A. K. SIKRI, J. ( 1 ) PRAYER made in this petition is to de-seal the shops belonging to different petitioners in this petition, which are situate at Ashram Chowk, near Jairam Ashram. The outcry of the petitioners is that such a sealing action is taken by the Delhi Development Authority (for short, 'dda')notwithstanding the order of status quo dated 14. 11. 2006 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in WP (C) Nos. 16852-861/2006 and confirmed vide orders dated 6. 2,2007 while disposing of the said writ petition. ( 2 ) APPREHENDING threatened action in this behalf, those shopkeepers, who are the petitioners herein, approached this Court, well in time, and before such an action could be taken. They filed WP (C) Nos. 16852-61/2006. Their plea was that there was threat of demolition of their properties/shops and the DDA was contemplating to take such action without issuing any show-cause notices to the petitioners and in complete violation of the principles of natural justice. They also submitted that no fresh construction or unauthorised construction had been raised by them and most of the properties are in existence since 1950-60. The matter was listed before the learned single Judge on 14. 11. 2006, which was the first date. After hearing the petitioners as well as counsel for the DDA, who appeared on advance notice of the petition, the Court issued notice and passed the order to the effect that "in the meanwhile, no action shall be taken without authority of law. " On the next date, i. e. 1. 12. 2006, a more specific protective order was passed directing that status quo shall be maintained. After the DDA filed its reply, the matter was argued at length on 6. 2. 2007. The DDA had also produced the original file of the Estate Officer of the DDA, which was perused by the Court. The learned single Judge found that for evicting the petitioners the DDA had taken action under the provisions of Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'pp Act' ). Notices were issued to the petitioners under section 4 of the PP Act and, thereafter, the Estate Officer heard the parties and had passed orders dated 20. 12. 2006 and 29. 12. 2006 for the eviction of the petitioners. Notices were issued to the petitioners under section 4 of the PP Act and, thereafter, the Estate Officer heard the parties and had passed orders dated 20. 12. 2006 and 29. 12. 2006 for the eviction of the petitioners. The learned single Judge also took note of the fact that the petitioner had assailed those orders by filing appeals, inter alia, contending that adequate time was not given to them for filing replies and they were not given opportunity to lead evidence or cross-examine the officers of the dda who had been examined behind their back. In respect of one petitioner, it was contended that no notice under Section 4 of the PP Act was even served upon him nor any consequential order under Section 5 of the said Act was passed. Since statutory appeals filed under Section 9 of the PP Act were pending before the learned Addl. District Judge, after taking note of the aforesaid background facts, the learned single Judge, on 6. 2. 2007, disposed of the writ petition by passing the following order:- "be that as it may, since the Petitioners other than the Petitioner No. 6, who have been served with the orders passed by the Estate Officer under Section 5 (1) of the Act, have preferred appeals before the ADJ (Appellate Authority) under Section 9 of the Act, the legality or otherwise of the said orders will be determined in those proceedings in accordance with law. The petitioners can urge the very grounds set out in their rejoinder in those proceedings. In the circumstances, this Court is of the view that the said appeals should be disposed of in a time bound manner and that during the'pendency of the appeal, the status quo as to the petitioners' possession be maintained. Accordingly, the learned ADJ before whom the appeals are stated to be pending is requested to dispose of the appeals filed under Section 9 of the Act against the orders dated 20. 12. 2006/29. 12. 2006 passed by the estate Officer within a period of six months from today and in any event not later than 7. 8. 2007. Till the disposal of the said appeals, the status quo as to the Petitioners' Possession shall be maintained. With these directions, the writ petitions are disposed of with no orders as to costs. Pending applications stand disposed of accordingly. Dasti to the parties. 8. 2007. Till the disposal of the said appeals, the status quo as to the Petitioners' Possession shall be maintained. With these directions, the writ petitions are disposed of with no orders as to costs. Pending applications stand disposed of accordingly. Dasti to the parties. " ( 3 ) AT this stage it would be necessary to fathom into the genesis of initiating action against the petitioners under the provisions of PP Act. This inquiry is necessary to find out the status of the petitioners, namely, in what capacity they are occupying the premises/shops at the aforesaid place. This has become necessary for the reason that, as would be mentioned in detail hereafter, the Monitoring Committee appointed by the Supreme Court gave directions to the DDA to seal the shops of the petitioners on the premise that they are encroachers upon the DDA land and, therefore, such encroachments are to be cleared by removing them. ( 4 ) AS already pointed out above, according to the petitioners the constructions exist since 1950-60 and no further construction has been raised thereafter. They further pleaded, which was the averment made in the earlier writ petition as well, that possession of most of these petitioners dates back prior to 1962 when the first Master Plan of Delhi came into existence. Most of the petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest came into possession of the land after migrating from Pakistan on the partition of the country and they were allowed to occupy the land in question. In the year 1964, acquisition proceedings were initiated in respect of the land in question and necessary notification under the provisions of Land Acquisition act was passed. Thus, the proceedings culminated into Award No. 1716 in respect of khasra Nos. 64/1, 65/1 and 66/1, which is the land in question. The petitioners pleaded that the said award records the occupation of the father of the petitioner No. 2 and predecessor-in-interest of other petitioners and also records that certain shops were in existence on the land in question. Pursuant to the award, when the possession of the land covered by the said award was taken, these shops were left out being built up areas and possession of only vacant area was taken over. Therefore, in spite of acquisition of the land, the possession of the petitioners and/or predecessors-in-interest was not disputed. Pursuant to the award, when the possession of the land covered by the said award was taken, these shops were left out being built up areas and possession of only vacant area was taken over. Therefore, in spite of acquisition of the land, the possession of the petitioners and/or predecessors-in-interest was not disputed. In the year 1981, the DDA acknowledged the possession and asked the petitioners to pay damages towards the possession of the land in question. They were asked to pay damages right from the year 1965. The petitioners complied with the notice of the DDA and started paying damages. Notices under Section 7 of the PP act for payment of rent/damages were being issued regularly to the petitioners, pursuant to which the petitioners have been paying those damages. ( 5 ) THUS, according to the petitioners, DDA had acknowledged the settled possession of the petitioners and was receiving even damages. On this premise, the plea taken by the petitioners in the writ petition was that the petitioners should not be divested of their respective possession in the shops without due course of law and the DDA could not extend the threat of taking demolition action without issuing any notice or without giving any opportunity of hearing. They had placed on record various documents in support of the aforesaid case set up by them. ( 6 ) IN this backdrop, when it was found that the petitioners were not the encroachers upon the land in the sense "encroachment" is understood and their possession was recognised by the DDA by accepting the damages from them, even if they had become unauthorised occupants, proper course was to evict them by due process of law, namely, by resorting to the provisions of the PP Act. DDA itself recognised this and had issued notices under section 4 of the PP Act and referred the matter to the Estate Officer. When these proceedings were pending and the petitioners found that there was a threat of demolition, they rushed to this Court and filed WP (C) Nos. 16852-61/2006, which culminated in the orders dated 6. 2. 2007, as already noted above. During the pendency of the petition, eviction orders dated 20. 12. 2006 and 29. 12. 2006 had been passed by the Estate Officer against the petitioners under Section 5 (1) of the PP Act. 16852-61/2006, which culminated in the orders dated 6. 2. 2007, as already noted above. During the pendency of the petition, eviction orders dated 20. 12. 2006 and 29. 12. 2006 had been passed by the Estate Officer against the petitioners under Section 5 (1) of the PP Act. The order of the learned single Judge, in the above circumstances, when the DDA had itself initiated appropriate procedure warranted, namely, action under the PP Act, and not a short-cut method to oust the petitioners without due process, was most appropriate and equitable and in conformity with the legal position. It is manifest that DDA itself recognised this. Under these circumstances protection was given to the petitioners during the pendency of these appeals. The learned single Judge was even conscious of the interest of the DDA. Therefore, to balance the equities, he directed that appeals be disposed of within a period of six months "and in any event not later than 7. 8. 2007". ( 7 ) ADMITTEDLY, no appeal was filed by anyone against this order dated 6. 2. 