IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA-3641-2000 (O&M) & COCP-251-2001 (O&M) i) RSA-3641-2000 (O&M) Daya Wa$ (Since Deceased) Through LRs ...Appellant Versus Municipal Corporaon, Faridabad ...Respondent ii) COCP-251-2001 (O&M) Dayawa$ ...Appellant Versus Mrs. Sunita Verma, Joint Commissioner, Municipal Corporaon, Faridabad ...Respondent Reserved on: 22.04.2026 Pronounced on: 06.05.2026 Pronounced fully/opera$ve part: Fully CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by: Mr. Amit Jhanji, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Priyanka Kansal, Advocate for the appellant(s) in RSA-3641-2000 and for the peoner(s) in COCP-251-2001. Mr. Vishal Garg, Advocate for the respondent. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. The present appeal has been filed by the plainff against the judgment & decree dated 26.07.2000 passed by the learned First Appellate Court, learned Addional District Judge, Faridabad, whereby the appeal preferred by the defendant–Municipal Corporaon, Faridabad was accepted and the suit of the plainff was dismissed, reversing the judgment dated PAGE N: 1 OF 6 PAGES YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document 24.12.1998 of the learned trial Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Faridabad, which had partly decreed the suit by granng relief of injuncon, while declining declaraon of ownership. 2. The trial Court record was requisioned and perused. For the sake of clarity, the pares are referred to as per their status before the trial Court. 3. The case of the plainff, as set up in the plaint, is that she is the owner in possession of land measuring 23 kanal 4 marla comprised in Khasra Nos.19/1, 22/2 and 44 situated in village Palla, District Faridabad. It was asserted that her possession over the suit land dates back several decades, allegedly for more than a century, and that she had constructed residenal quarters over part of the land, installed electricity connecons, and paid house tax to the defendant corporaon. It was further pleaded that a Johar (pond) earlier existed on a poron of the land, which was subsequently filled and brought under culvaon by the plainff. According to her, the defendant had no right, tle or authority over the suit property and, despite earlier evicon proceedings under the Public Premises Act having been dismissed, the defendant was again aCempng to interfere in her possession. On these averments, she sought a declaraon of ownership and a decree of permanent injuncon restraining interference in her possession. 4. The defendant–Municipal Corporaon contested the suit by denying the plainff’s ownership and possession. It was specifically pleaded that Khasra No.44 is a public pond forming part of shamlat deh meant for the benefit of the general public and that the plainff had no right therein. The remaining averments of the plaint were also denied and dismissal of the suit was prayed for. 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed necessary issues and the pares led evidence. The plainff relied primarily on revenue PAGE N: 2 OF 6 PAGES YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document records, house tax receipts, and oral evidence to establish long possession. The defendant relied upon revenue entries and statutory provisions to show that the land, parcularly Khasra No.44, vested in the Gram Panchayat and subsequently in the Municipal Corporaon. 6. Upon appreciaon of evidence, the trial Court held that the plainff had failed to prove her tle to the suit property and, therefore, was not entled to a declaraon of ownership. However, the trial Court found that the plainff was in seCled possession of the suit land and accordingly, granted a decree of permanent injuncon restraining the defendant from interfering in such possession except in due course of law. 7. Aggrieved by the grant of injuncon, the defendant preferred an appeal. The First Appellate Court, aGer reappraisal of the enre evidence and taking into consideraon addional revenue records, reversed the findings of the trial Court. It concurred that the plainff had failed to prove tle but went further to hold that even possession of the plainff over Khasra No.44 was unauthorized, as the said land was recorded as gair mumkin Johar and formed part of shamlat deh, vesng in the Gram Panchayat and thereaGer, in the Municipal Corporaon. Consequently, it held that no injuncon could be granted against the true owner. In respect of Khasra Nos.19/1 and 22/2, although possession of the plainff was noced, the Appellate Court declined injuncon on the ground that the plainff had not paid separate court fee for the relief of injuncon, once the relief of declaraon had been declined. The suit was thus dismissed in enrety. 8. Challenging the above said reversal, learned senior counsel for the appellant has contended that both Courts below had, in substance, recognized the possession of the plainff over the suit land and that the First Appellate Court erred in treang possession over Khasra No.44 as unauthorized despite revenue entries reflecng such possession since at PAGE N: 3 OF 6 PAGES YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document least the year 1973-74. It is further argued that earlier proceedings under the Public Premises Act had failed and that the finding regarding non- payment of court fee for injuncon is legally unsustainable, as the relief of injuncon, even if consequenal, does not require separate court fee in the manner assumed by the Appellate Court. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the judgment of the First Appellate Court, submiJng that Khasra No.44 is a Johar forming part of shamlat deh, which vests in the Gram Panchayat and thereaGer, in the Municipal Corporaon by operaon of law. It is argued that no injuncon can be granted against the true owner, parcularly when the possession is unauthorized. As regards the other khasra numbers, it is submiCed that the Appellate Court rightly declined relief on account of improper court fee. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the pares and perused the record, this Court finds that the controversy essenally revolves around three aspects: (i) tle of the plainff, (ii) nature of possession, and (iii) entlement to injuncon. 11. Insofar as tle is concerned, both Courts below have concurrently held that the plainff has failed to establish any ownership over the suit property. Learned counsel for the appellant has fairly conceded this posion. The said finding is based on appreciaon of evidence, parcularly revenue record and so, calls for no interference. 12. Coming to Khasra No.44, the revenue record clearly shows that the land is recorded as gair mumkin Johar. Under Secon 2(g)(4) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulaon) Act, 1961, a Johar falls within the definion of shamlat deh and vests in the Gram Panchayat under Secon 4 thereof. It is not disputed that the estate subsequently vested in the Faridabad Complex Administraon and thereaGer in the Municipal Corporaon. The plainff’s predecessor was not shown in possession of this PAGE N: 4 OF 6 PAGES YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document khasra number in earlier jamabandis and such entry appears only from the year 1973-74 onwards without any supporng order of competent authority. In these circumstances, the possession of the plainff over Khasra No.44 has rightly been held to be unauthorized. 13. It is a seCled principle that no injuncon can be granted against the true owner in respect of public land, parcularly when the possession is without authority. The finding of the First Appellate Court in this regard, therefore, calls for no interference. 14. However, the posion stands on a different foong insofar as Khasra Nos.19/1 and 22/2 are concerned. The revenue record consistently reflects possession of the plainff’s predecessor since at least the jamabandi for the year 1954-55. Though such possession does not confer ownership, parcularly when the land originally vested in the Panchayat and thereaGer in the Municipal Corporaon, it nevertheless establishes seCled and connuous possession. The nature of possession recorded as “bashrah malkan bawajah hissedari” indicates possession under a claim traceable to revenue entries and cannot be equated with that of a rank trespasser. 15. The law is well seCled that a person in seCled possession, even if not the owner, is entled to protect such possession against forcible dispossession except in accordance with law. The trial Court had rightly granted injuncon on this basis. 16. The First Appellate Court declined injuncon qua these khasra numbers solely on the ground that separate court fee had not been paid for the relief of injuncon once the relief of declaraon had been declined. This reasoning cannot be sustained. The nature of relief must be gathered from the substance of the plaint and not its form. Where a plainff seeks to protect exisng possession, the relief of injuncon assumes an independent character and cannot be denied merely on technical grounds relang to PAGE N: 5 OF 6 PAGES YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document court fee. At best, the plainff could have been directed to make good the deficiency, if any. 17. In this regard, the principle that the substance of relief prevails over its form has been consistently recognized, and where possession is established, denial of injuncon on a mere technicality would result in grave injusce. 18. Accordingly, the present appeal is partly allowed. The dismissal of the suit in respect of Khasra No.44 is affirmed. However, in respect of Khasra Nos.19/1 and 22/2, the judgment of the First Appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored to the extent that the plainff is granted a decree of permanent injuncon restraining the defendant– Municipal Corporaon from interfering in her possession over the said khasra numbers except in due course of law. 19. It is, however, directed that in case any deficiency in court fee is found, the same shall be made good by the plainff within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 20. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 21. As regards COCP No. 251 of 2001, the same had been filed by the appellant seeking iniaon of contempt proceedings against the respondent for alleged violaon of the interim order dated 13.11.2000 passed by this Court. However, during the course of arguments, the said peon was not pressed. Consequently, the same is dismissed as not pressed. A photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected case. 06.05.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No Uploaded on: 06.05.2026 PAGE N: 6 OF 6 PAGES YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document