69-wp-5871-2013.doc Shabnoor IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.5871 OF 2013 Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited Through Executive Engineer … Petitioner V/s. M/s. Avinash Equipments Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. … Respondents Mr. Rahul Sinha, Soham Bhalerao, Harchit Tyagi i/b DSK Legal, for the Petitioner. Mr. Mahendra Agvekar a/w Shraddha Chavan, for Respondent No.1. CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J. DATED : MARCH 4, 2026 P.C.: 1. The petitioner has brought this petition challenging the order passed by Respondent No.2. By that order Respondent No.2 has taken the view that the petitioner can issue electricity bills only for a period of two years. It was further observed that if the petitioner intends to recover electricity charges for the period prior to June 2010, then such recovery cannot be made through the billing mechanism under the Electricity Act. 2. According to Respondent No.2, for that earlier period the petitioner must approach the civil court and seek recovery through a civil suit. The effect of this direction is that the petitioner’s authority to raise and recover electricity charges through statutory 1 SHABNOOR AYUB PATHAN Digitally signed by SHABNOOR AYUB PATHAN Date: 2026.03.04 16:56:47 +0530 69-wp-5871-2013.doc billing has been confined only to a limited time frame of two years. The petitioner contends that such a restriction directly affects its statutory powers under the Electricity Act and therefore the legality of the order requires examination by this Court. 3. The main grievance of the petitioner is that Respondent No.2 has misunderstood the scope of the statutory powers available to the electricity distribution licensee. The petitioner submits that under the scheme of the Electricity Act it has a clear authority to issue bills for electricity supplied to the consumer. According to the petitioner, this authority cannot be artificially restricted by holding that the bill must necessarily relate only to consumption within the preceding two years. The petitioner further points out that in many situations the actual amount payable may become clear only later. This may happen because of revision of tariff, correction of earlier billing errors, or issuance of a supplementary or revised bill after verification of records. In such circumstances the liability of the consumer becomes crystallised only when the revised bill is issued. Therefore the petitioner argues that the date of consumption cannot automatically be treated as the date when the amount becomes due. If such a rigid view is taken, it would unnecessarily defeat the statutory scheme under which the electricity supplier is permitted to raise revised or supplementary bills whenever a legitimate correction becomes necessary. 4. This Court has recently examined a similar question in Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. v. Reenu Mohandas & Anr (Writ Petition No. 1731 of 2011, decided on 14 January 2026). In that decision the Court considered the true 2 69-wp-5871-2013.doc meaning of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the stage at which the amount can be said to have become first due. While dealing with that issue the Court referred to earlier judicial pronouncements and explained the position in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment. The Court noted that the Division Bench in the case of Rototex Polyester had interpreted the expression “the date when such sum becomes first due.” It was held that this expression refers to the date on which the consumer receives a valid and lawful bill. In other words, the liability of the consumer becomes payable when the bill is raised and communicated to the consumer. The Court also noted that this interpretation has been consistently followed and no contrary material was placed before the Court to suggest a different understanding of the provision. 5. The Court also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. vs. Rahamatullah Khan(2020) 4 SCC 650. The Supreme Court clarified that Section 56(2) does not prohibit the electricity supplier from raising a supplementary bill even after the expiry of two years. What the provision restricts is only the power to disconnect electricity supply for non payment of dues that are more than two years old. The judgment makes it clear that although disconnection is restricted after the lapse of two years, the electricity company is still free to adopt other lawful methods for recovery of the dues. Thus, the statutory provision does not extinguish the liability itself. It only limits the coercive step of disconnection. 6. When the present case is examined in light of the above legal position, the reasoning adopted by Respondent No.2 cannot be 3 69-wp-5871-2013.doc sustained. In the present matter the petitioner issued a revised bill on 1 June 2012. Once that revised bill was issued, the amount mentioned in that bill became payable from that date. Therefore, the relevant point of time for considering the liability was the date of issuance of the revised bill and not the earlier date on which electricity might have been consumed. Respondent No.2, however, proceeded on the assumption that the two year period must always be counted from the date of consumption. Such an approach overlooks the interpretation placed by the courts on the expression “sum becomes first due.” The law, as clarified in the decisions referred to above, clearly indicates that the liability becomes due when a valid bill is issued. Hence there was no legal justification for restricting the petitioner’s right to issue bills merely by calculating the period of two years from the date of consumption. The impugned order, to that extent, proceeds on an incorrect understanding of the statutory provision and therefore cannot be sustained. 7. At the same time, it is necessary to clarify the consequence flowing from Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act. Even though the electricity supplier may raise a bill or supplementary bill at a later point of time, the power to disconnect electricity supply is subject to a statutory limitation. If the dues relate to a period that is more than two years old from the date when the bill was issued, the electricity supply cannot be disconnected for recovery of such amount. Therefore, while the petitioner may pursue recovery of the dues through lawful means, the petitioner would not be entitled to disconnect the electricity supply of Respondent No.1 for 4 69-wp-5871-2013.doc recovery of amounts which are more than two years old from the date of issuance of the bill. 8. The impugned order stands modified to the aforesaid extent. 9. The writ petition stands disposed of in above terms. 10. There shall be no order as to costs. (AMIT BORKAR, J.) 5