2007 passed by the learned single Judge, which attained finality. Notwithstanding these orders which held the field as per which status quo as to the petitioners' possession was also to be maintained, the premises belonging to the petitioners have been sealed. ( 8 ) HOW and why it happened needs to be noticed at this stage. Before embarking on this enquiry, it is necessary to mention about the legal proceedings pending in this Court and the Apex Court relating to illegal constructions, their sealing and demolition. It is a matter of common knowledge that in certain petitions filed in this Court as well as in the supreme Court, which are public interest ligitations, the sealing and demolition orders are passed in respect of unauthorised constructions as well as constructions made by persons on the land belonging to the government by encroaching the said land. Experience is that many times the officials turn blind eye to such unauthorised constructions when they take place in gross violation of building bye-laws and much in excess of the sanctioned plans and on many occasions without any sanction plan and even after encroaching upon the Government land. Many times, these officials even become privy to such violations. Experience is that many times the officials turn blind eye to such unauthorised constructions when they take place in gross violation of building bye-laws and much in excess of the sanctioned plans and on many occasions without any sanction plan and even after encroaching upon the Government land. Many times, these officials even become privy to such violations. Thus, either because of their complicity or conspiracy, there is a mushrooming of such illegal structures throughout the length and breadth of this city. Though the Master Plan came into force in the year 1962, dreaming about a planned and beautiful city, which is followed by successive Master Plans, these visions of the Policy Makers have remained only on papers. Apart from defacing and mutilating the city, it has caused innumerable problems and hardships to the civic authorities, town planners and the citizens alike. Many Resident Welfare Associations, therefore, came forward to file the public interest litigations clamerring for taking immediate steps. It is in this backdrop, orders have been passed by the courts in such petitions from time to time for sealing and demolition of illegal structures. With a view to help the courts, as it is not possible to personally supervise and verify each and every illegal construction, this court as well as the Supreme Court have constituted Monitoring committees. This Court has appointed nine Court Commissioners as well, one for each MCD Zone, in the case of WP (C) No. 4582/2003 entitled Kalyan sanstha Social Welfare v. Union of India and Ors. ( 9 ) WHILE the laudable object and purpose is to clear the city from such illegal constructions and encroachments, at the same time, it is also to be ensured that those constructions which are legal and are not in violation of the building bye-laws or Master Plan of Delhi or where, because of the peculiar facts of particular cases, such persons are entitled to protection under the law, they are not affected. Obviously, the orders passed in such public interest litigations are of general nature and based on those orders many such constructions can come within their sweep where actions are to be taken. Obviously, the orders passed in such public interest litigations are of general nature and based on those orders many such constructions can come within their sweep where actions are to be taken. However, in a specific case if a citizen points out that he should not be brought within the mischief of these general orders and he wears the protective umbrella of the law, he has the right to approach a court of competent jurisdiction to point out that in his specific case such action is not warranted. A court of competent jurisdiction would have necessary powers to entertain such a petition and pass orders. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, some times the field covered may be common inasmuch as the issue raised by such person may be the same with which the Division benches of this Court and the Supreme Court in these public interest litigations are also seized of. Issue of comity of jurisdiction would arise in such a case. ( 11 ) WE may take note of the prophetic observations made by the Apex court way back in the year 1989 in the case of Narendra Kumar maheshwari v. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 1989 SC 2138 . Even after finding that in different High Courts applications for injunctions were not genuine and properly motivated, the Court did not accede to the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner in that case that it should lay down certain norms as to how the courts in different parts of the country should grant injunction or entertain an application effecting an all India issue or having ramifications all over the country. Instead the court sent the following message of wisdom for the courts to follow:-"106. . . . Except that before the Courts grant any injunction, they should have regard to the principles of comity of courts in a federal structure and have regard to self restraint and circumspection, we do not at this stage lay down any more definite norms. We may also perhaps add that it may be impossible to law down hard and fast rules of general application because of the diverse situations which give rise to problems of this nature. Each case has its own special facts and complications and it will be a disadvantage, rather than an advantage, to attempt and apply any stereotyped formula to all cases. Each case has its own special facts and complications and it will be a disadvantage, rather than an advantage, to attempt and apply any stereotyped formula to all cases. Perhaps in this sphere, the High Courts themselves might be able to introduce a certain amount of discipline having regard to the principles of comity of Courts administering the same general laws applicable all over the country in respect of granting interim orders which will have repercussion or effect beyond the jurisdiction of the particular courts. Such an exercise will be useful contribution in evolving good conventions in the federal judicial system. " it is inevitable that such an issue may arise in some of the cases. Present is one such case. ( 12 ) HOW it happened needs to be noticed at this juncture. The officials of the DDA visited the shops of the petitioners oh 9. 