1 906-WP-4685-96.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO.4685 OF 1996 WITH CA/4938/2025 IN WP/4685/1996 Tukaram Hari Patil Adult, Occu. Agri., R/o. Mohide, Taluka Taloda, District Dhule .. Petitioner Versus 1. The Commissioner (Revenue) Nashik Division, Nashik 2. Ramsingh Bula Bhil, Adult, Occu. Agri., R/o. Gunjali, Taluka Taloda, District Dhule 3. Shankar Rajaram Thakare Adule, Occu. Agril., R/o. Bordhan, Taluka Taloda, District Dhule 4. Tanya Soma Taya Bhil, Adult, Occu. Agril., R/o. Gunjali, Taluka Taloda, District Dhule .. Respondents Mr. S. P. Shah, Advocate for Petitioner; Mr. P. P. Dawalkar, A.G.P. for Respondent No.1 Writ petition is dismissed against Respondent No.4 CORAM : SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J. DATE : 02-09-2026 PER COURT:- 1. The petitioner has questioned the legality and validity of the show-cause notice/order dated 13.08.1996, issued by respondent No. 1 - the Commissioner (Revenue), Nashik Division, Nashik. 2026:BHC-AUG:40056 2 906-WP-4685-96.odt 2. The agricultural land in question originally belonged to a tribal person respondent No. 1's predecessor-in-title. On 23.03.1967, in relation to the land, a registered sale deed was executed in favour of respondent No. 3, who further transferred the land to the petitioner on 31.03.1969. Thereafter, the petitioner has effected exchange of the land in favour of respondent No. 4. 3. Initially, the proceedings were initiated under the provisions of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 (for short, “Act of 1974”). The Collector, in Tribal Case No. 134 of 1976, declined to invalidate the transfer under Section 3 of the Act. The said decision was further subjected to the revision by the Divisional Commissioner confirmed the Collector's decision via an order dated 07.08.1987, endorsing the order of the Collector. 4. However, respondent No. 1 sought to reopen the concluded issue invoking suo motu revisional powers under Section 7 of the Act, issuing the impugned notice dated 13.08.1996, almost nine years after the initial revisional order. 5. Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that having once suffered adjudication which concluded in the year 1976 same stood confirmed by the Divisional Commissioner in the year 1987. As such, it was not open for respondent No. 1 to review its own order after an inordinate delay of nine years. The learned counsel emphasis that the proviso to Section 7 of the Act 3 906-WP-4685-96.odt prescribes a strict limitation period of three years. Further submits that this issue is no longer res integra in light of the Division Bench verdicts of this Court in Writ Petition No. 483 of 2012 and Letters Patent Appeal No. 22 of 2001. 6. Addressing the issue of abatement, Mr. Shah, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Indu Shiv Verma v. Mahesh Parekh and Others [2025 SCC OnLine Bom 4247]. He contends that the interest of the private respondents is adequately protected and well represented by the respondent-authorities, who does not have a conflict interest. 7. Per contra, the learned Assistant Government Pleader has supported the action under challenge, contending that since the transaction violates Section 3 of the Act, the Commissioner was justified in exercising suo motu powers under Section 7 of the Act. It is contended that the impugned notice does not suffer from jurisdictional overreach. The learned A.G.P. also raised a preliminary objection that since no steps were taken to bring the legal representatives of the deceased tribal respondent on record, the writ petition stands abated, as such, is liable to be dismissed. 8. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the litigating sides and perusing the material placed on record, the issue falls for consideration is, whether respondent No. 1 could exercise suo 4 906-WP-4685-96.odt motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Act in relation to reopen an issue of transfer under the provision of Section 3 of the Act of 1974 after the same is adjudicated by review that had already attained finality and where the statutory period of three years had long expired. 9. The statutory scheme of Section 7 of the Act empowers the Commissioner to call for the record of any inquiry or proceeding of a Collector to satisfy himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. However, the proviso to Section 7 expressly forbids such an exercise after the expiry of three years from the date of the Collector's order, unless acting under a specific direction from the State Government. 10. In the present case, the Collector adjudicated Tribal Case No.134 of 1976 on 21.01.1986, and respondent No. 1 had already evaluated and endorsed that order on 07.08.1987. In the absence of any overriding direction from the State Government, the subsequent suo motu exercise initiated in the year 1996 is barred by the limitation. 