IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLA No.153 of 2004 (From the judgment dated 10.03.2004 passed by learned Adhoc Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Baripada in S.T. Case Nos.32/9 of 2003) Chantu @ Chhoturam Mohanta … Appellant -versus- State of Odisha … Respondent Advocates appeared in the case through hybrid mode: For Appellant : Mr. B.R.Mohanty, Advocate -versus- For Respondent : Ms. Suvalaxmi Devi, A.S.C. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANASH RANJAN PATHAK THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA Date of hearing-05.03.2026 Date of Judgment-30.06.2026 Sashikanta Mishra,J. The accused-appellant faced trial in S.T. Case No. 32/9 of 2003 in the Court of learned Adhoc Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Baripada under Section 302 of IPC for committing murder CRLA. No.153 of 2004 Page 2 of 12 of one Thakuri Mahanta. By judgment passed on 10.03.2004, he was convicted of the above offence and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Said judgment is impugned. 2. Prosecution case, briefly stated, is as follows: On 21.06.2002, the accused allegedly committed murder of Thakuri Mohanta by assaulting her with a Budia. Her son, Laxman Mohanta lodged report to the above effect at Mahulapada Police Station on the same day. Accordingly, P.S. Case No. 8 of 2002 was registered under Section 302 of IPC, followed by investigation. In course of investigation, the accused was arrested and other steps were taken. Upon completion of investigation, chargesheet was submitted. 3. The defence took the plea of denial and false implication. 4. To prove its case, prosecution examined 10 witnesses and exhibited 13 documents. It also proved 2 material CRLA No. 153 of 2004 objects on its behalf. The defence did not adduce any evidence. 5. After analyzing the evidence on record, the trial Court, relying upon the eyewitness accounts of the informant P.W.1, P.Ws. 2 and 3 found the prosecution case fully established against the accused. The trial Court also accepted the prosecution case that the accused had a strong motive to kill the deceased as he suspected her of practising witchcraft. The defence objections were negatived. The accused was thus convicted of the offence and sentenced as aforesaid. 6. Heard Mr. B.R. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. S.Devi, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State. 7. Mr. Mohanty, assails the impugned judgment on the ground that the trial Court committed manifest error in relying upon the version of the so-called eye-witnesses even though they were found to have materially changed their statements while deposing before this Court. He further CRLA. No.153 of 2004 Page 4 of 12 submits that it would be borne out from the evidence that multiple FIRs were lodged in the case which creates serious doubt about the prosecution case. He further argues that the trial Court erroneously brushed aside the evidence relating to previous litigation between the accused and the family of the deceased. Mr. Mohanty concludes his arguments by submitting that this is a case where the accused should have been given the benefit of doubt. 8. Per contra, Ms. Subhalaxmi Devi, learned ASC contends that there is clear evidence that the accused first shot an arrow at the deceased and when she screamed, he assaulted her by means of a Budia causing grievous injury. The medical evidence fully corroborates the ocular evidence. The motive of the accused to kill the deceased is also clearly proved. The contradictions pointed out by defence are minor in nature and cannot affect the prosecution case. 9. Having noted the rival contentions we shall analyse the evidence on record keeping in view the same. Page 5 of 12 CRLA No. 153 of 2004 The FIR was lodged on the date of occurrence by the son of the deceased Laxman Mohanta (P.W.1). The FIR simply mentions that the accused, Chotaram Mohanta and some other persons killed the deceased by means of a Budia. However, the chargesheet was submitted only against the accused. Nothing has been mentioned as regards the identity of the said other persons. No other witness has also stated anything about the involvement of any other person. The informant P.W.1 stated in cross-examination that while he was going to his house, he heard his mother shouting and at that time he was near the spot. Further, the accused assaulted his mother six times by means of an axe on her back, neck and rear. Previously also, the accused had shot an arrow which hit her left hand. Significantly, P.W.1 stated that he described in his FIR all these facts in detail. As already stated, the FIR does not mention any such thing except that the accused and some other persons killed the deceased by assaulting her with Budia. The accused further admitted that he lodged 4 to 5 CRLA. No.153 of 2004 Page 6 of 12 written reports and the present FIR is one among them while the police returned the rest FIRs to him. If the statements of P.W.1 are accepted, it would imply that the FIR exhibited in the case is different from the report said to have been lodged by him containing all the details. This creates a serious doubt as to the prosecution story as the possibility of the FIR exhibited in the case (Exhibit-3) being prepared with deliberation and by suppressing the original FIR cannot be entirely ruled out. 10. Reading of the impugned judgment reveals that the trial Court brushed aside the defence argument in this regard on the reasoning that considering the background of the witness (P.W.1) and the unexaggerated FIR it seems that P.W.1 does not understand what he means about the FIR and might have been confused regarding his signature on inquest report and other documents. This is making out a third case altogether by the trial Court on the face of the clear admission of P.W.1 and the implication of his statements in cross-examination as referred above. It amounts to supplying reasons by the Court, the foundation CRLA No. 153 of 2004 of which are not to be found in the evidence and therefore unacceptable. 