinaon of the real controversy; rather, it would reopen the factual controversy and unse2le the trial already concluded. 20. The reliance upon Secon 20 of the Specific Relief Act also does not alter the posion. Whether the agreement was in fact unconscionable, whether the circumstances surrounding its execuon jusfy refusal of specific performance and whether the plainff is entled to equitable relief are the ma2ers to be determined on the basis of the pleadings and evidence already brought before the Court. The peoner cannot seek to introduce a new factual foundaon for invoking such discreon aEer the conclusion of the trial, parcularly when he has failed to sasfy the requirement of due diligence. 21. There is yet another aspect, which cannot be overlooked. The proposed amendment is sought nearly eight years aEer the execuon of the agreement, more than seven years aEer instuon of the suit and nearly two years aEer the decree of the trial Court. Such a prolonged and unexplained delay, coupled with the fact that the relevant facts were always within the peoner's knowledge, constutes a strong circumstance against exercise of discreon in his favour. 22. This Court, while exercising jurisdicon under Arcle 227 of the Constuon, is not siKng as an appellate Court over every interlocutory order passed by a subordinate Court. The supervisory jurisdicon is intended to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdicon and is to be exercised sparingly where there is a patent jurisdiconal error, perversity, gross derelicon of duty or manifest failure of jusce. It is not intended to substute the view of the High Court merely because another view may also be possible. The Supreme Court has reiterated that Arcle 227 does not confer appellate jurisdicon upon the High Court and that interference is warranted only in exceponal circumstances. 23. In the present case, the learned Addional District Judge has considered the relevant circumstances, namely, that the proposed facts were SARITA RANI 2026.08.13 14:37 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order ÇR No.4676 of 2014 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:111233 already within the knowledge of the peoner, that the pares had already led their evidence and that no sasfactory explanaon was furnished for not raising the pleas earlier. The conclusion reached by the learned Court is neither perverse nor contrary to the statutory scheme of Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Rather, the impugned order accords with the legislave intent underlying the proviso to the said provision, which seeks to prevent belated amendments from delaying proceedings and from permiKng a party to alter the factual foundaon of the case aEer commencement and conclusion of trial. 24. The fact that the peoner claims to be an illiterate person or that he is related to the plainff may have relevance in determining the merits of the suit on the evidence already available, but these circumstances do not, by themselves, establish that the peoner was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from pleading the existence of his residenal house, his alleged illness or the other facts now sought to be introduced. No material has been brought on record to establish such impediment. 25. Viewed from any angle, the applicaon under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was filed at a highly belated stage, without sasfying the statutory requirement of due diligence and with the apparent effect of supplemenng the defence aEer the conclusion of evidence and pronouncement of the trial Court's judgment. The proposed amendment, therefore, cannot be allowed merely on the ground that an amendment may ordinarily be permi2ed at any stage. 26. Consequently, this Court finds no jurisdiconal error, perversity or material irregularity in the order dated 11.03.2014 passed by the learned Addional District Judge, Paala, warranng any interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdicon under Arcles 226/227 of the Constuon of India. 27. The present peon is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applicaon(s), if any also stand(s) disposed of accordingly. Page 8 of 9 SARITA RANI 2026.08.13 14:37 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order ÇR No.4676 of 2014 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:111233 28. Nothing stated herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the pending appeal, which shall be decided by the learned appellate Court independently on the basis of the pleadings and evidence already on record. August 13, 2026 Sarita (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned? : Yes/No Whether reportable ? : Yes/No Uploaded on: August 13, 2026 SARITA RANI 2026.08.13 14:37 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order