11. Having considered and endorsed it in the light of the provision of statute, more particularly, Section 7 of the Act which prescribes the period of three years as contemplated under the Proviso of Section 7. As such, it forbids respondent No.2 from initiating suo moto or a direction of the State Government to call 5 906-WP-4685-96.odt for record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any Collector for the purpose of satisfying the legality or propriety of the order passed by the Collector. 12. The legal position that suo motu revisional powers cannot be exercised beyond a reasonable or statutorily prescribed time frame to disturb settled rights is well established. 13. The Division Bench of this Court settled this issue in Bajirao Jivanrao Patil v. Gulab Supdu Tadavi (Writ Petition No. 483 of 2012, decided on 05.08.2016). The same has been subsequently followed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 22 of 2001 (Udhav Uttam Patil v. Daga Holkya Bhil). 14. Consequently, the issue is no longer res integra. As respondent No.1 had already exercised these powers on 07.08.1987, the subsequent, revision violates the limitation period prescribed under Section 7 of the Act. Paragraph 16 and 18 of the judgment in the case of Bajirao Jivanrao Patil (supra) reads as under; “16. Normally, function of proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein, but for the proviso would be within purview of the enactment. Proper functioning of the proviso is that it qualifies generality of the main enactment by providing exception. Reading proviso as appearing in section 7 of the Act of 1974, it is clear that it is so embedded in the section that it forms an integral part of 6 906-WP-4685-96.odt enactment and thus acquires the tenor and colour of substantive provision itself. Proviso abrogates the power of Commissioner to take up suo motu proceeding after three years of the order being passed by the Collector. The proviso will have to read harmoniously with section. The provision with proviso will have to be read as a whole harmoniously in a manner that both co-exist and none of it becomes a dead letter. The term “at any time” will have to be interpreted in a way that within a period of three years the Commissioner “at any time” may take up suo-motu proceeding after order is passed by the Collector. Exception would be in a case, State Government issues directions to the Commissioner in that case limitation period of three years would not arise.” “18. As such, it will have to be held that under section 7 of the Act of 1974 the Commissioner cannot exercise revisional powers suo-motu beyond a period of three years of the order being passed by the Collector, while exercising powers under section 3 of the Act of 1974 unless direction is issued by the State Government or permission is granted by the State Government. In that case only, proceedings can be initiated beyond period of three years. After permission is granted by the State Government, Commissioner should initiate proceeding within a reasonable time and as far as possible three years in such a case would be a reasonable time.” 15. Thus, in absence of the direction by the State Government, it was not open for respondent No.1 to undertake the exercise as has been taken by the communication which is subject matter of the challenge. 7 906-WP-4685-96.odt 16. So far as the preliminary objection of abatement, this Court finds merit in the petitioner's reliance on decision in the case of Indu Shiv Verma (supra). “6. Mere absence of interest in representing the estate of deceased Defendant No.1 is not a reason sufficient for Court not to exercise power under Order 22 rule 4A of the Civil Procedure Code. If a person sought to be appointed to represent the estate of the deceased Defendant is not interested, he must also show that he has an interest adverse to the interest of the deceased Defendant. In the present case, there is nothing on record to indicate that the Petitioner has any interest adverse to the interest of the deceased Defendant. She is the sister of deceased Defendant No.1 in respect of his actions.” 17. Thus, where the state authorities can adequately protect the statutory objective and do not hold a conflicting interest, mere absence of private dependent / legal representatives does not mechanically abate the proceedings meant to test the validity of a statutory order. 18. In view of the affirmative findings on the question of limitation and finality, the impugned notice cannot be sustained. Respondent No. 1 committed jurisdictional error while reconsidering an issue that had attained finality in the year 1987. The same cannot reopened, much less beyond period of limitation. 19. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. 8 906-WP-4685-96.odt 20. The impugned notice issued by respondent No. 1 dated 13.08.1996 is quashed and set aside. 21. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. 22. Pending application also stands disposed of. 23. No order as to costs. [SACHIN S. DESHMUKH] JUDGE rrd