Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
RSA No.55 of 19 IN THE 102
Baru Ram (since
Surender Singh a
2.
RSA No.2
Baru Ram (since
Surender Singh a
CORAM : HON Present: Mr.
Mr.
for t
Mr.
for r
Resp
*** AMARINDER
1.
This bearing Nos.55 o action. Both the challenging the c below whereby t of pre-emption h 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-1- THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB CHANDIGARH
RSA
Dat (since deceased) through LRs
Versus
ingh and others
No.2531 of 1995 (O&M) (since deceased) through LRs
Versus
ingh and another
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMAR Mr. Pardeep Solath, Advocate Mr. Satbir Mor, Advocate for the appellant in both cases. Mr. S.M. Sharma, Advocate for respondent No.1. Respondents No.2 to 9, service dispe ***
DER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL) This order of mine shall dispose os.55 of 1995 and 2531 of 1995 as t th the appeals have been preferred b the concurrent findings of fact rende reby the suit of respondent No.1-plain tion has been decreed.
NJAB AND HARYANA AT ARH RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) Date of Decision:05.02.2026
... Appellant ... Respondent
... Appellant ... Respondent MARINDER SINGH GREWAL e dispensed with. RAL) spose of two regular second appeals as they arise out of same cause of rred by the appellant-defendant No.1 t rendered by both the learned Courts plaintiff seeking possession by way ellant dents ellant dents ppeals use of No.1. Courts y way
RSA No.55 of 19
2.
For No.55 of 1995 a learned trial Cou
3.
In b by way of pre-em of land i.e. 323/3 Killa No.88/11(8 88 situated in vil therein that defen sold the same to
consideration of Rs.60,000/- in th The plaintiff clai sharer and asked do so, suit was fi
4.
The property admeas measuring 18 ka 89//14/1(2-4), 89 Sainthali, Tehsil which possession that defendant N property for a co 09.06.1989 to de 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-2- For the sake of convenience, facts a 95 and the parties are being describ l Court. In brief, the facts are that the plain emption in respect of the suit lan 323/364 share of land measuring 18 8/11(8-0), 89//14/1(2-4), 89//15(8-0), in village Sainthali, as per jambandi f t defendants No.2 to 9, being owners ame to defendant No.1 vide register ion of Rs.28,000/-, while mentionin in the sale deed, without any notice iff claimed his superior/preferential asked defendant No.1 to acknowledge was filed. The subject matter of challenge in R dmeasuring 2 kanals 1 marla i.e. 4 18 kanals 4 marlas comprised in com 4), 89//15(8-0), Khewat and Khata N Tehsil Narwana, as per jambandi for t session was sought by plaintiff by wa ant No.2 therein, being a co-sharer in
consideration of Rs.5000/- vide re to defendant No.1 without notice.
facts are being enumerated from RSA escribed as per their status before the plaintiff filed the suit for possession uit land measuring 16 kanals 3 marlas ing 18 kanals 4 marlas, comprised in 0), Khewat and Khata No.61/86 to andi for the year 1984-85 by pleading ners in possession over the suit land, egistered sale deed 15.05.1989 for a tioning a fictitious consideration of otice of aforesaid sale to the plaintiff right of pre-emption being a co ledge his right and when he denied to ge in RSA No.2531 of 1995 is the suit i.e. 41/364 share in the total land comprised in Killa No.88/11(8-0), ata No.61/86 to 88 situated in village i for the year 1984-85 with respect to by way of pre-emption on the ground arer in the entire land had sold the suit ide registered sale deed No.631 dated RSA re the ession marlas ised in /86 to eading t land, for a ion of aintiff. a co- ied to he suit l land 0), lage ect to round he suit dated
RSA No.55 of 19
5.
Both status of the plain sold specific num written statemen defendant Nos.2 vendor as well a No.1 at the time plaintiff had purc vendee cannot be
6.
On learned trial Cou the findings rend
7.
Lear purchased the lan thus, he could no evidence, much l the suit land, th perverse. A pre acquired the entir emption is imper passed by a Coo passed in RSA N
8.
It is withdrawn the am and decree passe 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-3- Both the suits were contested by d e plaintiff as a co-sharer and further ic numbers (86 to 88) out of khata No tement that the suits were filed by .2 to 9. The consideration of Rs.6 well as the stamp and registration exp e time of registration of sale deed. d purchased specific killa numbers fr not become co-sharer along with othe On appreciation of oral as well al Court decreed the suit and in appe s rendered by the learned trial Court
Learned counsel for the appellant the land in some other khata/khewat uld not be a co-sharer in the suit land much less, any sale deed to show that nd, the findings rendered by both A pre-emptor must step into the sho e entire property sold, not just a portio impermissible. In this regard, relian a Coordinate Bench of this Court in SA No.218 of 1992 decided on 27.02 It is further contended that respon the amount of Rs.48,000/- deposited passed by the learned trial Court a
d by defendant No.1 by denying the asserting that defendant No.2 had ata No.61. It was also asserted in the ed by the plaintiff in collusion with f Rs.60,000/- was actually paid to the on expenses were borne by defendant deed. Further, it was stated that the from other co-sharer and as such, h other co-sharers. well as documentary evidence, the appeal preferred by defendant No.1, stand affirmed. ellant contends that the plaintiff had ewat with specific killa numbers and it land. In the absence of any cogent that the plaintiff was a co-sharer in both the learned Courts below are he shoes of the original vendee and portion, meaning thereby, partial pre reliance is placed upon the judgment urt in Ajit Singh Vs. Waryam Singh 27.02.2025 (2025 NCPHHC 27624). respondent No.1-plaintiff has already sited by him in terms of the judgment ourt as is evident from order dated ng the .2 had in the with to the endant at the ch, e, the No.1, ff had rs and cogent in w are e and al pre- gment ingh 624). lready gment dated
RSA No.55 of 19 11.01.1996 passe In support of his Bench of this Representatives his Legal Repres the status of the owing to subseq another parcel o Reliance is place Court in Bagha 04.09.2025 and No.2006 of 1989
9. Per submits that the year 1984-85 preferential right interest in every one co-owner is actually out of po the right of that land. It is also when a co-share thereof. In supp Full Bench of th that the sale of a 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-4- passed by this Court and thus, he ha of his contention, he relies upon the ju this Court in Bachan Singh (d ives Vs.
Chuhar Singh alias Ajmer S epresentatives 2022 (3) RCR (Civil) of the vendee was changed as to a co ubsequent sale deed dated 09.06.1989 rcel of the land, as the suit was f s placed upon the judgments rendered gha Ram Vs. Vidya Devi passed and Jagdish Kumar and another V f 1989 on 30.04.2019. Per contra, learned counsel appearin the respondent No.1-plaintiff duly that he was a co-sharer and th l right over the suit land. It is further every parcel of the joint property and ner is possession of all in the eye o t of possession. What a vendee gets in f that co-sharer and not exclusive ow s also contended that the right of pre sharer sells the whole of his share n support of his contention, he relies of this Court in Bhartu Vs. Ram Sa le of a specific portion of land describe
, he has lost the right of pre-emption. the judgment passed by a Coordinate h (deceased) through his Legal mer Singh (since deceased) through ivil) 584. It is also contended that co-sharer before filing of the suit 6.1989 vide which he had purchased was filed thereafter on 09.05.1990. ndered by Coordinate Benches of this assed in RSA No.2495 of 1988 on her Vs. Lachhman passed in RSA ppearing for respondent No.1-plaintiff f duly proved vide jamabandi for the and thus, being a co-sharer, had a further contended that a co-sharer has and possession of joint property by eye of law, even if all but one are gets in the transfer from a co-sharer i ive ownership of any portion of joint of pre-emption is available not only share but also when sells a portion relies upon the judgment passed by a m Sarup 1981 PLJ 204 to contend escribed by particular khasra numbers ption. dinate egal ugh d that e suit hased .1990.
