IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Prasenjit Biswas C.R.A. 270 of 2001 Smt. Chhanda Chatterjee -Versus- Sri Mridul Chakraborty For the Appellant : Mr. Sumanta Ganguly For the State : Mr. Bibaswar Bhattacharya, Mr. Poonnug Roy. Hearing concluded on : 17.09.2026 Judgment On : 17.09.2026 (In Court:-) Prasenjit Biswas, J:- 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging the impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 17.04.2001 passed by the learned Trial Court in connection with Case No. C-3928 of 1999 arising out of T.R. 76 of 2000. 2 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 2. By passing the impugned judgment, this appellant is acquitted in a case instituted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. 3. The complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was lodged before the learned Trial Court alleging, inter-alia, that on 23.04.1999 the accused/respondent had obtained a loan of Rs.1,15,000/- from the complainant/appellant against execution of a promissory note, purportedly for the purpose of arranging a flat for her accommodation. It was further alleged that, towards repayment of the said liability, the accused/respondent had already paid a sum of Rs.21,000/- to the complainant and, in respect of the remaining liability, issued an account-payee cheque bearing No.166246 for a sum of Rs.50,000/- in favour of the complainant, drawn on the State Bank of India, Ballygunge Branch. 4. The said cheque was presented by the complainant through her banker, namely, State Bank of India, Garcha Branch, on 11.10.1999 for encashment. However, the cheque was dishonoured and returned unpaid on 15.10.1999 with the endorsement “Not Arranged For”. Upon receipt of the dishonoured cheque on 22.10.1999, 3 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 the complainant, through her learned Advocate, issued a statutory demand notice to the accused informing her of the dishonour of the cheque and calling upon her to make payment within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. The said notice was received by the accused on 26.10.1999. In response thereto, the accused, through her learned Advocate, sent a reply denying the allegations contained in the notice and refused to make payment of the amount claimed by the complainant. 5. In support of their respective cases, both the complainant and the accused adduced oral evidence and relied upon documentary materials. 6. Upon consideration of the evidence and materials placed on record, the learned Trial Court dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused/respondent principally on the ground that the statutory demand notice did not specifically mention the amount demanded under the dishonoured cheque. 7. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of acquittal, the present appeal has been preferred at the instance of the complainant/appellant. 8. Mr. Sumanta Ganguly, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment has not 4 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 been rendered upon a proper and comprehensive appreciation of the evidence and documentary materials available on record. It is contended that although the precise amount of the dishonoured cheque was not separately stated in the demand notice, the notice, when read as a whole and in the context of the admitted transaction, sufficiently conveyed to the accused that payment was being demanded on account of the dishonoured cheque. According to learned Advocate, the omission to reproduce the numerical amount of the cheque in the notice, by itself, ought not to have resulted in dismissal of the complaint when the identity of the cheque, the underlying transaction and the liability of the accused were otherwise clearly established from the evidence and exhibited documents. 9. Mr. Ganguly, further submitted that the cheque in question was admittedly issued by the accused in favour of the complainant and was presented for encashment, but was dishonoured by the drawee bank. According to the appellant, the cheque represented part discharge of the liability arising out of the transaction in question. It is therefore argued that the substantive requirement of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stood 5 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 substantially complied with and that the absence of a specific numerical mention of the cheque amount in the demand notice should not, in the facts of the present case, be treated as fatal to the complaint. 10. Learned Advocate further submits that PW1, being the complainant, entered the witness box and deposed in support of the allegations made in the complaint. The oral testimony of the complainant, according to the appellant, receives corroboration from the documentary evidence, including the cheque in question, the bank return memo and the statutory notice. It is therefore contended that the learned Trial Court ought to have considered the entire evidence in its proper perspective instead of rejecting the complaint solely on the ground relating to the form of the demand notice. 11. In support of such contention, learned Advocate for the appellant places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India & Anr. vs. Saxons Farms & Ors., reported in (1999) 8 SCC 221. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the validity of a notice issued under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and observed that although the statute 6 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 prescribes no particular form of notice, the notice must be in writing, must be issued within the prescribed period and must contain a demand for payment of the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque. The Court further explained that the object of the statutory notice is to afford the drawer an opportunity to rectify the omission and make payment. 12. Relying upon the aforesaid decision, learned Advocate submits that the demand notice in the present case ought to be examined by reading it as a whole and by keeping in view its substance and purpose rather than by adopting a hyper-technical approach. It is contended that the accused was duly informed about the dishonour of the cheque and was called upon to make payment, and that the accused, instead of availing herself of the statutory opportunity to make payment, sent a reply denying the liability. Therefore, according to the appellant, the object underlying the issuance of the statutory notice stood substantially achieved. 13. It is further argued that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the requirement of Section 138 is not to prescribe any particular form or language for the notice, but to ensure that the drawer is made aware of the 7 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 dishonour and is given an opportunity to make payment of the cheque amount within the statutory period. The learned Advocate accordingly submits that the notice should not be held invalid merely because the numerical figure of the cheque amount was not separately reproduced therein, particularly when the cheque itself was identified and the demand for payment was otherwise clear from the contents of the notice. 14. Per contra, Mr. Bibaswar Bhattacharya, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent/accused, submits that there is no sufficient ground or material on record warranting interference with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court. According to learned Advocate, the learned Trial Court correctly appreciated the statutory requirement governing the issuance of a demand notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and rightly dismissed the complaint on account of the fundamental defect in the statutory notice. 15. It is specifically contended that the demand notice issued by the complainant did not mention the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque. According to the learned Advocate, such omission goes to the root of the matter, 8 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 since a notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 is not a mere procedural formality but constitutes a statutory condition precedent for attracting the penal consequences contemplated under Section 138 of the Act. It is submitted that the drawer must be clearly apprised of the precise amount which he or she is required to pay within the statutory period, so that the opportunity afforded by the notice can be meaningfully exercised. 16. In support of his submission, learned Advocate for the respondent/accused places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while examining the requirements of a statutory notice under proviso (b) to Section 138, reiterated that the notice must demand payment of the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque. The Court further explained that the expression “said amount” occurring in proviso (b) to Section 138 is referable to the amount recoverable under the cheque in question. 17. Learned Advocate submits that, in Kaveri Plastics (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised that issuance of a notice demanding payment of the cheque 9 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 amount is one of the essential components of the statutory scheme under Section 138. It is contended that where there is a discrepancy between the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque and the amount demanded through the statutory notice, the requirement of proviso (b) is not satisfied. The subsequent proceedings under Section 138 cannot, therefore, be sustained when the statutory notice fails to make the requisite demand in respect of the cheque amount. 18. On the strength of the aforesaid principle, it is argued that the defect in the present case is not merely technical or inconsequential. The learned Advocate submits that the statutory notice is intended to afford the drawer a specific opportunity to make payment of the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque and thereby avoid the penal consequences of Section 138. Consequently, according to the respondent, a notice which does not specify or otherwise clearly demand the cheque amount cannot be treated as a valid notice merely on the ground that the dishonoured cheque or the underlying transaction may be identifiable from other materials. 19. It is further submitted that the decision relied upon by the appellant, namely, Central Bank of India (supra), does 10 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 not assist the appellant when the statutory requirement, as subsequently explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics (supra), is applied to the facts of the present case. According to the learned Advocate, the question is not whether a notice is required to follow any particular form, but whether its contents substantially satisfy the mandatory requirement of demanding payment of the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque. 20. Learned Advocate accordingly submits that the learned Trial Court committed no error in holding that the omission to mention the cheque amount in the demand notice constituted a material defect affecting the maintainability of the complaint. Since compliance with proviso (b) to Section 138 is a condition precedent to the operation of the penal provision, the defect cannot be cured merely by reference to the evidence subsequently adduced during trial. 21. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is based upon a proper appreciation of the statutory provisions and the materials available on record and does not suffer from any infirmity warranting appellate interference. Learned Advocate accordingly prays that the present appeal be dismissed and the impugned 11 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court be affirmed. 22. I have considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and have carefully examined the entire materials available on record. 23. In the present case, PW1, being the complainant, has deposed in support of the allegations and averments made in the written complaint. From the evidence on record, it appears that the respondent/accused issued an account- payee cheque bearing No.166246 for a sum of Rs.50,000/- in favour of the complainant/appellant towards discharge of his liability, the said cheque having been drawn on the State Bank of India, Ballygunge Branch. The complainant presented the said cheque through his banker on 11.10.1999 for encashment. However, the cheque was dishonoured and returned unpaid on 15.10.1999 with the endorsement “Not Arranged For”. 24. It is further in evidence that, upon receiving information regarding the dishonour of the cheque on 22.10.1999, the complainant, through his learned Advocate, issued a statutory demand notice to the accused informing him of the dishonour and calling upon him to make payment within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. 12 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 The said demand notice has been marked as Exhibit-3. The complainant's case is that, despite receipt of the said notice, the accused failed to make payment of the amount claimed. 25. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the statutory demand notice, in the form in which it was issued, satisfies the mandatory requirement of proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 26. On a careful perusal of Exhibit-3, it is apparent and, indeed, an admitted position that the demand notice does not specifically mention the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque, namely, Rs.50,000/-. The notice informs the accused about the dishonour of the cheque and contains a demand for payment, but the precise amount represented by the cheque has not been stated in the statutory demand. 27. Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act requires the payee or holder in due course to make a demand for payment of the “said amount of money” by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within the prescribed period. The statutory expression “said amount” has reference to the amount of money 13 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 covered by the dishonoured cheque. The requirement is therefore not merely that the drawer should be informed about the dishonour of the cheque, but also that he should be called upon to pay the amount covered by that cheque. 28. In this connection, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics (supra), assumes considerable significance. In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, upon consideration of the earlier authorities, summarised the legal position in the following terms: “8. From the aforestated reiterative pronouncements and the principles propounded by the courts, the position of law that emerges is that the notice demanding the payment of the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque is one of the main ingredients of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the event of the main ingredient not being satisfied on account of discrepancy in the amount of cheque and one mentioned in the notice, all proceedings under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would fall flat as 14 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 bad in law. The notice to be issued under proviso (b) to section 138 of the act, must mention the same amount for which the cheque was issued. It is mandatory that the demand in the statutory notice has to be the very amount of the cheque. After mentioning the exact cheque amount, the sender of the service may claim in the notice amounts such as legal charges, notice charges, interest and such other additional amounts, provided the cheque amount is specified to be demanded for payment.” 29. The aforesaid pronouncement makes the statutory position clear. The demand contemplated under proviso (b) to Section 138 must relate to, and must specifically require payment of, the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque. The statutory notice is not an empty procedural formality. It constitutes an important safeguard intended to give the drawer an opportunity to make payment of the cheque amount within the statutory period and thereby avoid the penal consequences contemplated under Section 138. 15 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 30. In the present case, there is no dispute that the cheque was for Rs.50,000/-. There is also no dispute that Exhibit- 3 is the statutory notice issued by the complainant. However, a material omission is found in the said notice inasmuch as the amount of Rs.50,000/- covered by the dishonoured cheque has not been stated as the amount demanded from the accused. 31. The requirement of the statute cannot be treated as satisfied merely because the cheque number or the fact of dishonour may have been referred to in the notice. The drawer must be placed in a position to understand with reasonable certainty the precise monetary liability which he is being called upon to discharge within the statutory period. In the absence of a demand for the cheque amount itself, the essential statutory requirement contained in proviso (b) to Section 138 remains unfulfilled. 32. Learned Advocate for the appellant has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India (supra), in support of the proposition that no particular form of notice is prescribed under the Act. There can be no quarrel with the general proposition that a statutory notice under Section 138 is not required to conform to any prescribed format and that its substance, 16 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 rather than its form, is required to be examined. However, the said decision cannot be understood to dispense with the substantive statutory requirement of making a demand for payment of the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque. 33. The decision in Central Bank of India (supra) does not lay down that the cheque amount need not be mentioned or demanded in the statutory notice. Rather, the question in the present case has to be examined in the light of the statutory language and the subsequent authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics (supra). Consequently, the reliance placed by learned Advocate for the appellant upon Central Bank of India (supra) does not advance the case of the appellant in the facts and circumstances presently before this Court. 34. It is important to bear in mind that the defect in the present case concerns a statutory condition precedent to the institution and continuation of proceedings under Section 138. The subsequent evidence regarding the existence of the debt, issuance of the cheque and its dishonour cannot substitute compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid demand under proviso (b) to Section 138. The validity of the statutory notice has 17 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 to be determined from the notice itself and not by reconstructing or supplementing its contents from the evidence subsequently adduced at trial. 35. In the present case, since the demand notice, Exhibit-3, does not contain a demand for payment of the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque, the mandatory requirement of proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has not been fulfilled. Consequently, the foundation necessary for attracting the penal provision under Section 138 is absent. 36. Upon an overall consideration of the evidence and materials on record and having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics (supra), I find that the learned Trial Court committed no illegality or material irregularity in dismissing the complaint and acquitting the respondent/accused on the ground of the defect in the statutory demand notice. The finding recorded by the learned Trial Court is consistent with the statutory requirement and the law governing the field. 37. I, therefore, find no sufficient ground or material warranting interference with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The findings recorded by the learned 18 C.R.A. 270 of 2001 Trial Court do not suffer from any perversity or legal infirmity calling for appellate interference. 38. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the appellant challenging the judgment and order of acquittal is dismissed. 39. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 17.04.2001, passed by the learned Trial Court in connection with Case No. C-3928 of 1999 arising out of T.R. No.76 of 2000, is hereby affirmed. 40. Let a copy of this judgment, together with the Trial Court Records, be transmitted to the learned Trial Court forthwith for information and necessary action. 41. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on payment of requisite fees. (Prasenjit Biswas, J.)