Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRA No. 44 of 2002 (From judgment and order dated 06.02.2002 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Mayurbhanj, Baripada, in S.T. Case No. 85/2001)
Khirod Kumar Rout ….
Appellant
-Versus-
State of Odisha ….. Respondent
Advocate(s) appeared in this case through hybrid mode: For Appellant(s) : Mr. B.S. Dasparida, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. P.S. Nayak
[Addl Government Advocate] ______________________________________________________________
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANASH RANJAN PATHAK AND THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
Date of Hearing : 21.07.2026 : Date of Judgment: 29.07.2026
Sashikanta Mishra, J. The appellant has preferred the present appeal against the judgment passed by the Sessions
Judge, Mayurbhanj, dated 06.02.2002 whereby, he was convicted u/s 302 and 498-A of the IPC for committing the murder of his wife, Minati Rout and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is as follows:- The appellant, Khirod Kumar Rout and the deceased, Minati Rout had been married for 6 to 7 years prior to the occurrence and had two children out of such wedlock. They resided together in the appellant’s village, Nagapal. At the time of marriage, the family of the deceased had given cash of Rs. 2500/-, a gold chain and a cycle as dowry. Thereafter, the appellant demanded a further sum of Rs. 5000/- through the deceased. On 19.10.2000 at about 2 AM, the informant, PW- 2 received news from two persons at his house regarding the hospitalization of his daughter, Minati Rout. He sent his brother and two nephews to Udala hospital, where they found the deceased dead and the accused present near her dead body. The accused did not offer any explanation to them
regarding the manner in which the deceased had sustained the injuries noticed on her person. Police initiated a UD Case but it was later dropped when the informant lodged an FIR in Udala P.S. at 11 AM the next morning, after hearing about the occurrence from his grand-daughter, PW-1. Police registered the case and took up investigation. Inquest was conducted over the dead body and the wearing apparels of the deceased were seized before sending her body for post mortem examination. Upon completion of the investigation charge sheet was submitted against the appellant u/s 302 and 498- A of IPC read with section-4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. The accused took the plea of denial. 4. To prove its case, prosecution examined eleven witnesses and exhibited six documents. Defence, on the other hand, exhibited 4 documents and examined no witness. 5.
The trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence of PW-1 and the circumstances emerging from the testimonies of PW-2 to 8, held that the prosecution had established the charges against the appellant and accordingly convicted him
under Sections-302 and 498-A of the IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life, however he was acquitted in the charge of section-4 of Dowry prohibition Act. 6. Heard Mr. B.S. Dasparida, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. P.S. Nayak, learned ASC for the State. 7. Mr. Dasparida assails the impugned judgment on the following grounds: - I. The evidence of P.W.1, the minor daughter of the deceased is wholly unreliable, inconsistent, and contradictory in material particulars and ought not to have been the basis for conviction. II. The evidence of P.W.1 suffers from material omission and contradiction regarding the manner of assault which go to the root of the prosecution case, and the learned Court below erred in treating the same as a minor contradiction. III. The trial Court failed to properly appreciate the omissions on part of the informant in the F.I.R. regarding the alleged cause or manner of death as
subsequently narrated by P.W.1. creating serious doubt regarding the genesis and credibility of the prosecution case. IV. The material inconsistency between the evidence of PW-1 and the medical evidence of P.W.9, the Doctor, regarding lack of injury on the neck or abdomen of the deceased was not properly appreciated. V. The trial Court ought to have acquitted the appellant in view of the evidence of P.W.11, particularly when record of U.D. Case filed by the witness was not produced before the trial Court. VI. The prosecution failed to examine material witnesses, including the father and mother of the appellant, who were allegedly present at the time of the occurrence and could have thrown considerable light on the circumstances surrounding the incident. VII. The trial Court ought not to have placed undue reliance upon the evidence of P.Ws.
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, who are post-occurrence witnesses and related to
the deceased to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. 8. Per Contra, Mr. Nayak would argue that the evidence of PW-1 clearly establishes the manner of death of the deceased as a result of the assault by the appellant in the turmeric field beside their house. She describes the manner of the assault in detail with the appellant pressing the crow-bar against the neck of the deceased resulting in her death. The testimonies of the other witnesses state the motive as demand for further dowry of Rs. 5000/-. 9. Before delving into the merits of the rival
contentions, we deem it proper to analyse the evidence on record independently. The post-mortem report (Ext.-2) establishes that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. PW-1 is the sole eye-witness to the incident who described the assault of the appellant on the deceased. 10. As can be seen from the judgment of the trial Court, the conviction of the appellant u/s 302 of the IPC was primarily based upon the testimony of PW-1, with
corroboration from the testimonies of the post-occurrence witnesses, PW-3, 4 and 8 and failure of the appellant to give any explanation for the death of his wife. 11. However, on a closer look at the evidence of PW- 1, we find material inconsistencies in her statement before the I.O. and testimony before the court regarding the manner of the assault. While she stated before the I.O. that the appellant dashed the head of the deceased against the door frame, she stated that the appellant pressed the neck of the deceased with a crow-bar in her deposition before the court. This material deviation makes the testimony of PW-1 doubtful, particularly when the alleged weapon of offence, i.e. the crow-bar was not seized by the I.O.
12. The Supreme Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (1957 (1) SCC 700) held that corroboration may be required where the nature of the testimony renders such corroboration necessary, including in the case of a child witness. The Court also emphasised that the necessity for corroboration depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. The relevant portion is quoted below for reference:-
“16. It is not necessary specifically to notice the other decisions of the different High Courts in India in which the Court insisted on corroboration of the testimony of a single witness, not as a proposition of law, but in view of the circumstances of those cases. On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established:
16.1. As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character. 16.2.
Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character. 16.3. Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes.”
(Emphasis added) In the present case, P.W.1 is a child witness and as already seen, her testimony suffers from material inconsistencies regarding the manner of assault. The need for corroboration from other witnesses, therefore, is imperative. Page 9 of 14
13. The trial Court held that such corroboration could be gathered from the evidence of PW-3, 4 and 8. However, none of them had witnessed the occurrence and they had only reached the hospital thereafter. Their testimonies may corroborate the fact that the deceased was found dead with injuries, but not the manner in which the same were inflicted or whether the same were caused by the appellant. 14. Furthermore, the medical evidence of PW-9 is that no injuries were found on the neck or the abdomen of the deceased. Though the trial Court relied upon the deposition of P.W.1, it has itself noted that the medical evidence shows alternatives to the manner of assault described. Thus, the testimony of P.W.1 regarding the alleged assault with the crow-bar finds no corroboration from the medical evidence. The absence of any injury on the neck, where the alleged assault was specifically directed, assumes significance in assessing whether her testimony can safely be relied upon as the sole basis for conviction. Page 10 of 14
15.
As regards the statement of PW-1 regarding the appellant dashing the head of the deceased against the door frame, the post-mortem report states that there are injuries on the head of the deceased consistent with the manner of assault described by PW-1 corroborating this version. However, this by itself is not sufficient to prove that the injuries were caused by the appellant when the credibility of PW-1 remains in question. Moreover, the I.O. during his cross-examination has stated in paragraph-7 that no marks of violence, broken bangles or other symptoms were found at the spot of occurrence. Thus, there is no corresponding circumstantial evidence presented to support this version of PW-1 either. Therefore, the sole testimony of P.W.1 cannot be held sufficient to sustain the order of conviction without further corroboration. 16. The other circumstance relied upon by the trial Court as corroboration to the evidence of P.W.1 was the failure of the appellant to offer any explanation regarding the condition of the deceased when questioned by PW-3, 4 and
8 at the hospital. It is borne out from their evidence that the appellant was present by the side of the deceased when they reached the hospital and P.W.1 has stated in her deposition that the appellant accompanied the deceased to the hospital. 17. In the circumstances, the subsequent conduct of the appellant does not lend assurance to the testimony of PW-1 and, therefore, does not provide the requisite corroboration to her testimony. 18. We shall now move to the charge under Section 498-A of the IPC. The prosecution case in this regard rests primarily on the testimonies of PW-2 to 8 and the evidence of PW-9 with regard to the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased. 19. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC, the prosecution is required to establish that the victim was subjected to cruelty as defined under the said provision.
Such cruelty may either be in the form of wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury or danger to
her life, limb or health, or in the form of harassment with a view to coercing her or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security, or on account of failure to meet such demand. 20. In the present case, though PW-2 has deposed regarding further demand of Rs. 5000/-, the said allegation does not find mention in the F.I.R. Moreover, as has been stated by PW-11, the I.O., no such allegation was made by PW-2 before him. The evidence of PW-5 and 6, who have also spoken regarding the alleged demand, does not disclose any specific instance of harassment of the deceased by the appellant in connection with such demand. 21. Apart from the alleged demand of Rs.5,000/-, there is no cogent and reliable evidence on record to establish any specific act of harassment or wilful conduct on the part of the appellant falling within the ambit of cruelty as u/s 498-A of the IPC. Moreover, the medical evidence regarding the injuries sustained by the deceased may establish the nature of such injuries, but, in the absence of
reliable evidence connecting the same with any act of cruelty falling within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC, the same cannot by itself establish the charge under the said provision. 22. In view of the aforesaid material omissions and deficiencies in the prosecution evidence, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC. The conviction of the appellant u/s 498-A of the IPC, therefore, cannot be sustained. 23.
Thus, upon an independent analysis of the evidence on record, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused u/s 302 and 498-A of IPC beyond reasonable doubt. 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment of conviction dated 06.02.2002 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mayurbhanj in S.T. Case No. 85/2001 is hereby set aside. The accused person being on
bail, pursuant to the order of the appellate court dated 05.02.2010 his bail bonds be discharged.
(Sashikanta Mishra, J.)
Manash Ranjan Pathak, J I agree.
(Manash Ranjan Pathak, J.)
Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 29th Augst, 2026/ B.C. Tudu, Sr. Steno.