IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) WPA 6006 of 2009 Steel Authority of India Limited IISCO Steel Plant Vs The State of West Bengal & Ors. For the Petitioner : Mr. Soumya Majumder, ld. Sr.Adv. Mr. Bandhu Brata Bhula. For the Respondent no. 3 : Mr. Bikash Ranjan Neogi, Ms. Ananya Neogi, Ms. Anushka Ghosh. For the State : Ms. Soma Chakraborty, Mr. Kaustav Seal. Judgment reserved on : 24.06.2026 Judgment delivered on : 09.07.2026 Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.: 1. The writ application has been preferred challenging the order of reference dated 23.04.2004 and the award dated 22.12.2008, passed by the 9th Industrial Tribunal, Durgapur. 2. The case of the petitioner herein is that the petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing Steel at its Burnpur Works and is a public sector undertaking under the Ministry of Steel. 2 3. The respondent no. 3 is the workman at whose instance the purported order of reference over the issue of regularization of service of 24 workmen in the company at its Burnpur Works had been referred to the learned Tribunal for adjudication. 4. That in the Slag Granulation Plant of the Burnpur Works, the persons named in the order of reference had claimed to have been appointed between 30.01.1980 and 27.07.1988 on various dates and the Union has claimed that those workers had performed their duties as operators and khalasis under the direct control of the management. 5. It is the case of the Union that the persons named in the order of reference, out of which 17 are concerned in the present dispute had joined the company, namely, Damodar Cement and Slag Limited, which was a contractor vis-à-vis the business of the petitioner company at its Burnpur Works in the department. 6. It is the case of the Union that on 09.02.1980 a Notification was issued under Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 prohibiting the nature of job in which concerned 17 persons named in the order of reference were working. 7. In 1984, an agreement with the contractors was terminated and another contractor namely Ashok Traders was inducted for certain work in the company in the Slag Granulation Plant. The said Ashok Traders (Contractor) ceased to operate as a contractor in March, 1997 and thereafter for sometime, by way of humanitarian act, and under pressure and threat of the Union which was apprehensive that the plant 3 might be shut down, those 17 persons were paid directly by the management of the petitioner-company 8. In 1999 another contractor namely P.K.Thakur was (nominated for executing work on contract and all 17 concerned contractors labours joined the services under the said contractor. Subsequently another contractor, namely Aich & Aich Company has been inducted as a contractor and the concerned persons continued to work under the subsequent contractor also, obviously on request of the outgoing contractor and under threat and pressure of the Union. 9. It is stated that at no material point of time, the management of the petitioner company had any supervision, administration and control over the nature and manner in which the work was to be executed by the contract labourers. 10. The establishment of the petitioner company is exempted under the provisions of Section 17 of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and the company by treating one of the 17 persons concerned in the dispute, namely, Atiar Rahaman Munshi, as an 'employee' within the meaning of the EPF & MP Act, 1952 had forwarded the application for non-refundable advance from PF Trust under House Building Scheme to the Trustee Board. It is stated that the P.F. Trustee Board of the company is a separate juristic entity and different from your petitioner company. 11. That all the 17 concerned persons have subsequently filled up their statutory forms under the Employees' Provident Funds and 4 Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 giving out their statutory declaration forms by admitting their status as employees of the contractors. 12. On the basis of these available facts the respondent no.3 purported to raise an industrial dispute straightway with the Conciliation Officer under the I.D. Act without raising any dispute with the employer. 13. The purported industrial dispute was referred to the learned Tribunal by the Government of West Bengal vide an Order of Reference dated 23.04.2004. 14. The issues in the order of reference are as follows:- “1. Whether the claim of the union for regularisation of services of 24 (twenty four) workmen (vide Annexure-i) in the company IISCO Ltd., Burnpur Works, is justified? 2. What relief, if any, are they entitled to ?” 15. The tribunal on adjudication held as follows:- “that the case under reference is allowed on contest. Accordingly, an Award is passed directing the company to regularize the services of the concerned workmen in the company under order of reference Annexure I excepting the names appearing in Sl. No. 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 23 with wages and other benefits with effect from the date when the reference has been made before this Tribunal.” 16. Hence, the writ application challenging the said order. 17. Mr. Soumya Majumder, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner on filing written notes has argued that the order of reference has pre-supposed the twenty four persons named in the order to be the workmen of the company. Although the materials before the conciliation machinery disclosed them to be contract labourers. The reference 5 therefore suffers from lack of material to form an opinion so as to make the reference. 18. Mr. Majumder has further argued that the award proceeds on the assertion of the workmen that they were under the direct administrative control of the company, and having been appointed between 30th January, 1980 to 27th July, 1988, they had been working continuously. 19. It is the contention of the petitioner that the Tribunal has passed an erroneous award on the ground that provident fund liability is an indirect/vicarious liability of a principal employer. Therefore, reference to provident fund documents does not establish a direct relationship between contract labourers and the principal employer. 