11. Defence has not assailed the finding relating to homicidal death of the deceased. We therefore do not propose to examine the said question and take it as accepted that the death was, in fact, homicidal in nature. In any case, the postmortem report and the autopsy surgeon’s evidence prove the same. 12. As regards authorship of the crime, we find that prosecution heavily relies upon the evidence of the so- called eye-witnesses namely, P.W.1, 2 and 3. P.W.1 as already stated, deposed many things about the occurrence and specifically of witnessing the assault by the accused on his mother by means of an axe. As already stated, the FIR exhibited in the case, purporting to have been submitted by P.W.1 does not mention any such thing. Most importantly, it was suggested in cross-examination to him that he had not stated before police what he stated about the assault before the Court. This part of his cross- CRLA. No.153 of 2004 Page 8 of 12 examination was not confronted to the I.O. (P.W.10) for reasons best known. 13. In order to satisfy ourselves we perused the Section 161 of Cr.P.C. statement of Laxman Mohanta (P.W.1). What strikes to mind upon reading such statement and comparing it with his deposition before this Court is that he had not stated to have seen the accused assaulting his mother as deposed before the Court. The trial Court refused to consider the vital contradiction/omission as the same was not confronted to the I.O. This is an absurd reasoning with which we cannot agree. When the trial Court has itself relied upon the case dairy and statement under 161 Cr.P.C. of another witness (P.W.3), we fail to understand as to why the same mode was not adopted in case of P.W.1, who undoubtedly is the most important witness. 14. The fact that the defence counsel conducting the case, for whatever reason, chose not to confront such omission/contradiction in the statement of P.W.1 to the I.O. is of no consequence. It is the responsibility of the CRLA No. 153 of 2004 Court to make such inquiry from the record as is necessary to ascertain the truth. When the glaring contradiction in the statement of P.W.1 is available on record, the Court cannot shut its eyes to it. 15. In so far as P.W.2 (Ranjit Kumar Mohanta) is concerned, he also sought to corroborate the version of P.W.1 as regards the occurrence and the manner of assault by the accused in material particulars. However, he had not stated anything at all before the police during the investigation. His entire evidence is found to have been an improvement and yet, the trial Court accepted the same on the ground that the contradiction was not confronted to the I.O. For the reason already indicated, we are unable to accept such approach. 16. This leaves us with the evidence of P.W.3, who stated to have seen the accused assaulting the deceased both before police as well as before the Court. The trial Court on comparison of both the statements, thought it proper to believe P.W.3. Ordinarily, we would not have found any fault with the trial Court on this score but given CRLA. No.153 of 2004 Page 10 of 12 the doubts arising from the FIR and other evidence, we would be slow to accept the version of P.W.3 without ample corroboration. 17. Looking for corroboration, we find that the trial Court has placed much emphasis on the version of P.W.7 before whom the accused is said to have made an extra judicial confession. Be it noted that P.W.7 had turned hostile to the prosecution. The trial Court has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of U.P. vrs. Ramesh Prasad Mishra and others (1996)10 SCC 360, regarding the use of evidence of a hostile witness. There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down therein that the evidence of hostile witness need not be totally rejected and the portion consistent with the case of prosecution or defence may be accepted. But then, the prosecution, after declaring P.W.7 as hostile simply suggested to him all that he had stated before police during investigation, which he denied, but no independent fact was sought to be proved through him. Surprisingly the trial Court has placed much weightage on the version of the I.O. CRLA No. 153 of 2004 where he states that P.W.7 had stated about the extra- judicial confession of the accused before him. Unless the fact itself is independently proved, we fail to understand as to how the statement of P.W.10, even if accepted, goes to prove the prosecution version regarding extra-judicial confession of the accused. The effect of the statement of P.W.10 would be that P.W.7 had stated about the extra- judicial confession of the accused before him during investigation. In other words, it would be akin to treating his statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. as a piece of substantive evidence. We therefore, reject the reasoning adopted by the trial Court. 18. Thus, from the analysis of evidence made by us, we find that the prosecution case as laid is not free from reasonable doubt at all. The trial Court appears to have been swayed away by the principle that being the son of the deceased, the informant would never screen the actual offender by falsely implicating the accused. For this principle to apply, the evidence has to be otherwise acceptable and trustworthy. When the same is lacking, the CRLA. No.153 of 2004 Page 12 of 12 Court cannot proceed merely on the assumption that a son would not lie about the identity of his mother’s killer. 19. We may also point out that graver the offence, stricter is the proof required to establish it. A case of murder cannot be proved on mere hunches or possibilities. Viewed in the light of the above, we are constrained to observe that the impugned order of conviction cannot be sustained. 20. For the foregoing reasons therefore, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and sentence is set aside. The accused being on bail, his bail bonds be discharged. .......................................... Sashikanta Mishra, J. Manash Ranjan Pathak, J. I agree. …........................................ (Manash Ranjan Pathak,J.) Deepak