1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP No. 838 of 2003 Sanjay Enterprises. Through Proprietor Shui Sanjay Kasal, aged about 38 years, 5/o Shri K Kasal, R/o Wara Sioni, Balaghat District- Balaghat (M.P.). ---Petitioner versus 1. Bhilai Steel Plant. Through Managing Director, Ispat Bhawan, Bhilai, Distt. Durg (C.G) 2. Deputy General Manager, Raw Materials Department, Bhilai Steel Plant, Ispat Bhawam, Bhilai, District- Durg (C.G.) 3. Manager (Purchase), Bhilai Steel Plant, Ispat Bhawan, Bhilai, District Durg (CG) 4. General Manager (Quality) Bhilai Steel Plant, Ispat Bhawan, Bhilm, District Dung (CG) ---Respondents WP No. 3765 of 2003 Kasal Tiles. Through Partner Shri Sanjay Kasal, Aged about 38 years, 5/o Shri D.K. Kasal, R/o Warn Sioni, Balaghat, District: Balaghat (M.P.) --- Petitioner versus 1. Bhilai Steel Plant. Through Managing Director, Ispat Bhawan, Bhilai, Distt. Durg (C.G.) 2 2. Deputy General Manager, Raw Materials Department, Bhilai Steel Plant, Ispat Bhavan, Bhilai, Distt. Durg (C.G.) 3. Manager (Purchase), Bhilai Steel Plant, Ispat Bhavan, Bhilai, Distt. Durg (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Rahul Ambast, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Vikram Sharma, Advocate (in WP No. 838 of 2003) and Mr. Pranjal Agrawal, Advocate (in WP 3765 of 2003) Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 02/02/2026 1. Since both the writ petitions arise out of similar and connected factual matrix, involve common questions of law relating to withholding of payment and enforcement of contractual clauses by the respondent– Bhilai Steel Plant, and the parties are substantially the same, they were heard together and are being decided by this common order. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the matters have been heard finally and decided by a common order. 2. The WP No. 838 of 2003 has been filed by the petitioner, Sanjay Enterprises, through its proprietor Shri Sanjay Kasal, calling in question the action of the respondents–Bhilai Steel Plant and its officers, whereby payment for the raw material supplied by the 3 petitioner, namely manganese ore, has been withheld on the allegation that the material supplied was sub-standard, despite the fact that the same was admittedly received and consumed by the respondents. The petitioner has, inter alia, sought issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, including a writ of mandamus for release of the withheld amount of Rs. 10,77,707/- and Rs. 12,46,385/-, a writ of certiorari for quashing Clause 8.0 of the acceptance of tender dated 14.06.2002 (Annexure P/6) as being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and for quashing the imposition of late delivery penalty amounting to Rs. 78,710/-. The petitioner further alleges that the respondents have acted in a wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory manner, contrary to the contractual provisions relating to sampling and umpire analysis, and in violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India. 3. The WP No. 3765 of 2003 has been filed by the petitioner, a partnership firm engaged in the business of supply of dolomite chips, calling in question the legality and validity of the action of the respondent–Bhilai Steel Plant in imposing Risk Purchase Penalty to the tune of Rs. 2,19,035/- and in withholding payment of Rs. 1,60,703/- towards the price of raw material allegedly rejected but admittedly consumed by the respondents, as also seeking quashment of Clause 9.1 of the contract and the impugned orders contained in Annexures P/15 and P/17, on the ground that the respondents have acted arbitrarily, unilaterally altered the terms of 4 the contract, and thereby violated Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. 4. The petitioner in WP No. 838 of 2003 has filed the petition seeking for the following reliefs:- “7.1 The petitioner above named most respectfully prays to this Hon'ble Court to call for the record. 7.2 The petitioner above named most respectfully prays to the Hon'ble Court to issue writ of certiorari for quashing Clause 8.0 of the acceptance of tender contained in Annexure P/6 for being ultra vires to the Article 14 of the Constitution. 7.3 The petitioner above named most respectfully prays to the Hon'ble Court to issue writ of mandamus directing the respondents for releasing the payments of Rs. 10,77,707/-+ Rs. 12,46,385/- towards the cost of the supply of the raw material with interest, which has been consumed by the respondents which is evident from Annexure P/18 and P/19. 7.4 The petitioner above named most respectfully prays to the Hon'ble Court to issue writ of 5 certiorari for quashing the letter by which late delivery penalty of Rs. 78,710/- has been imposed by the respondents. 7.5 Any other relief, which may suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 5. The petitioner in WP No. 3765 of 2003 has filed the petition seeking for the following reliefs:- “7.1 The petitioner above named most respectfully prays to this Hon'ble Court to call for the record. 7.2 The petitioner above named most respectfully prays to the Hon'ble Court to issue writ of certiorari for quashing Clause 9.1 of the acceptance of tender for being ultra vires to the Article 14 of the Constitution. 7.3 The petitioner above named most respectfully prays to the Hon'ble Court to issue writ of mandamus directing the respondents for releasing the payments of Rs. 1,60,703/-as per Annexure P/13 along with interest till date of payment. 7.4 The petitioner above named most respectfully prays to the Hon'ble Court to issue writ of 6 certiorari for quashing the document Annexure P/15 and P/17. Any other relief, which may be suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 6. The facts of the case as emerges from the pleadings of WP No. 838 of 2003 are that, the petitioner is a proprietary concern engaged in the business of supplying raw material, particularly manganese ore. The respondents are Bhilai Steel Plant and its officers, a Government company and public sector undertaking, which is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is, therefore, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner has been supplying manganese ore to the respondent–Bhilai Steel Plant since the year 1996 and, prior to the dispute in question, there had never been any complaint regarding quality, nor any delay or default in payment for the material supplied. *******For the year 2002–2003, the respondent–Bhilai Steel Plant invited tenders for supply of 1,17,000 metric tons of manganese ore (BF-Grade). Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted its techno- commercial bid along with the price break-up. The bid of the petitioner was accepted, and a letter of intent dated 16.04.2002 was issued in its favour, which was duly accepted by the petitioner. Subsequently, the tender was formally accepted by the respondents on 14.06.2002, thereby giving rise to a concluded contract between the parties, governed by the terms and conditions contained in the acceptance of tender. 7 *******In accordance with the contract, the petitioner dispatched the first consignment consisting of 33 railway wagons of manganese ore to the respondents. The said consignment was received by the respondents, and the receipt note clearly recorded that the material supplied conformed to the prescribed specifications, mentioning the contents of manganese, sulphur, aluminium and phosphorus. At that stage, the respondents had the contractual option either to accept or to reject the material, and the material was admittedly accepted and thereafter consumed by the respondents. *******Subsequently, an objection was raised by the respondents alleging that the quality of the raw material supplied was sub- standard. In response, the petitioner obtained re-analysis of the sample through an independent laboratory, namely Mitra S.K. Quality Control Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur, which, according to the petitioner, confirmed that the material was within the prescribed specifications. Thus, a dispute arose between the parties regarding the quality of the material supplied. *******As per Clause 6.0 of the contract, in the event of any dispute relating to sampling and analysis, the matter was required to be resolved through third-party or “umpire” sampling analysis, whose report was to be final and binding. Despite repeated requests and representations made by the petitioner for such umpire sampling, the respondents failed to conduct the same, even though they had initially agreed to do so. In the meantime, the petitioner dispatched a 8 second consignment of 36 wagons, which was also received and accepted by the respondents without demur. *******Notwithstanding the acceptance and consumption of the material, the respondents withheld payment of the price of the supplied manganese ore on the ground that the material was sub- standard. The petitioner issued notices demanding release of the outstanding amounts of Rs. 10,77,707/- and Rs. 12,46,385/-, but no payment was made. Additionally, the respondents imposed a late delivery penalty of Rs. 78,710/-, which, according to the petitioner, was wholly unwarranted as the consignments were dispatched within the stipulated time. *******Aggrieved by the arbitrary withholding of payment, non- conduct of umpire sampling as mandated by the contract, and imposition of late delivery penalty, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition, challenging the action of the respondents as arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India, and seeking appropriate writs and directions for redressal of its grievances. 7. The facts of the case as emerges from the pleadings of WP No. 3765 of 2003 are that, the petitioner is a registered partnership firm engaged in the business of supplying dolomite chips and has been supplying the said raw material to the respondent–Bhilai Steel Plant for several years without any complaint. For the years 2001–2002 and 2002–2003, the respondent invited tenders for supply of 7200 metric tons of Low Silica Dolomite Chips (8–20 mm). The petitioner 9 participated in the tender process, furnished the required price break- up, and its tender was accepted on 02.04.2002. As per the tender conditions, the delivery period for the supply was to commence from 01.04.2002 and extend up to 31.03.2003, i.e., for a period of one year. *******After acceptance of the tender, the respondents, by their communication dated 10.04.2002, called upon the petitioner to make immediate supply of the material. Subsequently and without prior notice or consent of the petitioner, the respondents unilaterally curtailed the delivery period and treated the contract as operative only up to 31.07.2002. On account of the alleged delay in supply within the curtailed period, the respondents issued Risk Purchase Notices dated 03.06.2002 and 26.06.2002 to the petitioner. The petitioner protested against the unilateral reduction of the delivery period and objected to invocation of the Risk Purchase Clause, asserting that such action was contrary to the agreed terms of the contract. *******During the subsistence of the contract, the petitioner supplied substantial quantities of dolomite chips, out of which 230.028 metric tons were shown as rejected by the respondents. Despite such rejection, the said material was admittedly consumed by the respondents, but payment amounting to Rs. 1,60,703/- was withheld by invoking Clause 9.1 of the contract. Further, the respondents imposed and recovered Risk Purchase Penalty of Rs. 2,19,035/- from the petitioner’s bills. The petitioner’s representations against the 10 said actions were rejected, leading to the present writ petition challenging the imposition of penalty, withholding of payment, and the validity of Clause 9.1, as being arbitrary, illegal, and violative of Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. 8. Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner (in WP No. 838 of 2003) would submit that, the petitioner has been supplying manganese ore to the respondent–Bhilai Steel Plant since the year 1996 without any complaint whatsoever and that, in the present case also, the material supplied pursuant to the tender for the year 2002–2003 was duly dispatched, received and admittedly consumed by the respondents. It is contended that once the respondents have accepted and utilized the raw material, they are legally bound to pay the consideration thereof, and withholding of payment on the alleged ground of sub-standard quality is wholly arbitrary and unsustainable in law. *******It is further submitted that the contract itself provides a complete mechanism for resolution of disputes relating to quality and sampling. Clause 6.0 of the contract specifically contemplates that in the event of any dispute between the seller and the purchaser regarding sampling or analysis, a third-party or “umpire” sampling analysis shall be conducted and the report thereof shall be final. In the present case, despite repeated representations and even an initial assurance by the respondents, the said umpire sampling was never conducted, and therefore, in the absence of a final umpire 11 report, the material supplied by the petitioner cannot be treated as rejected. *******Learned counsel would argue that the respondents have acted in a manifestly arbitrary manner by consuming the material on the one hand and, on the other, denying payment by invoking Clause 8.0 of the contract. It is contended that Clause 8.0, insofar as it permits non-payment for material which has been consumed, is one-sided, unreasonable and opposed to public policy, and is, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. B.N. Ganguly (AIR 1986 SC 1571) to contend that such unconscionable and arbitrary contractual terms cannot be enforced by a State instrumentality. *******It is also submitted that the imposition of late delivery penalty of Rs. 78,710/- is wholly unjustified and without any factual or legal basis. The consignments were dispatched within the stipulated period, and in any case, when the respondents themselves accepted the supplies without protest and consumed the material, levy of penalty is arbitrary and vitiated by non-application of mind. Such action, it is urged, further demonstrates the capricious conduct of the respondents. *******Learned counsel would, therefore, submit that the impugned actions of the respondents in withholding payment, failing to conduct umpire sampling, and imposing late delivery penalty are violative of 12 Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India. It is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writs, orders or directions, including a writ of mandamus directing release of the withheld amounts, and writs of certiorari quashing Clause 8.0 of the contract and the penalty imposed, in the interest of justice. 9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner (WP No. 3765 of 2003) would submit that, the entire action of the respondents in invoking the Risk Purchase Clause and imposing penalty is wholly arbitrary and unsustainable in law, inasmuch as the respondents themselves committed a fundamental breach of the contract by unilaterally curtailing the agreed delivery period from 01.04.2002– 31.03.2003 to 31.07.2002, without notice or consent of the petitioner. It is contended that once the time schedule formed an essential term of the contract, the same could not have been altered unilaterally, and therefore, the petitioner cannot be penalised for non-supply within a period which was never contractually agreed upon. *******Learned counsel further submits that the respondents have acted illegally and unjustly in withholding payment of Rs. 1,60,703/- towards 230.028 metric tons of dolomite chips which, though described as rejected, were admittedly consumed by the respondents. It is argued that Clause 9.1 of the contract, which permits non-payment even after consumption of the material, is per se arbitrary, opposed to public policy, hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, and violative of Articles 14 and 300-A of the 13 Constitution of India. Reliance is placed on the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (AIR 1986 SC 1571) to contend that unfair and unreasonable contractual clauses imposed by a State instrumentality are liable to be struck down. *******It is lastly submitted that the conduct of the respondents amounts to unjust enrichment, as they have derived benefit by consuming the petitioner’s material without making payment and, at the same time, have imposed Risk Purchase Penalty by withholding Rs. 2,19,035/- from the petitioner’s bills. Learned counsel submits that such action is ex facie discriminatory, unreasonable, and violative of Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution. Therefore, the impugned orders contained in Annexures P/15 and P/17, as well as Clause 9.1 of the contract, deserve to be quashed, and the respondents be directed to release the withheld amount along with appropriate interest. 10. Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents (Bhilai Steel Plant) in WP No. 838 of 2003 would submit that, the present writ petition is not maintainable either in law or on facts. The dispute arises purely out of contractual obligations governed by specific terms and conditions mutually agreed between the parties. Clause 8 of the contract categorically provides that material not conforming to the prescribed specifications shall stand rejected and that even if such rejected material is consumed due to operational exigencies, no payment shall be made to the contractor. The 14 petitioner, having consciously participated in the tender process and expressly accepted the terms and conditions of the contract, including Clause 8, is estopped from challenging the same. It is a settled principle that contractual terms, once accepted with full knowledge, cannot subsequently be assailed through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. *******It is further submitted that the chemical analysis of the manganese ore supplied by the petitioner was carried out strictly in accordance with the contractual procedure, and as per the agreement, the findings of the respondent–Bhilai Steel Plant are final and binding. The petitioner was afforded full opportunity under the sampling and analysis procedure to witness the sampling and to collect samples for independent testing from a recognized government laboratory, which the petitioner failed to avail within the stipulated time. The petitioner cannot now seek to take advantage of his own omission. The contention that the analysis ought to have been conducted by an outside agency is contrary to the express contractual provisions, which clearly vest finality in the analysis conducted by the respondent’s laboratory. Hence, the rejection of the material and denial of payment are fully justified under the contract. *******Learned counsel further submits that the writ petition is, in substance, a claim for recovery of money arising out of an alleged breach of contract, for which an alternative and efficacious remedy of civil suit and arbitration is available, as provided under Clause 18 of the contract. Such disputed questions of fact relating to quality of 15 material, chemical analysis, and entitlement to payment cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. The transaction being purely commercial in nature, no element of arbitrariness, unreasonableness, or violation of statutory or constitutional provisions is made out. Consequently, the writ petition is devoid of merit, barred by availability of alternative remedies, and liable to be dismissed with costs. 