20. Even a short time direct payment by the principal employer to the contract labourers in the absence of contractor will not establish a direct master servant relationship between the principal employer and the contract labourer. 21. The petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nihal Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. reported in (2013) 14 SCC 65 and WPA 23964 of 2014 along with MAT 2266 of 2023 wherien the Court held as follows:- “17. From the mere fact that the payment of wages came from the bank at whose disposal the services of each of the appellants was kept did not render the appellants employees of those banks. The appointment is made by the State. The disciplinary control vests with the State. The two factors which conclusively establish that the relationship of master and servant exists between the State and the appellants. A fact which is clearly recognized by the Division Bench of the High 6 Court in LPA NO. 209 of 1992. It may be worthwhile mentioning here that under the law of contracts in this country the consideration for a contract need not always necessarily flow from the parties to a contract. The decision of the SSP to reject the claim of the appellants only on the basis that the payment of wages to the appellants herein was being made by the banks concerned rendering them disentitled to seek regularisation of their services from the State is clearly untenable.” 22. It is the further case of the petitioner that in any event failure of the contractor to pay wages to the contract labourers triggers of the statutory responsibility of the principal employer to pay wages in terms of Section 21 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Compliance with such statutory provision does not establish a direct relationship. 23. It is further argued by Mr. Majumder that the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. Workmen of Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Anr. in Civil Appeal Nos. 902-903 of 2023 dated 07.02.2023 was delivered in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India while dealing with a different case of 159 contract labourers, who had laid different standard of evidence. The said facts do not match with the case in hand. It is further stated that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SAIL reported at (2001) 7 SCC 1 (para 125) held that on an establishment of direct relationship, the contract labourers engaged in prohibited jobs notified under Section 10 of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 will only have a preferential right of employment vis-à-vis outsiders who participate in the recruitment process for the post. As such, the petitioner prays that 7 the impugned award suffers from inherent illegality and is liable to be dismissed. 24. The petitioner has also relied upon the judgment in Gujarat Electricity Board Thermal Power Station, Ukai, Gujarat vs. Hind Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 27 (Para 57). 25. Mr. Neogi, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 on filing written notes of argument has argued that in a similar matter the ld. 9th Industrial Tribunal at Durgapur in the year 2005 passed similar and identical order, challenging which the petitioner herein filed a writ petition. After dismissal of the writ petition, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court and being aggrieved by the order of the Hon’ble Division Bench, the petitioner herein filed a special leave petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering all aspects held as follows:- “12. The issue whether the workmen were employed by IISCO or they were contractual employees is essentially a question of fact which has been examined in depth by the Tribunal, learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court, holding concurrently that the workmen were actually the employees of the appellant-Authority. Such a finding of fact does not warrant for any interference by this Court. Having held so, we clarify that it is not necessary to regularize the services of the workman who have died, retired or still in employment and even in the absence of such a status they shall be entitled to the following service benefits: 8 (i) Pay-scale at par with the employees who are on the roll of the appellant- Authority; (ii) The benefit of provident fund; (iii) The benefit under the Gratuity Act; (iv) The other service benefits including the medical allowance which the appellant Authority has granted to its employees under the Service Regulations or through administrative decisions from time to time. Such benefits will be admissible from the cut-off date determined by the Tribunal." 27. The specific case of the respondent no. 3 herein is that there being no difference in status with the respondent workmen herein and the workmen of the SLP, being similarly situated and similarly circumstanced this Hon’ble Court has ample jurisdiction to decide the relief which the respondent workmen are entitled in view of the specific finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. Mr. Neogi further argues that the award as challenged by the respondent in this writ petition and the award which was challenged before the learned Single Judge, Hon’ble Division Bench and then the Hon’ble Supreme Court, are same and identical and it is thus submitted that those findings which reached its finality, cannot be reopened and this Court has ample power to decide what relief the respondent workmen are entitled to in view of the specific finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as the respondent workmen herein are employees of the petitioners herein, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 12 of the earlier SLP being Civil Appeal Nos. 902-903 of 2023 (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 26634-26635 of 2019 and as such the respondent 9 workmen are entitled to relief as per the award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal. 29. The respondent no. 3 herein has relied upon a judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court, passed in WP 20732 (W) of 2009 dated 17th January, 2017, wherein the Court held as follows:- “21. I do