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2007 DAILYLAW 442 (BOM)

Gangadhar s/o Kashinath Patwari v. Sunanda w/o Nilkanthrao Badgire

2007-03-28

S.B.DESHMUKH

body2007
1. Heard Mr. Bhore, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Chaudhari, learned counsel for respondents. 2. The petitioner, is the respondent in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 35 of 2005 filed in the court of learned M.A.C. Tribunal at Udgir, District Latur by the respondents/original claimants under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles, Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1988" for short). The petitioner is also respondent in another application filed by the respondents/claimants under Section 140 of the Act 1988 in the same court. 3. The petitioner, moved an application at Exh.23 in M.A.C.P. No.35 of 2005 on 31.3.2006. The respondent by an application, requested the learned Member, M.A.C.Tribunal to hear the application under Section 140 and 166 of the Act, 1988. In other words, the petitioner requested for hearing no fault liability application under Section 140 together with application under Section 166 of the Act, 1988. The learned trial court, recorded the finding that the petitioner as well as his advocate, were called several times, however, they were not present, therefore, rejected the application. It appears from the order passed by the trial court dated 7.6.2006 that the matter was called out before the recess and after recess also. However, neither the petitioner nor his counsel turned up to the court. The trial court after hearing the respondents rejected the application holding that there is no substance in the application. 4. Learned counsel Mr. Bhore has invited my attention to another application i.e. Misc. application No.8 of 2006. According to him, this application is filed in the month of June, 2006. Mr. Bhore, learned counsel is not aware on which date this application is filed in the trial court. He has invited my attention to para 4 of this application i.e.8 of 2006, which was for transfer of the case. In this application, explanation is tendered that on 7.6.2006, the counsel appearing for the petitioner was engaged in the court of learned J.M.F.C. and after passing of the order, the advocate for the petitioner approached the court, however at that time order was already passed. This explanation tendered by the petitioner, cannot be considered for more than one reason. Firstly, when the matter was listed before the trial court on 7.6.2006, at that time, neither the petitioner nor his advocate was present. He recorded that no application seeking adjournment was also filed. This explanation tendered by the petitioner, cannot be considered for more than one reason. Firstly, when the matter was listed before the trial court on 7.6.2006, at that time, neither the petitioner nor his advocate was present. He recorded that no application seeking adjournment was also filed. The court, therefore, was constrained to decide the application not only in default but after perusing the reply filed by respondents. Therefore, I see no perversity in the order passed by the trial court. 5. This application is filed under Section 140 of the Act, 1988. Section 140 correspondence to Section 92-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Filing of the petition under Section 166 of the Act, 1988 for compensation is not necessary or obligatory for making an application under Section 140 based on "No Fault Liability". The dismissal of petition for compensation under Section 166 on the ground of limitation only also cannot stop operation of Section 140, which is based on "No Fault Liability". Chapter X i.e. Liability Without Fault in certain cases is an independent provision and the Tribunal is bound to decide the claim application under Section 140 of the Act, 1988 for grant of interim compensation, notwithstanding the claimant having filed any other application under Section 166 or under any other provisions of the Act. The provisions of Chapter X has overriding effect on any other provisions of the Act and it has been made clear under Section 144 of the Act, 1988. In tortuous liability, the negligence or rashness of the driver has to be established. Such is not the need in case of application under Section 140 based on no fault liability. Principle underline under Section 140 of the Act, 1988 is distinguishable from the real strict liability in case of Section 166. The compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if one of the exception to the Rule can be applied. Amount awarded and paid under Section 140 of the Act, 1988 can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Thus, these two remedies made available under Sections 140 and 166 of the Act, 1988 and are resting on two different premises. Amount awarded and paid under Section 140 of the Act, 1988 can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Thus, these two remedies made available under Sections 140 and 166 of the Act, 1988 and are resting on two different premises. The Tribunal may consider the material for its satisfaction that (1) accident arose out of the motor vehicle, (2) it has resulted in permanent disablement or death of person and (3) the claim is made against the owner and the insurer of motor vehicle involved in the accident. In this facts situation, applicant cannot be directed to proceed with application under section 140 as well as 166 of the Act, 1988. The application filed by the applicant under Section 140 has to be considered in accordance with the scheme of section 140 and on the basis of the material made available by the parties. The applicant cannot be compelled to wait until decision of application under Section 166 for hearing of the application under Section 140 of the Act, 1988. The precedence in hearing of application under Section 140 of the Act, 1988 is mandated by law and has to be accorded. 6. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any error in the order passed by the learned trial Court. Hence, no interference is called for and the writ petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs.