1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP No. 2818 of 2003 1 - Smt.Puspa Devi Agrawal (died) through LRs 1.1 - Nirmala Agrawal W/o Lt. Subhash Agrawal Aged About 59 Years R/o Shriji Heights, Flat No.-101, Civil Line, Behind Electric Office, Byron Bazaar, Prem Kunj, Govind Kunj, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 1.2 - Kanhaiya Agrawal S/o Lt. Subhash Agrawal Aged About 37 Years R/o Shriji Heights, Flat No.-101, Civil Line, Behind Electric Office, Byron Bazaar, Prem Kunj, Govind Kunj, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 1.3 - Parag Agrawal S/o Lt. Subhash Agrawal R/o Shriji Heights, Flat No.-101, Civil Line, Behind Electric Office, Byron Bazaar, Prem Kunj, Govind Kunj, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 1.4 - Mona Agrawal W/o Bivek Jindal Aged About 39 Years R/o 902 Beach Park, B.L.V.D. Apt 133, Foster City, C.A. 94404, San Francisco. 2 - Subhash Chandra Agrawal (died) ... Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Revenue Department, DKS Bhawan Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Secretary Urban Administration And Development Department, DKS Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Municipal Corporation Raipur, Through Its Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Raipur (C.G.) 4 - Raipur Development Authority, Through The Chief Executive Officer, 2nd Floor, Bhakt Mata Karma, Commercial Complex, New Rajendra Nagar, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioners : Shri Sachin Nidhi, Advocate. For State : Ms. Supriya Upasne, Govt. advocate and Ms. Isha Jajodiya, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent No.4 : Shri Udit Khatri, Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board 12.03. 202 6 1. This petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners for vacant possession of their land which were INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.03.23 18:35:31 +0530 2 illegally possessed by the respondents, and alternatively claimed allotment of Plot No.B-32 & C-22, situated at Devendra Nagar, Raipur, or any other alternative suitable land, and also for exemplary costs, and prayed for the following reliefs : “7.1 That the respondents Municipal Corporation be directed to handover the vacant possession of the land belongs to the petitioners which was illegally acquired by them. 7.2 That the respondent Corporation may kindly be directed to allot alternative land bearing plot No.B-32 and C-22 falling in the Devendra Nagar. 7.3 The respondents be directed to allot the alternative land to the petitioners as per their own choice, out of the vacant land still lying in the Devendra Nagar Scheme. 7.4 The petitioners be awarded exemplary cost of Rs.10 lacs for the illegal and arbitrary action of the respondents.” 2. The facts of the case are that, the original petitioners Smt. Pushpa Devi Agrawal and Subhash Chandra Agrawal owned the land in question bearing Khasra No.178 Area 450 Sq.ft. and Khasra No.178 Area 720 Sq.ft. situated at Pandri Raipur. They purchased the land from its owner Smt. Charanjeev Kaur through registered sale deeds in the year 1981. After their purchase, the said lands were occupied illegally by Raipur Development Authority (in short, RDA) and had constructed approach road without informing the petitioners. On 22.02.1983 the petitioners served a legal notice to RDA and after receiving notice, the RDA asked the petitioners to furnish details of their land vide letter dated 04.03.1983. In response to letter dated 04.03.1983, the petitioner submitted relevant documents to RDA, but their lands were not vacated. On 10.05.1983 another letter was issued by the RDA that the petitioner’s land will be acquired and in lieu 3 thereof, they will provide developed plot or compensation to the petitioners. On 08.08.1986 the petitioners gave their proposal for allotment of alternative developed plots, and in reply thereof, the RDA issued letter on 27.09.1988 that the land of the petitioners have already been vested under Devendra Nagar Scheme and they are considering allotment of alternative plot to the petitioners. It is also the case of the petitioners that RDA had taken a decision to allot them plot number B- 32 and C-22, however, on 23.10.1988 they came to know from news clipping published in daily newspaper about auction proceeding of various plots of RDA including plot number B-32 and C-22. The petitioners immediately raised objection to the authorities not to auction plot number B-32 and C-22, but their objection were not considered, however, a corrigendum was issued by the authorities stating therein that in place of plot numbers B-32 and C-22, it be read as D-4. Subsequently, the petitioners were apprised that the said two plots B- 32 and C-22 have been given to the Chhattisgarh Housing Board. On 23.12.1988 they again requested RDA for allotment of aforesaid two plots, but nothing has been done by the authorities. After repeated representations made by the petitioners, the RDA issued a letter on 22.08.1991 and proposed for allotment of plots near Cloth Market which was adjoining to a drainage which consists of plot numbers 1,3&4 and asked the petitioners to deposit an amount of Rs.21,339/-. The petitioners made counter proposal for allotment of plot numbers 3,4&5 instead of plot numbers 1,3&4 so that they may have a big chunk of plot. In alternative they also made counter proposal for allotment of land at Indira Gandhi Commercial Complex or plot number 4 B-32 and C-22 as agreed by the RDA, however, no response was given by the RDA to the counter proposal of the petitioners. Despite their repeated efforts no fruitful result came out and lands were not allotted to the petitioners despite approaching higher authorities of the State. On 05.08.2003 a letter was issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Raipur informing the Secretary of Urban Development Department of the State of Chhattisgarh that lands of petitioners were not acquired in the year 1980-81, but now Municipal Corporation, Raipur, is proceeding to acquire the petitioners land as RDA was merged with Municipal Corporation Raipur in the year 2002- 03. During all these period, neither plots were allotted to petitioner nor any compensation was paid to them and also their lands were not vacated, they approached this court by filing present writ petition. During pendency of present writ petition, both the petitioners died and their legal representatives have been substituted who are prosecuting the present writ petition. 3. The respondent No.4-RDA filed its return and denied the averment of writ petition with the pleading that the land of petitioners were included by the RDA under development scheme for development of cloth market under Devendra Nagar Scheme No.32 for construction of road. The petitioners were informed by the RDA vide letter dated 10.05.1983 that in lieu of their acquired land, the RDA will give them developed land or compensation and asked to opt one of them. The petitioners, vide their letter dated 08.03.1986 opted for developed plot against their acquired land. The petitioners were called on 27.09.1988 to select the developed plots. When a notice for auction was published in daily 5 newspaper on 23.10.1988, an objection was raised by the petitioners, however, they (RDA) denied that any assurance was given to them for allotment of plot number B-32 & C-22. The petitioners were proposed for allotment of plot number 1 & 4 near cloth market and directed to deposit an amount of Rs.21,339/- as excess amount of plot, however, the petitioners made counter proposal and alternative proposal of allotment of land at Indira Gandhi Commercial Complex or allotment of plot number B-32 and C-22. Due to petitioners indifference and lack of clarity, the developed plot could not be allotted to them as they were changing their stand at every time. It was also the stand of RDA in its return that pursuant to resolution of Board meeting of RDA dated 19.07.2019, allotment of developed plot to the petitioners and similarly placed persons under Devendra Nagar Scheme No.-32 was kept on hold in the light of requirement of opinion from the State Government and allotment of similar measurement of plots to the affects persons in any other developed scheme was under consideration as no land was available under the said Devendra Nagar Scheme No.-32. They have also pleaded in the return about the order dated 18.07.2012 passed by Division Bench of this court in WPC No.3966 of 2010 (Sunil Kumar Mhaske & Others Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Another). 4. The respondent No.3-Municipal Corporation Raipur, also filed their return in which they submitted that the land of the petitioners bearing Khasra No.178 was taken by the RDA and constructed an approach road and it is a dispute between the petitioners and RDA. However, the RDA was merged with the Municipal Corporation Raipur in between 13.02.2002 to 03.09.2004 thereafter the RDA was reconstituted and 6 still in existence. At the time when the land of the petitioner was taken by the RDA, it was a separate body and made correspondences with the petitioners. Since the writ petition was filed in the year, 2003 and at that time the RDA was merged with the Municipal Corporation Raipur, therefore, he has been made as a party respondent in the petition. It is the RDA who properly replied the grievance of the petitioners in the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that under the undisputed facts that the petitioners are owner of land bearing Khasra No.178 Area 450 sq.ft. and 720 sq.ft., the RDA have developed Devendra Nagar under Devendra Nagar Scheme and constructed approach road over the land of the petitioners without there being any acquisition of land, payment of compensation or alternative plot to them. The right of property is a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and cannot be taken away without due process of law even for the public purposes. Despite repeated communications made by the petitioners for allotment of developed plot or compensation, the authorities have not taken any action for the same and kept their representations pending for one or other reasons. There is no document filed by the respondents either by the RDA, Municipal Corporation, Raipur or by the State that the land of the petitioners was acquired at any point of time or any proceeding was initiated for the same. Till date they are deprived from their property which has been illegally taken over/encroached by the RDA for Devendra Nagar Scheme and the petitioners are entitled for vacant 7 possession of their land or compensation as per the prevailing market rate as on today along with damages. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.4-RDA, would submit that the land of the petitioners was acquired and immediately thereafter the approach road was constructed for Devendra Nagar Scheme. The petitioners themselves were indecisive in opting for developed plots and they had taken different stands at different point of time. For this alone, the plots could not be allotted to the petitioners. Earlier option was given to them for allotment of plot near Cloth Market i.e. Plot Nos. 1,3&4 and asked the petitioners to deposit additional differential amount of Rs.21,339/-, but they declined to accept the offer made by the respondent RDA and make themselves dis-entitled for allotment of alternative plot. He would further submit that the petitioners have claimed that they have been deprived from the property since 1983, but the writ petition has been filed much after i.e. in the year 2003 which is highly belated and such belated claim cannot be accepted therefore their writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. When this court raised query from the counsel appearing for respondent-RDA with regard to availability of any document with respect to initiation of land acquisition proceeding or acquisition of land of the petitioners, he shows inability to answer the same and denied having any such document of land acquisition of petitioner’s land. However, he would only submit that the land of the petitioners was acquired by the authorities and only thereafter the approach road was constructed. The fact remains in the present writ petition that, there is no document available on record with respect to any land acquisition 8 proceeding with respect to acquisition of the land of the petitioners or relinquishing the rights of the petitioners over the subject land in favour of the respondent authorities either by any deed or by any conduct. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent-State would also submit that approach road over the land of the petitioners has been constructed by the RDA and their proposal for allotment of alternative plot has been denied by the petitioners and therefore they are not entitled for any relief. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation Raipur would also supported the stand taken by the RDA as well as State and submits that the RDA, only for few years merged with the Municipal Corporation Raipur in between 2002 and 2004 and it is a dispute between the petitioners, RDA and State Government who has to acquire the land of the petitioners and no relief has been claimed from Municipal Corporation. Therefore, their writ petition against Municipal Corporation may be dismissed. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the writ petition. 11. Having heard leaned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record, this court finds that ownership of petitioners over the land bearing Khasra No.178 Area 450 sq.ft. and 720 sq.ft. situated at Pandri Raipur is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the said land came to be utilized by the respondent RDA for the purpose of development of road under Devendra Nagar Scheme without completing due process of law with respect to acquisition of land. The record further reflects that initial 9 correspondences were made by the respondents proposing either compensation or allotment of alternative developed plots, no final action in accordance with law has been taken till date. Considering the grievance of the petitioners, the coordinate Bench of this court observed in its order sheet dated 10.12.2025 as under: “As per the note sheet dated 25/11/2025 submitted by the respondent No.4, Raipur Development Authority (RDA), both the parties i.e. the petitioners and the respondent authorities i.e. the Additional Chief Executive Officer, RDA and Case In-charge Officer, Shri M. S. Pandey, Superintending Engineer appeared before the RDA on 24/11/2025 at 11:00 where discussion was held but as the Tehsildar, Shri Alok Kumar Verma was on leave, it was decided that the discussion would be held again but no date was mentioned. However, according to the petitioners, they had been given the dates of 3rd and 4th December but they were not contacted on that date. It appears that despite the direction of this Court, the officers of RDA are not taking the case seriously. Hence, it is directed that on the next date of hearing, the Revenue Officer, Tehsildar, Shri Alok Kumar Verma, Case In-charge, Shri M.S. Pandey, Superintending Engineer, RDA and the Additional Chief Executive Officer, RDA shall remain present before this Court in person.” 12. Pursuant to the order dated 10.12.2025, an order has been passed by the respondent RDA on 16.12.2025 which reads as under: “टीप व आदेश WPC - 2818 of 2003 में माननीय छ्ቈीसगढ़ उ्ሴ न्यायालय, बिलासपुर के आदेश बिदनांक 17/11/2025 के अनुपालन में राजस्व अधि"कारी के माग#दश#न में इंजीबिनयर, काय# सहायक एवं माक' िሡटग शाखा के साथ सव' टीम गबि+त कर ्ቚाधि"करण की अन्य योजनाओं में ቝኌस्थत भूखण्डों के सव'्ቌण का काय# करवाया गया। उ्ሹ सव'्ቌण के अनुसार कु ल 25 व्यावसाधियक भूखण्डों की उपलब्"ता धि=न्हांबिकत की गई जिजसमें न्यूनतम भूखण्ड 538.20 वग#फु ट एवं अधि"कतम 9610 वग#फु ट का बिनकला। काया#लयीन अभिभलेखों के परिरशीलन में यह पाया गया बिक भूबिमस्वामी को आंटन प्ቔ ्ቅमांक 2293 बिदनांक 22.08.1991 के अनुसार 585 वग#फु ट बिवकजिसत भूखण्ड की पा्ቔता बिन"ा#रिरत की गई है. =ुबिक ्ቚाधि"करण में नगर तथा ्ቇाम बिनवेश बिवभाग ्ቛारा स्वीकृ त अभिभन्यास के अनुसार ही योजना का बिनमा#ण एवं बिवकास काय# बिकया जाना ्ቚाव"ाबिनत है। जिजसके अनुसार स्वीकृ त अभिभन्यास में दቦኌशत भूखण्ड के ्ቌे्ቔफल में कोई भी 10 परिरवत#न बिकया जाना संभव नहीं होने के कारण उ्ሹ मु्ቌे को मान मुख्य काय#पालन अधि"कारी महोदय के सं्ሺान में लाया गया एवं बिनद'शानुसार प्ቔ ्ቅ. 2545 बिदनांक 08.12.2025 के ्ቛारा आवेदक को तत्काल सू=ना जारी की गई। WPC 2818 of 2003 माननीय छ.ग.उ्ሴ न्यायालय, बिलासपुर के आदेश बिदनांक 10.12.2025 के आदेशानुसार यह देखा गया बिक उ्ሹ तथ्यों को माननीय न्यायालय के सं्ሺान में नहीं लाया जा सका है, जिजसके प्ቐात् आवेदक से फोन पर ==ा# की तो ्ሺात हुआ बिक उनको उ्ሹ प्ቔ ्ቚा्቎ नहीं हुआ जिजस पर बिवशेष प्ቔ वाहक को भेज कर उन तक पहुं=ाया गया एवं पुनः फोन पर ात की गई ताबिक उ्ሹ उपलब्" 25 भूखण्ड से बिकसी भी भूखण्ड का =यन कर लिलये जाने पर ्ቚाधि"करण ्ቛारा आगे की काय#वाही बिकये जाने हेतु तदानुरूप अ्ቇसर हो सके , जिजसके अनु्ቅम में आवेदक आज बिदनांक 16 12.2025 को समय 11:00AM ्ቚाधि"करण में उपቝኌस्थत हुए एवं उन्हें कौशल्या माता बिवहार एवं ट्रांसपोट# नगर योजना के नक्शे का अवलोकन कराया गया उ्ሹ नक्शे में दቦኌशत अनुसार उपलब्" भूखण्ड को कौशल्या माता बिवहार एवं ट्रांसपोट# नगर के नक्शे में बिवन्हीत कर उनसे यह जानकारी =ाही गई की उपरो्ሹ में से कोई भी भूखण्ड उन्हें उपयु्ሹ ्ቚतीत हो तो ्ቚाधि"करण की टीम मौके पर जाकर उस भूखण्ड के भौधितक अवलोकन हेतु तत्पर है। आवेदक को यह जानकारी भी दी गयी बिक यबिद उनके ्ቛारा पा्ቔता 585 वग#फु ट भूखण्ड से अधि"क रका का =यन बिकया जाता है तो अंतर की ्ቚाव"ाबिनत राभिश जमा करने उपरांत ्ቚाधि"करण ्ቛारा उ्ሹ भूखण्ड का आंटन बिकया जावेगा ताबिक माननीय छ.ग. उ्ሴ न्यायालय, बिलासपुर के आदेशों का अनुपालन बिकया जा सके । परंतु आवेदक ्ቛारा स्थल पर जाकर उपलब्" भूखण्डों की भौधितक रूप से अवलोकन करने एवं ड़े आकार के भूखण्ड हेतु अधितरिर्ሹ राभिश जमा करने में अबिनच्छा व्य्ሹ की गई। नस्ती अवलोकनाथ# एवं हस्ता्ቌराथ# ्ቚस्तुत।" 13. This court further finds that despite repeated representations made by the petitioners since 1983, neither possession of land was restored to them nor were they paid any compensation. The stand of the respondents that the petitioners were indecisive in opting for alternative plots, does not absolve the authorities or their legal obligation to acquire the land in accordance with law. Once the land of the petitioners were taken over and utilized for public purposes, the respondent RDA, State or its instrumentalies are duty bound to either acquire the land by following due process or to compensate the 11 petitioners appropriately. The petitioners cannot compel to opt for any big chunk of plot or to pay the differential amount in lieu thereof as has been done by the RDA on 16.12.2025. 14. It is also evident from the record that there is no document on record which shows that the land of the petitioners were formally acquired. There is absolutely no document with respect to either acquisition of land of the petitioners or initiation of any land acquisition proceeding and it is only a submission of the respondents that the land of the petitioners was acquired for construction of road under Devendra Nagar Scheme. The subsequent development of Devendra Nagar or surrounding area do no cure the illegality committed in depriving the petitioners of their land without authority of law. The prolonged inaction on the part of respondents spending several decades is arbitrary, unjust and violative of the constitutional rights of the petitioners. 15. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Others Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, 2013(1)SCC 353, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that where the land is taken and used for public purpose without acquisition, the land owners are entitled to compensate and the State cannot avoid its obligation on technical ground. In paragraph 11 & 12 it has been held as under: “11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other 12 permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a ?true and concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and "police power" of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a 'subject' of medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under our constitution. 12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. “ 16. In case of Vidya Devi Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others, 2020(2)SCC 569, Their Lordships of Supreme Court has held that States act of taking over private land without acquisition proceeding or payment of compensation is illegal and violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, and it was observed in para 12 & 13 as under: “12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. 12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article. 13 12.3 To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, wherein this Court held that: “ 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied) 12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held that: “21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC 627. 12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. "Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied). 12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, this Court held as follows : “48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 12.7. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State. 