not find the decision of the Tribunal to be perverse. On behalf of the workmen, 58 exhibits were relied upon and oral evidence was also adduced both by the workmen and the management. These exhibits demonstrate direct supervision of officers of the petitioners over these workmen. Mr. Gupta has argued that certain officers of SAIL who described the workmen as employees had no authority to do so. But this is not a case where status is sought to be established by documents. The Tribunal had to see what was the actual nature of relationship between the parties. Thus it is immaterial as to whether a particular officer was authorized to describe a particular workman as direct employee of the organization or not. What is material is that they were treated as direct employees of the Company. In some cases, they were required to work in night shifts, which ordinarily a permanent workman has to work in. For certain period, the workmen had come out of the fold of the contractor. In this factual perspective, the description of the workmen represented by the first respondent as contract-worker is was a sham exercise, a camouflage to conceal their real status. 22. Though reference was framed as if it was a case of regularization, this was not a case where dispute was on regularization simpliciter. This was a case where the Tribunal examined as to whether the employment by the contractor was a sham or camouflage arrangement. In my opinion the Tribunal had correctly arrived at its finding. I accordingly dismiss 10 the writ petition. The award of the Tribunal is sustained. Interim order passed in this matter, if any, shall stand dissolved.” 30. By a judgment dated 18th April, 2019 the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in FMA 1369 of 2017 held as follows:- “34. The learned Judge, in our opinion, correctly appreciated, relying upon General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra), that the present case was not one of regularisation simpliciter such as in the case of an ad hoc or casual employee claiming this privilege. The basic issue in the case before His Lordship was the status of the 159 workmen and whether they were the employees of SAIL or the contractors, and in the event they were SAIL’s employees, the claim that required the industrial adjudicator’s attention was whether they were to be treated on a par with other regular employees. Steel Authority of India Limited (supra) lays down the law that if the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer. The present case stands on a better footing, in that no contract is shown to exist and, therefore, question of a contractor interposing between SAIL and the 159 workmen does not and cannot arise. 35. We record our respectful concurrence with the views expressed by the learned Judge on each of the points that were raised before His Lordship by SAIL, and hold on the facts and circumstances of this particular case that the materials before us are insufficient to even persuade us to hold that the learned Judge was not right in not interfering with the challenge to the impugned award. The 159 workmen had/have been employed almost uninterruptedly for more than two decades and most of them having crossed the age of retirement and only a handful 11 being in service, we consider that the time is now ripe to allow the matter to rest.” 31. Finally, the respondent no. 3 has relied upon the judgment of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra) dated 7th February, 2023 and has categorically submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court has already decided the issue similar to the one involved in the present writ application and as the respondents-workmen are similarly placed, they are entitled to get relief as prayed for. 32. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 that though the said judgment was directed to be not treated as a precedent in similar matters, the substance and observation of the Court can be considered as a guidance by this Court. 33. Mr. Majumder, counters the said argument by stating that the award which was before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said proceedings referred to by the parties, was on a different issue and the facts and circumstances in both the cases are not similar and, as such, the workman in the present case cannot be treated at par with the workman in which they have been granted relief by the Supreme Court. 34. In the present case, as whether there existed any relationship of employer and employees between the parties herein, the following observation/findings of the tribunal are relevant:- “i. According to G.M. IISCO (O.P.W.1), “As the Contractors were not engaged during that period we engaged Contractor's workers and paid their salary to maintain their livelihood. When award of 12 contract was not finalized, the present applicants were engaged by us under direct supervision during that period. The period was from 1st April 1997 to 19th August 1999. It is a fact that all 24 applicant-s were under direct control of supervision from 1.4.97 to 19.8.99. We did not submit any document to show that all these 24 applicants went under the control of fresh contractor". “This piece of evidence adduced on behalf of the Employer rendered assistance to the applicants to prove their case that they have been working under direct control of the company.” ii. “Ext. 11 is a Memo issued by Sri S.C.Lall, Assistant General Manager (S & S) addressed to Deputy General Manager (Iron) Burnpur, which states- “Enclosed herewith please find a list of workers earlier employed by Ex-Contractor of Old Slag Granulation Plant, M/S Ashoka Trading Company. The contract with M/S A.T.C expired on 31.3.97 and from 1.4.97 Sorap & Salvage Deptt., was continuing the Plant Operation with the same 36 workers. Since a decision has been taken by contempt Authority that plant operation and maintenance areas would be managed by the Blast Furnace Department, the names of the concerned workers are being forwarded for future 13 attendance keeping and disbursing of their salaries, Sri S.C.Lall, Assistant General Manager (S&S).” “This Memo (Ext. 11) described the present applicants as Earlier employed by Ex-Contractor of Old Slag Granulation Plant, M/S Ashoka “Trading Company”. Admittedly, the applicants were earlier employed by the Ex-Contractor Ashoka Trading Company. So, after expiry of the contract with M/S Ashoka Trading Company, these applicants were taken under direct control of the Management definitely for the need of the company. It is reiterated that the sole witness adduced by the company has stated on oath “We did not submit any document to show that all these 24 applicants went under the control of the fresh Contractor.” iii. “So, the story of new Contractor as put forth by the company can reasonably be held to be a camouflage and has been brought into existence in order to conceal the relationship between the employees and the Management. No contractor has come forward to depose that the applicants were their workmen.” 35. The tribunal followed the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainbhai v. Alath Factory Thezhilali Union, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1410, wherein the Court held:- 14 “Where a worker or group of workers, labours to produce goods or services and these goods or services are for the business of another, that other is, in fact, the Employer. He has economic control over the workers' subsistence, skill and continued employment. If he, for any reason, chokes off, the worker is, virtually, laid off. The presence of intermediate contractors with whom alone the workers have immediate or direct relationship ex contractu is of no consequence when, on lifting the veil or looking out the conspectus of factors governing employment, it is found, though draped in different perfect paper arrangement, that the real employer is the management, not the immediate contractor". This case law is very much applicable here.” 36. The learned tribunal further held that:- “………………. That the applicants where initially employed by the contractor but after the expiry of the contract of contractor the Management started controlling and supervising the work done by the applicants. The applicants of the instant case have been doing their works admittedly since 1982-83. Nothing has been proved to show that the Jobs performed by the applicants are not perennial in nature, although the workmen have been working for more than a couple of decades.” 37. The tribunal finally held:- “The represented applicants are held to be the workmen of M/S Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., Burnpur Works. It is also held that the applicants/workmen shall be treated at par with other workmen of the 15 company for the purpose of wages and other benefits. It is also held that they shall be entitled to the benefits from the date when this reference has been made before the Tribunal.” 38. It appears from the said findings in the impugned award and other materials on record that the workers herein are similarly placed as the workers before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 902-903 of 2023, order dated February 07, 2023, in Steel Authority of India Limited vs Workmen of Steel Authority of India Limited & Anr. 39. The issues in reference were also similar and the workmen herein are also part of the same company. 40. Para 2 of the said Order/Judgment dated February 07, 2023 being relevant is as follows:- “2. Respondent No. 1 is a workers’ union of erstwhile Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO) Steel Plant at Burnpur, District Burdwan, West Bengal. There were 159 workers, who were employed as contract labourers. They were employed, initially somewhere in the year 1990 or subsequent thereto on different dates. The present status is that out of 159 workers, 32 have unfortunately passed away and except one, others have retired on superannuation.” 41. The workers therein were also initially employed as contract labourers in 1990. Herein they were similarly employed, even earlier that is some time in the year 1983. 42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed:- “10. …………The concept of regular employment is not a sine qua non for the purpose of granting the statutory benefits admissible to a workman under various social welfare legislations and in accordance with the service 16 regulations/terms and conditions of employment which are uniformally applied by an employer qua all its employees………” 43. In the present case also the tribunal has examined in depth the issue whether the workmen were employed by IISCO or they were contractual employees and held that the workmen were actually the employees of the petitioner herein. 44. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified that:- “15. ……….the instant appeals have been decided keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case owing to the long pendency of the dispute coupled with the fact that out of 159 workmen, 32 have already died and only one workman remains in service while the others have attained the age of superannuation, and it shall not be taken as a precedent for other similar matters, if any, pending before different forums.” Thus the findings and observations of the Hon’ble Court is taken as a guidance herein, the issue being similar and also in the interest of justice. 45. Accordingly the impugned award dated 22.12.2008 passed by the 9th Industrial Tribunal, Durgapur, is modified as follows:- a) The order as to regularization of the services of the workmen is set aside. b) The workmen irrespective of their present status shall be entitled to the following service benefits: 17 (i) Pay-scale at par with the employees who are on the roll of the appellant – Authority; (ii) The benefit of provident fund; (iii) The benefit under the Gratuity Act; (iv) The other service benefits including the medical allowance which the appellant – Authority has granted to its employees under the Service Regulations or through administrative decisions from time to time. Such benefits will be admissible from the cut-off date determined by the Tribunal. 46. WPA 6006 of 2009 is accordingly disposed of. 47. Connected application, if any, stands disposed of. 48. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 49. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously after due compliance. (Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)