THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRA No.201 of 1995 (In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) read with Section 382 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) Udayanath Sahoo and ……. Appellants others -Versus- State of Orissa ……. Respondent For the Appellants : Mr. D.P. Dhal, Senior Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Ashok Kumar Apat, AGA CORAM: THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA Date of Hearing: 24.02.2026 :: Date of Judgment: 16.04.2026 S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal, filed by the appellants are directed against the judgment and order dated 01.06.1995 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Khurda in S.T. Case No. 4/50/307 of 1995/92, whereby the learned trial court convicted the appellants under Sections 148 and 304 Part-I read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 148 IPC and ten years under Section 304 Part-I read with Section 149 IPC, with both sentences directed to run concurrently. Four of the accused persons, namely Sudarsan Sahu, Prafulla Naik, Manu Naik and Nakula Naik, were acquitted of all charges. 2. Heard Mr. D.P. Dhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Ashok Kumar Apat, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 05.08.1990 at about 6.00 P.M., the deceased Nakula Charan Patnaik was returning from his field. It was alleged that certain persons were cutting and damaging his mango trees, and upon receiving such information, the deceased had gone to the orchard accompanied by P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 9. While returning at about 6.30 P.M., near Kapila Bundh and on the land of P.W.1, the deceased was allegedly confronted by accused Udayanath Sahu along with a group of 20-25 persons. The prosecution alleged that the said group constituted an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons such as farsa, tangia (axe), hammer, crowbar and lathis. It was further alleged that the accused Udayanath Sahu instigated the members of the assembly to kill the deceased, assuring them that he would bear the expenses of litigation. Thereafter, Panu Chhualsingh allegedly assaulted the deceased on his leg with a farsa, Prafulla Naik assaulted him with a crowbar, Raghu Sahu assaulted him with a tangia, and others assaulted him with lathis. As a result of the assault, the deceased sustained multiple incised injuries and fractures on both legs. 4. On receipt of information, one Khetrabasi Sahu (P.W.5) lodged a written report (Ext.4) at Begunia Police Station at about 10.20 P.M. on 05.08.1990. Initially, offences under Sections 341/326/307 I.P.C. were registered. Subsequently, upon the death of the injured at Begunia P.H.C., the case was converted to one under Section 302 IPC. 5. During investigation, the Investigating Officer (P.W.13) conducted inquest (Ext.1/1), prepared spot map (Ext.7), seized blood- stained earth and grass (Ext.5), seized clotted blood from the verandah of the deceased (Ext.6), and sent the dead body for post-mortem examination to Khurda Sub-Divisional Hospital. The post-mortem report (Ext.3) revealed multiple incised wounds and fractures of bones. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against 24 persons under Sections 147/148/302/149 I.P.C. The case against 15 accused persons was committed to the Court of Session, Khurda. 6. During trial, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of thirteen witnesses, including four alleged eye witnesses (P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 9), the son of the deceased (P.W.12), the Medical Officer (P.W.4), and the Investigating Officer (P.W.13), along with documentary exhibits such as the FIR, inquest report, post-mortem report, seizure lists, spot map and F.S.L. report. 7. The defence plea throughout was one of complete denial and false implication arising out of prior enmity. No evidence was adduced by the defence. The case thus rested upon appreciation of ocular evidence, medical evidence and surrounding circumstances arising from the prosecution materials. 8. The learned trial Court, upon an elaborate appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence, held that the prosecution had successfully established that the deceased died a homicidal death as a result of the assault in question. The Court, however, disbelieved the alleged oral dying declaration on the ground of material omissions in the F.I.R. and forwarding reports and treated it as an afterthought. Relying principally on the ocular testimony of P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 9, corroborated by the medical evidence, the Court concluded that the accused persons had formed an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons and had conjointly assaulted the deceased. Nevertheless, considering that the injuries were confined to the legs and that there was no clear intention to cause murder, the charge was altered from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 304 Part-I read with Section 149 IPC and the appellants were convicted thereunder. Relevant part of the impugned judgment is reproduced hereunder for convenience of ready reference:- “15. The cumulative effect of the evidence on record with regard to the dying declaration purported to have been made by the deceased before p.w.12 and his relations, while his body was placed on the front verandah of his own house and ofcourse before he succumbed to his injuries, appear to be not at all reliable for as this act is neither mentioned in the F.I.R. (Ext.4) nor in the two forwarding reports sent by p.w.13 to the court on 7.8.90 and 8.8.90. to secure the detention of the two batches of the accused persons forwarded to the court. In fact p.w.13 should have sought detention of the accused persons in jail custody basing upon the purported oral dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased before p.w.12, and his relations. This element of evidence therefore, appears to me as has been rightly submitted by the learned defence counsel, to be an after thought development and fabricated to reinforce the prosecution case. In that view of the matter, I am not in a position to persuade myself to rely upon the evidence with regard to dying declaration introduced by the prosecution. xxxxx xxxxx xxxx 20. On hearing the arguments of the learned P.P. and the defence counsel, it appears to me that the assailants of the deceased had certainly the intention to cause death of the deceased and they also further knew that their act was likely to cause death of the deceased though such culpable homicide committed by them does not amount to murder, as because, all the injuries inflicted were on the legs and the legs of a person cannot be, without resorting to remote possibility vital part of the body. 21. In the above analysis of the evidence on record, the case laws cited and the arguments advanced at the Bar. I am of the opinion that prosecution has satisfactorily proved its case against all the accused persons except Sudarsan Sahu, Prafulla Naik, Manu Naik and Nakula Naik, under Sections 148 and 304-I read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and accordingly, they are convicted thereunder. Accused Sudarsan Sahu, Prafulla Naik, Manu Naik and Nakula Naik are found not guilty of the charges framed against them and they are acquitted thereof under section 235(1) Cr.P.C. and set at liberty forthwith.” 9. Being aggrieved by the findings as recorded above, leading to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Khurda, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants. 10. Mr. Dhal, learned Senior counsel for the appellants, submitted that the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is unsustainable both on facts and in law. He contended that from the written report lodged by P.W.5, in which only four persons were named as accused, namely Prafulla Nayak, Anama Nayak, Udayanath Nayak and Panu Chhualsingh. However, after investigation, charge sheet was submitted against as many as twenty-four persons and fifteen were eventually placed on trial, thereby indicating substantial exaggeration and improvement in the prosecution story. He argued that the prosecution relied heavily on the alleged oral dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased before P.W.12, but the learned trial Court itself disbelieved the said evidence and categorically held that the alleged dying declaration could not be relied upon. In absence of such evidence, the prosecution case rests entirely upon the testimony of P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 9, who are projected as eye witnesses. 11. Mr. Dhal, further submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 9 suffers from serious contradictions and inconsistencies. Their version regarding the circumstances of the occurrence is materially at variance with the contents of the F.I.R. In the F.I.R., it is alleged that the deceased was assaulted while returning from his field, whereas during trial the said witnesses deposed that they had accompanied the deceased to his mango tope upon receiving information that some persons were cutting his trees and that the assault took place while they were returning from there. Even the learned trial Court acknowledged the existence of such discrepancy. Moreover, the names of several persons attributed with overt acts by these witnesses were not facing trial in the present case, while some of the appellants were not specifically named or attributed any overt act. Such inconsistencies, omissions and improvements render the testimony of these witnesses unreliable and unsafe to form the basis of conviction. 12. Mr. Dhal submitted that subsequent developments in the connected split-up trials also cast serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The same eye witnesses, namely P.Ws.6 and 9, who were relied upon by the trial Court to convict the appellants, have subsequently turned hostile in the trials of the absconding accused persons and have not supported the prosecution case. In several such trials, the accused persons were acquitted by the competent courts. It is, therefore, argued that the prosecution case appears to be the result of village faction and prior enmity between rival groups, and that the appellants have been falsely implicated. In view of the unreliable evidence and doubtful investigation, it is contended that the learned trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence on record and the conviction of the appellants deserves to be set aside. 13. On the basis of the allegation made in the FIR, the police investigated the case and nailed down as many as twenty four accused persons. Accordingly, charge sheet was filed against all of them for the offence punishable under Sections 302/148/149 of the IPC. In the present trial, namely, S.T. Case No.4/50/307 of 1995/92, fifteen accused persons were put to trial, out of them accused Sudarsan Sahu, Prafulla Naik, Manu Naik and Nakula Naik were acquitted, whereas the present eleven appellants have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced them on that count. The other accused persons, those who have been charge sheeted but not put to trial, were subsequently apprehended. Rabi Naik, Bhagirathi Chalansingh and Hadia Naik faced separate trial in ST Case No.5/20/95- 2008/98. The court of the learned Adhoc Addl. Sessions Judge, Khurda, vide its judgment dated 11.01.2011, acquitted all three accused persons. It is relevant to mention that the same set of witnesses, whose version has been relied upon by the learned trial court in the present case, were examined by the prosecution in the trial of the three accused persons. However, the witnesses have not supported the prosecution leading to acquittal of all three accused persons, who faced the trial. Similarly, Prananath Chhualsingh faced trial in S.T. Case No. 23/109 of 1999 and the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Khurda vide judgment dated 13.02.2014 acquitted the said accused. However, the accused Raghunath Sahu and Gagan Nayak are still facing the trial in S.T. Case No. 65 of 2008, whereas the accused Bijay Sethi is facing trial in S.T. Case No. 3/23/96/2024. 14. The eleven appellants, those who have been convicted by the impugned judgment, have jointly filed the present appeal. However, during pendency of the appeal, the appellant no.1-Udaynath Sahoo, appellant no.3-Jambu Nayak, appellant no.10-Udia Nayak and appellant no.11-Anam Nayak had expired. Therefore, the present appeal qua those appellants stood abated. Hence, the appeal is subjected to consideration for the appellant nos.2 and 4 to 9. 15. The learned trial court convicted these appellants primarily relying upon the ocular testimony of P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 9, those who are the injured witnesses. The learned trial court found their testimony reliable and stood corroborated with the evidence of P.W.4, the doctor. The close scrutiny of the ocular evidence of the injured witnesses, namely, P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 9 requires to be analyzed so as to ascertain the overt act attributed by these witnesses to the surviving appellants herein. 16. P.W.6 in his testimony has deposed that on instigation of the deceased appellant, no.1-Udayanath Sahu, all the accused persons assaulted the deceased Nakula Patnaik. He has specifically deposed that the deceased appellant no.11-Anam Nayak put his ‘gamuchha’ around the neck of the deceased and pulled him down. The deceased fell down facing downward and while getting up accused Prananath Chhualsingh (acquitted) gave a hammer blow on the left leg of the deceased below the knee. When the witnesses tried to interfere, accused Raghunath (who is facing trial) gave an axe blow on the right leg of the deceased and accused Rabi Naik (acquitted) and Biju Sethi (facing trial) and Kanhu Naik (appellant no.8) assaulted at the back of the deceased by means of their lathies. Similarly, P.W.7 deposed that he witnessed the incident from a distance and noticed 10 to 15 persons were in the mango tope of the deceased. The accused persons were engaged in cutting the trees. They got frightened and while returning, the deceased appellant no.1 Udaynath Sahoo and many other villagers, including the accused persons armed with lathies and other weapons, chased them. Near Masanipada, on the instigation of the deceased appellant no.1, deceased appellant no.11 put ‘gamuchha’ around the neck of the deceased and pulled him down and thereafter Prananath Chhualsingh (acquitted) gave a blow on the left leg of the deceased by means of a hammer. Accused Nidhi Kohalsingh (who was not charge sheeted) also assaulted him on his left leg by means of ‘Kanta’. Then Raghunath (facing trial) also assaulted him over the right leg by means of an axe and Prafulla (A-9) also assaulted him. P.W.8 and 9 also narrated the incident exactly in a similar tone. The evidence of all the eyewitnesses, if read in unison, although found corroboration from the evidence of the medical officer (P.W.4), but it is apparent that none of them has attributed any overt act against the surviving appellants for whom the appeal is under consideration. The learned trial court, under the aid of Section 149 of IPC convicted all the accused persons, those who were alleged to have been accompanied by the principal accused Udayanath Sahu. 17. From the analysis of the evidence, it is apparently clear that in so far as appellant nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are concerned, none of the witnesses has taken their name, much less attributed any overt act to them. Therefore, the learned trial court’s analysis in para-16 of the judgment falls short of the evidence to nail the appellants in the alleged commission of the crime. Para-16 of the trial court judgment reads thus:- “16. The testimonies of P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 9 confirm to one pattern. It transpires from their evidence that they accompanied the deceased to his mango tope on being requested, at the evening time on 5.8.90 and while returning from the mango tope, accused Udayanath Sahu came up with the accused persons and confronted them on the open land of p.w.1 near Masani Pada (cremation ground). Accused Udayanath Sahu seeing the deceased, ordered the group of accused persons he was leading to slay him at the spot assuring them that he would meet all the expenses of litigation of his murder. It further transpires from their evidence that on getting this kind of order from accused Udayanath Sahu, accused persons, namely, Anam Naik, Udia Naik, Kanhu Naik and others variously assaulted him. It is also stated by P.Ws.6 to 9 that one Panu Chhualasingh (Prananath Chhualsingh), Raghunath Sahu, Rabi Naik, Biju Sethi etc. (who are not accused in this case, but have been charge sheeted) assaulted by means of hammer, crow bar and axe to both the legs of the deceased causing incised wounds and multiple fracture. Mr. R.N. Burma, the learned P.P. submitted that it is another thing to say that Panu Chhualsingh, Nidhi Kahalasingh, Raghu Sahu, Rabi Naik, Biju Sethi etc. are not accused in this case, but the fact remains that those culprits conjointly with the accused persons, who now stand their trial in this court, assaulted the deceased by deadly weapons like Farsa, hammer, axe etc. Mr. Burma submitted that if prosecution is able to prove that those charge sheeted culprits mounted a murderous assault on the deceased, in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly comprising the accused persons of this case, in that case they (the accused) shall also be vicariously liable for the offence of murder.” 18. The learned trial court has rightly analyzed the evidence of the eye witnesses as mentioned above but no reasoning thereafter on the appreciation of evidence was recorded by the trial court to convict the appellants, those whose names have not even been uttered by the eye witnesses. Moreover, P.W.7 in his evidence has very categorically stated that along with Udayanath Sahoo there were 20 to 25 other persons armed with various weapons present but he had not noticed accused Sudarsan Sahu, Prafulla Naik, Manu Naik, Jambu Naik and Patara Naik among them. Similarly, P.W.8 in paragraph-2 of his evidence has stated as under:- “2. They were coming in group while some others were following. We saw them near the Padia land of Satrughna Mansingh and of them I could recognised the following persons namely accused Udayanath Sahu, Anam Naik, Panu Chhualsingh, Raghunath Sahy, Bagyadhar Chhualsingh, Laxmidhar Chhualsingh, Golakha Behari Sahu, Mayadhar Sahu, Madhab Sahu, Biju Sahu, Prafulla Kohalsingh, Nidhi Kohalsingh, Udayanath Naik, Rabi Naik and Biju Sethi. There were few others also among these persons.” 19. It is quite uncomprehensible as to how the said witness in one breath has taken the names of as many as sixteen accused persons, namely, Udaynath Sahoo, Anam Naik, Panu Chhualsingh, Raghunath Sahy, Bagyadhar Chhualsingh, Laxmidhar Chhualsingh, Golakha Bahari Sahu, Mayadhar Sahu, Madhab Sahu, Biju Sahu, Prafulla Kohalsingh, Nidhi Kohalsingh, Udayanath Naik, Rabi Naik and Biju Sethi. However, in his evidence he has not attributed specific overt act to each of the accused persons, although he has simply mentioned their names. P.W.9 had also narrated the incident in a similar fashion but did not specifically attribute any overt act against the surviving appellant nos.2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, although he had ascribed certain overt acts to appellant nos.8 and 9. 20. This being the nature of evidence, the learned trial court, under the aid of Section 149 of IPC ought not to have roped in all the appellants while selectively acquitting a few of them. The acquittal of Sudarsan, Prafulla, and Manu is primarily recorded by the learned trial court relying upon the evidence of P.W.6, who had stated that he had not seen these accused persons at the spot along with 20 to 25 persons accompanying the principal accused Udayanath Sahoo. Therefore, the trial court’s appraisal of the evidence vis-à-vis the role attributed to surviving appellant nos.2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 would not sustain the scrutiny of law to maintain the conviction so recorded. Therefore, all those appellants, namely, appellant nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are entitled to the benefit of doubt, as there is no clear and untainted evidence illuminating on record to hold them guilty of the offence as alleged. Accordingly, all of them are acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt to them. 21. In so far as appellant nos.8 and 9 are concerned, the conviction recorded against them for offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of IPC is also liable to be altered. The learned trial court has convicted them under Section 304 Part-I read with Section 149 of the IPC. However, from the nature of evidence it is evident that the offence alleged against these appellants would fall under Section 304-II instead of Section 304-I of IPC because to make out a case of offence punishable under Section 304-II of IPC the prosecution has to prove that the accused caused a death of a person through his act, which he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. Mr. Dhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2012 8 SCC 450 (State vrs. Sanjeeb Nanda) and submitted that the prosecution evidence falls short of proving any ingredient of offence under Section 304-II of IPC. 22. The evidence indicates that primarily the accused persons have mercilessly assaulted the deceased Nakula with lethal weapons which obviously with knowledge that it may cause death. But the intention to kill the deceased is lacking in the present case and that’s what the reasoning recorded by the learned trial court. The learned trial court further records in paragraph-12 of the judgment that the accused persons have inflicted injuries on the leg and avoided the vital part of the body. Therefore, they had no intention to kill the deceased. However, the lethality and brutality of the attack by them were within their knowledge that the injury may cause the death of the injured. Therefore, in the absence of any intention to cause death, the offence under Section 304-I of the IPC may not have been attracted in the instant case. Hence, the conviction recorded by the learned trial court stands altered to that of the offence under Section 304-II of the IPC. 23. Having altered the offence from Section 304-I of IPC to Section 304-II of IPC, the sentence awarded to the appellants no.8 and 9 also liable to be altered. At this stage, Mr. Dhal, learned Senior counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chellammal and Another v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, 2025 INSC 540. 24. The recent judgment pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chellammal (supra) cast an obligation on the sentencing court to give reasoning while declining to treat an accused under the Probation of Offenders Act. After having altered the conviction from Section 304-I of IPC to Section 304-II of IPC, it is apparent that the bar to treat a convict under the Probation of Offenders Act stands obliterated because Section 304-II of IPC does not provide for life imprisonment. 25. The incident relates back to the year 1990 and at that point of time the accused persons, namely, appellant nos.8 and 9 were in their early and mid-thirties. After a lapse of about three decades, both the appellants must be in their sixties. Moreover, in the present case, the accused persons, those who faced trial separately, have already been acquitted. The same set of witnesses in the trial against other accused persons have wriggled out of their statements given to the police, hence they were turned hostile. Taking into consideration all the attending circumstances, age of the appellant nos.8 and 9, and keeping in view the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chellammal (supra), I am of the considered view that the appellant nos.8 and 9 are entitled to the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. Page 22 of 26 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chellammal and Another v. State represented by the Inspector of Police1 has elaborately explained the scope, object and significance of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 while considering the question of extending the benefit of probation to a convict. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has underscored that the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Probation of Offenders Act is essentially reformative in nature, aiming to provide an opportunity to first-time or less serious offenders to reform themselves rather than subjecting them to incarceration. It has been emphasized that the provisions of the Act are intended to prevent the deleterious effects of imprisonment on individuals who can otherwise be rehabilitated as responsible members of society. The Court has further highlighted that Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act confers a wide discretion upon the courts to release an offender on probation in appropriate cases and that the said provision has a broader and more expansive ambit than Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 1 2025 INSC 540 While discussing the interplay between the aforesaid provisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also clarified that courts are duty-bound to consider the applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act in cases where the circumstances justify such consideration, and if the court decides not to extend the benefit of probation, it must record special reasons for such refusal. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are reproduced hereunder: “26. On consideration of the precedents and based on a comparative study of Section 360, Cr. PC and sub- section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act, what is revealed is that the latter is wider and expansive in its coverage than the former. Inter alia, while Section 360 permits release of an offender, more twenty-one years old, on probation when he is sentenced to imprisonment for less than seven years or fine, Section 4 of the Probation Act enables a court to exercise its discretion in any case where the offender is found to have committed an offence such that he is punishable with any sentence other than death or life imprisonment. Additionally, the non-obstante clause in sub-section gives overriding effect to sub-section (1) of Section 4 over any other law for the time being in force. Also, it is noteworthy that Section 361, Cr. PC itself, being a subsequent legislation, engrafts a provision that in any case where the court could have dealt with an accused under the provisions of the Probation Act but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reasons therefor. Page 24 of 26 27. What logically follows from a conjoint reading of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act and Section 361, Cr. PC is that if Section 360, Cr. PC were not applicable in a particular case, there is no reason why Section 4 of the Probation Act would not be attracted. 28. Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor.” Regard being had to the facts of the present case, particularly the long lapse of time since the occurrence, the absence of criminal antecedents of the appellant nos.8 and 9, and the overall circumstances emerging from the record, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the appellant nos.8 and 9 deserves consideration under the beneficial provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is inclined to extend to the appellant nos.8 and 9 the benefit contemplated under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. 27. In such view of the matter, the present Criminal Appeal in so far as the conviction recorded against appellant nos.8 and 9 is concerned, is turned down. But instead of sentencing appellant nos.8 and 9 to suffer imprisonment, this Court directs the appellant nos.8 and 9 to be released under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act for a period of one year on their executing bond of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) each within one month with one surety each for the like amount to appear and receive the sentence when called upon during such period and in the meantime, the appellant nos.8 and 9 shall keep peace and good behavior and they shall remain under the supervision of the concerned Probation Officer during the aforementioned period of one year. 28. Accordingly, this appeal qua appellant Nos. 2,4,5,6 and 7 stands allowed and appeal qua appellant Nos. 8 and 9 stands partly allowed. (S.S. Mishra) Judge The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Dated the 16th of April, 2026/ Ashok MOHAPATRA