Judgement JUDGMENT:- The plaintiff/ respon-dent, who is the owner of a lodging house at Coimbatore, has filed O.S. No. 358 of 1982 on the file of the Sub Court, Coimbatore, seeking the following reliefs: (a) For eviction of the tenant/ defendant/ appellant and for delivery of possession; and (b) For future mesne profits from the date of suit viz., 2-6-1982. The trial court decreed the suit as prayed for, against which the defendant has filed the present appeal. 2. The case of the respondent/ plaintiff is as follows: The plaintiff purchased the suit properties by a registered sale deed dated 13-11-1972. In 1978 he converted the building as a lodging house and has put up 24 lodging rooms in the three storey building viz., eight rooms in the first floor, eight rooms in the second floor and eight rooms in the third floor. Six out of 24 rooms were double rooms with bath attached. There was an office room in the ground floor and one room for the use of Dhobi on the terrace. 3. There were almirahs, electric fittings and electric connections in each of the rooms. There is one bore well and over-head tank installed. An one H.P. motor is connected to the municipal water pipe and one three H. P. motor has been attached to the bore well to lift the water to over-head tank in the terrace. The defendant was put in possession of the suit properties for a period of three years by virtue of a lease agreement which is unregistered, on 1-4-1979. According to the plaintiff, the lease came to an end by efflux of time on 31-3-1982. The plaintiff, on the expiry of the lease, issued a notice dated 14-5-1982 calling upon the defendant to quit and deliver vacant possession on or before 31-5-1982. As the defendant did not comply with the said demand, the suit was filed. 4. According to the plaintiff, all the rooms so let out were suitably furnished. The plaintiff claimed that the building was exempt from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Ront Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred as to the Act) under Section 30(iii). This is because, according to the plaintiff, the lease was a composite lease. 4. According to the plaintiff, all the rooms so let out were suitably furnished. The plaintiff claimed that the building was exempt from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Ront Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred as to the Act) under Section 30(iii). This is because, according to the plaintiff, the lease was a composite lease. The plaint was sought to be amended, by the plaintiff subsequent to the filing of the suit by introducting paragraphs 12(a) to 12(d) as per which the case of the plaintiff is, that the defendant was a friend of one A. Sundrarajan, who introduced the defendant to him and subsequent to that, in June, 1978 the plaintiff and the defendant started the lodge even though it was not a regular partnership but was the association of persons without any formal record. 5. According to the plaintiff, he had invested lot of capital towards purchase of furniture and necessary equipments to run the lodge and employed one Devarajan, manufacturer of cots, and one Shanti Arts to help the plaintiff to paint the name board. The plaintiff would further submit that he and the defendant had made an application to the Coimbatore Municipality for approval to run the lodge and from 1-4-1979 the defendant was given the lease of the lodge under the agreement Ex, A. 5. During 1980, an additional room adjacent to the office room in the ground floor was allowed to be occupied by the defendant as tenant. The plaintiff issued the quit notice dated 14-5-1982 to surrender possession of the lodging house, which was acknowledged by the defendant on 15-5-1982. In that notice there is no mention of the lodge having been leased out with furnitures, fittings etc., and even in the description of properties in the notice it is mentioned as premises bearing Door No. 160, N. H. Road, Coimbatore. Even in the operative portion of the notice the plaintiff has not said that the lease was a composite lease. The further case of the plaintiff is that the building is exempt from the provisions of the Act in terms of Section 30(1) as a period of five years from the date on which the construction had been completed had not lapsed. 6. The further case of the plaintiff is that the building is exempt from the provisions of the Act in terms of Section 30(1) as a period of five years from the date on which the construction had been completed had not lapsed. 6. The case of the defendant/ appellant is as follows :- The defendant denies the earlier arrangement between him and the plaintiff with respect to running of the lodging house. He pleaded that it is a simple lease of building and not a composite lease and that the suit is not maintainable as the building is governed by the provisions of the Act. He also pleaded that he had furnished the lodging house and that the building is more than five years old and as such, the suit may be dismissed as not maintainable. According to the defendant, the base entered into between the parties was only in respect of the building and it is not true that the plaintiff furnished the 24 rooms in the said lodging house and that the plaintiff had not leased out the suit building with necessary equipments in order to make the lease as a composite lease. It was the defendant who had furnished all the 24 rooms suitably by putting up costs, beds, pillows, tables, chairs, mirrors, tube lights, fans, wash basins, hot water heaters, etc., at his cost and commenced the lodging business under the name and style of Balaji Lodge with effect from 9-6-1978. 7. The defendant would submit that the building was not exempt from the provisions of Section 30(1) of the act nor under Section 30(iii) of the Act. The case of the plaintiff that it was a composite lease is belied not only from the lease agreement Ex. A. 5, which does not show any indication that the lease in question was a composite lease, but on various other documents marked. Even the notice to quit Ex. A. 7 does in no manner indicate that the lease was a composite lease. Further, the plaintiff not having complied with the requirement of Section 30(1) of the Act by notifying the local authorities within five years from the date of completion of the building, he could not claim the benefit of exemption under Section 30(iii) of the Act. A. 7 does in no manner indicate that the lease was a composite lease. Further, the plaintiff not having complied with the requirement of Section 30(1) of the Act by notifying the local authorities within five years from the date of completion of the building, he could not claim the benefit of exemption under Section 30(iii) of the Act. The defendant also strongly denied the existence of any partnership or association between himself and the plaintiff and submits that there was no proof whatsoever for such a case. 8. In sum and substance, the case of the defendant was: a. The lease entered into between the parties was only in respect of building and not a composite lease and on the own showing of the plaintiff it cannot be considered as a composite lease. B. Neither in the plaint nor in the notice to quit, it is indicated that the lease was a composite lease and only in the amended plaint a new case was sought to be introduced to prove that the lodging house already existed when the property was leased out to the plaintiff, for which there was no proof at all, in the form of official documents about the existence of lodging house. c. The building was not constructed within five years prior to the institution of the suit and the claim by the plaintiff was not true and the requirements of Section 30(iii) of the Act by notifying the concerned authorities about the completion of the building was not complied with, which disentitles the plaintiff the claim exemption under Section 30(1) of the Act. D. The lease deed Ex. A. 5 being unregistered was not valid and was void in the eyes of law and no Court can take notice of such a lease agreement to decide the rights of parties and also the nature of the transaction entered into between the parties. E. The notice to quit dated 14-5-1982 and the service alleged to have been effected have no relevance to the case and the notice to quit was in any (sic) even defective. 