6. 2007 and, with the aid of Police force, forcibly sealed the shops. The cry of the petitioners protesting such an action on the ground that they had protection of the court in the form of orders dated 6. 2. 2007 went into deaf ears. This forced the petitioners to file the present writ petition bringing out the aforesaid illegality and prayer is made to de-seal the shops. The petition was listed before the learned single Judge, who wanted to know as to under what circumstances the sealing operation was carried out. The petition was filed on 19. 6. 2007 when the courts were closed for summer vacation and it was heard by the learned Vacation Judge on 20. 6. 2007. Counsel for the DDA pointed out that the matter was placed before the Monitoring Committee constituted by the supreme Court, which directed the properties to be sealed. DDA was asked to state these facts on affidavit. When the matter came up before the learned single Judge after vacation, on 5. 7. 2007 the DDA produced a note dated 3. 5. 2007, which explains the circumstances under which the sealing orders were passed. This note was prepared by the Department of Land management of the DDA. The learned single Judge in his detailed order dated 20. 7. 2007 had taken cognizance of this note and the circumstances which led to the sealing of the shops. We reproduce that portion of the order as it is self-explanatory :- "5. At the hearing on 5. This note was prepared by the Department of Land management of the DDA. The learned single Judge in his detailed order dated 20. 7. 2007 had taken cognizance of this note and the circumstances which led to the sealing of the shops. We reproduce that portion of the order as it is self-explanatory :- "5. At the hearing on 5. 7. 2007 learned counsel for the DDA produced a note dated 3. 5. 2007 that had been prepared by the Department of Land management of the DDA for the consideration of Shri Sanjay Bansal, court Commissioner (Central Zone), Monitoring Committee appointed by the Division Bench of this Court and the Nodal Officer (SEZ ). This note related to three different cases. The first concerned the Badarpur sand Traders at Mathura Road in which case also certain proceedings are pending in this Court. The second case related to the present petitioners. The DDA in this note extracted the relevant operative portion of the Order dated 6. 2. 2007 passed by this Court which directed that till the disposal of the appeals the status quo as to the petitioners' possession shall be maintained. The third case is the note related to a property in Jasola. 6. Below the note is a hand written note dated 17. 5. 2007 of Shri K. J. Rao, the learned Court Commissioner appointed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in I. A. 22 in W. P. (C) No. 4677 of 1985 (M. C. Mehta v. Union of india ). It is a two paragraph note. The second paragraph gives a direction as to the manner in which the sealing should take place as regards the Badarpur Sand Traders at Mathura Road. The first paragraph reads: "all the commercial establishments on encroached land mentioned above may be sealed for misuse. " It is stated in the affidavit dated 9. 7. 2007 filed by Shri O. P. Mishra (OSD), Land and Management, dda in these proceedings that it was consequent upon the directions issued by Shri K. J. Rao on 17. 5. 2007 that the sealing programme was fixed for 9. 6. 2007. 7. It appears that at some stage even before the Order dated 6. 2. 2007 was passed by this Court, the Court Commissioner appointed by this court had been asking DDA to send him information concerning the badarpur Sand Traders as well as the present cases. 5. 2007 that the sealing programme was fixed for 9. 6. 2007. 7. It appears that at some stage even before the Order dated 6. 2. 2007 was passed by this Court, the Court Commissioner appointed by this court had been asking DDA to send him information concerning the badarpur Sand Traders as well as the present cases. Annexed to Mr. O. P. Mishra's affidavit are certain letters written by the DDA to the coordinating Officer of the Monitoring Committee in that regard. The court also finds from the record that letters were written time and again by the DDA to the Court Commissioner Mr. Sanjay Bansal as well apprising him of the fact that this Court was seized of the matter concerning the present petition and that a status quo order was operative. 8. In the Badarpur Sand Traders file there is a note dated 17. 3. 2007 written by Mr. O. P. Mishra, OSD (Landm), marking the file to Shri K. J. Rao, stating that the Badarpur Sand Traders had a stay from the. ADJ against eviction and that "we need your directions to get the land vacated in. the context of the Supreme Court's Order. " This is how the present cases and the Badarpur Sand Traders cases appear to have been examined by Shri K;j. Rao. 9. In response to a query as to how and why the Monitoring Committee appointed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta's case was brought into the picture, Mr. Sarin, learned counsel for the DDA informs the Court, on instructions from Shri O. P. Mishra, OSD (Landm), DDA, that the Monitoring Committee has always been kept apprised of the situation concerning unauthorised constructions and that weekly coordination meetings do take place. The note dated 18. 5. 2007 of the Deputy director, Land and Management of the DDA on the file of the Badarpur sand Traders' case states that on 17. 5. 2007 he along with the OSD attended the office of Shri K. J. Rao, Chairman, Monitoring Committee appointed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Mr. Sarin, learned counsel for the DDA has also drawn attention to the last paragraph of an Order dated 11. 5. 5. 2007 he along with the OSD attended the office of Shri K. J. Rao, Chairman, Monitoring Committee appointed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Mr. Sarin, learned counsel for the DDA has also drawn attention to the last paragraph of an Order dated 11. 5. 2006 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta's case, which reads as under:-"our attention has also been drawn to para 16 of the second report of the Monitoring Committee on 24th March, 2006, it was directed that sealing shall continue notwithstanding any order passed by any court. Be that as it may, we reiterate that no court other than this Court will have any jurisdiction to make an order of de-sealing the premises sealed under the orders of this Court. " ( 13 ) THE learned single Judge, in these circumstances, came out with the following posers:- (a) The Monitoring Committee had gone ahead with the sealing notwithstanding the order dated 6. 2. 2007 passed by this Court and, thus, serious question concerning the implementation and enforcement of the orders of this Court had arisen. Whether it would amount to undermining the authority of this Court, queried the learned single Judge. (b) Whether the Division Bench of this Court or the Hon'ble supreme Court had intended that the Court Commissioners appointed by either of the Courts could ignore the subsisting orders passed by the High Court? (c) Dependant upon the answer to the aforesaid question, another important issue that would arise would be as to whether such persons would be answerable for committing contempt of court. The learned Single Judge thought it appropriate that these issues be considered by the Division Bench keepjng in view the gravity of those issues and their repercussions that the answers to these questions may have on other cases. ( 14 ) THAT is how the writ petition came to be listed before this Division bench and we heard counsel for the parties as well as Mr. Sanjay Bansal, court Commissioner (Central Zone) appointed by the Division Bench. ( 15 ) ENTIRE records were produced before us by the DDA. Mr. Sanjay bansal, the learned Court Commissioner made a ferment appeal for exonerating him as according to him he had not played any role in the matter because of which he could be held responsible for the sealing. ( 15 ) ENTIRE records were produced before us by the DDA. Mr. Sanjay bansal, the learned Court Commissioner made a ferment appeal for exonerating him as according to him he had not played any role in the matter because of which he could be held responsible for the sealing. ( 16 ) BEFORE we take note of and deal with the respective submissions, we may point out certain more facts which were brought to our notice from the records in addition to what is noted by the learned single Judge and reproduced above. ( 17 ) IT has become clear from the order of the learned single Judge that note dated 3. 5. 2007, which was prepared by the Department of Land management of the DDA made a specific reference to the order dated 6. 2. 2007 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court which directed that till the disposal of the appeals the status quo as to the petitioners' possession shall be maintained. This note, apart from dealing with the cases of Harinagar Ashram, also mentioned two other cases relating to Badarpur sand Traders at Mathura Road and to a propety in Jasola. Beneath this note is the endorsement of Shri K. J. Rao, the learned Court Commissioner appointed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court giving a direction to seal these premises and the manner in which the sealing should take place. No satisfactory explanation could be given by Mr. Sarin as to why this note was put before Shri K. J. Rao at all. We have already discussed in detail the judgment dated 6. 2. 2007 of the learned single Judge. It appears that the dda was also convinced that proper course in these cases is to get the appeals under Section 9 of the PP Act decided, which are pending before the learned ADJ, and till that time the petitioners were entitled to protection. In any case the DDA had not challenged this order. Thus, it was the bounden duty of the DDA to obey these orders. In this backdrop, preparing of a note of this nature, clubbing it with two other cases relating to Badarpur Sand traders case and a property in Jasola, and then handing over the note to shri K. J. Rao for his opinion, prima facie, smacks of mala fides on the part of the officer who acted in this manner. In this backdrop, preparing of a note of this nature, clubbing it with two other cases relating to Badarpur Sand traders case and a property in Jasola, and then handing over the note to shri K. J. Rao for his opinion, prima facie, smacks of mala fides on the part of the officer who acted in this manner. This action of the officer appears to be contumacious and needs, therefore, strong condemnation inasmuch as he wanted to proceed contrary to the orders by taking circuitous root. ( 18 ) WHAT should be the role of Monitoring Committees or Court commissioners is the next aspect to which we now advert to. When a competent court of law passes injunction order in a particular/ specific case, that order is to be obeyed. If such an order is not in accordance with law in the opinion of the authorities, proper course is to challenge that order by taking it to the higher court. Of course, there may be one exception in these particular cases. If it is found that the order passed by the court is contrary to a specific order passed by the Supreme Court, perhaps the Committee appointed by the Supreme Court may still go ahead of the action of sealing, in view of the orders dated 24. 3. 2006 passed by the Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta (supra ). However, this order is to be read with subsequent orders passed by the Supreme Court. On 11. 5. 2006, the Apex Court passed another order, operative portion whereof is quoted below, keeping in view the report dated 4. 5. 2006 submitted by the Supreme Court appointed Monitoring committee with regard to sealing of a property situate in Sant Nagar, East of Kailash:- "our attention has also been drawn to para 16 of the second report of the Monitoring Committee. On 24th March, 2006, it was directed that sealing shall continue notwithstanding any order passed by any court. Be that as it may, we reiterate that no court other than this Court will have any jurisdiction to make an order of de-sealing the premises sealed under the orders of this Court. " This order mentions that if sealing has already taken place on the directions of the Supreme Court, then de-sealing would not be done irrespective of any orders passed by any court. Reason is obvious. " This order mentions that if sealing has already taken place on the directions of the Supreme Court, then de-sealing would not be done irrespective of any orders passed by any court. Reason is obvious. When sealing orders are passed by the Apex Court, remedy of the aggrieved party is to approach the said Court and it is that Court only which is competent to consider as to whether the premises be de-sealed or not. Order of de-sealing passed by the subordinate courts would be in violation of the Supreme Court's orders. However, if there is no order of the Supreme Court at all in a specific case and stay orders are given by this Court, such an order should be respected. If the Monitoring Committee or the Court Commissioners feel that order passed may not be appropriate and the Single Judge of this Court has dealt with a matter which is seized of by the Division Bench of this Court or the supreme Court in the aforesaid PILs, proper course would be to bring the said order to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court or the Supreme court, as the case may be, and obtain orders for sealing/demolition notwithstanding such an order passed by the learned single Judge or even the subordinate courts. Notably, in the instant case, even the Supreme Court monitoring Committee understood that this would be the proper course of action. ( 19 ) MR. Gaurav Sarin, learned counsel appearing for the DDA, placed before us the various reports submitted by the appointed Monitoring committee appointed by the Apex Court. One is Report No. 2 dated 4. 5. 2006. In this report, the Committee had pointed out that a particular property at sant Nagar, East of Kailash was sealed under the orders dated 16. 2. 2006 and 24. 3. 2006 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in spite of the sealing carried out under those orders, the High Court had passed orders directing. de-sealing of the said property. Thus, the Supreme Court passed the aforesaid order dated 11. 5. 2006 when it found that the High Court had ordered de-sealing in spite of sealing of that property by the order of the supreme Court. Another such report is Report No. 35 dated 4. 5. 2007. This report relates to one Khatir Restaurant in prohibited area of Safdarjung Tomb. Thus, the Supreme Court passed the aforesaid order dated 11. 5. 2006 when it found that the High Court had ordered de-sealing in spite of sealing of that property by the order of the supreme Court. Another such report is Report No. 35 dated 4. 5. 2007. This report relates to one Khatir Restaurant in prohibited area of Safdarjung Tomb. It is pointed out by the Monitoring Committee that the Committee had directed the NDMC to seal the premises. However, the owner of the said restaurant approached the High Court and obtained a stay order and the case was posted for further hearing in November 2007. Copy of the said order dated 15. 5. 2007 was also enclosed. The Monitoring Committee pointed out that the Supreme Court had vide its order dated 24. 3. 