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High Court of Orissa · body

2008 DAILYLAW 1202 (ORI)

GUNANIDHI BHUYAN v. G.M.,O.F.D.C.LTD.

WP(C)/8259/2008 · 2026-06-19

R K Pattanaik

Writ Petition (Civil)body2008

Judgment text

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.8259 of 2008 Gunanidhi Bhuyan …. Petitioner Mr. Biswajit Nayak, Advocate -Versus- General Manager, Orissa Forest Development Corporation Ltd., Bhubaneswar & others …. Opposite Parties Mr. P. Jena Advocate for O.P. CORAM: JUSTICE R.K. PATTANAIK DATE OF HEARING: 30.04.2026 DATE OF JUDGMENT:19.06.2026 1. Instant writ petition is filed by the petitioner assailing the enquiry report as at Annexure-5 and the impugned order of opposite party No.1 vide Annexure-7 and to exonerate him on the basis of a report i.e. Annexure-9 with respect to a departmental proceeding initiated on the grounds stated followed by consequential directions issued in that regard as may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. The petitioner challenges the imposition of penalty under Annexure-7 directed by opposite party No.1 to recover an amount of Rs.81,594/- from his salary on the basis of a de novo enquiry conducted by opposite party No.4 bypassing the report of an enquiry held earlier by opposite party No.3 whereby, he was exonerated of all the charges framed and AFR hence, the entire exercise and the action by the opposite parties to be arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional and violative of the principles of natural justice. 3. Briefly stated, the petitioner joined in Orissa Forest Development Corporation in the year 1975 as Assistant Supervisor in Telkoi Sub-Division and thereafter, he was promoted to the rank of Sectional Supervisor in 1982 and was posted at Bhagabanpur Depot at Patrapada in 1995 under the administrative control of opposite party No.3 and continued there up to March, 1997 and during his tenure at the depot between October, 1995 and December, 1996, it had received 7302.10 Quintals of casuarina Garinda firewood and 221.30 Quintals of casuarina twigs from other depots under Nimapada Sub-Division. According to the petitioner, the firewood and twigs were received in a wet condition and in the meantime, there was disposal by transporting 5676.35 Quintals of firewood and 176.20 Quintals of twigs to different sales depot besides 392.40 Quintals of firewood and 28 Quintals of twigs by way of cash sale as per the instructions of the authorities concerned. Furthermore, out of the above sales, 276.60 Quintals of firewood were sold to Bhakta Samilani, Salepur and the amount was realized by opposite party No.3 for sum of Rs.37,341/-. So, to say, the petitioner had shown disposal of 6368.75 Quintals of firewood and 204.20 Quintals of twigs during the period under consideration. 3.1. The petitioner had reposted several times regarding shrinkage of wet firewood to the concerned SDM on 20th February, 1996, 31st July, 1996, 14th March, 1997 and 12th May, 1997 intimating that there is apprehension of excess shrinkage by passage of time but he did not receive any response and hence, informed the same to opposite party No.3 by letters dated 12th March, 1996 and 10th August, 1996 duly received by the Authority. It is pleaded further that the petitioner submitted the progress report every month in which actual shrinkage was mentioned and during the said period, it was 933.35 Quintals of firewood and 17.10 Quintals of twigs, in total, 950.45 Quintals and the entire shrinkage was covering a period of 14 months. 3.2. When a total shrinkage was shown at 950.45 Quintals of firewood, the Authorities allowed only 346.05 Quintals and not the balance and thereafter, initiated a department proceeding against him drawn up basing on the physical verification carried out during 1996-97. The proceeding was drawn up by opposite party No.1 under Annexure-1 followed by Annexure-2 on the following charges, namely, (i) misappropriation of Corporation’s revenue amounting to Rs.81,594/- towards shortage of firewood; and (ii) breach of trust appointing the Deputy DM, Bhubaneswar (C) Division as the Enquiring Officer (EO) to enquiry into the charges levelled against him reiterating engagement of the Section Officer as Marshalling Officer to such enquiry. After the enquiry was concluded, a report was submitted before opposite party No.1 but it was not acted upon nor was the outcome of the enquiry communicated to the petitioner. As such the enquiry was concluded on 9th October, 2001. But surprisingly in the month of December, 2003, the petitioner received order dated 20th December, 2003 (Annexure-3), wherein, opposite party No.1 appointed opposite party No.4 as the EO to hold a de novo enquiry into the charges framed against him. In response to the above order, the petitioner appeared before the EO upon receiving notice and participated in the enquiry and finally on 7th February, 2008, he received a notice from opposite party No.1 enclosing a copy of the enquiry report submitted by opposite party No.4 directing him to submit a written defence within 30 days from the date of receipt of such notice. A copy of the said enquiry report is at Annexure-5 received by the petitioner vide Annexure-4, whereafter, he requested opposite party No.1 to supply him certain documents in order to prepare the defence to the show cause and prayed for 15 days more since letter dated 19th January, 2008 was received on 7th February, 2008 but unfortunately just after two days i.e. on 27th February, 2008, the impugned order dated 19th February, 2008 was received, wherein, opposite party No.1 awarded a punishment to recover the amount of Rs.81,594/- from his salary @ Rs.2,000/- a month with the last instalment being Rs.1,594/-. It is also pleaded that reasonable opportunity was not provided to the petitioner to submit a written statement of defence and therefore, the decision imposing punishment communicated to him vide Annexure-7 is illegal and not tenable in law. A copy of the representation dated 25th February, 2008 by the petitioner to supply him the documents to prepare the defence is at Annexure-6 but as earlier stated, it was followed by the final order of penalty i.e. Annexure-4. Page 5 of 19 3.3. Finding no other alternative, the petitioner applied for certain documents from the office of opposite party No.1 along with the enquiry report submitted by the previous EO under the Right to Informant Act. A copy of the said enquiry report dated 9th October, 2001 as at Annexure-9 was supplied to the petitioner pursuant to the above request to opposite party No.1. Referring to Annexure-9, it is further pleaded that the petitioner was exonerated from all the charges in the year 2001 and therefore, a second enquiry in 2003 was not at all warranted and therefore, the action of the opposite parties is illegal alleging that a copy of the said report was never supplied to him and surprisingly after he was exonerated of all the charges, a de novo enquiry was commenced which ultimately led to the imposition of penalty. 4. Opposite party No.2 filed the counter on behalf of the Corporation and it is pleaded therein that there was shortage of firewood upon a physical verification held with a report received from the SDM, Bhubaneswar (C) Division and in connection therewith, the departmental action was initiated by the Disciplinary Authority and it was in respect of 598.05 Quintals of firewood and 6.35 Quintals of twigs. It is pleaded that taking into account the physical inspection report and admissible shrinkage of firewood, it was decided to draw a departmental proceeding against the petitioner to make good the loss sustained by the Corporation which was caused on account of misappropriation and negligence of the petitioner and ultimately report of the EO was received but Disciplinary Authority found it not satisfactory and considered it just and proper to conduct a de novo enquiry and accordingly appointed another EO purpose being to ascertain the truth of the allegations levelled against him. 4.1. Since the petitioner remained silent and did not submit any show cause reply to the notice after the enquiry was concluded with a report of such enquiry supplied to him, it was followed by a final order of the Disciplinary Authority awarding punishment and to recover the amount of misappropriation from his salary. It is alleged that the representation of the petitioner by letter dated 25th February, 2008 to supply necessary documents is a fabricated one and it was never received by the Disciplinary Authority. Replying to the plea that there are two enquiries held since it amounts to double jeopardy, it is pleaded that only upon closure of a de novo enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority imposed a punishment as the earlier report was never acted upon. Lastly, it is pleaded that due procedure was followed by the Disciplinary Authority and therefore, there is no question of any violation of statutory provisions far less principles of natural justice and therefore, the order of punishment awarded to the petitioner is just, fair and legal and as such it is not open to challenge. 5. Heard Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jena, learned counsel for opposite parties. 6. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that after an enquiry concluded and report was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority with exoneration of the petitioner of all the charges framed, a de novo enquiry on the self-same charges is not permissible under law and is an exercise which is per se illegal and non est in the eyes of law. It is submitted that a full-fledged enquiry was conducted and report as per Annexure-9 was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority but instead a second enquiry was initiated without any justification and as such, the action is not legally sustainable. The contention of Mr. Nayak, learned counsel is that no satisfaction was reached at by the Disciplinary Authority after receiving the enquiry report i.e. Annexure-9 and as to why it was not accepted and instead of following the established procedure of a department proceeding, a de novo enquiry on the same set of charges earlier drawn up is outrightly illegal, hence, the report i.e. Annexure-5 and also the impugned decision by order vide Annexure-7 of opposite party No.1 imposing punishment on the petitioner directing recovery cannot be sustained in law and therefore, it shall have to be quashed in the interest of justice. 7. On the contrary, Mr. Jena, learned counsel for the opposite parties submits that the Disciplinary Authority was dissatisfied with the enquiry report i.e. Annexure-9 and therefore, the de novo enquiry was directed. The submission is that the petitioner participated in the second enquiry and opposite party No.1 followed the established procedure and ultimately concluded the departmental proceeding and for the shortage in firewood after such an enquiry awarded the punishment which is therefore not to be interfered with as rightly recovery of Rs.81,594/- was ordered from his salary in instalments. Lastly, it is submitted by Mr. Jena, learned counsel that the enquiry report since proved and established the guilt of the petitioner towards shortage of firewood at the depot, it was rightly followed by the order of punishment i.e. Annexure-7, hence, such decision calls for no interference. 8. The proceeding against the petitioner has been initiated as per the Odisha Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) and in terms of Rule 15 thereof. Except for the plea of the petitioner that reasonable time was not allowed to respond to the second show cause notice issued by the Disciplinary Authority, the procedure of enquiry has not been challenged. Rather, the second enquiry initiated on the self-same allegation is questioned by the petitioner. The Court finds that upon a departmental proceeding being drawn up against the petitioner by office order dated 21st October, 1998, he was directed to submit defence within 30 days of the receipt of the same vide Annexure-1. The EO was appointed in partial modification of the earlier office order dated 27th January, 1999, however, retaining the Section Officer to marshal the proceeding. Such enquiry was held and concluded but it was not within the knowledge of the petitioner regarding its outcome which he could learn only upon receiving a copy of the report i.e. Annexure-9 supplied to him under the Right to Information Act. On a reading of the said report, the Court finds that the charges of misappropriation and breach of trust levelled against the petitioner were found to be devoid of merit with a suggestion that he may be exonerated from the same. The said report as per Annexure-9 was not acted upon by the opposite party No.1 who instead appointed another EO for a de novo enquiry on the same allegations against the petitioner, which was ultimately followed by the impugned order i.e. Annexure-7 upon receiving the enquiry report as per Annexure-5. 9. The primary ground of challenge of the petitioner is that the Disciplinary Authority upon receiving Annexure-5 ought to have followed a procedure either accepting the findings therein or informing him the reasons not to do so and to follow further course of action as per the Rules. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that opposite party No.1 could not have avoided the report and abandoned the exercise with initiation of a de novo enquiry as the same is not contemplated under law. In support of the above contention, Mr. Nayak, learned counsel cited the following decisions, such as, K.R. Deb Vrs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong AIR 1971 SC 1447; Ami Lal Vrs. Commandant, 52nd Battalion, CRPF, Manipur 2019 Supreme (Ori) 148; Narendra Kumar Samadhiya Vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others 2026 SCC OnLine MP 6164; and Union of India and others Vrs. P. Thayagarajan AIR 1999 SC 449 to submit that the procedure followed by opposite party No.1 with a de novo enquiry in absence of any justifiable reasons is indefensible. 10. The Apex Court in K.R. Deb (supra) held and concluded in the following words while considering whether successive enquiries is contemplated under law with reference to Rule 15(1) of the Rules, 1957 and the same is extracted hereinbelow: “11. Rule 15(1) of the Classification and Control Rules reads as follows: (1) Without prejudice to the, provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiry) Act, 1850, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 13 shall be passed except after an inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner hereinafter provided." Clause (2) of Rule 15 provides for framing of charges and communication in writing to the 'government servant of these charges with the statement of allegations on which they are based, and it also provides for a written statement of defence. Under Clause. (3) the Government servant is entitled to inspect and take extracts from such official records as he may specify, subject to certain exceptions. Under clause (4) on receipt of the written statement of defence the Disciplinary Authority may itself enquire into such. of the charges as are not admitted, or if it considers it necessary so to do, appoint a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiring Officer for the purpose. Clause (7) provides that at the conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiring Authority shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. If in the opinion of such authority the proceedings of the inquiry establish charges different from those originally framed it may record findings on such charges provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the Government servant has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them. Under Clause (9), the Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge. Clause (10) provides for issue of show-cause notice. 12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report- of, the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the disciplinary, Authority-. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 13. In our view the rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules but was harassing to the appellant 14. Before the Judicial Commissioner the point was put slightly differently and, it was urged that the proceedings showed that the Disciplinary Authority had made up its mind to dismiss the appellant. The Judicial Commissioner held that on the facts it could not be said that the Disciplinary Authority was prejudiced against the appellant. But it seems to us that on the material on record a suspicion does arise, that the Collector was determined to get some Inquiry Officer to report against the appellant. 15. In the result we hold that no proper inquiry has been conducted in the case and, therefore, there has been a breach of Article 311(2) of the Constitution.” 11. In a similar set of facts, this Court in Ami Lal (supra) held and concluded that when there has been an enquiry held, subsequent enquiry dismissing the petitioner from service even upheld by the Apex Court cannot be sustained and a reference to the decision in K.R. Deb (supra) is made therein. The above decision was in connection with a departmental proceeding initiated under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 read with Section 27 of the CRPF Rules. In the aforesaid case, the departmental proceeding was dropped but thereafter, a second enquiry was directed and it was held that when the disciplinary action was concluded and the delinquent was reinstated presumably on full exoneration, a second enquiry was not permissible. A decision of the Apex Court in State of Assam and another Vrs. J.N. Roy Biswas AIR 1975 SC 2277 is also referred to therein, where it was held and observed that no rule of double jeopardy bars but absence of power under a Rule leaves a second enquiry by the Disciplinary Authority vulnerable after the delinquent was absolved. 12. In fact, in K.R. Deb (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court that unless there is some serious error crept into the enquiry or vital witnesses were not available at the time of enquiry or were not examined for some reason, the Disciplinary Authority may direct a fresh enquiry. Similarly, in Narendra Kumar Samadhiya (supra), it has been concluded that a Disciplinary Authority can order de novo enquiry if there are defects in the original and it has to be done according to the prescribed rules and the punishment imposed must be based on a properly conducted enquiry supported by valid reasons. It has also been held therein that Disciplinary Authority may remit a case for further enquiry but not for a de novo enquiry and it was a decision with reference to Rule 15(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. 13. In P. Thayagarajan (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court that the Disciplinary Authority can order a de novo enquiry under the CRPF Rules, 1995 for serious procedural defects or for not considering evidence or if there is departure from the procedure contemplated under Rule 27(C)(2) of the said Rules which requires oral evidence to be direct and recorded by the Enquiring Officer in presence of the parties and also subject to cross-examination. 14. According to this Court, if the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with an enquiry report that exonerates delinquent, it cannot simply order a de novo enquiry for being dissatisfied on the same charges to secure a different result since repeated enquiries violate principles of administrative justice. The required course of action in such an eventuality would be for the Disciplinary Authority to record its tentative reasons for disagreement with the findings of the EO and to forward a copy of the report of the enquiry along with the reasons for the difference of opinion and disagreement to the delinquent providing a reasonable opportunity for him to submit a written response or explanation and thereafter, to take a decision considering the defence and the evidence on record either accepting the exoneration or imposing a penalty supported by reasons. A de novo enquiry is not permissible simply because the Disciplinary Authority dislikes the exoneration report or is inclined to allow a second chance to prove the charges levelled against the delinquent. However, in a given set of circumstances, a fresh enquiry can be ordered where there is a procedural flaw. If it is found that the initial enquiry was improper or violated the mandatory rules like denying the delinquent a reasonable opportunity to defend etc. or there is missing evidence which is crucial, a fresh enquiry is permitted. There can be no blanket order for de novo enquiry as it has to be subject to a satisfaction arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority that the provisions of the rules for the departmental enquiry have not been adhered to or a serious defect crept into the process where for instance important witnesses were completely unavailable or any such critical evidence was left out from consideration. This Court is of the view that repeated enquiries to secure a desired verdict by the Disciplinary Authority is having no sanction of law. Instead of scraping the enquiry as a whole, a Disciplinary Authority shall have to record its reasons for disagreement with the findings of the EO on each article of charge and forward a copy of the enquiry report along with tentative reasons for such disagreement to the delinquent allowing him reasonable time to submit his defence. After considering the response of delinquent, the Disciplinary Authority is either to agree with the reply and drop the charges or to record a finding of guilt with reasons. The enquiry report is recommendatory in nature and not binding to the Disciplinary Authority which is to independently act upon with reference to the evidence on record and to form an opinion either to accept such report and findings therein of the EO or to disagree and record its own reasons based on the evidence received during enquiry and thereafter considering the defence of the delinquent, to proceed to pass a final order. A completely fresh enquiry is not permissible on the same charges and evidence, however, it may be considered only if there has been serious defect in the enquiry and if the enquiry has not been conducted in terms of the provisions of the rules causing prejudice to the delinquent. This Court is, therefore, of the view that only in a case of flawed enquiry, a fresh one may be directed but not for any other reasons. 