9. The plaintiff marked Exs. A.1 to A. 11 and examined himself as PW 1, One Sundararajan as PW 2 and one Devarajan, supplier of furniture as PW 9. The defendant marked Exs. 9. The plaintiff marked Exs. A.1 to A. 11 and examined himself as PW 1, One Sundararajan as PW 2 and one Devarajan, supplier of furniture as PW 9. The defendant marked Exs. B. I to B. 15 and examined himself as D. W. 1, one Sundaresan as D. W. 2 and one Govindaraj as D. W. 3. The trial Court framed the following eight issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff has converted his building as a lodging house in 1978 and leased out the same to the defendant for a period of three years from 1-4-1979? 2. Whether there is a proper, valid and legally enforceable lease deed? 3. Whether the lease expired on 31-3-1982? 4. Whether the suit building is exempted, from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act? 5. Whether there has been a valid notice to quit? 6. Whether the Plaintiff has leased out the property along with furnitures and fittings? 7. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? 8. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to ? The trial Court answered all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and granted a decree as prayed for grating two months time to the defendant to vacate. The ascertainment of future mesne profits was relegated under Order 20, Rule 12, C.P.C. Against the Judgment and decree of the trial court, the present appeal has been filed by the defendant on various grounds as set out in the memorandum of grounds of appeal. 10. I have heard Mr. Sathish Parasaran for the appellant/ defendant and Mr. E. Padmanabhan for the respondent/Plaintiff. I have also persued the documents. 11. In this appeal, the appellant/defendant sought to raise the following two contentions : (a) The building is not exempt under Section 30(i) of the Act as more than five years have lapsed on the date of institution of the suit. Incidentally, the defendant also challenged the admissibility of Ex. A.5, the lease agreement. (b) The building is not exempt under Section 30(iii) of the Act as it is a simple lease of a building and not a composite lease. 12. First I will deal with the first contention raised by the defendant. Incidentally, the defendant also challenged the admissibility of Ex. A.5, the lease agreement. (b) The building is not exempt under Section 30(iii) of the Act as it is a simple lease of a building and not a composite lease. 12. First I will deal with the first contention raised by the defendant. Regarding the first issue, the contention of the defendant was, that the trial court was in error in holding that the building is exempt under Section 30(1) of the Act. That section will only apply if the following conditions are satisfied, viz., after the completion of the construction of the building, five years has not lapsed and that the fact of completion on the date of completion should be notified by the landlord to the local authority concerned. The decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ramswaroop v. Lilavati, AIR 1982 SC 945 : (1980) 3 SCC 452 was relied on by the defendant in support of the said contention, which decision according to Mr. Sathish Parasaran, clinches the issue in favour of the defendant. In that case, the Supreme Court has laid down the law that to prove the benefit of exemption, the following conditions are essential: (a) Onus lies on the landlord to prove that the construction is a new construction. (b) The trial Court should record specifically when the building was completed and cannot act on conjectures and surmises. © The municipal records would be the best testimony on this aspect. 13. It is submitted by Mr. Sathish Parasaran, that the landlord who seeks exemption must prove that he is entitled to the benefits of the exemption and it is not for the tenant to prove that the building has been constructed beyond the period of five years. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the trial court has failed even to consider the question as to whether the landlord has discharged his burden and notified the Coimbatore Municipality about the actual completion of the building and when it was completed and to what extent it was completed. Mr. Sathish Parasaran would then submit that there is also no evidence on record as to whether the plaintiff/ landlord at all notified about the completion of construction. Section 30(2) of the Act mandates that the landlord should have completed the construction and should have notified to the local authority. Mr. Sathish Parasaran would then submit that there is also no evidence on record as to whether the plaintiff/ landlord at all notified about the completion of construction. Section 30(2) of the Act mandates that the landlord should have completed the construction and should have notified to the local authority. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the palintiff/landlord has not notified the date of completion of construction and has failed to discharge the said onus. 14. Mr. Sathish Parasaran would then submit that the trial Court has proceeded on the assumption that Ex. A. 6, which is the sanctioned plan of the suit properties, contains the seal dated 26-11-1976, and proceeded on the assumption that simply because the plaintiff made an application earlier on 11-11-1974, it cannot be contended that the plaintiff had started construction earlier to the revised sanction as contained in Ex. A. 6. It is also submitted that the trial Court relied upon the half yearly property tax paid to the Municipal Corporation, Coimbatore, and it was only during the first half of 1977, there was a revision in the property tax and based on this, the trial court assumed that the construction should have been completed only after 1-10-1977. Therefore, it is submitted that the trial Court has completely failed to consider the mandatory language employed in Section 30(1) of the Act that the building should not only have been completed within five years but the completion should also have been notified to the local authorities, and inasmuch as plaintiff has not notified the completion of construction nor has he obtained the completion certificate from the Coimbatore Municipal Corporation, he has failed to discharge the onus, and the trial Court was in error in giving the benefit of exemption to the plaintiff as laid down under Section 30(1) of the Act based on circumstancial evidence and not on direct evidence. Therefore, it is strenuously contended by Mr. Sathish Parasaran that such a relief cannot be granted in the light of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramswaroop's case, AIR 1982 SC 945 which clearly mandates that the trial Court is duty bound to give express finding in this regard. Therefore, it is strenuously contended by Mr. Sathish Parasaran that such a relief cannot be granted in the light of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramswaroop's case, AIR 1982 SC 945 which clearly mandates that the trial Court is duty bound to give express finding in this regard. In that