of this 88 on RSA aintiff or the had a er has rty by ne are arer is f joint t only ortion d by a ntend mbers
RSA No.55 of 19 by a co-owner ou land and pre-emp
10. I ha paper book as we
11. Hist Mohammedan ru recognized and decisions have co The first is the in property before i allows the pre substitute himse essentially a righ demonstrate that at the time the ri the right to pre- filing the suit an decree. Addition continuously from pendency of the s or superior right
12. In th Singh & anothe the contours of th 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-5- ner out of the joint khewat would be emptible under Section 15(1) (b) of I have heard learned counsel for th as well as the case laws cited with the istorically, the right of pre-em dan rule, where it emerged from cust and enforced by courts, particular ave consistently held that a pre-empto the inherent or primary right, namely efore it is sold. The second is the seco -emptor to follow the property himself in place of the original ve a right of substitution, and its exerc te that his right is not only equal to, bu the right is asserted. The pre-emptor -empt on three crucial dates; (i) the suit and (iii) the date on which the c dditionally, the claimant must pro ly from the date of sale until the pass f the suit, the claimant loses this right right before adjudication, the suit for In the judgment passed in Bishan other AIR 1958 SC 838, the Hon’b rs of the right of pre-emption as under:
uld be a sale of share out of the joint (b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. for the parties and have perused the ith their able assistance. emption traces its origin to the m customary practices that were later ticularly in northern India. Judicial emptor possesses two distinct rights. amely the right to receive an offer of he secondary or remedial right, which perty after it has been sold and to nal vendee.
This secondary right is s exercise requires the pre-emptor to l to, but superior to, that of the vendee mptor must establish the existence of the date of the sale, (ii) the date of the court of first instance passes its st prove that this right subsisted e passing of the decree. If, during the s right or the vendee acquires an equal it for pre-emption is liable to fail. han Singh and others vs. Khazan Hon’ble Supreme Court has set-forth under:- e joint ed the to the e later dicial rights. ffer of which nd to ght is tor to endee nce of ate of ses its sisted ng the equal azan forth
RSA No.55 of 19
“11 the This emp sold pre orig sold esse of th bein meth equa
13. Adm No.1-plaintiff ha khatauni No.61/9 along with other at the time of tra respondent-No.1 specific portion o co-sharer, had a Bench of this C posed “whether khasra numbers out of the joint la emption Act?”
“6. equa 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-6- 11…..To summarize: (1) The right the thing sold but a right to the of This right is called the primary o emptor has a secondary right or a r sold. (3) It is a right of substitution pre-emptor takes the entire bargain original vendee.
(4) It is a right to a sold and not a share of the propert essence of the right, the plaintiff mu of the vendee or the person substit being a very weak right, it can methods, such as the vendee allowin equal right being substituted in his p Admittedly, as per jamabandi for tiff had purchased 169/578 share in t o.61/90 and Khasra No.89//18/1, 19/2 other co-sharers and thus, the vendor transferring the land in favour of t No.1-plaintiff by purchasing a fractio rtion of land described by particular k had also stepped into the shoe of this Court in Bhartu’s case (supra) ether the sale of a specific portion ers by a co-owner out of the joint k int land and pre-emptible under Sec ”has held as under:-
6. Take another example where 'A equal shares measuring 200 bighas
right of pre-emption is not a right to e offer of a thing about to be sold. ry or inherent right. (2) The pre r a remedial right to follow the thing tion but not of re-purchase i. e., the gain and steps into the shoes of the to acquire the whole of the property perty sold. (5) Preference being the ff must have a superior right to that bstituted in his place. (6) The right can be defeated by all legitimate lowing the claimant of a superior or his place.” di for the year 1984-85, respondent re in the land comprising khewat and 1, 19/2/1, 20/1 from Pritam Singh etc. vendor had not ceased to be co-sharer ur of the plaintiff. In other words, the fraction of share of vendor (though a cular khasra numbers), who was still a e of the co-sharer (vendor). A Full pra) while answering the question tion of land described by particular int khewat would be a sale of share Section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre e 'A' and 'B' jointly own a khewat in has. 'B' is in separate possession of ht to sold. pre- hing , the f the erty the that right mate r or ondent at and gh etc.
sharer ds, the ugh a still a Full estion ular hare Pre- in n of
RSA No.55 of 19 100 tran cont so h in t othe 100 the matt co- shar 40 two spec thes as s anyt of th area the s and xxxx
8. T on Ram 1368 AIR emp defe inter Kau of th in te 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-7- 100 bighas of land comprised of transfers it to 'C'. This is not dispu continues to be a co-sharer in the l so how can it be disputed that 'C' w in the remaining 100 bighas of otherwise it would mean that 100 bighas of land in his possession the remaining 100 bighas which o matter can further be illustrated by -sharers in the joint khewat, say shares. 'B' who is in exclusive 40 bighas of land comprised of kha two khasra numbers, that is, 1 and specifically stating in the deed these khasra numbers as a co-share as such. Can it be said on these anything except a co-sharer's intere of the fact that the sale is of specif area. The answer obviously would the sale is obviously of a share by th and nothing else. xxxx
xxxx
8. The learned counsel for the appe on Radhakrishan Laxminarayan Ramchandra Alshi and others, 1368, and Bishan Singh and others AIR 1958 Supreme Court 838, co emption being piratical in nature i defeated by all legitimate means. interpretation of the said clause Kaur's case (supra) cannot be rejec of the co-sharer can be defeated by in terms of specific khasra numbers
of specific khasra numbers and isputed that in spite of this sale, 'A' the land transferred by 'B'. If that is 'C' would necessarily be a co-sharer of land in possession of 'A' as hat 'A' is exclusively owner of sion and also a co-sharer with 'C' in ch obviously is not possible. The by another example.
'A' and 'B' are say of 100 bighas of land in equal ive possession of land measuring khasra Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 transfers and 2 measuring 20 bighas to 'C' eed that he is in possession of harer and is transferring his interest hese facts that 'C' had purchased terest in khasra Nos.1 and 2 in spite ecific numbers and of the specified uld be in the negative and if so then by the co-sharer out of the joint land
xxxx ppellant, on the other hand, relying ayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar ers, AIR 1960 Supreme Court thers v. Khazan Singh and another, contended that the right of pre re is a very weak right and can be ns. He, therefore, argued that the use as enunciated in Mst. Gurnam ejected on the ground that the rights d by describing the land purchase bers because the vendee would have and , 'A' at is arer ' as r of C' in The ' are qual ring sfers 'C' n of erest ased spite ified then land lying dhar ourt ther, pre- n be t the nam ights ased have
RSA No.55 of 19 cert cons The no s the not acce frag shar shar emp may co- emp defe reve all t the illus purc shar hold part join emp the l othe Judg
14. The partial pre-empti Singh’s case (su 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-8- certainly a right to do so and he ca
consideration that it would defeat The argument, on the face of it, is no substance. What has been accep the vendee to defeat the claim of p not the purpose of the Legislature. T accepting the right of a co-share fragmentation of the holding, preser sharers and avoid introduction of sharer. The legitimate means of a v emption of a co-sharer so far reco may transfer the land purchased by -sharer having an equal right emptor. By doing so, no doubt, t defeated but not the purpose of th reverts back to another co-sharer i all the purposes referred to above. the right of pre-emption may be, it illusory that it can be defeated s purchased in terms of specific khasr share. We, therefore, answer the q hold that the sale of a specific particular khasra numbers by joint khewat would be a sale of sha emptible under section 15(1)(b) of the learned counsel for the appellan other points, this case would now Judge for final disposal.” The argument of learned counsel fo emption and reliance on the judgme (supra) has no merit. In the said
e cannot be denied this right on the feat the purpose of the Legislature. t, is quite attractive but has, in fact, ccepted by the Courts is the right of of pre-emption of an individual but re. The purpose of the Legislature in harer obviously is to prevent the reserve the harmony amongst the co of an undesirable person as a co f a vendee to defeat the right of pre recognised by the Courts is that he d by him prior to the suit to another ight of pre-emption with the pre bt, the right of the pre-emptor is of the Legislature because the land rer in the joint khewat and it serves ove. Consequently, howsoever weak e, it cannot be accepted that it is so ted simply by describing the land hasra numbers instead of fractional the question in the affirmative and ific portion of land described by y a co-owner out of the share out of the joint land and pre ) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. As ellant intends to argue the appeal on now go back to the learned Single nsel for the appellant with respect to udgment passed by this Court in Ajit e said case, the plaintiff had excluded n the ture.
