JUDGMENT 1. This appeal at the instance of defendant is directed against the judgment and decree dated 1.4.2005 passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Shajapur in regular Civil Appeal No. 21-N1999 whereby the order dated 5.4.1999 passed by Civil Judge, Class-I, Sarangpur was affirmed. The brief facts are as under. 2. The respondent No.1 had filed a suit for partition of residential house. A preliminary decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff by the trial Judge on 9.5.1970. Against the said preliminary decree, the appellants preferred a First Appeal No. 31-A/1978 which was dismissed on 11.2.1980 by the Additional District Judge, Shajapur. On 26.4.1988, the respondent moved an application under Order XXXIV, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code for passing a final decree in terms of preliminary decree and for delivery of possession of his share in the joint immovable property. The said application was opposed by the appellant basically on the ground that it was hopelessly barred by limitation. The said objection was overruled and the final decree was passed on 5.4.1999. Said decree was also challenged by the appellant by filing an appeal under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. The first Appellate Court by order dated 25.9.1999 rejected the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and as a result, the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter, appellants preferred Second Appeal No. 553/1999. By order dated 17.12.2004, this Court allowed the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellant and the matter was remanded back to the lower Appellant Court for decision on merits. By the impugned judgment and decree, lower Appellate Court considered the matter on merits and thereafter dismissed the appeal holding that the application submitted by respondent on 26.4.1988 for preparation of final decree was not barred by limitation. Hence, this appeal. 3. The only contention urged by learned counsel for the appellant is that the application for preparation of final decree would be governed by Article 136 or in the alternative, under Article 137 which is residuary Article. In support of his contention, learned counsel for appellant has relied upon decision reported in 1996 MPLJ 221 , Nemichand Bherulal v. Chironjilal Bhanwarlal. 4. In support of his contention, learned counsel for appellant has relied upon decision reported in 1996 MPLJ 221 , Nemichand Bherulal v. Chironjilal Bhanwarlal. 4. A careful reading of the said decision would reveal that in that case, the issue before the Court was whether the property inherited by a son from his father could become subject matter of execution after period of limitation. Obviously, the said decision is clearly distinguishable on the facts of the present case and does not help the appellant. 5. Decree has been defined in the Code. As per the definition of decree, it is a formal expression of adjudication which conclusively and finally determines civil rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. In the considered opinion of this Court, normally a preliminary decree in a partition suit, subject to appeal, conclusively finalises matters relating to declaration of rights and interest, while final decree works out those rights. In a partition suit, unless final decree is not drawn up, it could not be said that suit has been disposed off i.e. completely and finally. After the preliminary decree in a partition suit, one, if he so desires, must apply to the Court for exclusive possession of specific share in the erstwhile joint property by passing a final decree to effectuate the separation and partition of his share in erstwhile joint property. No period of limitation is prescribed for making an application for passing of final decree under the Indian Limitation Act. I am fortified by the decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1991 Madras 307. 6. The Code provides for two decree, a preliminary decree and final decree in some cases. Article 136, which was pressed in service by the learned counsel for appellant, deals with two different concepts, viz. -'enforceability' and 'Executability'. See Hammed Joharam v. Abdul Salam [ (2001) 7 SCC 573 = AIR 2001 SC 3404 ]. In a partition suit, the enforceable decree is the final decree which alone is capable of execution. An application by a party for effecting partition by passing a final decree is not an application for execution but an application in a pending suit and so cannot be barred by Article 136 or 137 or any other Article of the Limitation Act. An application by a party for effecting partition by passing a final decree is not an application for execution but an application in a pending suit and so cannot be barred by Article 136 or 137 or any other Article of the Limitation Act. The period of limitation prescribed under Article 136, in the opinion of this Court, would come into play only after the final decree is passed and a party to such suit fails to take appropriate steps for the enforcement of the final decree. As has been pointed hereinabove, the final decree was passed by the trial Court on 5.4.1999 after getting the Commissioner's report. Thus, this Court has no hesitation to hold that prior to 5.4.1999, the application for final decree moved by the respondent was not barred by limitation. The lower Appellate Court has rightly held that the application was not barred by limitation. 7. In view of the foregoing discussion, this appeal does not raise any question of law much less substantial question of law which is a sine qua non for entertaining a Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. In view of the foregoing discussion, I do nor find any merit and substance in this appeal. Same is accordingly dismissed summarily.