case, the Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that whenever a new building is completed, a report has statutorily to be made and only on a completion, survey and certificate; occupation is ordinarily permitted. These records must also be available at the office of the Local authority and that the statutes make it clear that reliance upon Municipal records rather than the lips of witnesses is indicated to determine the date of completion and the nature of construction. Therefore, it is submitted that the trial Court should give express finding about the completion of the Building based only on statutory Municipal records, which has not been done by the trial Court in this case. In the light of this, it is contended that the finding of the trial Court with regard to its assumption based on circumstantial evidence that the building should have been completed only after 1-10-1977 requires to be set aside inasmuch as the trial Court has not complied with the requirement of Section 30(1) of the Act and has completely failed to consider the Municipal records in this regard. Therefore, the matter requires remand to the trial Court to consider this question as was done by the Supreme Court. 15. Per contra, Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned Counsel for the respondent/ plaintiff invited my attention to the pleadings viz., paragraph 4 of the plaint, which reads thus:"All the rooms were also suitably furnished. Besides these, there were office room in the ground and one room for use of Dhobi on the terrace. There were almirahs. There were electrical fittings and electrical connection for each of the rooms." In this respect, the plaintiff has examined himself as PW 1 and one Sundararajan as PW 2 and produced Exs. A. 1 to A. 4 and A. 6. Per contra, the defendant that the building is more than five years old. The defendant disputed the plea of the plaintiff that initially the plaintiff and the defendant jointly carried on the lodging business under the name and style of Balaji Lodging. 16. According to Mr. A. 1 to A. 4 and A. 6. Per contra, the defendant that the building is more than five years old. The defendant disputed the plea of the plaintiff that initially the plaintiff and the defendant jointly carried on the lodging business under the name and style of Balaji Lodging. 16. According to Mr. E. Padmanabhan, it is evident that five years have not lapsed since the date of completion of the construction on the date of plaint from the following facts. Ex. A. 6 and Ex. A. 7 dated 23-11-1976 are the sanctioned plan and the licence for putting up a building. Ex. A. 6 is dated 26-11-1976 on which date the licence fee has been paid. After securing the building plan, the new construction was put up. Ex. A. 7, the extract of property demand register, shows that the new building has been completed only after 1-10-1977 and it has been assessed with effect from 1-10-1977. The annual rental value of the old building and the half yearly tax, as seen from Ex. A. 7, has been increased for the second half year of 1977-78. As per this, it is intrinsically clear that the building construction has been reported and new building has been assessed to property tax with effect from 1-10-1987. The building has been completed only, during October, November, 1977. The present suit has been filed on 2-6-1982, which is within five years from the date of completion of construction. 17. It is contended, on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff that the defendant has not produced any documents to prove that the building has been completed before 1977 and that he has not specifically pleaded that the building was completed before January-February, 1977. In such circumstances, it is argued that the plaintiff has established that the building has been constructed within five years from the date of plaint and it is exempt. In such circumstances, it is argued that the plaintiff has established that the building has been constructed within five years from the date of plaint and it is exempt. In this connection, the learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision reported in Nand Kishore Marwah v. Samudri Devi, (1987) 4 SCC 382 : ( AIR 1987 SC 2284 ) wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "In view of Section 2(2) of the 1972 Act if an assessment is made of the newly built house then the date of completion of the building, the date from which 10 years are to be computed, will be the date on which the first assessment was made. Therefore, the period of 10 years have to be computed from October, 1976". 18. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, incidentally, the defendant has challenged the conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff and the defendant were jointly carrying on the lodging house business to begin with. Such a challenge, according to Mr. E. Padmanabhan, is devoid of merits and liable to be rejected for the following reasons:- (a) The plaintiff has produced Exs. A. 3 and A. 4 which were produced by the Coimbatore Corporation. (b) Ex. A. 3 is a renewal of the licence for the year 1979-80. It refers to the earlier grant of the licence for the year 1978-79 and the licence number is set out therein. © Ex. A. 4 is a certificate of renewal. Both in Ex. A. 3 and in Ex. A. 4 the name of the Plaintiff as well as the defendant has been shown as the occupiers of the lodging house. The application has been signed and licence has been obtained jointly. 19. Further, according to Mr. E. Padmanabhan, the account books produced by the defendant will belie the case as he has not even entered the payment of advance of Rs. 25,000/- in the account book Ex. B. 9. The application for licence for running the lodging house has been submitted in the joint names of the plaintiff and the defendant and so also the renewal. E. Padmanabhan, the account books produced by the defendant will belie the case as he has not even entered the payment of advance of Rs. 25,000/- in the account book Ex. B. 9. The application for licence for running the lodging house has been submitted in the joint names of the plaintiff and the defendant and so also the renewal. The evidence of P.W.1 supported by the evidence of P. W. 2, who is a common friend and who had introduced the defendant to the plaintiff, is also specific in this respect and there was a joint venture to begin with and subsequently the defendant became a lessee of the running of the lodging house. These facts, according to Mr. E. Padmanabhan, would go to show that the lease is a composite lease, which is exempt from the provisions of the Act. 20. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. As rightly contended by Mr. Sathish Parasaran, the trial court was in error in holding that the building is exempt under Section 30(1) of the Act. In my opinion, Section 30(1) of the Act will apply only if the two conditions viz., exemption will be available only if after the completion of the construction of the building five years has not lapsed and that the fact of completion and date of completion should be notified by the landlord to the local authority concerned, are satisfied. As has been laid down in the decision reported in Ramaswaroop's case, AIR 1982 SC 945 cited by Mr. Sathish Parasaran, the onus lies on the landlord to prove that the construction is a new construction. The Supreme Court has also held that the trial court should record specifically when the building was completed and it cannot act on conjectures and surmises. The Supreme Court has further held that the municipal records could be the best testimony on this aspect. 