128 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) Date of Decision: 15.07.2026 The General Manager, Haryana Roadways and others .......... Appellant Versus Ramesh Kumar .......... Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH MANUJA Present: Mr. Raj Partap Singh Brar, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana for the appellants. None for the respondent. **** HARKESH MANUJA, J. (ORAL) The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellants-defendants assailing the judgment and decree dated 21.01.2008 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sonepat (for brevity, “ld. First Appellate Court”) whereby the appeal preferred by the respondent- plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 24.09.2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sonepat (for brevity, “ld. trial Court”) was allowed. Consequently, judgment and decree of the ld. trial Court dismissing the suit was set aside and the suit of the respondent- plaintiff was decreed in his favour. However, liberty was reserved to the disciplinary authority to proceed afresh from the stage subsequent to submission of the enquiry report. DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -2- [2] Brief facts of the case are that the respondent-plaintiff, Ramesh Kumar, was serving as Driver with Haryana Roadways, Sonepat Depot. On 28.03.2001, while driving busfrom Sonepat towards Chandigarh, an accident occurred near village SarifGarh involving a tractor-trolley which was going from Shahabad to Pipli, resulting in the death of the tractor driver. Pursuant to the said accident, respondent-plaintiff was charge-sheeted under Rule 7 of the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987(for brevity, “the 1987 rules”)and was placed under suspension vide order dated 30.03.2001. The respondent-plaintiff submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 14.05.2001 and sought reinstatement. During the pendency of the enquiry, he was reinstated on 15.05.2001. Thereafter, an Enquiry Officer was appointed on 17.05.2001 who conducted an enquiry and submitted his report on 28.07.2001. The respondent–plaintiff further pleaded that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, vide judgment dated 13.03.2003 (Ex. PW/B), acquitted him in the criminal case. Despite such acquittal, appellant–defendant No.1 held him guilty and issued a show cause notice dated 01.05.2003. The respondent–plaintiff submitted a reply thereto on 21.08.2003, and a personal hearing was afforded to him. However, finding the reply unsatisfactory, appellant–defendant No.1, vide Order No.7422 dated 20.11.2003, imposed the following punishments upon the respondent–plaintiff: (i) the suspension period from 30.03.2001 to 15.05.2001 was to be considered up to the subsistence allowance; and (ii) stoppage of one annual increment permanently. DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -3- [3] Thereafter, the respondent-plaintiff preferred a statutory appeal before appellant-defendant No.3 against the punishment order dated 20.11.2003, but the same came to be dismissed vide order dated 20.07.2004. [4] The respondent-plaintiff sought a decree for declaration to the effect that the punishment order dated 20.11.2003 passed by appellant- defendant No.1 and the appellate order dated 20.07.2004 passed by appellant-defendant No.3 were illegal, void and liable to be set aside and that the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to get one increment and the remaining suspension allowance. [5] The appellants-defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement raising preliminary objections regarding maintainability, locus standi and cause of action. The appellants-defendants pleaded that information regarding the accident had been received by the department, whereupon the respondent-plaintiff had been placed under suspension with immediate effect vide order dated 30.03.2001 and charge-sheet under Rule 7 of the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 was served upon him. It was pleaded that though the respondent-plaintiff was acquitted in criminal case but ld. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded compensation vide award dated 22.07.2002 while fixing joint and several liability. In view thereof, respondent-plaintiff was served with show cause notice dated 01.05.2003 (Ex.D4) proposing stoppage of two annual increments and restricting suspension period to subsistence allowance only. Consequently, vide order dated 20.11.2003, appellant-defendant No.1 imposed the punishments upon the respondent-plaintiff and appeal against this order was dismissed by appellant-defendant No.3 on 20.07.2004. DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -4- [6] From the pleadings, the trial Court framed following issues: 1. Whether the order dated 30.11.2003 passed by defendant No. 1 and order dated 20.07.2004 passed by defendant No. 3 are illegal, void and liable to be set aside? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get one increment and suspension allowance of the remaining period as prayed for? 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form nor the plaintiff has any locus standi to file the same? 4. Relief. [7] After appreciating the pleadings and the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the ld. trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 24.09.2007 dismissed the suit of the respondent- plaintiff with costs, holding that the orders dated 20.11.2003 and 20.07.2004, passed by appellants-defendant Nos. 1 and 3 respectively, had been passed after following the due procedure for the award of punishment and after affording sufficient opportunity of hearing to the respondent-plaintiff. Consequently, the ld. trial Court held the said orders to be legal, valid, and binding upon the rights of the respondent-plaintiff. [8] Aggrieved of the judgment and decree dated 24.09.2007, the respondent-plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No.90 of 2007 before the learned First Appellate Court and the same came to be allowed vide judgment and decree dated 21.01.2008, thereby reversing the order of ld. trial Court; however, liberty was reserved to the disciplinary authority to proceed afresh from the stage subsequent to submission of the enquiry report. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -5- [9] On 08.12.2008, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, this Court admitted the appeal and framed the following substantial question of law: "Whether, in the absence of any pleading or evidence of prejudice to the respondent’s defence, failure of the punishing authority to communicate reasons for disagreement with the enquiry report vitiates departmental proceedings? [10] The operation of the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court was ordered to be stayed during the pendency of the present appeal. [11] Learned State counsel for the appellants submits that the ld. First Appellate Court committed a patent error in reversing the well- reasoned judgment and decree passed by the ld. trial Court. It is contended that the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent-plaintiff were conducted strictly in accordance with the 1987 Rules. Learned counsel further submits that, although the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it duly issued a show-cause notice communicating the reasons for such disagreement, wherein reference was also made to the finding recorded by the MACT holding the respondent- plaintiff guilty of rash and negligent driving. It is argued that the punishment order came to be passed only after considering the respondent-plaintiff's reply to the said show-cause notice. Learned counsel lastly contends that the respondent-plaintiff was afforded adequate opportunity of hearing both during the disciplinary proceedings as well as before the Appellate DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -6- Authority. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned State counsel prays for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 21.01.2008 passed by the learned First Appellate Court and for restoration of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. No other contention is raised or pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. [12] There is no representation on behalf of the respondent today. [13] I have heard learned counsel for the appellants-defendants and gone through the paper book. I am unable to find force in the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants. [14] A perusal of the record reveals that pursuant to the accident dated 28.03.2001, the respondent-plaintiff was charge-sheeted under Rule 7 of the 1987 Rules and was placed under suspension vide order dated 30.03.2001. During the pendency of the enquiry, he was reinstated on 15.05.2001. Thereafter, in the enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer appointed on 17.05.2001, he was exonerated from the charges levelled against him, however disagreeing with the enquiry report, the appellant-defendant no.1 served a show cause notice upon the respondent-plaintiff and after considering his reply thereto, while holding him guilty, vide order No. 7422 dated 20.11.2003, imposed punishments upon the respondent-plaintiff to the effect that the suspension period from 30.03.2001 to 15.05.2001 was to be considered up to the subsistence allowance; and stoppage of one annual increment permanently. Thereafter, the appeal preferred by the respondent- plaintiff against the aforesaid punishment order also came to be dismissed by appellant-defendant No.3, vide order dated 20.07.2004. DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -7- [15] The issue before this Court is whether the failure of the punishing authority to communicate the reasons for its disagreement with the enquiry report vitiates the departmental proceedings in the absence of any pleading or evidence of prejudice to the respondent's defence. [16] Before proceeding further, this court deems it apposite to refer to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of the Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra reported as 1998 (3) SCT 833wherein the Court observed that where the Enquiry Officer exonerates the delinquent employee on all or any of the charges and the disciplinary authority proposes to record a contrary finding, it is incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to communicate its tentative reasons for such disagreement and afford the delinquent an effective opportunity of representation before recording its final findings. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder: “ 16. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -8- take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” [16.1] The above legal position was further reiterated by this Court in the case of M.S. Chauhan v. State Bank of India, 2003 (4) SCT 577, wherein it was held that where the punishing authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer exonerating the delinquent on all or any of the charges and proposes to impose punishment, it is obligatory upon such authority to issue a show-cause notice indicating the reasons for its disagreement as well as the proposed action, and to afford the delinquent an adequate opportunity to defend himself. It was further held that such a procedural defect may be cured by remitting the matter to the disciplinary authority to proceed afresh from the stage at which the defect had occurred. [16.2] A similar view was taken by this Court in P.N. Verma v. The Chairman, 2000 (4) SCT 159, wherein it was held that where the Enquiry Officer exonerates the delinquent but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ from such findings, issuance of a show-cause notice accompanied by the enquiry report and the reasons for disagreement is mandatory in terms of the applicable service regulations, Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and the principles of natural justice. [17] Adverting to the facts of the present case, the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the enquiry report, did issue a show cause notice (Ex. D4) dated 01.05.2003, however the said notice neither disclosed the reasons for such disagreement nor pointed out any defect, illegality or DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -9- irregularity in the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. The only ground mentioned therein was regarding the award of the compensation against the respondent-plaintiff passed by the learned MACT holding the respondent- plaintiff liable for rash and negligent driving, which, by itself, cannot be considered as a reason to disagree with the enquiry report. In these circumstances, the learned First Appellate Court rightly observed that if the respondent-plaintiff was to be punished solely on the basis of the MACT award, there was no purpose in conducting a departmental enquiry. Moreover, proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal are summary in nature under the benevolent scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the strict rules of evidence are not applicable thereto. Consequently, the grant of compensation by the MACT could not, by itself, justify holding the respondent-plaintiff guilty in the departmental proceeding. [18] Furthermore, in view of the legal position discussed above in Kunj Behari Misra (supra), M.S. Chauhan (supra) and P.N. Verma (supra), it is well settled that a delinquent official can be held guilty and punished only on the basis of independent and cogent evidence adduced during the departmental enquiry. Even where the Enquiry Officer exonerates the delinquent, the disciplinary authority is competent to reappreciate the evidence and arrive at a different conclusion; however, before recording such disagreement and imposing punishment, it is incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to afford the delinquent a reasonable opportunity of hearing. In the present case, the respondent–plaintiff, in his cross- examination, admitted that he had been afforded adequate opportunity of DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -10- hearing during the departmental enquiry. However, such admission pertains only to the enquiry proceedings. There is nothing on record to establish that, after the disciplinary authority decided to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the respondent–plaintiff was afforded a separate and meaningful opportunity of hearing before the disciplinary proceedings culminated in the order of punishment. [19] Lastly, as per the judgment dated 13.03.2003 (Ex.PW/B), ld. learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra even acquitted the respondent-plaintiff in the criminal case. Thus, there was no evidence with the disciplinary authority to hold him guilty and inflict punishment of stoppage of one increment and restricting the subsistence allowance of the suspension period. [20] In view of the factual and legal position discussed above, the disciplinary authority, having proceeded against the plaintiff–by holding him guilty and imposing punishment in the absence of a reasoned show cause notice disclosing the basis of its disagreement, independent and cogent evidence to establish the charges, and a proper opportunity of hearing, the learned First Appellate Court, rightly held the orders dated 20.11.2003 and 20.07.2004 passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, respectively, to be illegal, null and void. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly against the appellants. [21] Furthermore, the learned First Appellate Court has not foreclosed the disciplinary proceedings. While setting aside the punishment order and the appellate order, it expressly reserved liberty to the disciplinary authority to continue the proceedings afresh from the stage immediately after DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 1658 of 2008 (O&M) -11- submission of the enquiry report. Thus, the judgment under challenge does not absolutely exonerate the respondent-plaintiff from the disciplinary proceedings on merits but merely requires the competent authority to proceed further in accordance with law. [22] Accordingly, the present Regular Second Appeal is dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 21.01.2008 passed by the learned First Appellate Court is hereby affirmed. [23] Since the appeal stands dismissed, the interim order dated 08.12.2008, whereby operation of the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court was stayed during pendency of the appeal, automatically stands vacated. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court shall become operative, subject to the liberty expressly reserved therein. The liberty granted by the learned First Appellate Court shall be subject to the applicable statutory rules governing continuation or initiation of disciplinary proceedings after retirement. [24] Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. [25] Copy of this order be conveyed to the respondent by the appellant-department on the residential address of the respondent available with the department in its record. July 15, 2026 ( HARKESH MANUJA ) 'dk kamra' JUDGE Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether Reportable Yes/No DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.21 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document