APHC010527922011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI WRIT PETITION NOs: 12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 Bench Sr.No:-67 [3584] Hope Integrated Rural Development Society and others ...Petitioners Vs. Principal Secretary and Others ...Respondent(s) ********** CORAM :THE CHIEF JUSTICE LISA GILL SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN DATE : 3rd September 2026 Present: Advocate for Petitioner: SRINIVAS CHITTURU, rep. by SRI D.UMA MAHESWARA RAO Advocate(s) for Respondent(s): GP FOR PANCHAYAT RAJ & RURAL DEV, N V SUMANTH COMMON ORDER: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Challa Gunaranjan) Since the issue raised in all these writ petitions being common, are heard together and disposed by present common order. 2 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 2. For sake of convenience, the facts in W.P. No.12928 of 2011 are set out as under: (a) The prayer made in all these writ petition is as under: “to issue a Writ Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ Order or Direction of the like nature to direct the Respondents 1 to 3 to establish Fast Track Court as provided under Sec 15 of A.P. Micro Finance Institutions Regulation of Money Lending Act, 2011 and to pass such other orders.” (b) Petitioner in W.P. No.12928 of 2011 is a registered society stated to be established with the object to disseminate knowledge and know how useful to the rural/urban poor and disadvantaged sections of society without emphasis on women population in diverse activities and thereby achieving economic growth of rural/urban poor families with particular attention to provide adequate employment opportunities to women, to promote productivity and thereby income through Micro Finance and to achieve appreciable raise in the standard of living of the poorest section of the population. It is carrying on activities in and around areas of Kurnool District in Andhra Pradesh. (c) Petitioner is stated to have mobilised funds from various sources including other NGOs for the purpose of achieving its 3 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 objects. As on 31.03.2011, petitioner has accepted loans to the tune of 258.12 lakhs from various lenders. Of which, it has advanced loans ranging from ₹8,000/- to ₹20,000/- to almost 3,700 members/borrowers, in total amounting to 193.25 lakhs. The individuals who have borrowed aforesaid amounts were not required to provide any collateral security, except for personal guarantee from group members. (c) At that juncture, the State had come up with legislation, initially by way of an ordinance namely A.P. Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Ordinance, 2010 and later translated into Act No.1 of 2011. After coming into force of the said enactment, the activities undertaken by petitioner were governed and regulated by the provisions of said enactment. Thus, thereafter, the loan repayments started diminishing and almost reached a dismal point. The petitioner initially got registered as Micro Finance institution as envisaged under the said Act vide certificates dated 02.11.2010 valid till 01.11.2011. (d) The scheme of the Act provided that in case there are any outstanding loans to be recovered, in terms of Section 15, remedy has been provided to approach Fast Track Court. As there are no designated Fast Track Courts in terms of Section 15, petitioner approached this Court seeking writ of mandamus to the 4 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 respondents for establishment of such Fast Track Courts, enabling them to avail legal remedies wherever there are defaults of loans by the member borrowers. 3. Heard Sri D.Uma Maheswara Rao, learned counsel, representing Sri Srinivas Chitturu, learned counsel for petitioners on record and learned Government for Panchayat Raj appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and Sri N.V.Sumanth, learned standing counsel appearing for 4th respondent. 4. Learned counsel for petitioners, while reiterating the pleadings made in the affidavit filed in support of writ petitions, would contend that when there is a specific legislative mandate in terms of Section 15 of the Act, the respondents are bound to establish Fast Track Courts, as otherwise the petitioners would be deprived of its right to remedies, as it is as on 31.03.2011, 193.25 lakhs, 207 lakhs and 780.34 lakhs respectively are outstanding and unrecovered, therefore, until and unless the Fast Track Courts are established, petitioners would not be in a position to initiate appropriate legal action for recovering the same. 5. (a) Per contra, learned Government Pleader as well as learned standing counsel for 4th respondent submitted that as of now there are no cases as such filed raising any dispute under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions 5 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 (Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011 (herein after, for short ‘the Act’) and pending before any of the courts in the State from the promulgation of the Act till date. Further, it is also submitted that Section 15 merely makes a provision for establishment of Fast Track Courts, however, there is no provision in the Act ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Court, therefore, the right to recover loans is in no way affected. In support of said submission, reliance is placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in South Delhi Municipal Corporation and another v. Today Homes and Infrastructure Private Limited and others. (b) Further, it is also stated that as the registrations in favour of petitioners were not renewed after November 2011, the petitioners cannot seek either implementation of provisions of the Act or avail remedy under the Act. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in reply, while referring to Rule 12 of Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Rules, 2011 (herein after, for short ‘the Rules’), submitted that even in the absence of renewal of registration, still petitioners are entitled to recover the dues from the defaulters, therefore, they have subsisting right to invoke legal remedies envisaged under Section 15 of the Act. 6 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 7. We have given due and careful consideration to the submissions of learned counsel and perused the record. 8. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it is apt to refer Section 15 of the Act and Rule 12 of the Rules: “Section 15: Settlement of Disputes: (1) For the protection of debtors and for the settlement of disputes of civil nature between the SHG or its members on the one hand and the MFI on the other hand or between the members of the SHG and the SHG, in relation to the loans granted under this Act to the SHG or its members, the State Government after consultation with the High Court, and by notification,- (a) shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, establish for every district in the State a Fast- Track Court; (b) may establish Fast-Track Court for such other areas in the State, as it may deem necessary. (2) The Government shall, after consultation with the High Court of Andhra Pradesh specify, by notification, the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a FastTrack Court shall extend and may, at any time, increase, reduce or alter such limits. (3) The cases that may be filed before the Fast-Track Court shall be disposed of within a period of three months. (4) The decree of the Fast Track Courts shall be liable to be executed in accordance with the procedure under the Code of the Civil Procedure 1908. Rule 12: Effect of cancellation or non-renewal of Registration: In case of cancellation of registration as per 7 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 rule 10 or non-renewal of registration as per rule 8(4), such Micro Finance Institution shall not extend any fresh loans to the borrowers, but will be entitled to recover the dues of the subsisting loans subject to following the provisions of section 16 of the Act.” 9. The State, in its endeavour to protect the interests of self- help groups (SHGs) and relieve them from the undue hardship by regulating money lending transactions by the money lending Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs), who are providing loans to SHGs with usurious interest rates and resorting to coercive means of recovery resulting in impoverishment and at times leading to suicides of the borrowers, brought in Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011. 10. Section 3 of the said Act contemplates that all MFIs in the state shall get registered before the Registering Authority of concerned district, specifying their area of operation, rate of interest being charged and system of conducting due diligence and manner of recovery and persons authorized for conducting the said activity. Section 7 further stipulated that MFIs shall not seek any security from borrowers by way of bond, pledge or other security for the loan to be extended. Sections 8 and 9 also regulate rates of interest. Section 15 deals with settlement of disputes and Section 16 envisages penalty for coercive actions of MFIs. The said section 8 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 specifically mandates that MFIs shall not resort to any type of coercive measures against SHGs or its members or their family members and illustrates the possible actions which would fall within the meaning of coercive action. 11. In exercise of rule-making power under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011, Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Rules, 2011 have been issued. Rule 3 deals with the manner in which application for registration has to be made and further Rule 8 deals with renewal of registration. Rule 12 deals with effect of cancellation or non-renewal of registration, which clearly mentions that even in case of non-renewal, still MFIs are entitled to recover the dues of subsisting loans subject to the provisions of Section 16 of the Act. A conspectus analysis of the scheme of the Act and Rules makes it clear that MFIs are entitled to recover the outstanding loans from the borrowers or members of SHGs. 12. Section 15 envisage Government to establish Fast Track Court for every district to deal with settlement of disputes of civil nature between the SHG or its members on one hand and the MFIs on the other hand, or between members of SHG and the SHG, in relation to the loans granted under this Act to the SHG or its 9 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 members. The fact remains that the government has not established Fast Track Courts so far. 13. Be that as it may, there is no other provision in the Act which specifically bar Civil Court's jurisdiction to deal with the disputes mentioned above. Therefore, even in the absence of Fast Track Courts being established as contemplated under Section 15, there is no bar for one to approach competent civil court and raise dispute or initiate proceedings for recovery of outstanding loans. 14. It is fairly now well settled in law that unless there is a specific bar or exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction, one would have inherent right to approach Civil Court for redressal of grievance. 15. In South Delhi Municipal Corporation case1, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with aforesaid jurisdictional aspect, after considering the earlier judgments, reiterated the law as under: “7. There is an inherent right to approach a civil court. The bar on a civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily or lightly inferred. The jurisdiction of civil courts can be excluded by an express provision of law or a clear intendment in such law. Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford [Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, (1859) 6 CBNS 336 : 141 ER 486] resolved the dispute pertaining to the bar on jurisdiction of civil courts, in the following manner: (ER p. 495) “One is where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law: there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude 10 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 the common law remedy the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy: there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. … The remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.” 8. In a case arising under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Privy Council in Secy. of State for India v. Mask & Co. [Secy. of State for India v. Mask & Co., 1940 SCC OnLine PC 10 : (1939-40) 67 IA 222 : AIR 1940 PC 105] observed as follows: (SCC OnLine PC) “… It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.” 9. Section 17 of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950 barred the jurisdiction of any court in matters pertaining to assessments made under the Act. The recovery of sales tax under the said Act was the subject-matter of civil suits filed by the assessees. The State objected to the maintainability of the civil suits on the ground that jurisdiction of civil court was barred. After taking note of several judgments of this Court on the point of ouster of jurisdiction of the civil courts, Hidayatullah, J. in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. [Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., (1968) 3 SCR 662 at p. 682: AIR 1969 SC 78] observed as follows: (AIR pp. 89-90, para 32) “(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory 11 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.” 10. A perusal of the relevant provisions of the Act would show that there is no express bar on the jurisdiction of courts. However, Section 169 of the Act provides for an appeal to the 12 HCJ & CGR, J W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 & 13743 of 2011 Municipal Taxation Tribunal. Section 171 of the Act provides that the order of the Municipal Taxation Tribunal in the appeal filed by the assessee shall be final. According to the Corporation, the aforementioned sections, read together, create a bar on the jurisdiction of civil courts. 11. Any person having a grievance that he had been wronged or his right has been affected can approach a civil court on the principle of “ubi jus ibi remedium” — where there is a right, there is a remedy. As no internal remedy had been provided in different statutes creating rights or liabilities, the ordinary civil courts had to examine the grievances in the light of those statutes. With the advent of a “Welfare State”, it was realised that enactments creating liabilities in respect of payment of taxes, obligations after vesting of estates and conferring rights on a class of citizens, should be complete codes by themselves. With that object in view, forums were created under the Acts themselves where grievances could be entertained on behalf of the persons aggrieved [Shiv Kumar Chadha v. MCD, (1993) 3 SCC 161]. 16. In view of aforesaid observations, we are of the view that on account of mere non-establishment of Fast Track Court in terms of Section 15 of the Act, petitioners are not remediless, rather could avail remedies by approaching competent civil court. Therefore, we see no merit in these cases. 17. Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration, if any, in this case shall stand closed. LISA GILL, CJ CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J SS