IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4150 of 2013 Reserved on: 08.07.2026 Date of Decision: 20.07.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Rajneesh Kumar @ Nishu ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondent : Mr N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate, with Mr Divya Raj Singh, Advocate, for the respondent. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 29.01.2013 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 1, Dehra District Kangra, HP (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61 (1) (a) of the Punjab Excise Act as applicable to the State of HP. (The parties shall hereinafter be 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police filed a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61 (1) (a) of the Punjab Excise Act as applicable to the State of HP. It was asserted that ASI Surjeet Kumar (PW4) and Constable Vinod Kumar were present for patrolling at Dehra Tehsil Chowk on 15.02.2008 at about 11.15 p.m. They met Pradeep Raj Singh (PW1) and Roshan Lal. ASI Surjeet Kumar (PW4) received secret information that a vehicle was transporting a huge quantity of liquor. A naka was set up. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-24A-3157 arrived on the spot at about 02.30 a.m. from Jawalji. ASI Surjeet Kumar (PW4) signalled the driver to stop the vehicle. The driver stopped the vehicle. The driver identified himself as Gyan Singh, and the person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Rajneesh Kumar @ Nishu. The police checked the vehicle and found 20 polythene packets kept on the seats of the vehicle. The police checked the packets and found 12 bottles of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) bearing the mark, Black Jack, XXX Rum for sale in 3 UT Chandigarh in each packet. A permit was demanded for transporting the liquor from the occupants of the vehicle, but they could not produce any permit. 12 bottles were retained as a sample. Sample bottles were sealed with seal ‘H’. Seal impression (Ext.PW4/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Pradeep after use. The liquor, vehicle and documents were seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/A). Rukka (Ext.PW4/B) was prepared and was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW4/C) was registered. ASI Surjeet Kumar (PW4) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW4/E) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He deposited the case property with ASI Chuni Lal (PW5), who made an entry in the register of Malkhana (Ext.PW5/B) and deposited the case property in Malkhana. He sent the samples to CTL Kandaghat on 24.02.2008 through HHC Amar Chand (PW3) vide RC No. 25/21 (Ext.PW5/A). HHC Amar Chand (PW3) deposited all the articles at CTL Kandaghat and handed over the receipt to ASI Chuni Lal (PW5) on his return. The result of analysis (Ext.PW2/A) was issued, mentioning that the samples of IMFL contained 74.4%, 74.5%, 74.6% and 74.8% proof alcohol in them. The statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their 4 version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with a commission of offences punishable under Section 61 (1) (a) of the Punjab Excise Act as applicable to the State of HP, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Pradeep Raj Singh (PW1) is the witness to the recovery. ASI Surjeet Kumar (PW4) effected the recovery and investigated the matter. ASI Ashok Kumar (PW2) partly investigated the matter. HHC Amar Chand (PW3) carried the case property to CTL Kandaghat. ASI Chuni Lal (PW5) was working as an MHC with whom the case property was deposited. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that a Naka was laid at Hanuman Chowk Dehra at around 02:30 a.m. on 15.05.2008, and they were found in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-24A-3157. They denied the rest of the 5 prosecution's case. They claimed that they were innocent and were falsely implicated. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent, which made them highly doubtful. As per Pradeep Raj Singh (PW1), only one sample was sent to the FSL, and there is no evidence that the rest of the bottles contained IMFL in them. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offences. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. Both Pradeep Raj Singh (PW1) and ASI Surjeet Kumar (PW4) had consistently stated that the accused were found in possession of 240 bottles of Black Jack XXX rum in a Tata Sumo bearing registration No. HP-24A-3157. Pradeep Raj Singh (PW1) was declared hostile, but he supported the prosecution's case in his cross-examination by the learned APP. The presumption that official acts are done correctly applies to 6 the acts of Police Officials, and their testimonies could not have been discarded because of minor contradictions. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr N. K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that both the witnesses deposed about the interception of the vehicle and the recovery of 240 bottles of IMFL from the vehicle. The minor contradictions in the statements of official witnesses were not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr N. K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars, which made them highly doubtful. The police had 7 received prior information regarding the transportation of the liquor, but no independent witness was associated, and no reason was assigned for the non-association of an independent witness, which made the prosecution's case highly suspect. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded 8 by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 14. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of 9 acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (f) The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10 16. Rukka (Ext.PW4/B) mentions that the police were on patrolling duty when they received secret information at about 11:15 p.m. ASI Surjeet Singh (PW4) stated that he was present at Hanuman Chowk, Dehra, at about 11:15 p.m. with ETI Pradeep Raj and Roshan Lal, when he received secret information that a vehicle was carrying liquor. However, Surjeet Singh (PW4) has nowhere stated that he had reduced the information to writing and sent it to the police station. 17. Section 46(2) of the Punjab Excise Act (as applicable to the State of H.P.) provides that an officer empowered under the Act will exercise the same powers in respect of such investigation as an officer in charge of a Police Station may exercise under Chapter XIV of the CrPC. Section 50 of the Punjab Excise Act provides that provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 relating to arrest, detention and custody, searches, summons, warrant of arrest, search warrant, and investigation shall apply to all actions taken under the Act. Therefore, Surjeet Singh (PW4) was required to comply with the requirements of Section 165 of the Cr.PC before searching the vehicle. 11 18. It was submitted that the provision of Section 165 of the Cr.PC does not apply to the search of the vehicle but only to the search of the house. This submission is stated to be rejected. Section 165 of the Cr.PC reads as under: - 165. Search by police officer.—(1) Whenever an officer in charge of a police station or a police officer making an investigation has reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purposes of an investigation into any offence which he is authorised to investigate may be found in any place within the limits of the police station of which he is in charge, or to which he is attached, and that such thing cannot in his opinion be otherwise obtained without undue delay, such officer may, after recording in writing the grounds of his belief and specifying in such writing, so far as possible, the thing for which search is to be made, search, or cause search to be made, for such thing in any place within the limits of such station. (2) A police officer proceeding under sub-section (1) shall, if practicable, conduct the search in person. (3) If he is unable to conduct the search in person, and there is no other person competent to make the search present at the time, he may, after recording in writing his reasons for so doing, require any officer subordinate to him to make the search, and he shall deliver to such subordinate officer an order in writing, specifying the place to be searched, and so far as possible, the thing for which search is to be made; and such subordinate officer may thereupon search for such thing in such place. (4) The provisions of this Code as to search warrants and the general provisions as to searches contained in section 100 shall, so far as may be, apply to a search made under this section. 12 (5) Copies of any record made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall forthwith be sent to the nearest Magistrate empowered to take cognisance of the offence, and the owner or occupier of the place searched shall, on application, be furnished, free of cost, with a copy of the same by the Magistrate. 19. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that it applies to the search of any place within the limit of the Police Station of which the person is in charge or to which he is attached. The term “place” under Section 2 (1) (p) of the CrPC includes a house, building, tent, vehicle and vessel. Therefore, the search of the vehicle would be the search of a place and Section 165 of the CrPC would be attracted to the search of the vehicle. 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ITC Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1971, that every search must be preceded by a warrant, but if it is not possible to do so, the search can be conducted by complying with the requirements of Section 165 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: - “17. Section 165Cr. P.C. deals with circumstances and prerequisites for searches without a warrant. As a general rule, every search must be preceded by a warrant, and reasons to believe must be recorded. Section 165 applies where, due to exigent circumstances, it is not possible to obtain a search warrant. In such cases, the officer may, 13 after recording his reasons in writing and specifying, as far as possible, the thing for which the search is to be made, conduct or cause a search of the place. Section 165(4) provides that the general provisions relating to searches contained in Section 100 also apply to searches under Section 165. It is therefore clear that even under Section 165, the existence of reasons to believe that an imminent search is necessary must be recorded, with as much detail as possible. The mandate of Section 100(4) must also be satisfied even in searches under Section 165. Xxx 19.2. In every search conducted under a special enactment without a warrant, the requirement of recording reasons to believe is mandatory. The reasons necessitating the search must be relevant and must reflect application of mind based on some information - either from a third party or personal knowledge - and cannot be based on mere presumption or extraneous considerations. Such reasons cannot rest on mere suspicion or subjective satisfaction; something more substantial is required for a prudent person to conclude that a search and/or seizure is necessary.” 21. In the present case, ASI Surjeet Singh (PW4) had not complied with the requirement of Section 165 of the Cr.P.C., and this would make the prosecution case highly suspect. 22. Pradeep Raj Singh (PW1) stated that he and Roshan Lal were going to their home on 14.02.2008 at about 4:15 pm when the police contacted them at Tehsil Chowk Dehra and informed them that a joint checking was to be carried out during the night. A naka was set up at about 11:15 p.m. at Hanuman 14 Chowk, and a vehicle was intercepted at 02:30 p.m. This witness has nowhere stated that he had met the police party along with Roshan Lal at about 11:00 p.m. and any secret information was received in his presence; rather, he has stated that he was informed at about 04.15 p.m. that a naka would be set up at Hanuman Chowk during the night. Therefore, the testimony of this witness is quite inconsistent with the prosecution's case. 23. Pradeep Raj Singh (PW1) stated that a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-24A-3157 was intercepted during the night, which had 20 polythene packets, each containing 12 bottles of IMFL. A permit was demanded for transporting the liquor, but the occupants of the vehicle could not produce any permit. Therefore, a nip was taken out as a sample for chemical analysis. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he stated that one bundle containing 12 bottles of IMFL was retained as a sample. He admitted that he had mistakenly stated that one nip was taken out as a sample. He stated in his cross-examination by the learned counsel for the defence that he had sealed the nip and had retained the sample seal with him. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the testimony of this witness was highly discrepant regarding the taking of the sample. He had initially 15 stated that one nip was taken as a sample, and thereafter that one bundle containing 12 bottles was taken as a sample, and in the cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence, that he had sealed one nip and retained the seal with him. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in not relying upon his testimony. 24. It is an admitted version that information was received at about 11:15 p.m. during the night, and the vehicle was intercepted at about 02:30 a.m. No reason has been assigned as to why an independent witness was not associated. ASI Surjeet Singh (PW4) stated that he had not joined any local witness because it was night. However, this is no explanation at all. The police had sufficient time to join any independent witness during the naka, and an explanation that it was night time was no explanation at all. 25. The testimony of Pradeep Raj Singh (PW1) and ASI Surjeet Kumar (PW4) contradict each other on material aspects, and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution's case. 16 26. No other witness was examined to establish the prosecution's version. It is an admitted version that Constable Vinod Kumar No. 1008 was also accompanying ASI Surjeet Singh (PW4). However, he was not examined, and no reason was assigned for his non-examination 27. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 28. No other point was urged. 27. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 29. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this 17 judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 30. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 20th July, 2026 (Nikita)