2006 directed that sealing shall continue notwithstanding any orders passed by the Court. In these circumstances, it was urged that "the Monitoring Committee request the hon"ble Court to permit the Monitoring Committee to get the premises sealed notwithstanding the stay order of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, since the allottee had encroached upon public land and is misusing the premises for commercial activities including banqueting without any valid licenses in gross violation of the laws of the land". This report also mentions about the encroachment on Right of Way (for short, 'row') on Ring Road at Kilokari (Ashram Chowk ). In this behalf, it is pointed out by the Monitoring Committee that there were many commercial shops on encroached public land, which was confirmed by the pwd as well, and had requested for de-sealing of the premises to enable them to demolish the constructions. It was further pointed out that the monitoring Committee had de-sealed the premises as desired by the PWD and, in the meantime, the applicants approached various courts and obtained stay orders. The Committee, in these circumstances, again requested the Apex Court "to vacate the stay granted by various courts in the matter so that the PWD may go ahead with their planned work of widening of the road". The discerning fact is that faced with the court orders, the Monitoring Committee had not taken the action of sealing/demolition itself but had prayed the Supreme Court to pass appropriate orders to enable them to go ahead. The discerning fact is that faced with the court orders, the Monitoring Committee had not taken the action of sealing/demolition itself but had prayed the Supreme Court to pass appropriate orders to enable them to go ahead. Secondly, even when there was mention about the encroachments on ROW at Kilokari (Ashram Chowk), there was no mention of orders dated 6. 2. 2007 passed by the Single Judge of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. ( 20 ) SECOND report to which we would like to refer is Report No. 38 dated 21. 7. 2007. No doubt, this report is filed subsequent to the sealing of the shops of the petitioners. However, what is important for us to note is that this report again mentions about Khatir Restaurant. After reiterating the position about this restaurant, which was mentioned in the 35th report as well, there is again a request to the Court to permit the Monitoring committee to get the premises sealed notwithstanding the stay order of the high Court. This report repeats the position about the ROW on Ring Road at Kilokari (Ashram Chowk) and note dated 4. 5. 2007 of the PWD addressed to the Monitoring Committee is also enclosed, which mentions about certain stay orders granted by the courts and also pendency of the matter before the division Bench of this Court dealing with such matters. It does not mention about the petitioners' case or the order dated 6. 2. 2007, but there is again a request to the Supreme Court to vacate the stay granted by various courts so that the PWD may go ahead on their planned work of widening the road. Interestingly, there is no mention that in the meantime shops of the petitioners had been sealed notwithstanding the stay orders. The order dated 24. 7. 2007 passed by the Supreme Court on this report assumes more significance insofar as the present case before us is concerned. Interestingly, there is no mention that in the meantime shops of the petitioners had been sealed notwithstanding the stay orders. The order dated 24. 7. 2007 passed by the Supreme Court on this report assumes more significance insofar as the present case before us is concerned. Referring to para 11 of the aforesaid Report No. 38, which related to ROW on Ring Road at Kilokari (Ashram Chowk) and permission was sought to take action in spite of orders of the courts by vacating those orders, the Supreme Court did not agree with this suggestion and passed the following order:- "in paragraph-11 of the report, it has been stated that because of stay orders passed by various courts, the work of demolition of unauthorised construction is stalled. Reference in this context is made to a letter of the Executive Engineer, PWD, Division NO. N-112, Government of delhi, dated 4th May, 2007. Learned counsel for the MCD/dda/nct shall bring to the notice of the concerned courts that the interim applications are to be disposed of within a period of six weeks from today. Necessary information be given to the court within a period of one week so that the parties concerned can be informed about this order. " The Apex Court, thus, thought it proper that the courts which had granted the stay should deal with those applications and dispose them of within a period of six weeks and did not consider it proper to vacate those stay orders. One can understand the rational behind such an order. In specific cases, may be stay was desirable and, therefore, the court seized of the matter had to bestow its consideration. It is that court which could vacate or confirm the stay order. ( 21 ) THE doctrine of comity or amity requires a court not to pass an order which would be in conflict with another order passed by a competent court of law. The Supreme Court in a recent case entitled Indian Household and healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd. , AIR 2007 SC 1376 , explained this doctrine by quoting from Spelling and Lewis', as would be clear from para 12 of the said judgments:- "12. This aspect of the matter has been considered in 'a Treatise on the Law Governing Injunctions' by Spelling and Lewis' wherein it is stated: section 8. This aspect of the matter has been considered in 'a Treatise on the Law Governing Injunctions' by Spelling and Lewis' wherein it is stated: section 8. Conflict and Loss of Jurisdiction - Where a court having general jurisdiction and having acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter has issued an injunction, a court of competent jurisdiction will usually refuse to interfere by issuance of a second injunction. There is no established rule of exclusion which would deprive a court of jurisdiction to issue an injunction because of the issuance of an injunction between the same parties appertaining to the same subject matter, but there is what may properly be termed a judicial comity on the subject. And even where it is a case of one court having refused to grant an injunction, while such refusal does not exclude another coordinate court or judge from jurisdiction, yet the granting of the injunction by a second judge may lead to complications and retaliatory action. . . " ( 22 ) A Single Judge of this Court in the case of CFA Institute and Anr. v. All India Institute of Technical Education (WP (C) No. 4037/2007 decided on 31. 5. 2007) took note of two United States Supreme Court decisions explaining the principle of comity of courts. Para 29 of the said judgment containing this discussion reads as under:- "29. . . . . I would also like to refer to two decisions of the US Supreme court on the question of comity of courts. In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal. , 509 US 764, it was observed that the comity of courts refers to a situation where judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere. In Parsi v. Davidson: 405 US 34, it was observed that under accepted principles of comity, a court should stay its hand only if the relief the petitioner seeks would also be available to him with reasonable promptness and certainty through the alternative machinery. In Parsi v. Davidson: 405 US 34, it was observed that under accepted principles of comity, a court should stay its hand only if the relief the petitioner seeks would also be available to him with reasonable promptness and certainty through the alternative machinery. " ( 23 ) THE moot question is that when the Monitoring Committee of the supreme Court had brought to the notice of the Supreme Court the injunction orders granted by the other courts and sought permission from the Court to go ahead with sealing or demolition, as the case may be, in the absence of any order from the Supreme Court on its reports, why in the instant case the Committee decided to proceed ahead with the sealing even when order dated 6. 2. 2007 passed by a Single Judge of this Court was specifically brought to the notice of the Committee. Since the action is by the Monitoring Committee appointed by the Supreme Court and we have not heard the Members of the said Committee, we say no further and leave the matter at that. May be, the Supreme Court on an appropriate occasion delineate the powers of the Monitoring Committee. Till then, we only hope that orders dated 24. 7. 2007 passed by the Supreme Court would be the sufficient guide for the Monitoring Committee and it would not take such action in future when there is a stay order passed by this Court, without taking specific permission of the Supreme Court in such cases. ( 24 ) IN the present case, we find that the particular matter which is raised in these petitions by the petitioners is not seized of by the Supreme court as the constructions, as per the petitioners, are of pre-1962 era. There were no orders of sealing or demolition by the Supreme Court. There were no such orders even by the Division Bench dealing with these PILs. The petitioners had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing WP (C) Nos. 16858-61/2006. The said petition was considered on its own merits and, as noted above, the court found that status quo shall be continued and the petitioners' possession be not disturbed till the appeals under Section 9 of the PP Act are decided by the ADJ. 16858-61/2006. The said petition was considered on its own merits and, as noted above, the court found that status quo shall be continued and the petitioners' possession be not disturbed till the appeals under Section 9 of the PP Act are decided by the ADJ. This order had attained finality and, even otherwise, we have found the approach of the learned single Judge to be in accordance with law, because of the sealing action, in the meantime, it appears that the learned adj has not disposed of the appeals so far, though deadline provided to him was 7. 8. 2007. ( 25 ) IN order to maintain the dignity of the Court and to ensure that the order passed should have been given the respect it should command, we order de-sealing of these shops of the petitioners forthwith by the DDA. The learned ADJ shall also take up the appeals pending before him immediately. He shall hear the matter on the next date fixed before'him and decide the same. In case the next date before the learned ADJ is at a distant future, the DDA would be at liberty to approach the ADJ for pre-ponement of the date. ( 26 ) THIS writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.