fact, ht of l but re in the e co- co- pre- t he ther pre- r is land rves eak is so land onal and d by the pre- t. As l on ingle ect to Ajit cluded
RSA No.55 of 19 certain khasra nu and thus, it was h Secondly, the arg decretal amount by a Coordinate B merit. In the ca amount as direct learned 1st Appe without granting in the present ca respondent No.1 the learned trial withdrawn by ord
judgment and de to be heard in nea
15.
Last status of the app owing to subseq another parcel o though at the f
judgment of a C relied upon by th argument is also Jagdish Kumar, by the plaintiff th 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-9- sra numbers from the suit land while t was held by this Court that the suit w the argument that respondent No.1-pla ount vide order dated 11.01.1996 and inate Bench of this Court in Bachan S the case of Bachan Singh, the plain
directed by the learned trial Court Appellate Court had extended the tim anting stay in favour of the plaintiffs ent case, it is nowhere the case of th t No.1-plaintiff had not deposited the trial Court. Rather, the amount by orders of this Court, keeping in vie and decree was stayed and the appeal, in near future. Lastly, the argument of learned co ppellant-defendant No.1 (vendee) ubsequent sale deed dated 09.06.198 rcel of the land, much prior to the fi the first blush seems impressive b of a Coordinate Bench of this Court n by the learned counsel for the appel is also distinguishable on the facts of ar, the vendee before filing of the ntiff therein had purchased another pa
while claiming his pre-emptory rights e suit was bad for partial pre-emption. plaintiff has already withdrawn the 96 and reliance upon judgment passed an Singh’s case (supra) has also no plaintiff did not deposit the decretal ourt on or before 01.04.1969 and the the time for payment till 02.08.1969 intiffs-respondents therein. However, of the appellant-defendant No.1 that ed the decretal amount as directed by so deposited was allowed to be g in view the fact that execution of the appeal, being admitted, was not likely ed counsel for the appellant that the endee) was changed as to a co-sharer 6.1989 vide which he had purchased the filing of the suit on 09.05.1990 sive but ultimately, falls flat. The Court in Jagdish Kumar (supra) as appellant in support of the aforesaid cts of the present case. In the case of of the suit seeking pre-emptory rights ther parcel of the land out of the joint rights ption. wn the passed lso no ecretal nd the 8.1969 wever, .1 that ted by to be of the likely at the sharer chased .1990, The ra) as resaid ase of rights e joint
RSA No.55 of 19 holding from the a co-sharer. In made by a Coord (3) RCR (Civil) Singh v. Harnam the Punjab Pre acquiring land pr deemed to have defeating the co in the judgment p
“ clea plai sold sale that on M Rs.
beco and equa acqu suit aris imp Prio upto defe 1944 21 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-10- m the original vendor and thus, impro r. In the said judgment, reliance wa Coordinate Bench (see Krishan Lal a ivil) 117), based on a Full Bench ju rnam Singh 1971 PLJ 578 wherein Pre-emption Act, 1913 were inter and prior to institution of a 'pre-empto have improved his status equal to he co-sharers' right of pre-emption. H ment passed in Krishan Lal’s case (sup
10. The facts as have been not clearly show that the sale which is plaintiff is dated December 15, 19 sold 32 kanals of land in favour of sale consideration of Rs.1,17,000/- that through a sale deed Ex.D3 Sha on May 2, 1989 to the defendant- Rs.1,21,312/-, therefore, it is undis become co-sharers alongwith othe and khewat. Their rights in the joint equal to that of the plaintiff. It i acquired the aforesaid status much suit by the plaintiff-respondent. The arises for consideration is as improvement in the status of defen Prior to the year 1944, there was upto which the vendee-defendant defeating the claim of a pre-emptor. 1944, an amendment was made in 21-A was inserted to the following e
improved his status as equal to that of nce was placed upon the observation Lal and another v. Himta Ram 2006 nch judgment of this Court in Garib herein provisions of Section 21-A of interpreted, to hold that a vendee emptory suit' by a co-sharer, would be ual to that of the co-sharer, thereby tion. However, the Coordinate Bench (supra) has observed as under:- noticed by the two Courts below h is sought to be pre-empted by the 5, 1988, vide which Shakuntla had ur of the defendant-appellants for a 0/-.
It also emerges from the record Shakuntla had sold some other land -appellants for a consideration of undisputed that the defendants had other co-sharers in the joint khata joint khata and khewat have become It is also apparent that they had uch prior to the filing of the present Therefore, the only question which as to whether the aforesaid efendants was liable to be ignored was some confusion as to the stage ant could improve his status for ptor. However, Vide Punjab Act 1 of e in the Principal Act and Section ng effect : that of vation 2006 arib A of endee uld be hereby Bench elow y the had for a cord land n of had hata ome had sent hich said ored. tage for 1 of ction
RSA No.55 of 19
legis inhe after igno plai of t othe 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-11-
"21-A. Any improveme inheritance or succession defendant after the instit shall not affect the right o suit."
A perusal of the aforesaid legislature provided that any impro inheritance or succession made in t after the institution of a suit for ignored and could not affect the righ plaintiff. The said provision came to of this Court in the case of Garib others, 1971 PLJ 579.
It was held b
"Prior to the introduction Act 1 of 1944, there was part of vendee to defea making improvement in volitional efforts upto t introducing this new pro improve his status on circumscribed upto the d not thereafter except whe of the vendee is not a res because of inheritance o added to counter-act the 15 and ILR 1942 Lahore 1 Because of the amendmen by introduction of Section it had been ruled that a can improve his position suit are no longer good prohibits such voluntary i it was enacted to nullify th
vement, otherwise than through sion, made in the status of a vendee nstitution of a suit for pre-emption, ght of preemption of plaintiff in such aid provision would show that the provement, otherwise than through in the status of a vendee-defendant for pre-emption was liable to be right of pre-emption claimed by the e to be interpreted by a Full Bench arib Singh v. Harnam Singh and ld by the Full Bench as follows : ction of Section 21-A by Amending was an unhealthy race going on the defeat the right of preemption by t in his position by voluntary and to the date of getting decree. By provision the scope of the race to on the part of the vendee was he date of institution of the suit and where the improvement in the status a result of his efforts or volition but ce or succession. Section 21-A was the view taken in ILR 1942 Lahore ore 190 and 473. ment of the Punjab Pre-emption Act ction 21-A, the authorities in which t a vendee by voluntary acquisition ition even after the institution of the ood law. Section 21-A specifically ary improvements after the suit, and ify the effect of those authorities. ough ndee tion, such t the ough dant o be y the ench and ding n the n by and . By e to was and tatus but was hore Act hich ition f the cally nd
RSA No.55 of 19
inter any suit coul circ impr insti entit the suit, was 1990
11. Sect that emp igno opin
12.
abo prov he b clai afor afo inter statu 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-12- By introducing Section 2 1944, the Legislature cl voluntary improvement in institution of the suit, inheritance or succession
In view of the provisions o interpretation thereof in Garib Sing any improvement of the status of a v uit was liable to be ignored and th could not be defeated by any circumstances, the natural coro improvement had been made in th institution of the suit, then the ven entitled to take protection of the a the aforesaid improvement, even if suit, would be contrary to the spirit was taken in the case of Mala Ram 1990(1) RRR 72 : 1989 PLJ 445. 11. The question which now arises i Section 28-A of the Act come to the that since the sale dated May 21, 19 emption suit, therefore, improvem ignored because of the aforesaid opinion, the answer has to be in the
12. Provisions of Section 28-A h above. A bare reading thereof w provision is only attracted to non- he bases his claim on the strength o claim that he had acquired a rig aforesaid sale deed itself is still aforesaid provisions, by any stre interpreted to defeat the claim of a d status by a subsequent sale deed an
on 21-A by the Amending Act 1 of e clearly intended to recognise no nt in the status of a vendee after the it, but only those resulting from sion." s of Section 21-A and in view of Singh's case (supra), it is clear that f a vendee after the institution of the d the claim of a plaintiff/pre-emptor any such improvement. In these corollary would be that if an n the status of vendee prior to the vendee defendant would always be he aforesaid improvement.
Ignoring en if made prior to the filing of the pirit of Section 21-A. A similar view am v. Subash Chander and others,
ses is as to whether the provisions of o the rescue of the plaintiff to claim 1, 1989 was subject matter of a pre vement in status was liable to be said provisions. In my considered the negative. A have already been reproduced of would show that the aforesaid -suit the plaintiff/preemptor when th of some sale deed in his favour to right of co-sharer-ship when the still liable to be pre-empted. The stretch of imagination, cannot be of a defendant who has improved his d and has acquired the right of co 1 of e no r the from w of that f the ptor hese an the s be ring f the iew hers, ns of laim pre- o be ered uced said hen ur to the The t be d his f co-
RSA No.55 of 19 shar sale defe Act to h othe in th of th
13. plai and 688 the been cons May the of fi of c The soug Both appe by t of th Hig the the imp subs whic the a igno 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-13- sharership, similar to that of the p sale deed is subject of any pre defendant do not fall within the pa Act and such the defence of improve to him. As a matter of fact, the q otherwise of the status of the defend in the light of Section 21-A only and of the Act are not attracted at all to
13. Faced with the aforesaid difficu plaintiff-respondent has relied upon and another v. Rameshwar, 1992
688. On the first impressions the s the case of the plaintiff. As a matte been relied upon by both the Court
consideration of the aforesaid au Maya Devi's case (supra) the sale w the pre-emptor on the basis of his c of filing of the suit, the vendee def of co-sharership in the suit prope The subsequent sale in favour o sought to be pre-empted by the pree Both the said suits were heard to appeals arising out of the said litig by the Appellate Court. Two Regul of the aforesaid two suits were als High Court. It was in these circum the conclusion that the new status the first sale, which was sought improve the status of the vende subsequent sale itself was subject which was being decided together the aforesaid peculiar facts, the imp ignored and the claim of the preem
the plaintiff. Even if the subsequent pre-emption suit, the rights of a e parameters of Section 28-A of the rovement of status cannot be denied he question of any improvement or efendant-vendee has to be examined y and the provisions of Section 28- ll to the case. ifficulty, the learned counsel for the upon a judgment in Smt. Maya Devi 1992(2) RRR 623 : 1992(1) PLR he said judgment seems to support atter of fact, the said judgment has ourts below. However, on a deeper d authority, it is apparent that in ale was sought to be pre-empted by his co-sharership. Prior to the date e defendants had acquired the right roperty through a subsequent sale. ur of vendee-defendants was also preemptor by filing a separate suit. d together by the trial Court. The litigation were also heard together egular Second Appeals arising out e also being heard together by the cumstances that this Court came to tatus acquired by the vendee after ght to be pre-empted, would not endee in any manner, since the bject matter of a pre-emption suit, ther with the first suit. Because of e improved status of the vendee was eemptor was upheld. uent of a f the nied t or ined -A r the Devi PLR port t has eper at in d by date right sale. also suit. The ether out y the e to after not the suit, se of was
RSA No.55 of 19
14. disti pre 1988 deed the a-vi has acqu plai pref supp thes had May the v khew ratio attra cann vend
16.