15. In the case at hand, the Disciplinary Authority appears to have assigned no reason as to why the findings of the first enquiry as per Annexure-9 are unacceptable. According to the counter affidavit, it is pleaded that the Disciplinary Authority was dissatisfied with the outcome of the enquiry. Acceptability of the enquiry report or a fresh enquiry to commence does not depend on the satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority. It is not that the Disciplinary Authority is to direct de novo exercise when there is a full- fledged enquiry already held and concluded according to the rules which is permissible only if that was a serious procedural defect or illegality or such enquiry ignored vital evidence from consideration and that there was no examination of any such material witnesses or where the principles of natural justice stood violated. 16. Rule 15 of the Rules prescribes the procedure for imposing penalty by the Disciplinary Authority. The manner in which an enquiry is to be held is stipulated therein and in terms of Rule 15(7) of the Rules at the conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiring Authority shall prepare a report recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons thereon and thereafter may recommended punishment to be inflicted upon when the charges are established. Sub-Rule (8) of Rule 15 of the Rules mandates as to what would comprise of the record of enquiry including a report with the findings on each charge and the reasons therefor and also the recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed. According to the Rule 15(9) of the Rules, the Disciplinary Authority may for reasons to be recorded by it in writing to remit the case to the Enquiring Authority for further enquiry and report, whereafter, such enquiry shall be proceeded according to the provisions of Sub-Rule (6) thereof as far as may be. Apart from the above, the Disciplinary Authority if not the Enquiring Authority shall consider the record of the enquiry and submit findings on each charge. The other procedures to follow are stipulated under the Rules and finally the order of the Disciplinary Authority shall have to be communicated to the delinquent in accordance with Rule 15(10)(ii) of the Rules. 16.1. On a reading of Rule 15 of the Rules, the Court finds no any provision for a de novo enquiry. A further enquiry may be directed by the Disciplinary Authority for reasons to be recorded in view of Rule 15(9) of the Rules. In absence of any such provisions in the Rules regarding a de novo enquiry, according to this Court, opposite party No.1 could not have directed it even after a full-fledged enquiry concluded with a report received. The report of enquiry i.e. Annexure-9 was not acted upon and communicated to the petitioner and after a couple of years, a de novo enquiry followed for reasons best known to opposite party No.1. Nothing is placed on record from side of the opposite parties to satisfy the Court, the reason behind a de novo enquiry directed by opposite party No.1. The Disciplinary Authority cannot act according to its whim and caprice. Even otherwise also, in a disciplinary proceeding, when the Authority differs with the view expressed by the EO, he shall have independently examine the materials on record to reach at a conclusion. As earlier stated, the Disciplinary Authority is not bound to accept and act upon the enquiry report and recommendation received. If there is disagreement, the Disciplinary Authority shall have to place it on record on each of the charge framed and to intimate the delinquent to respond to the same and thereafter, to take a decision. Any such further enquiry in terms of Rule 15(9) of the Rules does not mean a de novo enquiry. It is just a remittance of the enquiry by the decision of the Disciplinary Authority in accordance therewith but not for a fresh enquiry. When there is no such provision for a de novo enquiry as per the Rules, regard being had to the case laws cited and discussed hereinbefore, in absence of any reason assigned by opposite party No.1 as to what necessitated a de novo enquiry when an enquiry was previously held and concluded and it was a full-fledged one with a report received as per Annexure-9 with findings therein exonerating the petitioner from the charges levelled, it can well be said that a fresh enquiry could not have been directed. The explanation of opposite party No.1 is not forthcoming as to what prevailed upon him to direct a de novo enquiry all the more when the Rules do not prescribe it. Nevertheless, it was for opposite party No.1 to follow the principles laid down to order a de novo enquiry discussed and highlighted upon hereinabove and having not done so, the entire exercise with any such enquiry stands vitiated. Instead of the above exercise, opposite party No.1 was required to submit the tentative reasons of disagreement and to follow the procedure but there has been a complete departure and it cannot, therefore, be countenanced under law. Having said that, this Court is inclined to hold that the order of punishment vide Annexure-7 is liable to be set aside. Since the petitioner was aged about 56 years in the year 2008 and had retired long back for the fact that the de novo enquiry has been held illegal, this Court is not in favour of directing opposite party No.1 to act upon Annexure-9 to take a decision thereon either way at this distant point of time. 17. Accordingly, it is ordered. 18. In the result, the writ petition stands allowed. As a necessary corollary, the enquiry report as at Annexure-5 and the impugned order of opposite party No.1 vide Annexure-7 are hereby set aside and formally quashed. (R.K. Pattanaik) Judge Tudu