IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA-1655-1997 Sube Khan and Others . . . . Appellants Vs. Asgari and Another . . . . Respondents **** Reserved on: 23.03.2026 Pronounced on: 27.03.2026 Pronounced fully/opera4ve part: Fully **** CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by:- Mr. Amit Jain, Senior Advocate with Mr. Varun Parkash, Advocate for the appellants. Mr. Sachin Mi#al, Advocate and Mr. Akshat Mi#al, Advocate for the respondents. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. The present appeal has been preferred by the plain&ffs against the judgment & decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court dated 23.03.1997, whereby the suit for declara&on ins&tuted by the plain&ffs was dis- missed, reversing the judgment & decree dated 25.11.1995 passed by the learned trial Court of Addi&onal Sr. Sub Judge, Nuh. 2. For the sake of convenience, the par&es are referred to as per their status before the trial Court. The record of the Courts below, available on DMS, has been perused. 3. The founda&onal facts, which are either admi#ed or stand con- cluded by concurrent findings, deserve to be no&ced at the outset. The par&es belong to the Meo community and are governed by customary law in ma#ers rela&ng to aliena&on and adop&on. The suit property was ancestral in the hands of Zahur Khan son of Rustam. Upon his death, the property devolved upon his NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.03.27 14:37 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1655-1997 2026:PHHC:048082 widow, Smt. Asgari, who inherited the same as a limited owner. The plain&ffs are collaterals of Zahur Khan. 4. It is also not in dispute that earlier li&ga&on between the par&es culminated in a decree dated 22.01.1981, whereby Smt. Asgari was restrained from aliena&ng the suit property without the consent of the collaterals of her husband, and the said finding a#ained finality upto the High Court. 5. The present suit was ins&tuted by the plain&ffs claiming that upon the death of Smt. Asgari, being only a limited owner, the property would revert to them as collaterals. The plain&ffs challenged the adop&on of defendant No.2 by Smt. Asgari vide registered adop&on deed dated 04.02.1991, contending that such adop&on was illegal, void and not binding upon their reversionary rights, primarily on the ground that the consent of the husband’s collaterals had not been obtained and that the adoptee was not from the husband’s lineage. 6. The defendants contested the suit by asser&ng that defendant No.2, being the daughter’s son of Smt. Asgari, was validly adopted by her and that under the applicable customary law, no consent of the collaterals was re- quired. It was further pleaded that upon the death of Smt. Asgari, defendant No.2, being her legally adopted son, was en&tled to succeed to the estate. 7. The learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence led by the par&es, accepted the case of the plain&ffs and decreed the suit. However, the learned first Appellate Court, upon re-apprecia&on of the evidence and considera&on of the legal posi&on, reversed the findings and upheld the validity of the adop&on. 8. Assailing the above reversal, learned counsel for the appellants has contended that under the customary law applicable to Meo Caste, a widow cannot adopt without the authority of her husband or without the consent of his collaterals, and therefore, the adop&on in the present case is void. It is fur- ther argued that the ancestral nature of the property and the status of the plain&ffs as collaterals en&tle them to succeed as reversioners. Page 2 of 4 NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.03.27 14:37 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1655-1997 2026:PHHC:048082 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon authorita&ve pronouncements, including Hem Singh v. Harnam Singh,1954 AIR (SC) 581, to contend that customary adop&on in Punjab is essen&ally secular in nature and amounts to appointment of an heir, and that requirements regarding authority, ceremonies or preference in selec&on are directory and not manda- tory. 10. This Court has considered the rival submissions and has carefully perused the record. 11. The principal ques&on that arises for considera&on is whether the adop&on of defendant No.2 by Smt. Asgari is invalid for want of consent of the husband’s collaterals or absence of express authority. 12. The learned first Appellate Court has undertaken a detailed exami- na&on of the customary law governing the field and has rightly concluded that customary adop&on among Meos is primarily a mode of appoin&ng an heir and does not strictly adhere to the rigours of classical Hindu law. The reliance placed on judicial precedents holding that the requirements rela&ng to authority or choice of adoptee being directory in nature are well-founded. 13. In Hem Singh v. Harnam Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court authorita&vely held that adop&on under Punjab customary law is secular in character and the rules rela&ng to ceremonies and preferences in selec&on are merely directory. Consequently, an adop&on made in devia&on thereof is not rendered invalid. This principle has consistently been followed by this Court in subsequent decisions. 14. Applying the aforesaid legal posi&on, it becomes evident that the absence of consent of the collaterals of the husband does not vi&ate the adop- &on. Similarly, the fact that the adoptee is the daughter’s son of the widow can- not be treated as a disqualifica&on, as the choice of the person to be adopted falls within the discre&on of the adopter and such preference rules are not mandatory. Page 3 of 4 NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.03.27 14:37 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1655-1997 2026:PHHC:048082 15. The evidence on record, as me&culously examined by the first Ap- pellate Court, clearly establishes the factum of adop&on. The adop&on deed dated 04.02.1991 is a registered document. The same has been duly proved by the tes&mony of the executant, a#es&ng witnesses, the natural father of the adoptee, and the scribe. The subsequent conduct of the par&es also supports the fact that defendant No.2 was treated as the adopted son of Smt. Asgari. There is, thus, no infirmity in the finding that the adop&on was validly effected. 16. Once the adop&on is held to be valid, the consequence in law is that the adopted son steps into the shoes of a natural-born son for the purposes of succession. In such a situa&on, the claim of the collaterals as reversioners stands excluded. The plain&ffs, being distant collaterals, cannot assert a superior right in the presence of a validly adopted son. 17. The earlier decree restraining aliena&on by Smt. Asgari also does not advance the case of the plain&ffs. The said decree did not impose any re- stric&on upon her right to adopt, nor did it curtail her capacity to appoint an heir under the customary law. 18. It is well se#led that in a second appeal, interference is warranted only when a substan&al ques&on of law arises. The findings recorded by the first Appellate Court are based on proper apprecia&on of evidence and correct appli- ca&on of the se#led legal principles governing customary adop&on. No perver- sity or illegality has been pointed out so as to warrant interference. 19. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed. (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE 27.03.2026 Neeka Tuteja Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes/No Whether reportable? Yes/No Uploaded on.: 27.03.2026 NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.03.27 14:37 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document