VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. ( 1 ) BY means of the present application the Petitioner has applied for being released on bail till the finalisation of the writ petition, in which a prayer has been made for the issuance of an appropriate writ quashing the proceedings and decision of the General Court Martial. The Petitioner also prays for his reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits as also for the quashing of the impugned Order dated 29. 11. 2006 which confirmed the findings of the Court of Inquiry sentencing him two years rigorous imprisonment and dismissal from service. The Writ Petition is still to be admitted. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that at the present moment the petitioner has already undergone custody for fifteen months and would be due to be released from Jail in March, 2008 after deducting jail remissions. The argument is that since the writ petition is likely to be decided after the petitioner has undergone his sentence, the prayers pertaining to his release would be rendered infructuous. Hence he is entitled to being enlarged on bail. It is contended by Mr. Dalal that if the period of incarceration is completed by, the Petitioner cannot be adequately compensated in terms of money if the writ petition is eventually allowed. The argument is palpably attractive, but the answer would depend on whether the Petitioner has an established and vested right to assail the sentence of the Court Martial by means of a writ petition, even though an appeal has not been provided for by Parliament. ( 2 ) THE Petitioner also asseverates that the General Officer Commanding 31 armoured Division had rejected the Petitioner's Appeal for Suspension of sentence vide Order dated 17. 7. 2007 holding that since "the petitioner has been convicted by General Court Martial on grave charges for committing theft of property belonging to the government and there being sufficient evidence on record to sustain his conviction. " The prayer was not meritorious. ( 3 ) THE Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) makes no provision for the filing of an Appeal against the sentence of a Court-Martial other than Section 164, and annulment of proceedings under Section 165. It is in this context that learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied on the poignant, yet unheeded, remarks made in Union of India VS. It is in this context that learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied on the poignant, yet unheeded, remarks made in Union of India VS. Charanjit Singh Gill, JT 2000 (5) SC 135. This decision, in turn, refers back to a decision in Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi VS. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 140 and Sunil Batra VS. Delhi Administration, 1979 (1) SCR 394. In Bedi the Supreme Court had recorded these pithy observations which were extracted by their Lordships in Gill. 44. Reluctance of the apex court more concerned with civil law to interfere with the internal affairs of the Army is likely to create a distorted picture in the minds of the military personnel that persons subject to Army Act are not citizens of India. It is one of the cardinal features of our Constitution that a person by enlisting in or entering Armed Forces does not cease to be a citizen so as to wholly deprive him of his rights under the Constitution. More so when this Court held in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, that even prisoners deprived of personal liberty are not wholly denuded of their fundamental rights. In the larger interest of national security and military discipline Parliament in its wisdom may restrict or abrogate such rights in their application to the armed Forces but this process should not be carried so far as to create a class of citizens not entitled to the benefits of the liberal spirit of the constitution. Persons subject to Army Act are citizens of this ancient land having a feeling of belonging to the civilised community governed by the liberty-oriented constitution. Personal liberty makes for the worth of human being and is a cherished and prized right. Deprivation thereof must be preceded by an enquiry ensuring fair, just and reasonable procedure and trial by a judge of unquestioned integrity and wholly unbiased. A marked difference in the procedure for trial of an offence by the criminal court and the court martial is apt to generate dissatisfaction arising out of this differential treatment. Deprivation thereof must be preceded by an enquiry ensuring fair, just and reasonable procedure and trial by a judge of unquestioned integrity and wholly unbiased. A marked difference in the procedure for trial of an offence by the criminal court and the court martial is apt to generate dissatisfaction arising out of this differential treatment. Even though it is pointed out that the procedure of trial by court martial is almost analogous to the procedure of trial in the ordinary criminal courts, we must recall what Justice William O'douglas observed : "[t]hat civil trial is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights while a military trial is market by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice. Very expression 'court martial' generally strikes terror in the heart of the person to be tried by it. And somehow or the other the trial is looked upon with disfavour. " In Reid v. Covert, Justice Black observed at Page 1174 as under: courts martial are typically ad hoc bodies appointed by a military officer from among his subordinates. They have always been subject to varying degrees of "command influence". In essence, these tribunals are simply executive tribunals whose personnel are in the executive chain of command. Frequently, the members of the court martial must look to the appointing officer for promotions, advantageous assignments and efficiency ratings " in short, for their future progress in the service. Conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, the members of a court martial, in the nature of things, do not and cannot have the independence of jurors drawn from the general public or of civilian judges. Absence of even one appeal with power to review evidence, legal formulation, conclusion and adequacy or otherwise of punishment is a glaring lacuna in a country where a counterpart civilian convict can prefer appeal after appeal to hierarchy of courts. Submission that full review of finding and/or sentence in confirmation proceeding under Section 153 is provided for is poor solace. A hierarchy of courts with appellate powers each having its own power of judicial review has of course been found to be counter-productive but the converse is equally distressing in that there is not even a single judicial review. Submission that full review of finding and/or sentence in confirmation proceeding under Section 153 is provided for is poor solace. A hierarchy of courts with appellate powers each having its own power of judicial review has of course been found to be counter-productive but the converse is equally distressing in that there is not even a single judicial review. With the expanding horizons of fair play in action even in administrative decision, the universal declaration of human rights and retributive justice being relegated to the uncivilised days, a time has come when a step is required to be taken for at least one review and it must truly be a judicial review as and by way of appeal to a body composed of non-military personnel or civil personnel. Army is always on alert for repelling external aggression and suppressing internal disorder so that the peace-loving citizens enjoy a social order based on rule of law; the same cannot be denied to the protectors of this order. And it must be realised that an appeal from Ceaser to Ceaser's wife " confirmation proceeding under Section 153 " has been condemned as injudicious and merely a lip sympathy to form. The core question is whether at least there should be one appeal to a body composed of non-military personnel and who would enjoy the right of judicial review both on law and facts as also determine the adequacy of punishment being commensurate with the gravity of the offence charged. Judicial approach by people well-versed in objective analysis of evidence trained by experience to look at facts and law objectively, fair play and justice cannot always be sacrificed at the altar of military discipline. Unjust decision would be subversive of discipline. There must be a judicious admixture of both. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the Petitioner has fervently contended that since no remedial action has been taken by Parliament, nay no discussion or cogitation on this point has at all been been made, the Writ Court should virtually transform itself into an Appeallate Court. There must be a judicious admixture of both. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the Petitioner has fervently contended that since no remedial action has been taken by Parliament, nay no discussion or cogitation on this point has at all been been made, the Writ Court should virtually transform itself into an Appeallate Court. The argument is predicated on the following observations in Gill : Despite lapse of about two decades neither the Parliament nor the Central government appears to have realised their constitutional obligations as were expected by this Court except amending Rule 62 providing that after recording the finding in each charge the Court shall give brief reasons in support thereof. The Judge-Advocate has been obliged to record or caused to be recorded brief reasons in the proceedings. Even today the law relating to Armed Forces remains static requires to be changed keeping in view the observations made by this Court in Prithi Pal Singh Bedi's case (supra), the constitutional mandate and the changes effected by other democratic countries. The time has come to allay the apprehension of all concerned that the system of trial by court-martial was not the arch type of summary and arbitrary proceedings. 10. In the absence of effective steps taken by the Parliament and the Central government, it is the constitutional obligation of the courts in the country to protect and safeguard the constitutional rights of all citizens including the persons enrolled in the Armed Forces to the extent permissible under law by not forgetting the paramount need of maintaining the discipline in the Armed Forces of the country. ( 5 ) IN L. Chandra Kumar VS. Union of India, 1997 (3) SCC 261 the Seven judges Constitution Bench of the Apex Court had recognised and reaffirmed the almost limitless powers of the High Courts exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The observations of the constitution Bench are of wider ambit than those articulated in K. Venkatachalam vs. A. Swamickan, AIR 1999 SC 1723 which has been relied upon by Mr. Dalal. It is trite that Writ Courts are fully empowered to enlarge a person on bail if it is satisfied that the ends of justice compelling so demand. The observations of the constitution Bench are of wider ambit than those articulated in K. Venkatachalam vs. A. Swamickan, AIR 1999 SC 1723 which has been relied upon by Mr. Dalal. It is trite that Writ Courts are fully empowered to enlarge a person on bail if it is satisfied that the ends of justice compelling so demand. The obstacle in the path of the Petitioner, however, is that that his claim for bail partakes of a routine character, namely, that because a writ petition is pending, he should be enlarged on bail. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has eloquently put forth the analogy applicable to pendency of appeals. We, however, feel that the net has been thrown too wide by Mr. Dalal; that his advertence to Moti Lal Saraf -vs- State of Jandk, (2006) 10 SCC 560 is of no avail. Their Lordships were dealing with the malaise of protracted criminal trials, which are rampant primarily because of a shortage of judicial officers in our country. It was in that context that it had been opined that the right to speedy trial, which is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, commences with the actual restraint imposed by the arrest and incarceration of a prisoner, and continues at all the stages viz. Investigation, Inquiry, Trial, Appeal and Revision. Mr. Dalal has also relied on Kashmira Singh VS. The State of Punjab, 1977 SCC (CRI)559 which also holds that pending the final disposal of an Appeal bail ought normally be granted. The incongruity is to equate an Appeal with a Writ petition. It would be relevant to recall the scope of judicial Review under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as enunciated in Union of india VS. Himmat Singh Chahar, 1999 (4) SCC 521 : in view of the rival submissions at the Bar the short question that arises for consideration is what would be the extent of the jurisdiction in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution over the findings of the authority in court-martial proceedings" The defence personnel serving in the Army, Navy or Air Force when commit any offence are dealt with by the special provisions contained in the Army Act, 1950 or the Navy Act, 1957 or the Air Force Act, 1950 and not by the normal Procedure Code. The said Navy Act is a complete code by itself and prescribes the procedure to be followed in case it is decided that an officer should be tried by a court-martial. The Act also provides sufficient safeguard by way of further appeal to the Chief of the Staff and then ultimately to the Union Government. Since the entire procedure is provided in the Act itself and the Act also provides for a further consideration by the Chief of the Naval Staff and then by the Union Government then ordinarily there should be a finality to the findings arrived at by the competent authority in the court-martial proceedings. It is of course true that notwithstanding the finality attached to the orders of the competent authority in the court-martial proceedings the High Court is entitled to exercise its power of judicial review by invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 but that would be for a limited purpose of finding out whether there has been infraction of any mandatory provisions of the Act prescribing the procedure which has caused gross miscarriage of justice or for finding out that whether there has been violation of the principles of natural justice which vitiates the entire proceedings or that the authority exercising the jurisdiction had not been vested with jurisdiction under the Act. The said power of judicial review cannot be a power of an appellate authority permitting the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and in coming to a conclusion that the evidence is insufficient for the conclusion arrived at by the competent authorities in court-martial proceedings. At any rate it cannot be higher than the jurisdiction of the High Court exercised under Article 227 against an order of an inferior tribunal. ( 6 ) OUR attention has also been drawn to the decision of the Division Bench in S. P. N. Sharma VS. Union of India, AIR 1968 Delhi 156 to the effect that habeas Corpus proceedings would be misutilised in cases where a person has been properly detained by a Court-Martial; neither proceedings are available so as to enable the Writ Court to exercise supervisory control or to Review proceedings of the Court-Martial. ( 7 ) MR. Dalal has also drawn attention to the observations made by a division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 428-DB of 1996 decided on 8. 9. 1999, titled Dharam Pal VS. ( 7 ) MR. Dalal has also drawn attention to the observations made by a division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 428-DB of 1996 decided on 8. 9. 1999, titled Dharam Pal VS. State of Haryana, where it had been held that life convicts who have undergone five years of imprisonment of which three years should be after conviction, ought to be released on bail pending hearing of the appeals. While doing so, en passant the Division Bench observed that the same principles would apply to those convicted by Courts-Martial and such prisoners should be entitled to release after seeking a suspension of their sentences. The persuasive value of this Judgment, however, stands considerably diluted in view of the Orders passed by a Bench comprising the author of Dharam Pal, in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No (s ). 3123/2006 titled Union of India VS. Shinder Singh decided on 14. 5. 2007 where the following observations were made: the question involved in this special leave petition is a matter of principle as to whether the High Court can in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution interfere with orders passed by the Chief of army Staff in relation to a Court Martial proceedings which is not subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court treating the instant application as if it was an application for bail in a pending appeal has suspended the sentence of life imprisonment passed against the respondent which the Chief of Army Staff has refused. However, this is a matter which may be raised again in the writ petition before the High Court and, if necessary, before this Court. We adjourn the hearing of this petition by six months and request the high Court to dispose of the writ petition itself within a period of four weeks from today. We make it clear that the period during which the respondent is not in custody pursuant to the impugned of the High Court will not be counted for the purposes of grant of remission. Liberty to the parties to make a mention. ( 8 ) SHINDER Singh arose from the Judgment of learned Single Judge of the punjab and Haryana High Court which had applied Dharampal as well as Col. Harish chandra Goswamy VS. Union of India, 1991 (1) CLR 433. Mr. Liberty to the parties to make a mention. ( 8 ) SHINDER Singh arose from the Judgment of learned Single Judge of the punjab and Haryana High Court which had applied Dharampal as well as Col. Harish chandra Goswamy VS. Union of India, 1991 (1) CLR 433. Mr. Dalal has brought to our notice the Orders passed in WPC) Nos. 11588/2007 and 2931/2007 where Appeal had been granted. We have already taken pains to clarify that the extraordinary jurisdiction of High Courts contained in Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India indubitably empower the Writ Court to enlarge convicts on bail, but in exceptional cases. The question which has engaged our attention in these proceedings did not arise before either of those Division Benches or even before two Division Benches of this very Court. It is our considered opinion that entertaining applications for bail in writ petitions, solely on the ground of entitlement to bail during the pendency of the writ petition, should be deprecated. So far as Goswamy is concerned the learned Single Judge of this court had not granted bail in case where 'rule' had been issued by the Division bench. It was in those circumstances that he had drawn the assumption that the court had prima facie been convinced that an error in the Court-Martial had occurred which would be liable to be set aside in the exercise of Judicial review. That is not the position that obtains before us. ( 9 ) THERE is no gainsaying that the right to Appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice, the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi judicial adjudications. The right to Appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant (Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Jawahar D. Mehta VS. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, AIR 1988 SC 2010 and Shyam Kishore VS. Municipal corporation of Delhi, (1993) 1 SCC 22 . In Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing Society, nagpur VS. M/s. Swaraj Developers, AIR 2003 SC 2434 the following enunciation of the law has been articulated:- 17. Right of appeal is statutory. Right of appeal inherits in no one. When conferred by statute it becomes a vested right. In this regard there is essential distinction between right of appeal and right of suit. Housing Society, nagpur VS. M/s. Swaraj Developers, AIR 2003 SC 2434 the following enunciation of the law has been articulated:- 17. Right of appeal is statutory. Right of appeal inherits in no one. When conferred by statute it becomes a vested right. In this regard there is essential distinction between right of appeal and right of suit. Where there is inherent right in every person to file a suit and for its maintainability it requires no authority of law, appeal requires so. As was observed in The State of Kerala v. K. M. Charia Abdulla and Co. ( AIR 1965 SC 1585 ), the distinction between right of appeal and revision is based on different implicit in the two expressions. An appeal is continuation of the proceedings; in effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority and it has power to review the evidence subject to statutory limitations prescribed. But in the case of revision, whatever powers the revisional authority may or may not have, it has no power to review the evidence, unless the statute expressly confers on it that power. It was noted by the four-Judges Bench in Hari Shankar and others v. Rao girdhari Lal Chowdhury ( AIR 1963 SC 698 ) that the distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one. A right of appeal carries with it a right of re-hearing on law as well as fact, unless the state conferring the right of appeal limits the re-hearing in some way, as has been done in second appeals arising under the Code. The power of hearing revision is generally given to a superior court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law. Reference was made to Section 115 of the Code to hold that the High Court's powers under the said provision are limited to certain particular categories of cases. The right there is confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone. ( 10 ) THERE is a clear distinction between right of an Appeal and right to file a Suit, or to prefer a Revision, and a fortiori a writ petition which is always dependent on the discretion of the High Court. ( 11 ) FURTHERMORE, it is well entrenched that a Writ Petition will not be entertained if an alternative remedy has not been availed of. ( 11 ) FURTHERMORE, it is well entrenched that a Writ Petition will not be entertained if an alternative remedy has not been availed of. Chapter-XIV of the Act deals with Pardons, Remissions and Suspensions. By virtue of Section 179 a convict can, inter alia, apply for his release on parole. Parole has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition as "release from jail, prison or other confinement after actually serving part of the sentence". A convict can also apply for suspension of sentence under Section 182. Taking resort to latter provision is additionally advantageous since Section 185 postulates that where a sentence is suspended such period shall be reckoned as part of the term of such sentence. In addition to Chapter-XIV the Petitioner or any other convict can also resort to Section 164 (2) or Section 165 of the Act. ( 12 ) ARTICLE 33 of the Constitution of India clarifies that it would be competent for Parliament to determine the extent to which the Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution of India would apply to the members of the Armed Forces. The Act and the Army Rules would, therefore, have to be analysed in order to appreciate the powers of the writ Court to enlarge on bail prisoners convicted by Courts-Martial. It cannot possibly be contended that there is no logic or wisdom in restricting the application of civil laws to Armed Forces, so long as Fundamental rights are substantially left intact. Article 21 cannot be construed as justifying the release of prisoners from incarceration consequent upon their being held guilty by a properly constituted Court which has functioned in consonance with law. Having said that, it is lamentable that the parliament has not cared to discuss the observations of the Supreme Court in bedi. ( 13 ) WE have already drawn attention to Article 33 of the Constitution of India. It would also be relevant to take note of Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which states that nothing contained therein shall affect any special or local law or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law. These provisions came up for consideration in Ajmer Singh VS. It would also be relevant to take note of Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which states that nothing contained therein shall affect any special or local law or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law. These provisions came up for consideration in Ajmer Singh VS. Union of India, (1987) 3 SCC 340 where it was held that the Army Act, the Navy Act and the Air force Act embody a completely self-contained comprehensive Code and, therefore, constitute special laws conferring special jurisdiction and powers making the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure inapplicable thereto. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which deals with suspension of sentence pending the Appeal and the release of the appellant on bail in certain circumstances, would not be applicable. This is another reason why the Writ court should be loathe in entertaining bail applications in Courts-Martial cases in a routine manner. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for the Petitioner has contended that it may not be possible for the Petitioner to obtain parole under the Army Act, Rules and regulations solely on the ground that his writ petition is pending adjudication by this Court. This may well be so, but even then the writ court cannot be transformed into an Appellate Court hearing criminal appeals. If the petitioner's prayer for parole is rejected illegally, the Writ Court will intervene. As has already been seen an Appeal is a creature of a statute. The common perception that every Order or Sentence is appealable is without foundation. Judges should guard against trivializing writ jurisdiction by making it a surrogate for Appellate Courts which can overturn findings of fact. The writ Court only exercises power of judicial Review which is of a much narrower compass. ( 15 ) IN Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 651, the parameters of Wednesbury unreasonableness have been delineated in these words - "the duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision/making authority exceeded its powers" 2. Committed an error of law. 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision/making authority exceeded its powers" 2. Committed an error of law. 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must given effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. vs. Secretary of state for the Home Department, ex Brind, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, "consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention". ( 16 ) WE, therefore, conclude that bail applications should not ordinarily be entertained in writ proceedings even if the consequence is that the petitioner would have undergone the sentence before the Petition is decided. The presumption normally is that a Judgment or Sentence is legally and jurally in order. ( 17 ) WE now return to the bail application before us. We reiterate that the writ Court is not bereft or devoid of power to grant bail in exceptional circumstances. However, pendency of a writ petition is not a ground for grant of bail. Writ proceedings cannot be equated to appellate proceedings since the latter is a matter of right, whereas the former, apart from being restricted in nature, is discretionary in content. Exceptional circumstances compelling us to exercise our extraordinary powers have not been disclosed by the Petitioner. Application is accordingly dismissed.