RSA-4393-1999 (O&M) [1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA-4393-1999 (O&M) Kashmir Singh ...Appellant Versus State of Punjab and others ...Respondents Reserved on: 24.02.2026 Pronounced on: 26.02.2026 Pronounced fully/opera7ve part: Fully CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by: Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Arora, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Puru Jarewal, DAG, Punjab for respondent Nos.1 and 2. Mr. Cyrus, Advocate for Mr. M.K. Dogra, Advocate for respondent No.3. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
The plain.ff is in regular second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 09.09.1999 passed by the learned Addi.onal District Judge, Ferozepur whereby the suit for declara.on and injunc.on, though decreed by the trial Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) on 05.06.1997, was reversed and dismissed. 2. For the sake of convenience, the par.es are referred to as per their status before the trial Court. The original record has been perused. 3. The dispute relates to land earlier owned by Guru Karam Singh which was declared surplus. The plain.ff Fauja Singh, a tenant over the suit land, sought to purchase the same under Sec.on 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. His applica.on was allowed by the SDO (Civil) on 31.05.1967 (Ex.P1), fixing the purchase price payable in ten instalments, the first instalment falling due on 14.06.1967. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.26 17:04 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-4393-1999 (O&M) [2] 4. The plain.ff pleaded that he paid the instalments directly to the landowner between 1967 and 1973 and relied upon receipts Ex.P2 to Ex.P5. It was asserted that upon payment of the last instalment, he became owner, though muta.on was never sanc.oned and the State authori.es con.nued to reflect themselves in the revenue record, allegedly threatening dispossession. 5. Defendant No.3, brother of the plain.ff, supported the claim. 6. The State authori.es contested the suit raising objec.ons of jurisdic.on, limita.on and maintainability, while admiEng the surplus declara.on and order Ex.P1. However, they denied payment of instalments in the legally prescribed manner and asserted that the plain.ff con.nued merely as a gair-marusi tenant. 6. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that payment stood proved through receipts and consequently the plain.ff had acquired ownership. 7. The First Appellate Court, on re-apprecia.on of evidence and statutory provisions, reversed the decree holding that the statutory mode of payment was not complied with and that the suit was barred by limita.on. 8. On behalf of the appellant–plain.ff, Learned counsel contends that the underlying object of permiEng a tenant to purchase surplus land is to ensure payment of the purchase price to the landowner, and once such payment stands made, the benefit of ownership cannot be denied on technical grounds. It is argued that receipts Ex.P2 to Ex.P5 evidencing payment of instalments to the landowner have not been specifically disputed as having been issued by him, and therefore the First Appellate Court erred in discarding them and reversing the well-reasoned decree of the trial Court. 9. It is, however, fairly conceded by learned counsel for the YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.26 17:04 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-4393-1999 (O&M) [3] appellant that the landowner Guru Karam Singh was not examined to prove the receipts Ex.P2 to Ex.P5 in accordance with law. It is further conceded that the order dated 31.05.1967 (Ex.P1) did not authorise or direct payment of instalments directly to the landowner, thereby lending support to the respondents’ stand that the statutory mode of deposit before the competent revenue authority was not complied with. 10. Sec.on 18(4)(b) of the Act declares that ownership vests in the tenant only upon deposit of the purchase price or first instalment. Rule 23(3) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Rules mandates that such amount shall be deposited in the Government treasury, sub-treasury or paid to the Assistant Collector I Grade. 11. The use of the expression “being deposited” in Sec.on 18(4) (b), read with the mandatory language of Rule 23 employing the word “shall”, leaves liLle scope for devia.on. The statutory scheme does not merely contemplate payment of considera.on but prescribes the mode of payment as a condi.on precedent to ves.ng of ownership. 12. The object behind prescribing deposit through the revenue machinery is evident. It ensures transparency, enables the revenue authori.es to regulate surplus land redistribu.on and prevents collusive arrangements between landlord and tenant that defea.ng reseLlement schemes. 13. In the present case, the plain.ff himself admiLed that instalments were paid directly to the landowner and that the receipts were never produced before any revenue authority. More importantly, the landowner was not examined to prove the receipts. Consequently, even the factum of payment remained inadequately proved in terms of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, apart from the payment being contrary to the statutory mandate. 14. Thus, the Appellate Court rightly concluded that payment, even YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.26 17:04 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-4393-1999 (O&M) [4] if assumed, not being in the manner prescribed, could not confer ownership rights. 15. The plain.ff’s reliance upon receipts Ex.P2 to Ex.P5 suffers from serious eviden.ary infirmi.es. The author of the receipts was not examined and the signatures were sought to be proved through secondary tes.mony. The receipts were neither produced before revenue authori.es nor reflected in any contemporaneous official record. Such uncorroborated documents, par.cularly when relied upon to claim statutory ves.ng of ownership, could not have been safely accepted. 16. The First Appellate Court, being the final Court of fact, was therefore jus.fied in discarding the eviden.ary value of the receipts. 17. Apart from above, the suit having been filed in 1994 on the basis of the order dated 31.05.1967 (Ex.P1) and alleged payment completed by 1973, the cause of ac.on to seek declara.on of ownership had clearly arisen decades earlier. The plain.ff was not asser.ng .tle by adverse possession but strictly on the basis of statutory purchase under Ex.P1. 18. In such circumstances, limita.on commenced either from the date when ownership was claimed to have vested or, at the very latest, when the revenue record con.nued to reflect the State as owner. The plea that cause of ac.on arose on threat of dispossession cannot be accepted, where declara.on of .tle itself was founda.onal to the relief. 19. The Appellate Court, therefore, correctly held that the suit ins.tuted aNer an inordinate delay of over two decades was barred by limita.on. 20. The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are based on proper apprecia.on of statutory provisions and evidence. No perversity, misreading of evidence or substan.al illegality has been demonstrated warran.ng interference under Sec.on 100 CPC. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.26 17:04 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-4393-1999 (O&M) [5] 21. It is seLled that re-apprecia.on of evidence is impermissible in second appeal unless findings are perverse or based on misapplica.on of law. The present case discloses neither. 22. Even if the appeal is examined from the standpoint of existence of a substan.al ques.on of law, none arises. The controversy essen.ally revolves around compliance with statutory mode of payment and apprecia.on of evidence rela.ng to alleged instalments, both being pure ques.ons of fact concluded by the First Appellate Court. 23. The interpreta.on placed upon Sec.on 18 and Rule 23 by the Appellate Court is consistent with the plain language and object of the statute. No debatable legal issue of general importance or requiring authorita.ve determina.on is shown to arise. 24. In view of the mandatory statutory requirement of deposit of purchase price through the prescribed mode, the failure of the plain.ff to establish such deposit and the bar of limita.on, the judgment of the First Appellate Court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity. 25. The appeal is held to be devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. 26.02.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No Uploaded on: 26.02.2026 YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.26 17:04 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document