14 12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.8 wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi- faceted dimension. 12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case. 12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. 12.14 In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors., this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down 15 for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied) 13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been deprived of her private property by the State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The Appellant has been divested of her right to property without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law. The present case is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since the State has admitted that the land was taken over without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to the Appellant.” 17. Further, in Hari Krishna Mandir Trust Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2020(9)SCC 356, the Supreme Court as under: “96. The right to property may not be a fundamental right any longer, but it is still a constitutional right under Article 300A and a human right as observed by this Court in Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel and Others3. In view of the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, no person is to be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. The appellant trust cannot be deprived of its property save in accordance with law. 97. Article 300A of the Constitution of India embodies the doctrine of eminent domain which comprises two parts, (i) possession of property in the public interest; and (ii) payment of reasonable compensation. As held by this Court in a plethora of decisions, including State of Bihar and Others v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Others; Jelubhai Nanbhai Khachar and Others v. State of Gujarat and Anr.; Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others6, the State possesses the power to take or control the property of the owner for the benefit of public. When, however, a State so acts it is obliged to compensate the injury by making just compensation as held by this Court in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra and Others. 98. It has been established beyond any iota of doubt that the private road admeasuring 414 sq. meter area had never been acquired by the Pune Municipal Corporation. The right to property includes any proprietary interest hereditary interest in the right of management of a religion endowment, as well as anything acquired by inheritance. However, laudable be the purpose, the Executive cannot deprive a person of his property without specific legal authority, which can be established in a court of law. 99. In case of dispossession except under the authority of law, the owner might obtain restoration of possession by a proceeding for Mandamus against the Government as held by this Court in Wazir Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh8. Admittedly, no compensation has been offered or paid to the appellant Trust. As observed by this Court in K.T. Plantation Private Limited and Anr. v. State of 16 Karnataka9, even though the right to claim compensation or the obligation of the State to pay compensation to a person who is deprived of his property is not expressly provided in Article 300A of the Constitution, it is inbuilt in the Article. The State seeking to acquire private property for public purpose cannot say that no compensation shall be paid. The Regional and Town Planning Act also does not contemplate deprivation of a land holder of his land, without compensation. Statutory authorities are bound to pay adequate compensation. 100. The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not only have the power to issue a Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of Mandamus, but are duty bound to exercise such power, where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised discretion conferred upon it by a Statute, or a rule, or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion malafide, or on irrelevant consideration. 101. In all such cases, the High Court must issue a Writ of Mandamus and give directions to compel performance in an appropriate and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority.” 18. In view of aforesaid legal proposition and the facts and circumstances of the case, this court is of the considered opinion that the petitioners are entitled for the relief and the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 19. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to forthwith initiate appropriate land acquisition proceeding in accordance with relevant provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, in respect of petitioners land, if already not initiated. Upon such acquisition of the land of the petitioners, the respondents shall determine the compensation as on the date of initiation of land acquisition proceeding and shall pay compensation to the petitioners. All necessary exercise be done within a period of eight months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 20. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition stands allowed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder