THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLA No. 358 of 2009 (In the matter of an application under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) Maniram Saha @ Dhrub @ Majhi …… Appellant -Versus- State of Orissa ……. Respondent For the Appellant : Mr. Tukuna Kumar Mishra, Amicus Curiae For the Respondent : Mr. Sobhan Panigrahi, ASC CORAM: THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA Date of Hearing: 12.03.2026 : Date of Judgment: 17.03.2026 S.S. Mishra, J. This Criminal Appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.07.2009 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nuapada in Sessions Case No. 27 of 2007 [arising out of Jonk P.S. Case No. 94/2006 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 357/2006 (TR 310/2007)], whereby the learned trial court convicted the appellant under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to further suffer R.I. for one month. 2. This appeal is pending since 2009 and none appeared for the appellant on several dates of hearing. Therefore, vide order dated 19.02.2026, this Court requested Mr. Tukuna Kumar Mishra, who was in Court, to assist the Court in the capacity of Amicus Curiae and he has readily accepted the same and after obtaining the entire record, assisted the Court very effectively. He has also filed a detailed written note of submission along with relied upon judgments. 3. Heard Mr. Tukuna Kumar Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant and Mr. Sobhan Panigrahi, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State. 4. The prosecution case, in nutshell, is that on 21.11.2006 at 8.00 A.M. the informant Narayan Dhrub lodged a written report at Beltukuri Outpost to the effect that about ten years back his daughter Gayatri married to the accused Maniram at village Bhaleswar. After one year of her marriage the accused subjected her to physical and mental torture. To settle their dispute, meetings were held at different times but the accused continued to torture her. It is alleged that on 20.11.2006 at about 4.00 P.M. one of the villagers of accused informed that Gayatri died. The informant and other relatives rushed to Bhaleswar and came to know that the deceased had consumed poison. The elder brother of Maniram abused them in obscene language and threatened them to assault. 5. On the basis of the written report of the informant (P.W.11), police registered the case and investigation was conducted and charge sheet has been filed in the present case against the accused for the alleged commission of offence u/s.498-A/306 of I.P.C. The accused took a stance of complete denial and claim trial. Accordingly, he was put to trial on the charges, as mentioned above. 6. The prosecution in order to bring home the charges examined as many as nineteen witnesses and exhibited eleven documents. Out of nineteen witnesses, P.Ws.1 and 2 were the witnesses to the seizure; P.Ws.3, 4, 5 and 6 were the independent witnesses; P.W.7 informed the fact of death of deceased to the informant; P.Ws.8 and 10 are the niece of the deceased; P.W.9 was the nurse who took zima of bedhead ticket; P.W.11 was the informant; P.W.12 was the autopsy doctor; P.W.13 is the brother of the deceased; P.W.14 was the headman of Dhrub Samaj; P.W.15 was the President of Dhrub Samaj; and P.Ws.16 to 19 were the I.Os of the present case. 7. Although the appellant stood charged for the offence punishable under Sections 498-A/306 of the IPC, but the learned trial Court relying upon the evidence of the prosecution, arrived at a conclusion that the appellant is not guilty of offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC and the appellant is only convicted under Section 498-A IPC and was sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default to further suffer R.I. for one month. 8. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.07.2009 passed by the learned trial court, although the appellant has filed the present appeal, but Mr. Mishra, after strenuously arguing for considerably length of time, confined the appeal only to the quantum of sentence rather questioning the conviction. 9. Mr. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant submitted that the appellant was employed as a Postmaster in the local post office, therefore the conviction recorded by the learned trial court vide impugned judgment may be detrimental and may hinder in availing his service benefit. However, he found recourse to the statutory protection provided under Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, if a person is found guilty of an offence and is treated under the provisions of section 3 and 4 of the P.O. Act, he shall not suffer “disqualification” attached to the conviction for offence under such law. In view of such statutory protection, Mr. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae submitted that the appellant may be treated under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act. He further submitted that the appellant after conviction have precisely prayed for extension of benefit of the P.O. Act before the learned trial court, which was turned down. The learned trial court while turning down the prayer has made the following observations:- “Heard the convicts as well as the defence on the question of sentence. The convict submits that he is innocent and prays to release him on P.O. Act. But the conduct of the convict manifest a mischievous disposition. He has harassed his wife both physically and mentally in such a manner that compelled her to take extreme step. So the convict deserves no sympathy. However, taking into account the future of his children I am inclined to impose a minimum sentence. Hence while convicting, I sentence the accused to undergo R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- i.d. to further suffer R.I. for one month. The pre-conviction period of detention as U.T.P. be set off.” 10. Mr. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that the incident relates back to the year 2006. The appellant was convicted in the year 2009 and since then the appeal is pending. About 19 years have already been lapsed in between and, therefore, much has changed by now. He submitted that at the time of incident the appellant was aged about 42 years, hence at present he is aged about 59 years. He further submitted that over the years, he has led a dignified life, integrated well into society, and is presently leading a settled family life. Incarcerating him after such a long delay, it is argued, would serve little penological purpose and may in fact be counter-productive, casting a needless stigma not only upon him but also upon his family members, especially when there is no suggestion of any repeat violation or ongoing non-compliance with regulatory norms. In view of the changing situation and passing of near about two decades, Mr. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae submitted that the sentence may be modified taking into consideration the entirety of the fact and circumstances of the case and he reiterated his prayer to treat the appellant under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. Page 7 of 13 11. The incident relates back to the year 2006 and at that point of time the appellant was 42 years of age. He has been convicted by the impugned judgment and order dated 20.07.2009. The present appeal is pending since 2009 and at present the appellant is about 59 years of age. Therefore, the prayer made by Mr. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant for extending the benefit of the P.O. Act deserves merit. True is that even after the conviction if the convict is treated under the P.O. Act, he will not suffer “disqualification” attached to the conviction. This has been well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 1985 (2) SCC 358 (Shanker Dass vs. Union of India). The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- “Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act must be placed out of way first. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or 4 "shall not suffer disqualification" attaching to a conviction for an offence under such law. The order of dismissal from service consequent upon a conviction is not a disqualification" within the meaning of section 12. There are statutes which provide that persons who are convicted for certain offences shall incur certain disqualifications. For example, Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, entitled "Disqualifications for membership of Parliament and State Legislatures" and Chapter IV entitled "Disqualifications for Voting contain provisions which disqualify persons convicted of certain charges from being members of legislatures or from voting at elections to legislatures. That is the sense in which the word "disqualification” is used in section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the reasoning of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. …………………..” 12. Regard being had to the societal position of the appellant, his clean antecedents, and the fact that the incident had taken place in the year 2006, I am of the considered view that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act and Section 360 of Cr.P.C. Additionally, the case of the appellant is also covered by ratio of the judgment of this Court in the case of Arjun Malik Vs. State of Odisha1 and Padmabati Muduli and others Vs. State of Orissa2 wherein this Court in cases of similar nature of matrimonial violence has extended the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act owing to large passage of time. 13. However, Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code prescribes punishment which may extend to three years and entails liability to fine. In the present case, the learned trial court has awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- to the appellant. Having regard to the nature of the offence, the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view the object 1 AIROnline 2025 ORI 489 2 CRA No.184 of 1994 and spirit underlying the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, this Court is of the considered view that the ends of justice would be adequately met by extending the benefit of probation to the appellant insofar as the sentence of imprisonment is concerned apt would be to rely on the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chellammal and Another v. State represented by the Inspector of Police3 which has elaborately explained the scope, object and significance of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 while considering the question of extending the benefit of probation to a convict. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has underscored that the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Probation of Offenders Act is essentially reformative in nature, aiming to provide an opportunity to first-time or less serious offenders to reform themselves rather than subjecting them to incarceration. It has been emphasized that the provisions of the Act are intended to prevent the deleterious effects of imprisonment on individuals who can otherwise be rehabilitated as responsible members of society. The Court has further highlighted that Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act 3 2025 INSC 540 confers a wide discretion upon the courts to release an offender on probation in appropriate cases and that the said provision has a broader and more expansive ambit than Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 14. While discussing the interplay between the aforesaid provisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also clarified that courts are duty-bound to consider the applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act in cases where the circumstances justify such consideration, and if the court decides not to extend the benefit of probation, it must record special reasons for such refusal. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are reproduced hereunder: “26. On consideration of the precedents and based on a comparative study of Section 360, Cr. PC and sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act, what is revealed is that the latter is wider and expansive in its coverage than the former. Inter alia, while Section 360 permits release of an offender, more twenty-one years old, on probation when he is sentenced to imprisonment for less than seven years or fine, Section 4 of the Probation Act enables a court to exercise its discretion in any case where the offender is found to have committed an offence such that he is punishable with any sentence other than death or life imprisonment. Additionally, the non-obstante clause in sub-section gives overriding effect to sub-section (1) of Section 4 over any other law for the time being in force. Also, it is noteworthy that Section 361, Cr. PC itself, being a subsequent legislation, engrafts a provision that in any case where the court could have dealt with an accused under the provisions of the Probation Act but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reasons therefor. 27. What logically follows from a conjoint reading of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act and Section 361, Cr. PC is that if Section 360, Cr. PC were not applicable in a particular case, there is no reason why Section 4 of the Probation Act would not be attracted. 28. Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor”. Regard being had to the facts of the present case, particularly the long lapse of time since the occurrence, the absence of criminal antecedents of the appellant and the overall circumstances emerging from the record, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the appellant deserves consideration under the beneficial provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is inclined to extend to the appellants the benefit contemplated under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. 15. In such view of the matter, the present Criminal Appeal in so far as the conviction recorded by the learned trial court is concerned, is turned down. But instead of sentencing the appellant to suffer imprisonment, this Court directs the appellant to be released under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act for a period of six months on his executing bond of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) within one month with one surety for the like amount to appear and receive the sentence when called upon during such period and in the meantime, the appellant shall keep peace and good behavior and he shall remain under the supervision of the concerned Probation Officer during the aforementioned period of six months. Although the appellant has been extended the benefit of Section 4 of the P.O. Act and he is released on good conduct bond, but additionally the appellant is liable to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (rupees five thousand) under Section 5 of the P.O. Act. The fine amount shall be deposited by the appellant within a period of one month. The fine amount to be deposited by the appellant shall be disbursed to parents/L.Rs. of parents of the deceased in accordance with Section 357 of Cr.P.C. 16. This Court records the appreciation for the effective and meaningful assistance rendered by Mr. Tukuna Kumar Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae. He is entitled to an honorarium of Rs.7,500/- (Rupees seven thousand five hundred) to be paid as token of appreciation. 17. The Criminal Appeal is partly allowed. (S.S. Mishra) Judge The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Dated the 17th of March, 2026/Ashok Designation: Secretary