CWP-1708-2002 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 208 CWP-1708-2002 DATE OF DECISION: 22.07.2026 SUNITA RANI SHARMA … Petitioner (s) Versus PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT CHANDIGARH AND ANR. ... Respondent(s) CORAM: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Present: Ms. Vamika Johar, Advocate, for Mr. Pritam Singh Saini, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. Luvinder Sofat, Senior DAG, Punjab. KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL) 1) This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the Award dated 5.6.2001 (Annexure P-8) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.T. Chandigarh, in Reference No. 288 of 1997, whereby the reference made on behalf of the petitioner was answered in the negative and her claim for reinstatement was declined. 2) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner, after passing her matriculation, was engaged as a Ticket Verifier by respondent No.2 with effect from 5.5.1986. It is the case of the petitioner that she continuously worked upto 31.12.1986; however her services were thereafter terminated orally with effect from 1.1.1987 without any notice, without holding any enquiry and without payment of retrenchment compensation. It is further submitted that at the time of termination, she had completed more than 240 days of continuous service and was, therefore, SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.27 17:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-1708-2002 -2- entitled to the protection of Sections 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). It is further submitted that some persons junior to her, continued to work even after her termination and that fresh persons were engaged on the post from which she was removed, in violation of Section 25-G of the Act. 3) It is also submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in the year 1992, 54 posts of Ticket Verifiers were created by the Transport Department, Government of Punjab, and a joint seniority list of retrenched employees was prepared for regularisation on those posts. It is submitted that although the petitioner was a retrenched employee who had completed more than 240 days of service, her name was illegally omitted from the joint seniority list Ex.W16, whereas persons junior to her, were granted regular appointment. It is submitted that this omission is in violation of Section 25-H of the Act. It is further submitted that the petitioner made repeated representations dated 14.1.1987, 19.6.1987, 23.8.1989 and 5.1.1995 for reinstatement, but the same were never considered by the management. 4) Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner was never engaged for a continuous or regular period, but was only a daily-wage worker engaged for a specific and limited period, as is evident from the appointment letters, and the discontinuation order dated 23.12.1986. It is further submitted that the appointment of the petitioner was specifically upto 27.12.1986, and not upto 31.12.1986 as claimed. It is also submitted that accordingly the petitioner had actually worked for only 237 days and not 240 days, and was therefore not entitled to the benefit of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It is further submitted that the joint seniority list Ex.W16 was also prepared strictly on the basis of information supplied by the General SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.27 17:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-1708-2002 -3- Managers of the various depots regarding workers who had completed 240 days of service. Since the petitioner did not meet the said requirement, her name was rightly excluded. It is further submitted that Baldev Singh, who was shown junior to the petitioner, was in fact appointed on a reserved post under orders of a competent court, and belonged to a different depot, and thus, his case was not comparable to that of the petitioner. 5) Heard learned counsel on either side and perused the record. 6) Before proceeding further, a gainful reference can be made to the proposition of law as discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6511 of 2005 titled as Surendranagar District Panchayat Vs. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, relevant paras whereof reads thus:- “8. As per Section 25F, no workman who is in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer unless conditions laid therein are fulfilled. The retrenchment is defined in Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Under the definition termination of the service of a workman by the employer by any reason whatsoever, otherwise than, as a punishment, by way of disciplinary action, would constitute retrenchment except in cases accepted in the Section itself, they are :- i) a voluntary retirement of a workman; ii) retirement of a workman on reaching the age of superannuation; iii) termination of the service of a workman as a result of nonrenewal of the contract of employment; or iv) termination of the service on the ground of continued ill- health of the workman. Unless these reasons are existed and proved, termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason, would constitute retrenchment. Therefore, if the employer is to retrench the workmen employed in his industry who is in continuous service has to follow the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. To attract provisions of Section 25F, the workman claiming protection under it, has to prove that there exists relationship of employer and employee; that he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act; the establishment in which he is employed is an industry within the meaning of the Act and he must have put in not less than one year of continuous service as defined by Section 25B under the employer. These conditions are cumulative. If any of these conditions are missing the provisions of Section 25F will not attract. To get relief from the court the workman has to establish that he has right to continue in service and that his service has been terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The Section postulates three conditions to be fulfilled by an employer for getting a valid retrenchment, namely:- i) One month's clear notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or that the workman has been paid wages for the period of notice in lieu of such notice; ii) payment of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof, in excess of six months; iii) a notice SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.27 17:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-1708-2002 -4- to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner. 9. To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the conditions required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorised leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workman shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25B. However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in sub-section (1). The workman must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of sub- section (1) of Section 25B is that the workman should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. Subsection (2) of Section 25B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 25B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2). By the legal fiction of sub-section 2(a) (i), the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workman has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25F. 16. In Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, it is said by this Court that before a workman can claim retrenchment not being in consonance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he has to show that he has been in continuous service of not less than one year with the employer who had retrenched him from service. 17. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 - (At Page 26, Para 3), this Court held that "In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside." 19. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no coworker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.27 17:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-1708-2002 -5- It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the workman- respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards noncompliance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for non-compliance of provisions of the Act. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. In order to entitle the Court to draw inference unfavourable to the party, the Court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved.” 7) The Labour Court, after appreciating the evidence led by both sides, returned a specific finding of fact that the petitioner had not completed 240 days of continuous service in the year preceding her termination. The Labour Court relied upon the appointment letter Ex.M5 and the termination order Ex.M6, both of which clearly recorded the period of engagement as 1.12.1986 to 27.12.1986, and further relied upon the admission made by the petitioner in her own cross-examination that she had received salary only upto 27.12.1986. The Labour Court also noted that the muster roll Ex.W7, being an unproved photocopy, could not be relied upon to displace the documentary evidence produced by the management. On this basis, the Labour Court held that the petitioner had worked for only 237 days and was, therefore, not entitled to the protection of Section 25-F of the Act. The Labour Court further held that since the petitioner had not completed 240 days of service, her exclusion from the joint seniority list Ex.W16 could not be said to be illegal, and consequently, SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.27 17:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-1708-2002 -6- no violation of Section 25-H of the Act was made out. On the question of limitation, the Labour Court held that though there is no period of limitation prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act for raising an industrial dispute, and thus this issue was decided in favour of the petitioner and had no bearing on the merits of her claim. 8) It is well settled that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India against an Award passed by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, this Court does not act as a Court of appeal to re-appreciate the evidence or substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. Interference is warranted only where the findings recorded by the Tribunal are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from a patent error of law apparent on the face of the record. In the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner, despite his able assistance, has been unable to demonstrate any such infirmity in the impugned Award. The findings returned by the learned Tribunal are founded upon a proper appreciation of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence available on record and are neither arbitrary nor perverse. No jurisdictional error or legal infirmity has been pointed out so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned Award does not call for any interference. 9) Consequently, finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE July 22, 2026 SwarnjitS Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.27 17:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document