21. The judgment of the trial court can be looked into at this juncture. The Supreme Court has also held that the trial court should record specifically when the building was completed and it cannot act on conjectures and surmises. The Supreme Court has further held that the municipal records could be the best testimony on this aspect. 21. The judgment of the trial court can be looked into at this juncture. The trial court has held that the suit building has been completed within five years from the date of filing of suit and once the suit has been filed within five years of the completion of the building, the mere fact that it has been pending beyond that period of five years will not take away the benefit of exemption given to the building under Section 30(1) of the Act. The trial court has further held that the building has been converted into a lodging house in 1978 and leased out to the defendant for a period of three years from 1-4-1979. It is settled law that the owner of the building/ property, who seeks exemption must prove that he is entitled to the benefits of exemption and it is not for the tenant to prove that the building has been constructed beyond the period of five years. I am not able to see any categorical finding by the trial court as to whether the landlord has discharged his burden and has notified the municipal authorities about the actual completion of the building and when it was completed and to what extent it was completed. There is also no evidence on record to show whether the plaintiff; landlord ever notified about the completion of the construction. Section 30(2) of the Act is mandatory in nature. 22. As rightly contended by Mr. Sathish Parasaran, the plaintiff should have notified to the local authority about the date of completion of the construction. But, the plaintiff has failed to discharge this onus. The trial court has proceeded on the assumption that Ex. A. 6, which bears the seal dated 26-11-1976, is the sanctioned plan and simply because the plaintiff has made an application earlier on 11-11-1974, it cannot be said that the plaitniff has started the construction earlier to the revised sanction as contained in Ex. A. 6. The trial court has proceeded on the assumption that Ex. A. 6, which bears the seal dated 26-11-1976, is the sanctioned plan and simply because the plaintiff has made an application earlier on 11-11-1974, it cannot be said that the plaitniff has started the construction earlier to the revised sanction as contained in Ex. A. 6. The trial court has also relied on the property tax paid to the Municipal Corporation, and basing on that, the trial court assumed that the construction should have been completed only after 1-10-1977. In my opinion, the trial court has completely failed to consider the mandatory language employed in Section 30 (1) of the Act viz., that the building should not only have been completed within five years but that the same should be notified to the local authorities. Since the plaintiff has not notified the completion nor has obtained the completion certificate from the local authorities, as rightly contended by Mr. Sathish Parasaran, the plaintiff has failed to discharge the onus and that the trial court was also in error in giving the benefit of exemption to the plaintiff under Section 30(l) of the Act based on circumstantial evidence and not on direct evidence. In the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramswaroop's case AIR 1982, SC 945, I hold that the trial court is duty bound to give express finding in this regard. The relevant records available with the local authority is the best evidence, to determine the date of completion and the nature of construction. In my opinion, the trial court has miserably failed to express any finding about the completion of the building based only on statutory Municipal records. The finding of the trial court that the building should have been completed only after 1-10-1977 has no basis at all. The Supreme Court in such a situation held that the failure of the trial court to record such a finding about the completion of the building, extent, etc., is fatal and that the municipal records are held to be the best testimony on the question and the admission of the tenant that the construction is new would not be conclusive. The Supreme Court under such circumstance remanded the case to the trial court to determine the issue in the light of the law laid down by it in the said case. The Supreme Court under such circumstance remanded the case to the trial court to determine the issue in the light of the law laid down by it in the said case. Viewed in this perspective, I am also of the view, that the failure of the trial court to specifically record when the building was completed etc., becomes fatal. These basic issues failed to receive any attention from the trial Court. In my opinion, the trial court has recorded a finding on speculative basis, which, in my opinion, is no finding at all in the eyes of law. I do not also want to dwell on the evidence in greater detail because I propose to remit the case to the trial court on this specific question. 23. It is quite conceivable that public records maintained by the Corporations and Municipalities bearing on the completion of the construction may throw conclusive light, whatever might have been the original proposal in the plan submitted. Moreover, whenever a new building is completed, report has statutorily to be made and only on a completion, survey and certificate, occupation is ordinarily permitted. These records may also be available in the office of the local authority. The statute makes it clear that reliance upon the Municipal records; rather than on the lips of witnesses, is indicated to determine the date of completion and the nature of the construction. This statutory obligation and guidelines have been wholly ignored by the trial court and the burden lying on the landlord has not been properly appreciated. The result is, the eviction order on this ground has to be set aside. 24. It may still be open to the landlord/ respondent to make out his case by producing better municipal evidence in the light of what I have indicated in this order. I do not wish to deny the landlord/ respondent this opportunity because the trial court has not approached the problem from the correct legal angle and perspective. I, therefore, hold that the judgment and decree of the trial court are to be set aside and the matter is to be remitted to the trial court for fresh trial. The trial court will give an opportunity to both parties to adduce fresh evidence, documentary and oral, to make out the ground of exemption from the application of the Act. 25. The trial court will give an opportunity to both parties to adduce fresh evidence, documentary and oral, to make out the ground of exemption from the application of the Act. 25. The second aspect, which has been considered by the trial court is, as to whether the suit property was exempt under Section 30(iii) of the Act. Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the respondent/ plaintiff would invite my attention to the relevant portions of the plaint, which are set out for immediate reference. Paragraph 5 of the plaint runs thus : "The defendant requested the plaintiff to lease the abovesaid properties with all the equipments, fittings, installations, etc., for running a lodging house. The plaintiff then put the defendant in possession of the said property along with the said items of equipment and fittings, etc., as a tenant on 1-4-1979 for a period of three years under the agreement executed in April, 1979, for the purpose of running a lodging house." Paragraph 12 of the plaint runs as follows: "The said property, was exempt from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, by virtue of Section 30, sub-clause (iii) of the said Act. As such the said Act does not apply and the suit is maintainable in this Court. 12(b). Both the plaintiff and the defendant started the lodge in June, 1978 - it was not a regular partnership but only an association of persons without any formal record. The plaintiff invested lot of capital towards purchase of furniture and necessary equipment for running the lodging house. He employed one Mr. Devarajan, manufacturer of cots to provide the necessary items of furniture. Mr. Devarjan did so. Likewise, one Shanthi Arts helped the plaintiff to paint the name board. 12©. Subsequently, the defendant and the plaintiff filed an application to the Coimbatore Municipality for approval to run the lodge. Both the plaintiff and the defendant have signed the application. The Municipal authorities granted the permission. 12(d). After the lodge was furnished, the defendant was actually carrying on the business day-to-day, while the plaintiff used to visit the place for a short period during the evenings now and then. Both the plaintiff and the defendant have signed the application. The Municipal authorities granted the permission. 12(d). After the lodge was furnished, the defendant was actually carrying on the business day-to-day, while the plaintiff used to visit the place for a short period during the evenings now and then. During these visits the plaintiff found that the defendant was not giving him proper accounts and therefore, the plaintiff decided to terminate the association." Paragraph 16 of the plaint runs as follows:- "The cause of action for the suit arose on 13-11-1972, the date of purchase and possession to the plaintiff, in 1978, when the plaintiff equipped and installed had constructed the said 24 rooms and equipped with furniture and electric and water tap connections and fittings and installed the overhead tank, the two electric motor pumps, etc., and had dug the bore well; on 1-4-1979 when the defendant was let into possession as a tenant in the suit properties under the suit agreement, in 1980, when an additional room (adjacent to office room in ground floor) was allowed to be occupied by the defendant as a tenant; on the several dates of payment of rent, on 31-3-1982, the termination of the tenancy on the expiry of the period; on and after 1-4-1982 when the possession of the defendant has become unlawful and wrongful and as a trespasser on each subsequent day when the plaintiff made demands for delivery of possession, on 1-4-1982 the date of the notice to quit, on 15-5-1982 the date of postal acknowledgement of the same by the defendant, on 31-5-1982 the date given in the notice to quit; at cusba Coimbatore City where the suit properties are situate within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court." 26. As against the said pleadings, Mr. Sathish Parasaran, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant pleaded that the defendant had taken lease of the building alone and that he had furnished the lodge by providing cots, beds, etc. According to him, it is not a composite lease. Reliance was placed on the evidence of the plaintiff as PW 1, PW 2, Sundararajan, who has deposed that it is the plaintiff, who, after the completion of the construction of Balaji Lodge, for the purpose of establishing a lodging house has furnished by providing cots, beds, almyrahs, etc., at his cost. Reliance was placed on the evidence of the plaintiff as PW 1, PW 2, Sundararajan, who has deposed that it is the plaintiff, who, after the completion of the construction of Balaji Lodge, for the purpose of establishing a lodging house has furnished by providing cots, beds, almyrahs, etc., at his cost. The evidence of PW 2 was also relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent. According to him, PW 2's evidence is to be given credence as his evidence has not been challenged at all. Likewise, PW 3, who manufactures furnitures under the brand name of Sowdambiga Steels, had deposed that the plaintiff had paid for the furniture supplied by him for Balaji Lodging. The Commissioner's report was also relied on to disclose that the furnitures found in the lodge have been manufactured by Sawdambiga/ Sona Sowdambiga and PWs 1 to 3 have spoken about the purchase of furnitures by the plaintiff, paying the price of furniture to PW 3. 27. As against this evidence, the defendant had examined himself as DW 1 and his Chartered Accountant as DW 2. According to DW 1, the furnitures had been purchased by him by placing reliance on the entries in the income-tax returns filed by him. DW 2 had deposed that he had not verified the entries and the contents of the returns with reference to the respective bills and vouchers. The account book entries also have not been verified with reference to the bills. Thus, according to Mr. E. Padmanabhan, the defendant had not established that he has purchased the furnitures. The finding rendered by the trial court in paragraph 9 of the judgment was also brought to my notice and according to the learned counsel for the respondent, the finding rendered by the trial court is unimpeachable for the reasons recorded by the trial court. 28. The following are the points raised by Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the respondent, in support of his contention : (a) The defendant had admitted that the fixtures and machineries have been provided only by the plaintiff as laid down in (1986) 99 Madras Law Weekly, 278. The fixtures are over-head tank, water tank, bath room, latrine attached to the building, machineries, office tables, fittings, electric motor, pump sets, fans, etc., (b) The defendant had not pleaded that Devarajan (PW 3) had not supplied the cots and tables. The fixtures are over-head tank, water tank, bath room, latrine attached to the building, machineries, office tables, fittings, electric motor, pump sets, fans, etc., (b) The defendant had not pleaded that Devarajan (PW 3) had not supplied the cots and tables. © The defendant has neither pleaded that he had paid for the cots, beds and tables nor established his purchase. (d) The defendant had admitted that it is PW 3 Devarajan, who had supplied the furnitures. (e) PW 3 Devarajan had deposed that the order was placed for the furniture by PW 2 and the defendant, but it was the plaintiff who had paid the cost of furniture. (f) Account Book Ex. B9 produced by the defendant had been conveniently prepared by the defendant. (g) No supporting vouchers and bills to support the entries dated 9-6-1978 and 24-5-1978 have been produced. (h) Reliance placed by the defendant on Ex. B-9, income-tax return, which is dated 30-4-1981, is of no avail. (i) DW 2, the Auditor had deposed that no vouchers have been produced for verification for the purchase of articles by the defendant. (j) The account Book Ex. B-9 do not bear the Income-tax seal. (k) The assessment is also summary and there was no occasion to verify the accounts. (1) The Defendanat had admitted that it was PW 3 who had supplied the furnitures. Therefore, it is obvious that it was the plaintiff who paid for the furnitures, as deposed by PWs 1 to 3. 29. According to Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the respondent, it follows automatically from the above points that it is the plaintiff who is the owner of the running Balaji Lodge and let out the same, to the defendant for the purpose of running a Lodging House with fixtures, furnitures, machineries, fittings and other articles, provided by him. Thus, it is contended that the plaintiff has established that it is a composite lease. 30. Reliance was placed on Exs. B1 to B4 written by PW 3. The defendant sought to contend that the purchase of furnitures was effected by him. In this respect, it is deposed by PW 3 Devarajan that it is the plaintiff who had paid for the furniture and that Exs. BI to B4 were addressed to M/s. Balaji Lodge for payment of cartage only. B1 to B4 written by PW 3. The defendant sought to contend that the purchase of furnitures was effected by him. In this respect, it is deposed by PW 3 Devarajan that it is the plaintiff who had paid for the furniture and that Exs. BI to B4 were addressed to M/s. Balaji Lodge for payment of cartage only. Further, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that in respect of Exs. B1 to B4 there is no corresponding entry made by the defendant in the account books Exs. B9 and B10 with reference to the defendant's claim that he had paid the small amounts mentioned in Exs. B1 to B4. In the two account books Exs. B9 and B10, the first opening entries are in the hand writing of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant, taking advantage of the availability of the account books, had fabricated the account books. The very fact that the entries relating to payment of advance, cartage, etc., do not find a place in the account books will prove this. During the earlier period, the payment of salary to the defendant also do not find a place and this would show that the defendant is not speaking the truth. 31. From the above reasons, it is pointed out by Mr. E. Padmanabhan, that the plaintiff, who is the owner of Balaji Lodge and who has furnished the lodge consisting of 27 rooms, had furnished the same with fixtures, fittings, furnlture, cots, beds, etc. with reception table and has leased out the running lodging house premises with all fittings and it it a composite lease. Hence, it is argued that the contention raised by the learned, counsel for the appellant on this ground is liable to be rejected by this court. Reliance was placed on the following three decisions reported in Dwaraka Prasad v. Dwaraka Dag Saraf, (1976)1 SCC 128 at 140 (AIR 1975 SC, 1758 at pp. 1766-67); M/s. Pals Theatres v. B. Abdul Gafoor Sahib, (1972) 2 Mad LJ 554: ( AIR 1974 Mad 135 ) and Balaji Cine Enterprises v. M/s. Sakthi Talkies, (1975) 88 Mad LW 88 - Division Bench). 32. I have carefully considered the rival submission made by the learned counsel appearing on either side. 1766-67); M/s. Pals Theatres v. B. Abdul Gafoor Sahib, (1972) 2 Mad LJ 554: ( AIR 1974 Mad 135 ) and Balaji Cine Enterprises v. M/s. Sakthi Talkies, (1975) 88 Mad LW 88 - Division Bench). 32. I have carefully considered the rival submission made by the learned counsel appearing on either side. The second aspect, as stated above, which has been considered by the trial Court, is as to whether the suit property was exempt under Section 30(iii) of the Act. Like in the case of Section 30(i) of the Act, the burden of proof to prove that the lease, which was granted was a composite lease, squarely lies on the landlord / plaintiff. Section 30(iii) of the Act reads as follows:- "Any lease of Building in which the object of the tenant is to run business or industry with the fixtures, machineries, furnitures or other articles belonging to the landlord and situate in such building." 33. Further, in order that Section 30(iii) of the Act to be made applicable, there should first of all be a lease. The lease should be granted with the object of the tenant to run the business or industry along with the fixtures, etc. belonging to the landlord and situate in such building. It is submitted that even the very first condition, i.e., the existence of a valid lease, is not satisfied on the facts of the present case. Ex. A5 was cited by the learned counsel for the appellant for this purpose. Ex. A5 is a document which, is invalid in the eyes of law and cannot be considered as a lease at all because it is unregistered. It is further contended that a lease for the purpose of Section 30(iii) of the Act should be a valid lease entered into in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and if there is no valid lease at all, at the threshold, Section 30(iii) itself cannot at all be invoked. Only if it is valid lease, then, the Court would further look in the lease deed to find out whether in that agreement what was granted under the lease was the composite lease or not because unregistered document is inadmissible in evidence. Only if it is valid lease, then, the Court would further look in the lease deed to find out whether in that agreement what was granted under the lease was the composite lease or not because unregistered document is inadmissible in evidence. Therefore, even at the threshold the plaintiff ought not to be entitled to claim the benefit under an invalid and void document to get any relief of exemption under Section 30(iii) of the Act. I see much force and merit in this contention. 34. Further, any lease of immovable property exceeding eleven months is to be compulsorily registered under Section 17 (1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act. Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act lays down that no document, which is required to be compulsorily registered, shall unless it has been registered - (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein; (b) confer any power to adopt; (c) be received in evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power. 35. Unregistered agreement, by itself could be used only for collateral purposes to find out who is in possession, etc., and an unregistered lease agreement cannot be used to determine the rights of the parties and as to determine whether the transaction entered into was composite lease or not because these questions are not collateral questions but direct questions which affect the immovable property and confers a power on the landlord to avail the benefit of exemption under the Act having legal consequences. Therefore, to confer the legal benefit or legal right is totally impermissible based on unregistered lease agreement. Even the trial court was in error at the threshold in acting upon such document to decide the rights of the parties depriving the appellant/ defendant on the basis of unregistered lease agreement, the benefit of which he would have otherwise been entitled to under the provisions of the Act. 36. In this case, virtually by unregistered lease agreement, the trial court has not only decided the collateral question but has decided on the rights of parties in respect of the immovable property, which is not permissible and is barred by Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. 36. In this case, virtually by unregistered lease agreement, the trial court has not only decided the collateral question but has decided on the rights of parties in respect of the immovable property, which is not permissible and is barred by Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. Assuming for moment that in spite of the document being unregistered, still, the rights of parties flow out of such unregistered document could be decided notwithstanding Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, even then, on merits, it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff has failed to discharge his burden to show that the lease in question was composite lease. Let me now analyse this point as put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant/ defendant. 37. In my opinion the plaintiff's case that the lease was composite lease has not been proved to the hilt in view of the following facts as pointed out by Mr. Sathish Parasaran. "In the original unamended plaint, in the description of properties, there is not even a whisper about the furnitures, fittings, etc. What is mentioned is as follows : "Coimbatore Town, N. H. Road on the eastern side building at Door No. 160 comprising of Balaji Lodge comprising of the following on the ground floor - office room; first floor eight rooms, second floor eight rooms; third floor eight rooms and fourth floor one room - total 26 rooms along with doors and windows, almyrahs, electric and light fittings, current connections, water pipes, one H.P., M.P. set; 3 H.P. set - one i.e., two motor pump sets, etc." 38. Then Ex. A8, which is a notice to quit, was relied, on for this purpose. There is no mention in the operative portion of Ex, A8 that the tenancy was a composite tenancy and what is mentioned is that the defendant took the premises on lease and nothing more. Only in the plaint it is mentioned that all the 24 rooms were suitably furnished. Realising the weakness of the plea, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Only in the plaint it is mentioned that all the 24 rooms were suitably furnished. Realising the weakness of the plea, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Sathish Parasaran, the plaintiff purported to amend the plaint to show as if there existed a partnership originally for which there was no proof at all, and that the business of hotel was being carried on in partnership from June, 1978, and that the plaintiff had contributed lot of capital towards the purchase of furniture, fittings, etc., and that the defendant was working as a partner of the arrangement. 39. No proof at all has been produced in respect of partnership or in respect of income derived from the partnership or loss suffered by the partnership and whether that reflected in the account books or shown in the Income tax Department records. Further, the fact that the lease could not be a composite lease and that the plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden of proof that the building was leased with furnitures, fittings, etc., as alleged, is disproved by the following facts; (a) The partnership arrangement pleaded by the plaintiff, even assuming to be true, does in no manner further go to show that the furnitures and fittings were acquired by the plaintiff. (b) The case of the plaintiff was that he purchased the furnitures, etc., from PW 3, Owner . of Sowdambiga Steels, from the beginning of 1978. In fact, the plaintiff in his evidence as PW 1 has admitted that he has not shown the purchase of furnitures and fittings in the income-tax returns during the relevant (c). Not only the plaintiff was not able to produce any evidence, even PW 3, who deposed during cross-examination, has accepted that he is not in a position to produce any document to show any transaction for the sale of furnitures and fittings between himself and the plaintiff, and he has categorically admitted that he did not have any account in support of the plaintiff's claim. (d) Exs. B1 to B4 indicate that the supply of furnitures was only delivered to the defendant and these documents disprove the evidence of the plaintiff that supplies had commenced from the beginning of 1978. (d) Exs. B1 to B4 indicate that the supply of furnitures was only delivered to the defendant and these documents disprove the evidence of the plaintiff that supplies had commenced from the beginning of 1978. (e) Inasmuch as the agreement had come into existence only from 1-4-1979, and even assuming that the partnership theory is true, the partnership having come into existence only in 1978, it would be impossible to believe the case of the plaintiff that the supply of furnitures began from the beginning, of 1978 and no proof has been adduced that supplies were received from the beginning of 1978, and considering all these and viewed from the totality of the circumstances, it is, for the plaintiff to prove and it is a fact that the plaintiff has not discharged his burden and on the other hand, has come out with contradictory case with regard to the purchase of furnitures, etc., by him. If the supplies had commenced from the beginning of 1978 itself, there would have been at least some proof and there is no proof whatsoever except the evidence through the lips of witnesses, which cannot be believed as they are interested, particularly when they are contradictory in character. Even though Exs. B1 to B4 did not prove the factum of purchase of furniture and equipments, it would show that the defendant has received the furnitures, etc., from PW 3 and belies the case of the plaintiff that furnitures were purchased from the beginning of 1978. (f) It is wholly unbelievable that both PWs 1 and 3 i.e. the purchaser and the supplier, did not have the evidence of purchase which would clearly go to show that the burden has not been discharged. On the other hand, the defendant has clearly shown that the case of the plaintiff cannot be believed by producing not only .his account books but also his income-tax returns which contain the seal of the Income-tax Department, in which evidence is there for the purchase of furnitures for the hotel business by the defendant. The income-tax returns containing the seal of the Income-tax Officer are Exs. B7, B8 and B12 to B14. The trial court in my opinion is erroneous in disbelieving these returns. (g) The trial court was also wrong in throwing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove that he had purchased the furnitures. The income-tax returns containing the seal of the Income-tax Officer are Exs. B7, B8 and B12 to B14. The trial court in my opinion is erroneous in disbelieving these returns. (g) The trial court was also wrong in throwing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove that he had purchased the furnitures. The trial court in paragraph 9 of its Judgment has observed thus: "So, I hold that the defendant has not proved that he had paid for the furnitures". The trial court further relied upon the evidence of PW 3. It is thus evident that the trial court without any documentary evidence has proceeded to firstly rely upon the evidence of witnesses produced and secondly, it has also put the burden on the defendant to disprove the plaintiff's claim for exemption. It is settled law that burden lies on the person who claims the benefit of exemption and not the defendant who denies it and therefore, I am of the view that the entire approach of the trial court is erroneous. (h) even assuming that the defendant has failed to produce any vouchers or bills, the duty was on the plaintiff to produce the same and the mere non-production of those documents by the defendant will not automatically lead to a presumption that the plaintiff had purchased these furnitures and therefore, would be entitled to the exemption under the Act. 40. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Sathish Parasaran, learned counsel for the defendant/ appellant the learned trial Judge without properly appreciating the evidence proceeded to make an initial presumption that there was no dispute that fixtures and machineries have been provided only by the plaintiff. The learned trial Judge has arrived at the conclusion by plainly reading the words 'fixtures, over-head water tanks, bath room and latrine' attached to the building. Similarly he calls the electric motor pump set for pumping of water into the over-head tanks as machineries. I am of the view that the learned trial Judge has failed to consider the true nature of the said motor pump sets, bath room, latrine, etc., and has allowed certain terms, for instance (sic) amenities in Section 17, Explanation, the definition of 'Building' in Section 2(2) to pass by. I am of the view that the learned trial Judge has failed to consider the true nature of the said motor pump sets, bath room, latrine, etc., and has allowed certain terms, for instance (sic) amenities in Section 17, Explanation, the definition of 'Building' in Section 2(2) to pass by. If a drastic assumption such as the one made by the learned trial Judge is taken as correct, then, in my view, no building, whatever be the nature will escape the tentacles of Section 30(iii) of the Act thereby rendering the very Act nugatory. The mere provision of basic amenities for better or enjoyment of the Property such as water connection, electricity connections, not being electrical fittings, will not by itself constitute the agreement a composite lease. 41. The next error committed by the learned trial Judge was in accepting the plaintiff's contention that the extracts Exs. B9 and B10 had to be rejected without any supporting vouchers and bills. Further, Ex. B12 also had to be rejected as it was prepared on the basis of Exs. B9 and B10 and that DW 2 the Auditor, had not verified the correctness in Ex. B9. While holding all the above, the learned trial Judge missed to note one crucial fact that Ex. B12, which is an income-tax return, carries on it the date 30-4-1981, which is much prior to the institution of the suit or even issuance of notice. Ex. B12 had been filed with the income-tax Department even when the relationship of the plaintiff and the defendant was cordial. The fact that the relationship of the plaintiff and the defendant was cordial even till 3-2-1982 can be seen from the evidence of PW2 who deposed that on that date the plaintiff and the defendant attended the marriage function in PW 2's house and took photographs together. Therefore, the income-tax returns Ex. B12 being antecedent to any dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant cannot be rejected merely on the allegation of the plaintiff's counsel that the entries should have been conveniently made to suit the defendant's case. 42. PW 2 has tendered evidence as regards the arrangement between the parties and 75; 25 profit sharing ratio etc., thereby displaying more knowledge as regards the relationship of the plaintiff and the defendant than even the plaintiff. 42. PW 2 has tendered evidence as regards the arrangement between the parties and 75; 25 profit sharing ratio etc., thereby displaying more knowledge as regards the relationship of the plaintiff and the defendant than even the plaintiff. PW 2 in my view, is an interested witness who has known the plaintiff for over 20 years. Though in cross-examination PW 2 denied any business links with the plaintiff, it can be gathered from the fact that both the plaintiff and PW 2 are in the leather business and have known each other for over 20 years and it was PW 2 through whom the plaintiff had set the defendant as a tenant. In sum and substance, the plaintiff sought to reply (sic) (rely) upon the defendant's case to prove that the lease was a composite lease without himself individually discharging the burden as required in law. On a careful consideration and analysis of the evidence tendered by both parties, oral and documentary, I am of the view that the building is not exempt under Section 30(iii) of the Act as it is a simple lease of a building and not a composite lease as contended by the plaintiff. 43. Let me now consider the argument advanced on behalf of both sides as to whether Ex. A5 lease agreement is admissible as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent or inadmissible as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. According to Mr. E. Padmanabhan, Ex. A 5 lease agreement has not been denied viz., its execution and the signatures therein. The decision reported in 86 Madras Law Weekly 451 : ( AIR 1973 Mad 262 ) was also relied on by him wherein it has been laid down that an unregistered lease deed, in this case Ex. A 5, is admissible for collateral purposes to prove the character of possession and the date of commencement of the lease. It is contended that the evidence of the defendant has to be rejected as not speaking the truth as he is interested only in prolonging his possession and as he had even gone to the extent of denying his acquaintance with PW 2, which is falsified by Ex. A 10 Photograph. 44. Per contra, it is contended on behalf of the defendant that Ex. A 5 is inadmissible, as admittedly, Ex. A 10 Photograph. 44. Per contra, it is contended on behalf of the defendant that Ex. A 5 is inadmissible, as admittedly, Ex. A 5 is an agreement of lease of immovable property exceeding one year and therefore requires compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act. A document which has not been registered has necessarily to face the consequences as laid down under Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. Such documents, in my view, can only be taken note of for collateral purposes and cannot be received in evidence to decide the rights of parties or affecting the rights of parties in immovable properties. It cannot be used to decide whether a right created under a document was merely a lease of premises or whether it was a composite lease. Such a document cannot be called collateral but directly involving the rights of parties. The plea of exemption based on unregistered lease will be totally unavailable under Section 30(iii) of the Act because, in my view, the very determination of availability of exemption under Section 30(iii) obviously involves the rights of parties and determination of rights of parties and would naturally affect the immovable property, subject matter of the document. Strong reliance was placed on the following decisions reported in Balaji Auto Limited v. Beharilal Kohli, AIR 1989 SC 1806 , Muruga Mudaliar v. Suboha Reddiar, AIR 1951 Madras 12 (Full Bench), Choeth Ram v. Deep Chand Jain, AIR 1977, Punj and Har 187 and Ram Shankar v. Mahatma Gandhi Higher Secondary School, Johihan, AIR 1979 Allahabad 184 I am of the view that if a document is inadmissible for non-registration all its terms are inadmissible. It follows that the plaintiff cannot, in the present circumstances, be allowed to rely upon the clause in his unregistered lease deed. 45. For the fore-going reasons, I allow the appeal and set aside the Judgment of the trial court. Since the trial court has failed to express a specific finding about the completion of the building based only on statutory Municipal records, which has not been done by the trial court in this case. The finding of the trial court with regard to its assumption based on circumstantial evidence that the building should have been completed only after 1-10-1977, is set aside. The finding of the trial court with regard to its assumption based on circumstantial evidence that the building should have been completed only after 1-10-1977, is set aside. The trial court also has not complied with the requirements of Section 30(1) of the Act and has failed to consider the municipal records in this regard. I, therefore, remand the matter to the trial court to consider this question as discussed in detail in paragraphs supra while answering contention No. (a) of the appellant. 46. It is contended by Mr. E. Padmanabhan that the defendant is in huge arrears of mesne profits etc., as ascertained by the trial court, and large amount is still due and outstanding and that no amount has been remitted by the defendant from May, 1991. Now that I have remitted this matter for the purpose of considering the above question, I direct the trial court to give top priority to the above suit of the year 1982, and dispose of the same in the light of the observations indicated above, as expeditiously as possible, but, however, not later than three months from the date of receipt of records and the Judgment from this court. Both parties are at liberty to let in further evidence, Oral and documentary, to prove their respective case. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.