11. Mr. Pranjal Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents (Bhilai Steel Plant) in WP 3765 of 2003 would submit that, the present writ petition is not maintainable. The dispute arises purely out of contractual obligations governed by the terms of the Acceptance of Tender and the General Conditions of Contract of SAIL. The petition involves disputed questions of fact relating to quality, quantity, delivery schedule and rejection of material, which cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy by way of civil suit and arbitration under Clause 18 of the contract, which has not been exhausted. *******The allegation of unilateral alteration of delivery schedule is wholly misconceived and denied. The revised delivery timeline up to 31.07.2002 was discussed and mutually agreed upon in a meeting held on 06.05.2002, which the petitioner attended. The urgency arose due to increased plant requirements, and all suppliers, including the petitioner, consented to expedite supplies. Written 16 communications dated 10.04.2002 and 27.04.2002 further evidence the same. Hence, there is no arbitrariness or violation of Article 14. *******It is submitted that Clause 9.1 of the Acceptance of Tender was expressly accepted by the petitioner and forms part of a concluded contract. As per the said clause, material not conforming to prescribed chemical and physical specifications is liable to rejection, and no payment is admissible even if such rejected material is consumed due to operational constraints. The material supplied by the petitioner was repeatedly found sub-standard by the Research and Control Laboratory, resulting in lawful rejection. The decision of the plant is final and binding under the agreed terms. *******The invocation of the Risk Purchase Clause was neither sudden nor punitive. Repeated notices dated 03.06.2002 and 26.06.2002 were issued to the petitioner to make good the shortfall. Despite ample opportunity, the petitioner failed to supply the balance quantity within the agreed schedule. Consequently, alternate procurement of 1918 MT was made in January 2003 at the petitioner’s risk and cost, resulting in an extra expenditure of Rs. 2,19,035.50, which is recoverable contractually. Risk purchase is compensatory in nature and cannot be equated with a penalty. *******The petitioner, having breached the contract by supplying inferior material and failing to meet delivery obligations, is not entitled to any payment, refund, or equitable relief. Clause 9.1 is neither unconstitutional nor opposed to public policy, having been voluntarily accepted. There is no unjust enrichment, as consumption of rejected 17 material is expressly provided for in the contract. The respondents have acted transparently, reasonably, and strictly in accordance with law and contractual terms. The petition, being devoid of merit, deserves dismissal with costs. 12. We have heard rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents placed on record, and the contractual provisions governing the field. The principal questions that arise for determination are: (i) whether the present writ petitions, arising out of purely contractual disputes, are maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; (ii) whether Clauses 8.0 and 9.1 of the Acceptance of Tender can be declared arbitrary or unconstitutional merely because they operate harshly against the petitioners; and (iii) whether the respondents can be compelled in writ jurisdiction to release payment for material which was contractually treated as rejected, notwithstanding its consumption. 13. At the outset, it must be noted that the disputes in both the writ petitions arise squarely out of the terms and conditions of concluded commercial contracts voluntarily entered into between the parties. It is not in dispute that the petitioners participated in the tender process 18 with open eyes, submitted their bids, and expressly accepted the Acceptance of Tender containing Clauses 8.0 and 9.1, as the case may be. These clauses unequivocally stipulate that material not conforming to prescribed specifications shall be treated as rejected and that no payment shall be admissible even if such rejected material is consumed due to operational exigencies. 14. The law is well settled that judicial review under Article 226 does not extend to rewriting the terms of a contract or granting reliefs which are purely in the realm of private law, unless a clear case of arbitrariness, mala fides, or violation of statutory or constitutional provisions is made out. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216, has categorically held that disputes relating to breach of contract, recovery of money, or interpretation of contractual clauses are ordinarily not amenable to writ jurisdiction, particularly where disputed questions of fact are involved. 15. In Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 116, the Supreme Court observed that where parties enter into a contract governed by agreed terms, the rights and obligations flowing therefrom are to be enforced through ordinary civil remedies and not by invoking writ jurisdiction. The Court further cautioned that Article 226 is not intended to facilitate avoidance of contractual obligations or to confer an unfair advantage on one of the contracting parties. 19 16. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we find that the core grievance of the petitioners pertains to alleged wrongful rejection of material, non-payment of price, and imposition of penalties under the contract. These issues necessarily involve examination of technical data, quality parameters, sampling procedures, delivery schedules, and alleged breaches by both sides matters which are inherently factual and incapable of summary adjudication in writ proceedings. 