1 CRA-S-328-SB-2009 (O&M) 201 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRA-S-328-SB-2009 (O&M) Date of decision: 10.09.2026 Arianchal Chits Pvt. Ltd. ….. Appellant versus M/s A.K. Steel and another ….. Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER MALIK Present: Mr. Abhishek Kaushik, Advocate for Mr. Vipul Jindal, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Ajay Singh, Legal Aid Counsel for the respondents. **** RAVINDER MALIK, J. (Oral) 1. The instant appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. against the impugned order dated 22.08.2008 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridabad, whereby the trial Court has acquitted the respondent-accused in complaint case No.1162 filed under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.2, being the proprietor and person in charge of respondent No.1, approached the complainant Company on 10.06.2003 and advanced a loan of Rs. 5,00,000/-. At the time of obtaining the said amount, respondent No. 2 assured the complainant Company that the entire loan amount would be repaid within a period of two months. Pursuant to the aforesaid assurance, the complainant Company advanced a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the accused. Against the said liability, respondent No. 2, on behalf of KAPIL 2026.09.11 19:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document 2 CRA-S-328-SB-2009 (O&M) respondent No.1 and in his capacity as its proprietor and person in charge, issued a post-dated cheque for a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- in favour of the complainant Company. Respondent No.2 further assured the complainant Company that the said cheque would be duly honoured and encashed upon its presentation for payment through the bank. In accordance with the assurance given by respondent No.2, the complainant Company presented the aforesaid cheque for encashment through its banker, Federal Bank Ltd., NIT, Faridabad, where the complainant maintained its account. However, the said cheque was returned unpaid by the bank of the accused with the remarks “Insufficient Funds”, vide cheque return memo dated 19.08.2003. The complainant Company received information regarding the dishonour of the said cheque on 20.08.2003. Thereafter, the complainant Company, through its counsel, served a legal notice dated 17.09.2003 through registered post, calling upon them to make payment of the cheque amount. Despite receipt of the said legal notice, the accused failed to make payment of the cheque amount within the prescribed period of 15 days. 3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran Etc., 2025(3) RCR (Criminal) 208, after considerable discussion and comparative interpretation of Sections 372 and 378(4) of Cr.P.C., concluded that the victim has a right to file an appeal under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. before the Court of Sessions. Relevant para of the said judgment is as under:- KAPIL 2026.09.11 19:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document 3 CRA-S-328-SB-2009 (O&M) “7.12 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see and can be elaborated as follows: Firstly, the victim of a crime must have an absolute right to prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any condition precedent. In the instant case, a victim under Section 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the holder of a cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of the offence committed by a person who is charged of the offence, namely, the accused, whose cheque has been dishonoured. Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C.. A person convicted of a crime has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to prefer an appeal. Thirdly, it is for this reason that the Parliament thought it fit to insert the proviso to sub-section 372 without mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes the legal representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer an appeal. On the contrary, as against an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor can prefer an appeal even if the complainant does not prefer such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is with the leave of the court. However, it is not always necessary for the State or a complainant to prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a victim's right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High Court under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. would be contrary to what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to circumscribe the victim's right to prefer an appeal just as it has with regard to a complainant or the State filing an appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to Section 372 so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal KAPIL 2026.09.11 19:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document 4 CRA-S-328-SB-2009 (O&M) on the grounds mentioned therein as compared to a complainant. Fifthly, the involvement of the State in respect of an offence under Section 138 of the Act is conspicuous by its absence. This is because the complaint filed under that provision is in the nature of a private complaint as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 143 of the Act by an express intention incorporates the provisions of the Cr.P.C. in the matter of trial of such a deemed offence tried as a criminal offence. Therefore, the complainant, who is the victim of a dishonour of cheque must be construed to be victim in terms of the proviso to Section 372 read with the definition of victim under Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C.” 4. Further, applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence vs. Raj Kumar Arora in Criminal Appeal No. 1319 Of 2013 with Criminal Appeal No. 272 of 2014 decided on 17.04.2025, while clarifying that judgments shall be applicable retrospectively, has held as under:- “91. The declaration of a statute dealing with substantive rights, by the legislature, is considered to be prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. The legal maxim "Nova Constitutio Futuris Forman Imponere Debet, Non Praeteritis" indicating that a new law ought to regulate what is to follow and not the past, carries with it a presumption of prospectivity and this presumption is generally said to operate unless the contrary is shown by an express provision in the statute or if the retrospectivity is otherwise discernible through necessary implication. This is because such statutes would have the consequence of affecting vested rights, impose new burdens or impair existing obligations. However, when a decision rendering an opinion as regards the interpretation of a penal provision is subsequently overruled by the decision of a larger bench, the consequence of the overruling is starkly different and by default, retrospective. This is because it is settled law that the law declared by this Court is KAPIL 2026.09.11 19:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document 5 CRA-S-328-SB-2009 (O&M) retrospective and is normally assumed to be the law from the inception. 92. The operation of a newly enacted statute or rule must not be confused with the effect of a judgment. A judgment or decision which interprets a statute or provision thereof declares the meaning of the statute as it should be construed from the date of its enactment. In other words, the judgment declares what the legislature had said at the time when the law was promulgated and therefore, it has retrospective effect. On the contrary, it is the statute or the rule which is presumed to be prospective unless expressly made retrospective. What follows from the same, is that a decision or judgment enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases irrespective of the stage of pendency before different forums since what has been enunciated is the meaning of the law which existed from the inception of the concerned statute or provision. What has been declared to be the law of the land must be held to have always been the law of the land. This conclusion also stems from the rationale that the duty of the court is not to "pronounce a new law but to maintain and expound the old one". (emphasis added) 5. In Celestium Financial (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the right of a victim to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal is at par with the right of an accused to prefer an appeal against conviction under Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. The Hon’ble Apex Court, by permitting a victim to prefer an appeal before the Court of Sessions without the requirement of obtaining special leave, offered a ray of hope to countless litigants who are awaiting an effective opportunity of being heard and a timely adjudication of their cases. The Hon’ble Court has, in fact, construed such right as a fundamental right falling within the domain of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Further, speedy resolution of disputes not only reinforces public KAPIL 2026.09.11 19:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document 6 CRA-S-328-SB-2009 (O&M) confidence in the administration of justice but also allevates the burden on Courts. 6. Therefore, in view of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Celestium Financial (supra) and Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (supra), the matter is relegated to the learned Sessions Judge, Faridabad with a direction to treat the present appeal as an appeal filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. and entrust the same to the appropriate Court for its disposal on merits expeditiously. 7. Registry is directed to send the complete paperbook and the record of the case to learned Sessions Judge, Faridabad, forthwith. 8. Disposed of, accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (RAVINDER MALIK) JUDGE 10.09.2026 Kapil Whether Speaking/Reasoned : Yes/No Whether Reportable : Yes/No KAPIL 2026.09.11 19:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document