In th the basis of whic qua acquisition before filing of t No.1-plaintiff by trial Court vide Appeals against filed by the app 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-14-
14. However, the facts in th distinguishable. It is apparent that pre-empted by the pre-emptor Him
1988. The vendees had improved th deed dated May 2, 1989. In these ci the present case is only with regard vis the pre-emptor qua the sale de has to be examined as to wheth acquired the right of co-sharershi plaintiff who was also a co-sharer c preferential right to file the prese supported by the judgment rendered these circumstances, it has to be h had improved their status through May 2, 1989, when Shakuntla had s the vendee-defendants had become c khewat and had acquired the statu tio of the judgment in Garib Sin attracted to the present case and, th cannot claim any right of pre- vendee. In the case in hand, the subsequent f which, a contention was raised by le ition of status of the vendee/appellan g of the suit for pre-emption has also tiff by way of separate suit and both su t vide judgments and decrees dated ainst the aforesaid judgments and de he appellant-defendant No.1 were re
the present case are totally that the sale which was sought to be Himta Ram is dated December 15, d their status vide a subsequent sale se circumstances, the controversy in gard to the status of the vendees vis le deed dated December 15, 1988. It hether the vendee-defendants had ership and, therefore, Himta Ram, rer could not be treated to have any resent suit in question. I am fully ered in Mala Ram's case (supra). In be held that the vendee-defendants ugh the subsequent sale deed dated ad sold some other land to them and me co-sharers in the joint khata and status similar to the plaintiffs.
The b Singh's case (supra) is also fully d, therefore, the plaintiff-pre-emptor -emption against the defendant
(emphasis supplied) equent sale deed dated 09.06.1989 on d by learned counsel for the appellant pellant-defendant No.1 as a co-sharer s also been challenged by respondent both suits were decided by the learned dated 20.08.1992 and 22.07.1992. and decrees of the learned trial Court ere registered on the same day i.e. tally to be r 15, sale sy in vis-
8. It had am, any fully ). In ants ated and and The fully ptor ant- 89 on pellant sharer ondent earned .1992. Court ay i.e.
RSA No.55 of 19 07.10.1994 and also being dispos defendant No.1 a made by this Co (supra) . 17. In v Pankajakshi (De and others (2016 (2019) 17 SCC 7 Singh (dead) thr law are not req Haryana High C Section 41 of the
18. As a the concurrent fi are hereby upheld orders passed by a period of two m was done in com Court. Resultant
19. Pend
February 05, 20 Pankaj* Whe Whe 5 of 1995 (O&M)
-15- and the regular second appeals filed
disposed of together. Thus, improved No.1 as a co-sharer is liable to be ig his Court in para 13 of the judgmen In view of the judgments passed by i (Dead) through Legal Representa 2016) 6 SCC 157, Randhir Kaur V CC 71 and Gurbachan Singh (dead ) through LRs and others (2023) SC ot required to be framed in second igh Court whose jurisdiction is ci of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. As an upshot of above, this Court fin rent findings of fact rendered by both upheld. The amounts withdrawn by th sed by this Court in both the appeals sh two months from the date of receipt o in compliance of judgment and dec sultantly, both the regular second appe Pending application(s), if any, shall (AMARIN
, 2026
Whether speaking/reasoned : Whether reportable
:
ls filed by him before this Court are proved status of the vendee/appellant be ignored in terms of observations dgment passed in Krishan Lal’s case sed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in entatives and others Vs. Chandrika ur Vs. Prithvi Pal Singh and others (dead) through LRs Vs. Gurcharan 3) SCC Online SC 875, questions of econd appeal before the Punjab and is circumscribed by provisions of ourt finds no illegality and infirmity in y both the Courts below and the same by the respondent No.1-plaintiff vide eals shall be deposited by him within ceipt of certified copy of this order, as d decree passed by the learned trial d appeals are dismissed. , shall also stand disposed of.
ARINDER SINGH GREWAL) JUDGE
Yes
Yes urt are ellant- ations case ourt in rika thers aran ons of b and ns of ity in same ff vide within der, as d trial