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2014 DAILYLAW 1984 (PNJ)

VINOD KUMAR v. P. O., INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT CIRCLE-1, FARIDABAD & ANR

CWP/25959/2014 · 2026-07-13

Kirti Singh

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Judgment text

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CWP-25959-2014 -1- 223 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-25959-2014 Date of decision: July 13, 2026 VINOD KUMAR ...Petitioner Versus THE PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT CIRCLE-1, FARIDABAD AND ANOTHER ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Present: Mr. B.S. Tewatia, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Shiv Kumar, Advocate for respondent No.2. **** KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL) 1. The instant petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing of impugned award dated 02.03.2012 (Annexure P-2), passed by respondent No.1, whereby the reference of the petitioner was dismissed. 2. The brief factual matrix, as narrated by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner/workman was appointed as a Chowkidar on 01.07.1996 with respondent No.2 on a monthly salary of Rs.2340/-. During his service, the petitioner met with an accident on 09.03.2005 and remained admitted in ESI hospital uptil 30.01.2006. After receiving fitness certificate from the hospital, the workman approached respondent No.2 for resuming his duties, which was refused to him, and his services were illegally terminated. Aggrieved therefrom, the petitioner served a demand notice ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.07.20 17:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP-25959-2014 -2- dated 20.04.2006 under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) upon respondent No.2. A claim petition was subsequently filed on 12.09.2007 by the petitioner, seeking his reinstatement into service with back wages, and continuity of service along with all the benefits accrued thereof. However, the claim of the workman was dismissed by the learned Tribunal vide order dated 02.03.2012. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the termination of the workman from services is illegal, as he was not served any show cause notice prior to his termination nor any inquiry was conducted. He further submits that the workman was in continuous service from 01.07.1996 to 09.03.2005, and had completed 240 days of continuous service prior to his illegal termination, thereby making him entitled for relief under Section 25-F of the Act. It is the further submission that the petitioner had duly informed respondent No.2 regarding his accident and the consequent medical treatment, yet respondent No.2, in an arbitrary manner, terminated the services of the petitioner, without even issuing a notice or charge-sheet to him, or conducting a proper inquiry, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. Moreover, the contention that respondent No.2 discharged the petitioner from service upon finding him medically unfit, is also without any substance, since no evidence to substantiate that respondent No.2 had in fact got the petitioner medically examined, was brought on record. Under these circumstances, dismissal of claim of the petitioner is arbitrary and perverse, and thus liable to be set aside. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 has argued that there is no infirmity in the impugned award passed by ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.07.20 17:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP-25959-2014 -3- the learned Labour Court, as the same has been passed after due appreciation of evidence available on record. Thus, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel and perused the relevant record. 6. Before proceeding further, a gainful reference can be made to the proposition of law as discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6511 of 2005 titled as Surendranagar District Panchayat Vs. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, relevant paras whereof reads thus:- “8. As per Section 25F, no workman who is in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer unless conditions laid therein are fulfilled. The retrenchment is defined in Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Under the definition termination of the service of a workman by the employer by any reason whatsoever, otherwise than, as a punishment, by way of disciplinary action, would constitute retrenchment except in cases accepted in the Section itself, they are :- i) a voluntary retirement of a workman; ii) retirement of a workman on reaching the age of superannuation; iii) termination of the service of a workman as a result of non renewal of the contract of employment; or iv) termination of the service on the ground of continued ill health of the workman. Unless these reasons are existed and proved, termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason, would constitute retrenchment. Therefore, if the employer is to retrench the workmen employed in his industry who is in continuous service has to follow the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. To attract provisions of Section 25F, the workman claiming protection under it, has to prove that there exists relationship of employer and employee; that he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act; the establishment in which he is employed is an industry within the meaning of the Act and he must have put in not less than one year of continuous service as defined by Section 25B under the employer. These conditions are cumulative. If any of these conditions are missing the provisions of Section 25F will not attract. To get relief from the court the workman has to establish that he has right to continue in service and that his service has been terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The Section postulates three conditions to be fulfilled by an employer for getting a valid retrenchment, namely :- i) One month's clear notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or that the workman has been paid wages for the period of notice in lieu of such notice; ii) payment of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof, in excess of six months; iii) a notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner. 9. To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the conditions required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.07.20 17:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP-25959-2014 -4- may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorised leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workman shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25B. However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in sub-section (1). The workman must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of sub-section (1) of Section 25B is that the workman should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. Subsection (2) of Section 25B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 25B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2). By the legal fiction of sub-section 2(a) (i), the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workman has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25F. 16. In Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, it is said by this Court that before a workman can claim retrenchment not being in consonance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he has to show that he has been in continuous service of not less than one year with the employer who had retrenched him from service. 17. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 - (At Page 26, Para 3), this Court held that "In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside." 19. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no coworker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.07.20 17:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP-25959-2014 -5- adverse inference for non production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the workman respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards noncompliance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for non-compliance of provisions of the Act. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. In order to entitle the Court to draw inference unfavourable to the party, the Court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved.” 7. It is the settled proposition of law that the preliminary burden of proof to prima facie establish continuous service for a period of 240 days rests upon the workman, which liability was not discharged in the present case by the production of any contemporaneous employment records or any other supportive documents. It was therefore that the learned Labour Court, after assigning cogent reasons, concluded that the claim of continuous service for the mandatory statutory period remained unsubstantiated. Similarly, the finding of the Labour Court that the petitioner was discharged on account of medical unfitness was founded upon evidence led by the management, including documents regarding issuance of notice and payment in lieu thereof. Accordingly, upon due appreciation of the facts of the case and the material on record, it was concluded that the cessation of service of the petitioner did not constitute retrenchment, attracting the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. 8. Trite to say that this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India does not sit as an appellate ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.07.20 17:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP-25959-2014 -6- Court to re-appreciate factual findings in the absence of any manifest illegality or perversity. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, violation of principles of natural justice or patent illegality, warranting any interference by this Court. 9. Consequently, finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same is hereby dismissed. 10. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) July 13, 2026 JUDGE Ithlesh Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable: Yes/No ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.07.20 17:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment