IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Criminal Revision No.4047 of 2013 Date of Decision : 9th April, 2026 _______________________________________________________ Manohar Lal ….Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioner : Mr. Virender Singh Rathour, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi Chauhan, Deputy Advocates General. Sandeep Sharma, Judge (Oral) Instant Criminal Revision Petition filed under Section 397/ 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, lays challenge to judgment dated 01.07.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, in Cr. Appeal No.26- D/X/10/06, affirming the judgment of conviction dated 29.08.2006 and sentence dated 30.08.2006, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, in criminal case No.26-II/04, whereby learned trial Court, while holding petitioner- accused guilty of having committed the offence punishable under Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of IPC, convicted and sentenced him as under:- 2. In nutshell, case of the prosecution is that on 02.12.2003, person, namely Neeraj Kumar was going from Dharamshala to Kangra, driving a scooter bearing registration No.HP-40-6949 and alongwith him one Sh. Manoj Kumar was a pillion rider. When aforesaid scooter reached near Shahid Samarak, Dharamshala, a Tata Sumo jeep bearing registration No.PB-06A-1993 came from opposite side, being driven rashly and negligently by accused Manohar Lal, who, while, overtaking a standing jeep, hit the scooter of Neeraj Kumar, as a result whereof, Neeraj Kumar and Manoj Kumar fell down and became unconscious. Two other persons, namely Sh. Rajeev Kumar Dhiman and Sh. Malkiat Singh, who at relevant time were also coming behind the scooter being driven by aforesaid Neeraj Kumar, took injured to the hospital, whereafter the matter was reported to the police. Sr. Offence Sentence Fine amount( ) 1. 279 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for one month 500/- 2. 337 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for one month 500/- 3. 304-A Rigorous imprisonment for Six months 2000/- 3 3. Complainant Manoj Kumar got his statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C., alleging therein that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the accused. In the aforesaid background, FIR, as detailed hereinabove, came to be lodged against the accused, wherein similar allegations, as have been noted hereinabove, have been recorded. After completion of the investigation, police presented the challan in the competent court of law. 4. Learned trial Court after satisfying itself that a prima-facie case exists against the accused, framed notice of accusation under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of IPC against him, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 5. Prosecution with a view to prove its case examined as many as 13 witnesses. Accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the case of the prosecution in toto and claimed himself to be innocent. Though, opportunity was granted to the accused to lead evidence in defence, but in vain. 6. Learned trial Court on the basis of the evidence made available on record by the prosecution, found accused guilty of having committed the offence punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of IPC and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as per the description given hereinabove. 7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial Court, present petitioner-accused filed an appeal under Section 374(3) of the 4 Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, which came to be registered as Criminal Appeal No. 26-D/X/10/06, but same was also dismissed vide judgment dated 01.07.2013. In the aforesaid background, present petitioner approached this Court by way of instant criminal revision petition, praying therein for his acquittal after quashing and setting- aside the impugned judgments passed by the learned courts below. 8. Mr. Virender Singh Rathour, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that the Courts below, while ascertaining the guilt of the accused for his having allegedly committed offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC, failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, as a result whereof findings to the detriment of the accused came to the fore. While making this Court peruse the statements made by the material prosecution witnesses, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that none of the prosecution witnesses has stated anything specific with regard to rash and negligent driving, if any, by the accused and as such, there was no occasion, if any, for the Courts below to hold accused guilty of having committed the offences under the aforesaid provisions of law. He further argued that though learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, while passing the impugned judgment, categorically recorded that there is no direct evidence suggestive of the fact that vehicle in question was being driven in rash and negligent manner by the accused, but yet on the basis of circumstantial evidence, he proceeded to uphold the 5 judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court, which is not based upon proper appreciation of evidence led on record by the respective parties. 9. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, while supporting the impugned judgments passed by learned Courts below, vehemently argued that the same are based upon proper appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the prosecution and there is no scope of interference in the same. He further argued that otherwise also, this Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C., has very limited jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence. He also referred to the statements made by the prosecution witnesses to point out that they have categorically stated that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent act of the accused. While making this Court peruse the spot map Ex. PW13/D, learned Additional Advocate General vehemently argued that bare perusal of the same suggests that the scooter, which was allegedly hit by the vehicle being driven by the accused, was on its side, but the accused, while overtaking another standing vehicle, hit the scooter, as a result of which, persons travelling on the same suffered multiple injuries and, unfortunately, one person lost his life. He also invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Saurabh Bakshi 2015 (5) SCC 182; wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has held that courts below while dealing with the accident cases should exercise great constraint, while taking lenient view against 6 reckless drivers, who drive rashly and negligently. Learned Additional Advocate General, has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case State of Kerala versus Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999)2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “ In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 10. In the aforesaid background, he prayed that the present petition deserves to be dismissed being devoid of any merit. 11. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties and gone through the record carefully. 12. True, it is that while exercising the power under Section 397 of Criminal Procedure Code, this Court has very limited power to re-appreciate the evidence available on record. But in the present case, where accused has been convicted and sentenced under Sections 279,337 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, this Court solely with a view to ascertain that the judgments passed by both the 7 Courts below are not perverse and same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence available on record, undertook an exercise to meticulously examine the evidence available on record to reach a fair and just decision in the case. 13. As far as scope of power of this Court, while exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- 8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to 8 correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order.” 14. In the instant case, this Court solely with a view to ascertain the genuineness and correctness of the submissions having been made by the learned counsel representing the petitioner as well as to find out “whether there is any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgments passed by the Court below, undertook an exercise to peruse the evidence led on record by the prosecution, perusal whereof, certainly persuade this Court to agree with the submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner/ accused that learned courts below have not appreciated the evidence in its right perspective, as a result of which, erroneous findings to the detriment of the petitioner-accused have come on record. 15. In nutshell, case of the petitioner-accused, is that no evidence, worth credence, ever came to be led on record to prove rash and negligent driving, if any, at the behest of accused and if it is so, learned court below could not have sentenced petitioner-accused under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of IPC. At this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce Section 279 of IPC herein below:- “Rash driving or riding on a public way:- whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees of with both.” 9 16. Careful perusal of aforesaid provision of law reveals that to invoke Section 279 IPC, prosecution is under obligation to prove that offending vehicle was being driven by the accused in rash and negligent manner and due to his negligent act, injury was caused to the complainant. Since factum with regard to injuries suffered by the pillion rider, Sh. Manoj Kumar as well as Sh. Neeraj Kumar, is not in dispute, this Court need not to go into aforesaid aspect of the matter. Similarly, death of rider of the scooter, namely Sh. Neeraj Kumar, is also not in dispute. Now, to ascertain whether the prosecution has been able to prove that offending vehicle was being driven by the accused in rash and negligent manner, this Court shall deal with the evidence led on record in that regard by the prosecution. 17. Though, prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses, as stated hereinabove, but statements made by PW-1, Manoj Kumar and PW-2, Rajeev Kumar, who are the spot witnesses, are relevant to ascertain the correctness of submissions made at the behest of the petitioner-accused. PW-1, Sh. Manoj Kumar, who was the pillion rider, and suffered injuries in the accident, deposed that Neeraj Kumar was driving the scooter at the relevant time and accused was driving the Tata Sumo in rash and negligent manner. He further deposed that Tata Sumo hit with the scooter, as a result of which, he and Neeraj fell down from the scooter and sustained injuries. He also deposed that he became unconscious at the spot. At this stage, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that afore witness categorically stated that vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently, but mere stating 10 of such fact that accused was driving the Tata Sumo in rash and negligent manner may not be sufficient to conclude rashness and negligence, especially in terms of Section 279 of IPC. 18. As per Section 279 of IPC, whoever drives any vehicle on a public way in rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life, shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment of either description for terms which may extend to six months, or with fine. ‘Negligence’ is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 19. ‘Speed’ is not the criteria to ascertain the rash and negligent driving, rather it is the manner, in which offending vehicle was driven, which determines rashness and negligence. As per the spot map Ex.PW-13/D, the offending vehicle was coming from Kangra to Dharamshala on its side, but since at the place of the accident, one jeep was parked in the middle of the road, accused, while overtaking the standing vehicle, had to change the lane, and in the meantime, scooter being driven by Neeraj Kumar came from Dharamshala side and was allegedly hit by Tata Sumo being driven by the petitioner- accused. As per the prosecution case, the road at the spot of the accident was quite wide and three vehicles could easily pass. It is also not in dispute that Tata Sumo driven by the accused was moving uphill side and as such, it can be inferred that speed of the vehicle at that time may not have been very high, especially when it had to 11 change its lane to overtake the standing vehicle. Moreover, perusal of photographs Ex. PW-12/A to Ex. PW-12/E clearly reveals that scooter being driven by the deceased Neeraj was hit by the bumper of Tata Sumo from the driver’s side. Though, after being hit by the bumper of the offending vehicle, the scooter fell down on the road, but photographs of the scooter nowhere suggest that the same was hit with high speed or force. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in case State of H.P and ors versus Parmjit Singh, latest HLJ 2012(HP) 297 to substantiate his plea that speed is not the only criteria to prove the rash and negligent driving. The relevant para Nos.14 and 15 of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “14. It is a settled law that the speed is not a criterion to prove the rash or negligent act of driving. The prosecution, as already stated above is obliged to prove the necessary ingredients of the offence by direct or circumstantial evidence. To fasten the criminal liability for the offences charged, there should be consistent, convincing and reliable evidence. Even in the exceptional cases, where the rule of res ipsa laquitar applies, it cannot be taken for guaranteed that the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident is guilty of offence. In the same situation, there could be civil liability as well, in addition to the criminal liability, but so far as the criminal liability, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and civil liability can be proved by preponderance of probabilities. 15. On the strength of the aforesaid evidence, it is very difficult to conclude that the accused was driving the vehicle rashly or negligently, more specifically when it has also come in the evidence that the deceased came in contact with the 12 offending vehicle while crossing the road. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the accused are not made out.” 20. Leaving everything aside, neither PW-1 nor PW-2 has stated anything specific with regard to rash and negligent driving, but they have deposed that offending vehicle was being driven negligently, which is not sufficient to invoke Section 279 of IPC, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in catena of cases. Moreover, this Court, having taken note of the fact that Manoj Kumar was the pillion rider, is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that, being a pillion rider, he would not have been in a position to clearly observe or assess the speed or manner in which the offending vehicle was being driven. Interestingly, pillion rider, who was the owner of the scooter, was wearing a helmet, whereas Neeraj Kumar, who at the relevant time was driving the scooter, was neither wearing helmet nor holding a valid driving licence. 21. PW-2, Rajeev Kumar, who was coming on a scooter behind the scooter of deceased Neeraj Kumar, deposed that Tata Sumo coming towards Dharamshala side, while overtaking the standing jeep, hit the scooter of the complainant. He deposed that driver of the Tata Sumo had fled away from the spot. He nowhere stated that Tata Sumo was being driven rashly and negligently by the accused. He also deposed that offending vehicle was being driven by 13 the accused in negligent manner, which is not sufficient to invoke section 279 of IPC. 22. PW-3, Sh. Hans Raj Agnihotri, PW-4, Roshan Lal, PW-5, HC Sushil Kumar, PW-7, Prem Chand, PW-8, Devender Pathania and PW-9, Sanjeev Kumar are the formal witnesses and their statements are not very relevant for determining the rash and negligent driving, if any, by the accused. 23. PW-10, Dr. Adarsh Kumar, conducted the postmortem examination on the body of Neeraj Kumar and issued report Ex.PW10/A. PW-11, Dr. K.S.Dadhwal, medically examined Manoj Kumar and Neeraj Kumar and issued MLCs Ex.PW11/A and Ex.PW11/B, respectively. He deposed that the injuries suffered by the injured could be caused in a vehicular road accident. No doubt, MLCs adduced on record reveal that injuries suffered by deceased Neeraj Kumar and Manoj Kumar were due to vehicular accident, but once prosecution has been not able to prove that offending vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently by accused, mere factum of suffering injuries by Manoj Kumar and Neeraj Kumar may not be sufficient to prove guilt, if any, of accused under Section 279 and 337 of IPC. Interestingly, learned Addititiional Session Judge, after having gone through the evidence led on record by the prosecution though arrived at a conclusion that there is no direct evidence that accused was driving the vehicle in question in rash and negligent manner, but yet taking note of circumstances, which otherwise have not been 14 disclosed in the judgment, proceeded to record that accused was negligent in driving the vehicle. 24. Mere bald statement that the petitioner-accused was negligent, by no stretch of imagination, could be termed to be sufficient to hold the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed the offence punishable under Section 279, 337 and 304 A IPC, hence, this Court after having carefully perused the material on record has no hesitation to conclude that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove on record reckless or careless driving by the petitioner-accused beyond reasonable doubt. 25. It is well settled that a person cannot be held criminally accountable for his rashness and negligence merely because evil consequences flow from his act, rather rashness must be such as to endanger human life or personal safety of others. Similarly, for criminal liability, the rashness or negligence must show a disregard for human life or personal safety of others. Question whether an act is criminally rash or negligent is a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of particular case and as such, needs to be elucidated minutely and with certain degree of precision. But in the instant case, prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt negligence, if any, on the part of the petitioner-accused. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Braham Dass versus State of H.P. (2009) 7 Supreme Court Cases 353. The relevant para No. 6 and 8 are reproduced herein below:- 15 “6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no evidence on record to show any negligence. It has not been brought on record as to how the appellant-accused was negligent in any way. On the contrary what has been stated is that one person had gone to the rooftop and the driver started the vehicle while he was there. There was no evidence to show that the driver had knowledge that any passenger was on the rooftop of the bus. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that PW-1 had stated that the conductor had told the driver that one passenger was still on the roof of the bus and the driver started the bus. 8. Section 279 deals with rash driving or riding on a pubic way. A bare reading of the provision makes it clear that it must be established that the accused was driving any vehicle on a public way in manner which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Obviously the foundation in accusations under Section 279 IPC is not (sic) negligence. Similarly, in Section 304-A the stress is on causing death by negligence or rashness. Therefore, for brining on application of either Section 270 or 304-A it must be established that there was an element of rashness or negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto, there was no evidence led to show that any negligence was involved.” 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled “State of Karnataka v. Satish,”1998 (8) SCC 493. The relevant paras of which are being reproduced herein below:- “1. Truck No. MYE-3236 being driven by the respondent turned turtle while crossing a "nalla" on 25-11-1982 at about 8.30 a.m. The accident resulted in the death of 15 persons and receipt of injuries by about 18 persons, who were travelling in the fully loaded truck. The respondent was charge-sheeted and tried. The learned trial court held that the respondent drove the vehicle at a high speed and it was on that account that the accident took place. The respondent was convicted for offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A IPC and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The respondent challenged his conviction and sentence before the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum. While the conviction and sentence imposed upon the respondent for the offence under Section 279 IPC was set aside, the appellate court confirmed the conviction and sentenced the respondent for offences under Sections 304A, 337 and 338 IPC. On a criminal revision petition being filed by 16 the respondent before the High Court of Karnataka, the conviction and sentence of the respondent for all the offences were set aside and the respondent was acquitted. This appeal by special leave is directed against the said judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court of Karnataka. 2. We have examined the record and heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. Both the trial court and the appellate court held the respondent guilty for offences under Sections 337, 338 and 304A IPC after recording a finding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed". No specific finding has been recorded either by the trial court or by the first appellate court to the effect that the respondent was driving the truck either negligently or rashly. After holding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed", both the courts pressed into aid the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to hold the respondent guilty. 4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur". There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the record and the Inspector was not examined for reasons best known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna in the prosecution case. 27. At this stage, this Court also cannot lose sight of the stern observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Saurabh Bakshi 2015 (5) SCC 182, wherein it has been observed as follows:- 25. Before parting with the case we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a 17 nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving where the other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty and the civilized persons drive in constant fear but still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such obtaining circumstances, we are bound to observe that the law-makers should scrutinize, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC, so with immense anguish.” 28. There cannot be any quarrel, whatsoever, with regard to the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to the careless/reckless driving of the drivers and the fact that drivers driving under the influence of alcohol deserve to be punished but in the present case careful perusal of evidence adduced on record by the prosecution, nowhere suggest that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that vehicle was being driven by the petitioner-accused in rash and negligent manner and he was under the influence of liquor. 29. 29. After having carefully perused the record and the statements of the witnesses and applying ratio of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment, noted hereinabove, this court is of the view that the judgments passed by the courts below are not based upon correct appreciation of the evidence adduced on record and as such, same deserve to be quashed and set-aside. 30. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above, the present petition is allowed and the judgments passed by the courts below are quashed and set-aside. Accordingly, 18 petitioner-accused is acquitted of the charges framed against him. His bail bonds/personal bonds are ordered to be discharged and interim order, if any, is vacated. All applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Sandeep Sharma) 9th April 2026 Judge (shankar)