17. The argument of the petitioners that consumption of the material by the respondents automatically entitles them to payment cannot be accepted. The contractual clauses specifically contemplate a situation where rejected material may be consumed due to operational compulsions, without conferring any right to payment. Once such a clause is consciously accepted, the mere fact of consumption cannot override the express contractual stipulation. The Supreme Court in Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2006) 10 SCC 236, has held that commercial decisions taken in terms of a contract cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction unless they are shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or actuated by extraneous considerations, which is not the case here. 18. Much reliance has been placed by the petitioners on the judgment in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156. In our considered opinion, the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. The doctrine of unconscionable contracts was invoked therein in the 20 context of a standard form service contract imposed upon employees having no real bargaining power. Commercial contracts between business entities dealing at arm’s length stand on a completely different footing. The Supreme Court itself has clarified in LIC of India v. Consumer Education & Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482, that the doctrine of unconscionability must be applied with circumspection and cannot be mechanically extended to all contracts involving State instrumentalities. 19. In the present case, both petitioners are experienced commercial entities engaged in supply of raw materials to large industrial undertakings for several years. There is nothing on record to indicate any inequality of bargaining power or coercion. Merely because a contractual clause operates to the disadvantage of one party does not render it arbitrary or unconstitutional. As held in Karnataka State Forest Industries Corporation v. Indian Rocks, (2009) 1 SCC 150, courts cannot invalidate contractual terms merely on the ground that they are harsh or commercially onerous. 20. The contention that non-conduct of umpire sampling ipso facto renders the rejection illegal also cannot be accepted in writ jurisdiction. Whether the petitioner failed to avail the sampling procedure within time, whether the respondent’s laboratory analysis attained finality under the contract, and whether any deviation occurred, are all disputed questions of fact. The Supreme Court in Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 728, has reiterated that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised 21 where adjudication would require examination of voluminous evidence or resolution of factual controversies arising from contractual dealings. 21. Similarly, in WP No. 3765 of 2003, the issue regarding alleged unilateral curtailment of delivery period and invocation of risk purchase clause is seriously disputed by the respondents, who have placed reliance on contemporaneous correspondence and meetings suggesting mutual consensus. Such matters cannot be conclusively determined without leading evidence, and therefore, cannot be gone into in writ proceedings. The recovery effected under the Risk Purchase Clause is compensatory in nature and arises from contractual rights expressly reserved to the respondents. 22. It is also significant that both contracts provide for alternative efficacious remedies, including arbitration and civil proceedings. The petitioners have not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances warranting bypass of these remedies. The Supreme Court in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107, while carving out exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, has clarified that writ jurisdiction in contractual matters may be exercised only where the action is wholly without jurisdiction, patently arbitrary, or violative of statutory provisions. None of these contingencies are established in the present cases. 23. The plea of violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 300-A is more rhetorical than real. A mere breach of contract or enforcement of 22 contractual terms does not amount to violation of fundamental or constitutional rights. As held in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470, Article 14 cannot be invoked to avoid contractual obligations freely undertaken, nor can Article 300-A be pressed into service where deprivation is in accordance with law and contract. 24. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that both the writ petitions are not maintainable, involve purely contractual disputes with disputed questions of fact, and do not disclose any arbitrariness, mala fides, or constitutional infirmity warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 25. Consequently, both WP No. 838 of 2003 and WP No. 3765 of 2003 are dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved