! "#$ $%&'&()* !"#$# %&$ !' (' !) +,!- -.- ) *++%!,- ' .... .- / , 1. The present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned order dated 10.10.2000 (Annexure P-6) passed by respondent No.1. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner, an Ex-Serviceman, was appointed as a Clerk in Golden Line Canteen, Karnal in January 1987 and was eligible for service up to the age of 58 years. However, it is the pleaded case that the petitioner was not allowed to join duty from February 1997 without any valid reason. The petitioner raised a demand under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is submitted that during conciliation, a settlement was arrived at whereby the respondents agreed to take him back in service with continuity, while leaving the question of back wages open. Pursuant to the settlement, the petitioner rejoined duty. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a claim under RITIKA 2026.08.20 11:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh Section 33-C(2) of the Act for back wages for the period from 01.02.1997 to 31.05.1999. However, the Labour Court rejected the claim vide order dated 10.10.2000. It is submitted that the impugned order is illegal as the settlement expressly preserved the right of the petitioner to claim back wages. Learned counsel contends that the petitioner was always willing to work, but the management did not permit him to join. The respondent No.2- management also failed to justify the denial of duty during the said period. Since the settlement restored his service with continuity, the petitioner is entitled to claim back wages. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned Award deserves to be quashed. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the relevant material on record. 4. At this juncture, a gainful reference can be made to Section 33(C) (2) of the 1947 Act, bare language of which reads thus:- "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government] [Substituted by Act 36 of 1964, Section 19, for Section 33-C (w.e.f. 19.12.1964). ][within a period not exceeding three months:] [ Inserted by Act 46 of 1982, Section 19 (w.e.f. 21.8.1984).][Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit." 5. With respect to the scope of Section 33(C)(2), a gainful reference can be made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.813 of 2022 titled as M/s Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and another, RITIKA 2026.08.20 11:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh wherein it was observed that:- "6. At the outset it is required to be noted that respondent No.2 herein filed an application before the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, demanding difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2012. It was thus the case on behalf of respondent No.2 that he was working with the appellant as a salesman. However, the appellant had taken a categorical stand that respondent No.2 was never engaged by the appellant. It was specifically the case on behalf of the appellant that respondent No.2 had never worked in the establishment in the post of salesman. Therefore, once there was a serious dispute that respondent No.2 had worked as an employee of the appellant and there was a very serious dispute raised by the appellant that respondent No.2 was not in employment as a salesman as claimed by respondent No.2, thereafter, it was not open for the Labour Court to entertain disputed questions and adjudicate upon the employer-employee relationship between the appellant and respondent No.2. As per the settled proposition of law, in an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based. As held by this Court in the case of Ganesh Razak and Anr. (supra), the labour court's jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like that of an executing court. As per the settled preposition of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (See Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and Anr. (1995) 1 SCC 235). In the case of Kankuben (supra), it is observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act while the latter does not. 7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the fact of the case on hand, when there was no prior adjudication on the issue whether respondent No.2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed by respondent No.2 herein and there was a serious dispute raised that respondent No.2 was never in employment as a salesman and the documents relied upon by respondent No.2 were seriously disputed by the appellant and it was the case on behalf of the appellant that those documents are forged and/or false, thereafter the RITIKA 2026.08.20 11:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh Labour Court ought not to have proceeded further with the application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon. Therefore, the order passed by the Labour Court was beyond the jurisdiction conferred under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court has not appreciated the aforesaid facts and has confirmed the same without adverting to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act." 6. Reverting to the case in hand, a perusal of the record reveals that the petitioner was initially engaged on a contractual basis and his contract was valid only upto 31.05.1997. Thereafter, no contract existed between the parties for the period from 01.02.1997 to 31.05.1999, and a fresh contract was executed only in June 1999. Thus, the entitlement of the petitioner to service and back wages for the intervening period was itself disputed. The Labour Court further found that the settlement merely permitted the petitioner to raise his claim for the said period before the competent authority; it neither admitted his entitlement to back wages nor determined the period or amount payable. 7. / 010 1 , 2 '-"''''2!' $ %#/%'3&$ %'%4 $'5 #% %,''#/' '#! % %'# %' ,3'6 #% $ 733#/ #! #%# 58 ! ! # % $ ' 010 1 , 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also failed to point out RITIKA 2026.08.20 11:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh any perversity or patent illegality in the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court, which are purely findings of fact, or to show that the same are contrary to the evidence available on record. 9. Keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case coupled with the settled principle of law as cited hereinabove, no ground for interference by this Court in the present petition is made out and the same is hereby dismissed. 10. Civil miscellaneous application pending, if any, shall also stand disposed of. .- 010'#/* '79 ) :9 '$# ) :9 RITIKA 2026.08.20 11:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh