VIKRAMAJIT SEN ( 1 ) ARGUMENTS substantially similar to those raised in the present appeal by Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Learned senior Counsel for the Appellant, Mere rejected by me in c. M. (M ). 36/2001 on 19. 2. 2001. The tenant had tendered rent in excess of Rs. 3500. 00 per month but had contended that since the amendment introduced in 1988 to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) Mas not retrospective, the tenant was still protected from eviction by the Delhi Rent Control act. I had expressed the opinion that "even if the question of the retrospectively of the Repeal is to be considered on the basis of the decision of the Division bench in Mrs, Nirmaljit Arora vs. Bharat Steel. Tubes ltd. . . . , AIR 1991 Delhi 160, this controversy would therefore, not arise in the facts of the present case. Without any compulsion, the tenant has tendered rent in excess of Rs. 3500. 00. This Mas not an involuntary act compelled by any decision passed under Section 15 (1 ). In my view, the matter stands fully covered by the decision rendered in D. C. Bhatia and Others vs. UOI and others, 1995 1 SCC 104 as well as parripati Chandrasekharrap and Sons vs. Alapati jalaiah, 1995 3 SCC 709 . " ( 2 ) THE facts in the present case are that the contractual rent for the demised premises is Rs. 5000. 00 per month. The Tenant had filed an application for the fixation of Standard Rent under Section 9 of the Act, on 11. 4. 1978. The evidence of the Tenant Mas completed on 31. 4. 1987. The Landlord commenced his evidence on 25. 1. 1989 and did not complete it even till November 2000. Instead, on 27. 11. 2000, the Landlord filed an application for dismissal of the Tenant s Standard Rent application on the grounds that since the rent was in excess of Rs. 3500. 00 the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain it. This application was allowed, and the Tenant s appeal was also rejected by the Rent Control Tribunal. ( 3 ) IN my view the matter stands fully covered by the pronouncements of the Hon ble Supreme Court especially those expressed in Parripati, Chandrasekharrao and Sons v. Alapati Jalaiah. (1995) 3 SCC 709 . Mr. This application was allowed, and the Tenant s appeal was also rejected by the Rent Control Tribunal. ( 3 ) IN my view the matter stands fully covered by the pronouncements of the Hon ble Supreme Court especially those expressed in Parripati, Chandrasekharrao and Sons v. Alapati Jalaiah. (1995) 3 SCC 709 . Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that the decisions on the point have left a penumbra which needs to be removed by the light of a detailed judgment, after the admission of this Second appeal. The Rent Control Tribunal was of the view that the rights of landlords had been eclipsed ^ by the Act, and this eclipse had vanished with the 1988 amendment thereto. ( 4 ) THE question before the Apex Court in parripati. s case (supra) also concerned the fixation of fair rent. During the pendency of this application an amendment akin to that in the Delhi Rent Control Act was passed; the only material difference is that in Andhra pradesh the relevant rent is Rs. 1000. 00 and in Delhi it is Rs. 3500. 00. The argument on behalf of the Tenant specifically was that he had acquired a vested right in praying for the fixation of fair. rent which could not be extinguished by the subsequent amendment. The Court relied on its earlier decision in D. C. Bhatia s case (supra) which was in the context of the 1988 amendment to the Delhi Rent Control Act. It accordingly also followed its decision in Mohinder Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and another, 1985 4 SCC 221 . The apex Court then observed as follows: "according to us there is a material difference between the rights which accrue to a landlord under the common law and the protection which is afforded to the tenant by such legislation as the Act. In the former case the rights and remedies of the landlord and tenant are governed by the law of contract and the law governing the property relations. These rights and remedies continue to govern their relationship unless they are regulated by such protective legislation as the present fact in which case the said rights and remedies remain suspended till the protective legislation continues in operation. These rights and remedies continue to govern their relationship unless they are regulated by such protective legislation as the present fact in which case the said rights and remedies remain suspended till the protective legislation continues in operation. Hence while it can legitimately be said that the landlord s normal rights vested in him by the general law continue to exist till and so long as they are not abridged by a special protective legislation in the case of the tenant, the protective shield extended to him survives only so long as and to the extent the special legislation operates. In the case of the tenant, therefore, the protection does not create any vested right which can operate beyond the period of protection or during the period the protection is not in existence. when the protection does not exist, the normal relations of the landlord and tenant come into operation. Hence the theory of the vested right which may validly be pleaded to support the landlord s case is not available to the tenant. It is for this reason that the analogy sought to be drawn by shri Subharao between the landlord s and the tenant s rights relying upon the decision of this Court in Atma Ram mittal is misplaced. In that case the landlord s normal right to evict the tenant from the premises was not interfered with for the first ten years of the construction of the premises by an exemption specifically incorporated in the protective rent legislation in question. The normal right was obviously the vested right under the general law and once accrued it continued to operate. The protection given to the tenant by the rent legislation came into operation after the expiry of the period of ten years. Hence, notwithstanding the coming into operation of the protection and in the absence of the provisions to the country, the proceedings already commenced on the basis of the vested right could not be defeated by mere passage of time consumed by the said proceedings. It is for this reason that the Court there held that the right which had accrued to the landlord being a vested right could not be denied to him by the efflux of time. " ( 5 ) MR. It is for this reason that the Court there held that the right which had accrued to the landlord being a vested right could not be denied to him by the efflux of time. " ( 5 ) MR. Gopal Subramaniam, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of appellant, has contended that the tenant s application must be adjudicated because of the following observation in D. C. Bhatia. s case (supra), but I am unable to agree, especially in view of the later decision on all fours in Parripati s case (supra): "the provisions of a repealed statute cannot be relied upon after it has been repealed. But, what has been acquired under the Repealed Act cannot be disturbed. But, if any new or further step is needed to be taken under the Act, that cannot be taken even after the Act is repealed. " ( 6 ) MR. Gopal Subramaniam, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, has also relied on the decisions rendered in M/s, Raval and. Co v. K. G, Ramachandran and Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 424 , Katikara Chintamani Dora and others v. Guntreddi Annamanaidu and others , (1974) 1 scc 567 , Thakur. Narain,. Singh. v,. State of Rajasthan, (1982) 2 SCC 66 , Commissioner of Income Tax, U. P. v. M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons. (1987) 3 SCC 516 , R. Rajagopal reddy. (dead.)by Lrs. and others,_v. Padmini chandrasekharan (dead) by Lrs. . (1995) 2 SCC 630 , O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) and (1984 ) 4 scc 66 and Union of, India and another v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by Lrs. etc, AIR 1989 SC 1933 but in my view none of these decisions dilute the ratio set down in parripati s case (supra ). The Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal have held against the Tenant. right for fixation of standard Rent has been extinguished from the statute. dismissed ( 7 ) C. M. 25/2001 is also accordingly dismissed