VIKRAMAJIT SEN ( 1 ) I propose to dispose off the Plaintiff s application filed on 7/4/1999 under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Civil Procedure Code. ) for passing a decree on the basis of admissions stated to have been recorded in the Written statement filed by the Defendant, namely, M/s, M. M. Bhagat and Company. The claim in the plaint is for a sum of Rs. 17,94,629. 23 together with interest thereon, towards the occupation charges payable per day of rooms in the Plaintiff s Hotel Claridges. After several opportunities had not been availed of by the Defendant for putting in written Statement, the Plaintiff had been constrained to file on 18/3/1999 I. A. No. 3102/99 under Order VIII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the day when this application was listed before the Court for consideration, the written Statement was filed. Again, the Defendant pursued a policy of protraction and procrastination, inasmuch as a Reply to the Plaintiff s application under Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code. was filed on 15/9/1999, after costs were imposed for the delay. The Reply was accompanied by an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. for amendment of the written Statement, being I. A. No. 10759/99. At the first hearing of this amendment application learned counsel for the Plaintiff pointed out that the Defendant had incorporated further admissions in the application and for this reason the Defendant s prayer for permission to withdraw it should be declined. Nonetheless, I allowed the withdrawal observing that the alleged admissions could still be taken into consideration when the present application I. A. 3823/99 was taken up for disposal, that is on the adjourned date of 23. 10. 2000. The Defendant has shown that it is indefatigable; yet another application being I. A. No. 9066/2000, has been filed on 29/8/2000 for amendment. These are the annals of the litigation thus far. ( 2 ) THE immediate question that arises is whether the Plaintiff s application for the passing of a decree should be disposed off prior to the Defendant s second application for the amendment of the written Statement, the latter having been filed subsequently. These are the annals of the litigation thus far. ( 2 ) THE immediate question that arises is whether the Plaintiff s application for the passing of a decree should be disposed off prior to the Defendant s second application for the amendment of the written Statement, the latter having been filed subsequently. The argument of learned counsel for the Defendant, as is usually that of learned counsel for parties similarly placed, is that if the amendment application is not taken up first, and the suit is decreed, this application would become infructuous. while not intending to make it an inflexible practice, I am of the opinion that applications should preferably be disposed off according to their antiquity. The present case demonstrates that the first application for amendment was withdrawn and the second one filed almost immediately thereafter even though leave to file it was not even asked for. The intention behind such applications is usually to protract litigation. I shall therefore take up the plaintiff s application under Order XII Rule 6 of the civil Procedure Code. along with the second application for amendment as I am convinced that the interests of justice, in contradistinction to the interests of a particular party, so demand. This also appears to me to be expedient since the applications for amendment tend to elucidate the nature of the pleadings viewed by the plaintiff as admissions of fact. Quite obviously this entails a quick consideration of the contents and substance of the Defendant s application. ( 3 ) THE relevant paragraphs of the pleadings are reproduced in juxtaposition so that the response/defence is easily discernible. ( 4 ) IN the withdrawn application for amendment I. A. 10759/1999 the Defendant had proposed to add the words "in his capacity as Chairman of Messers M. M. Bhagat and company" in the last sentence of the fifth paragraph. Even consequent upon the withdrawal of this application, it must be inferred by the Court as having now been clarified that this action was taken by the said Shri m. M. Bhagat as the Chairman of the Company, since these averments in the application have been duly supported by his affidavit. Or else the said Mr. Bhagat would have rendered himself vulnerable and punishable for perjury, or contempt of Court as he had attempted to interfere in the functioning of the Court. Or else the said Mr. Bhagat would have rendered himself vulnerable and punishable for perjury, or contempt of Court as he had attempted to interfere in the functioning of the Court. ( 5 ) IN support of the second amendment application the learned counsel for the Defendant has relied on Panchdeo narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti sahay and another, AIR 1983 SC 462 , for the proposition that an admission made by a party may be withdrawn or may be explained away. The facts of this case were that the Plaintiff had described himself in the plaint as a son of the uterine brother of one person and subsequently sought permission for deleting the word "uterine". The Trial Court allowed the amendment and the Apex Court was of the opinion that it was not proper for the High Court to interfere with the satisfaction of the Trial Court that the amendment was necessary to effectively adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. The Apex Court reversed the Order of the High Court having viewed the case from the stand-point that it is well settled that no interference is called for by the High Court unless there is an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. The decision in M/s ganesh Trading Company V. Moji Ram, AIR 1978 SC 484 was mentioned and followed. The Court observed that "procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable Courts to determine what is really at issue between parties, and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take. " This decision did not unequivocally and unreservedly lay down that admissions can be withdrawn as learned counsel for the Defendant would have me believe. The Restatement of the law on amendment to written Statements can be found in Heeralal v. Kalyan mal and others, (1998) 1 SCC 278 , in the following words: "now it is easy to visualize on the facts before this Court in the said case that the defendant did not seek to go behind his admission that there was an agreement of 25. 1. 1. 1991 between the parties but the nature of the agreement was sought to be explained by him by amending the written statement by submitting that it was not an agreement of sale as such but it was an agreement for development of land. The facts of the present case are entirely different and consequently the said decision also cannot be of any help for the learned counsel for the respondents. Even that apart, the said decision of two learned Judges of this Court runs counter to a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the case of Modi Spg. and Wvg. Mills co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram and Company, (1976) 4 Scc 320 . In that case Ray, c. J. , speaking for the Bench had to consider the question whether the defendant can be allowed to amend his written statement by taking an inconsistent plea as compared to the earlier plea which contained an admission in favour of the plaintiff. It was held that such an inconsistent plea which would displace the plaintiff completely from the admissions made by the defendants in the written statement cannot be allowed. If such amendments are allowed in the written statement the plaintiff will be irretrivably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity of extracting the admission from the defendants. In that case a suit was filed by the plaintiff for claiming a decree for rs. 1,30. 000 against the defendants. The defendants in their written statement admitted that by virtue of an agreement dated 7/4/1967 the plaintiff worked as their stockist-cum-distributor. After three years the defendants by application under Order VI Rule 17 sought amendment of written statement by substituting paras 25 and 26 with a new paragraph in which they took the fresh plea that the plaintiff was mercantile agent-cum-purchaser, meaning thereby they sought to go behind their earlier admission that the plaintiff was stockist cum distributor. Such amendment was rejected by the trial court and the said rejection was affirmed by the high Court in revision. The said decision of the High Court was upheld by this Court by observing as aforesaid. Such amendment was rejected by the trial court and the said rejection was affirmed by the high Court in revision. The said decision of the High Court was upheld by this Court by observing as aforesaid. This decision of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court is a clear authority for the proposition that once the written statement contains an admission in favourof the plaintiff, by amendment such admission of the defendants cannot be allowed to be withdrawn if such withdrawal would amount to totally displacing the case of the plaintiff and which would cause him irretrievable prejudice. Unfortunately the aforesaid decision of the three member Bench of this court was not brought to the notice of the Bench of two learned Judges that decided the case in Akshaya Restaurant v. P. Anjanappa, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 303. In the latter case it was observed by the Bench of two learned judges that it was settled law that even the admission can be explained and even inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings. The aforesaid observations in the decision in akshaya Restaurant proceed on an assumption that it was the settled law that even the admission can be explained and even inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings. However the aforesaid decision of the three-member Bench of this Court in modi Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. is to the effect that while granting such amendments to written statement no inconsistent or alternative plea can be allowed which would displace the plaintiff s case and cause him irretrievable prejudice. 10. Consequently it must be held that when the amendment sought in the written statement was of such a nature as to displace the plaintiff s case it could not be allowed as ruled by a three-member Bench of this Court. This aspect was unfortunately not considered by the latter Bench of two learned Judges and to the extent to which the latter decision took a contrary view qua such admission in written statement, it must be held that it was per incuriam being rendered without being given an opportunity to consider the binding decision of a three-member Bench of this Court taking a diametrically opposite view. " ( 6 ) REVERTING now to the second application for amending the written Statement moved by the Defendant, it will be clear that having explicitly admitted writing the letter dated 9/2/1996 (in the written Statement as well as in the first amendment application) pleadings and arguments to the contrary are impermissable. thereafter, the Defendant has prayed for leave to amend the Written Statement by explaining the Preliminary objection pertaining to non-joinder of parties. The plea is that M/s. OST Datta Computers Private Limited, m/s. Earth Foundation and M/s. Unique Unitrade were in occupation of most of the rooms. The explanatory characteristic of the amendment is not as innocuous as it is made out to appear. All three of these companies are owned/managed by Shri M. M. Bhagat, as contended by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, and not denied by the learned Counsel for the Defendant. A perusal of the letter dated 9/2/1996 will disclose that the letterhead only depicted the legend "bhagat" in the "bhagat wing, claridges". This obviously embraces the other three entities who functioned form the wing . A Legal Notice dated 10. 5. 1997 was Issued to the Defendant, and even in the reply thereto, the stance of liability of the three other entities was not taken. On a holistic view, therefore, the amendment is not explanatory, but has the nature of a withdrawal of an admission made. ( 7 ) FURTHERMORE, it is firmly established that law requires that a piecemeal adjudication of disputes is to be abjured and avoided. This legal principle is articulated in Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure and exemplified in the principles of estoppel and res judicata. There seems to be no reason whey these principles should not be broadly applied even to applications. In the present case the amendments which have been pleaded in the second application could as easily have been pleaded in the first one, which was withdrawn without any reservations or qualifications. ( 8 ) IN my opinion failure to plead all amendments at one instance would operate, except in the rarest of cases, as good and sufficient reason for its rejection. Rules of procedure, it has been so often stated, are handmaids of justice. ( 8 ) IN my opinion failure to plead all amendments at one instance would operate, except in the rarest of cases, as good and sufficient reason for its rejection. Rules of procedure, it has been so often stated, are handmaids of justice. Allowing several applications for amendments to be filed would have the direct consequence of delay in the culmination of a lis, and would thus be contrary to interests of justice For all these reasons so the second application for amendment of the Written statement, being I. A. 9066/2000, is dismissed with costs of Rs. 5000. 00. ( 9 ) I am also of the view that the Plaintiff s application under Order XII Rule 6 is well founded and deserves to be allowed; the suit ought to be decreed on the grounds that the fundamental pleadings in the plaint, being the kernel of the dispute, have been admitted by the Defendant. In the extracted paragraphs 5 to 7 of the plaint, there are specific averments to the effect that the Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 12. 85 lakhs and that the Defendant agreed in its letter to liquidate this amount in instalments or for a single lump sum amount of Rupees six lakhs. It is then averred that the Defendant made a payment of Rupees one lakh, on account. There ought to have been a specific and detailed traverse of these pleadings but this is singularly absent. On the contrary, there is intact a clear admission, inasmuch as the contents of paragraphs 6 and 7 are stated to be matters of record. ( 10 ) IN this analysis the Plaintiff s application, being I. A. No. 3823/1999, is allowed. The suit is decreed as prayed for in the plaint. Since a legal notice had been served on the Defendant prior to the filing of the suit, it would be appropriate that interest, from the filing of the suit till recovery of the decretal amount, is granted at the rate of 24 per cent per annum. The Plaintiff will also be entitled to costs.