Judgment :- Somasundaram, J. This Letters Patent appeal has been filed against the Order dated 4. 1993 made in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992 filed by the first respondent herein, directing respondents 2 to 4 herein to permit the first respondent herein to quarry sand in Amaravathi river for a period of 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993. 2. In the Sub Application No.133 of 1992 in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992, the appellant along with 5 others was sought to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992. However, Sub-Application 133 of 1992 was not pressed by the first respondent herein in the course of the proceedings in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992 and the parties proposed to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 were given up. The appellant got leave of this Court to file this L.P.A. in C.M.P.No.8488 of 1993. 3.Brief facts leading to the filing of this appeal are the following: The first respondent herein was granted lease of lands in the Amaravathi river poramboke area for the purpose of quarrying sand for the period from 7. 1987 to 30.6.1988. After the expiry of the lease period, the first respondent obtained an order dated 3. 1990 from the Learned single Judge in W.P.No.12459 of 1989 in the following terms: “In the circumstances of the case, though the petitioner is not entitled to renewal of licence for three years, and prayed for by him yet extension can be granted till the end of this fasli 1389, that is upto 30th June, 1990 subject to paying 25 per cent more than the original lease amount along with L.C and L.C.S. amount In the result, it is hereby ordered in the writ petition that the petitioner is granted extension of lease on the same condition from 13. 1990 to 30.6.1990 on condition of paying the proportionate lease amount. Originally fixed plus 25 per cent increased thereon plus L.C. and L.C.S. amount and that he should pay the entire lease amount as aforesaid on or before 12. 1990. 1990 to 30.6.1990 on condition of paying the proportionate lease amount. Originally fixed plus 25 per cent increased thereon plus L.C. and L.C.S. amount and that he should pay the entire lease amount as aforesaid on or before 12. 1990. It is made clear that on no account further extension of time would be granted by virtue of this order and that this extension is granted by way of concession as a special case only taking into account the hardship expressed by the petitioner.” Pursuant to the order of the learned single Judge, the Collector of Periyar District in his proceedings dated 29. 1991 granted a lease in favour of the first respondent for quarrying sand in the area in question for the period from 29. 1991 to 1. 1992. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Collector of Periyar District, one Sivabalakrishnan filed W.P.No.l5116 of 1991 before this Court to quash the order dated 29. 1991 and pending disposal of the writ petition, he obtained an order of interim stay. However, the first respondent was able to get the interim stay vacated on 12. 1991. As against the order vacating the interim stay, the said Sivabalakrishnan preferred W.A.No. 1465 of 1991 and a Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 12. 1991 allowed the writ appeal and directed the continuation of the stay of the operation of the order dated 29. 1991 till the disposal of W.P.No.l5116of 1991. While allowing the writ appeal the Division Bench has observed as follows: “Mr.T.N.Vallinayagam, learned counsel for the third respondent puts forth the plea that in case his client succeeds in throwing out the writ petition, there has got to be a working out of the period of the extension of the lease. That is a matter exclusively to be adverted to before the learned single Judge and it is for the learned single Judge to decide the question taking note of the relevant facts. This writ appeal is allowed.” When W.P.No.15116 of 1991 came for final disposal before Bakthavatsalam, J., on 2. 1992, the period for which permission to quarry sand was given by the Collector, i.e., the period from 29. 1991 to 1. This writ appeal is allowed.” When W.P.No.15116 of 1991 came for final disposal before Bakthavatsalam, J., on 2. 1992, the period for which permission to quarry sand was given by the Collector, i.e., the period from 29. 1991 to 1. 1992 was over and therefore, Bakthavatsalam, J. dismissed the writ petition as infructuous with the following observation: “It is open for the third respondent to take any other suitable action against the petitioner or the Government for any loss he had incurred in view of the pendency of the writ petition.” Then, the first respondent filed “ W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 in W.P.No. 12459 of 1989 requesting the learned single Judge to modify the order dated 3. 1990 made in W.P.No.12459 of 1989. On 12. 1992, the learned single Judge passed the following order in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992. ”Heard both. In view of the difficulty which had been expressed in the affidavit filed in support of this petition in enjoying the fruits of the orders passed by this Court in W.P.No.12459 of 1989 and in view of the direction given by this Court in connected writ petition to ask for extension of time only in these proceedings and in view of the fact that the Government is also prepared to comply with the directions given by this Court on account of the inconvenience for the period to be specified by this Court, the order already passed on 3. 1990 in W.P.No.12459 of 1989 granting the period for quarrying sand in Amaravathi River from 29. 1991 to 1. 1992 is modified to one from 15th February, 1992 to 31st May, 1992 or for a period of three and half months, which is convenient to the respondent“. As against the order dated 12. 1992 made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 the said Sivabalakrish-nan filed W.A.No.1422 of 1992 and a Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 210. 1992dismissed the writ appeal in the follow-ing terms: ”On a careful perusal of the papers placed before us, we find the order in W.P.No.12459 of 1989 enabling the first respondent.to quarry sand for a period of 3 1/2 months has become final as the same has confirmed by the Division Bench and no further appeal was filed. Therefore, the first respondent is entitled to the benefit of that order. Therefore, the first respondent is entitled to the benefit of that order. The order under appeal has only reiterated that order, and so, it cannot be said that the learned Judge has in any way exceeded the jurisdiction or granted a relief more than what was prayed for“. 4.Thereafter, the first respondent filed Contempt Application No.507 of 1992 under Secs.10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to punish respondents 2 to 4 herein and others for having disobeyed the order dated 12. 1992 made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 in W.P.No. 12459 of 1989. The case of the first respondent herein in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992 is that, though the second respondent gave an order to the first respondent for quarrying sand in the river in question, on 28. 1992 certain private parties, who were sought to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992 by filing Sub Application No. 133 of 1992, by their acts of commission and omission and by initiating certain legal proceedings against the first respondent herein, prevented him from quarrying sand in the area in question for the period of 31/2 months as per the Orders made in W.M.P.No. 2822 of 1992 as confirmed in W.A.No.1422 of 1992. The further case of the first respondent in the contempt application is that when he approached the second respondent for relief, he directed the first respondent to go to the third respondent and when he approached the third respondent, he was not as co-operative as he was earlier and he in turn directed the first Respondent to get the Revenue officials to the spot in order to enable him to carry on his quarrying operation without any obstruction by third parties. The first respondent further contended in the affidavit filed in support of the contempt application that he was driven from pillar to post and the ultimate result was that the fruits of the order of this Court were sought to be taken away from the first respondent by the deliberate, wilful and wanton efforts and actions of all the respondents, and therefore, they are liable to be punished under Secs.10 and 12 of the Act. respondents 2 to 4 filed separate Counter affidavits denying the various allegations contained in the affidavit filed in support of the contempt application. respondents 2 to 4 filed separate Counter affidavits denying the various allegations contained in the affidavit filed in support of the contempt application. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge found that respondents 2 to 4 herein have not disobeyed any order of court and committed any contempt. However, the learned Single Judge by the order dated 4. 1993 while holding that respondents 2 to 4 have not committed any contempt of any order of the court, issued the following directions.” “Hence, the order granted by this Court, which was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court, admittedly was not implemented so far, and that the petitioner is entitled to quarry sand for 3 1/2 months. This Court directs the respondents 1 to 3 to permit the petitioner to quarry sand from 5. 1993 for 31/2 months as already ordered by this Court and respondents 1 to 3 are directed to grant necessary adequate police protection to the petitioner and do necessary things and see that the quarrying operations by the petitioner is carried on peacefully without any difficulty by any interference of third parties. The petitioner is also directed to pay all the necessary charges if any for the protection to be afforded to him by the police. The petitioner is also directed to comply with all the conditions regarding the permission to be granted by the first respondent. This petition is ordered accordingly. The respondents 1 to 3 are discharged. The respondents 4 to 9 are given up since they are not parties in the impugned order”. Aggrieved by the said directions given by the learned single Judge in C.A.No.507 of 1992, the appellant who was originally sought to be impleaded as 8th respondent in the contempt application but not actually impleaded with the leave of this Court, has filed the present L.P.A. 5. Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant contended that when the subject matter of the contempt application was whether the respondents therein had disobeyed the order of this Court dated 12. 1992 made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 in W.P.No.12459 of 1989, the learned Judge has no jurisdiction to give a further period of lease in favour of the first respondent for a period of 3 1/2 months from 5. 1992 made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 in W.P.No.12459 of 1989, the learned Judge has no jurisdiction to give a further period of lease in favour of the first respondent for a period of 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993, that this Court in a contempt application or for that matter in a miscellaneous petition cannot grant extension of lease after the writ petition has been finally disposed of and that when the order dated 3. 1990 made in W.P.No.12459 of 1989 granting lease for the period from 13. 1990 to 30.6.1990 and the order dated 12. 1992 made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 have become final, the first respondent herein cannot get further extension of lease by filing a contempt application. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the order of the learned single Judge granting extension of lease for a period of 31/2 months from 5. 1993 is totally without jurisdiction and it is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that by the grant of extension of lease, by the order under appeal, for 3 1/2 months, the appellant would be seriously affected because the water table in the area will come down and the coconut grove in and around the places and the agricultural operations will be seriously affected. 6. Per contra, Mr.T.N.Vallinayagam, learned counsel for the first respondent, contended that in asmuchas by the order made in contempt application 507 of 1992, respondents 2 to 4 herein were discharged and nobody was punished under the provisions of the Act, the appeal filed against such an order of the learned single Judge is not maintainable, learned counsel for the first respondent, further contended that by the order dated 12. 1992 in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 in W.P.No.12459 of 1989 the learned single Judge has modified the order dated 3. 1990 made in W.P.No.12450 of 1989, by extending the time for sand quarrying by the first respondent for the period from 12. 1992 to 35. 1992 in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 in W.P.No.12459 of 1989 the learned single Judge has modified the order dated 3. 1990 made in W.P.No.12450 of 1989, by extending the time for sand quarrying by the first respondent for the period from 12. 1992 to 35. 1992 or for a period of 31/2 months which is convenient to the first respondent, that the said order of the learned single Judge made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 has been confirmed in W.A.No.1422 of 1992, that as per the said orders, the first respondent is entitled to quarry sand in the area in question for a period of 3 1/2 months which is convenient to the first respondent and therefore, the learned single Judge while disposing of the contempt application is justified in directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the river in question for a period of 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993. The learned counsel also contended that the order of the learned single Judge directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand for 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993 is in accordance with law equity and good conscience and therefore, it is not liable to be interfered with in this L.P.A. 7. Let us first examine the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the first respondent with regard to the maintainability of this L.P. A. The contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent is that in as much as by the order under appeal, respondents 2 to 4 have been discharged and nobody is punished under the provisions of the Act, the appeal filed against such an order is not maintainable-under Sec.19(1) of the Act. The learned counsel further contended that if an appeal against the order made in contempt application 507 of 1992 does not lie under Sec. 19(1) of the Act, it does not follow that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent could be invoked and therefore, the present appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is also not maintainable. An identical contention regarding the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and another, Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1990 and Letters Patent Appeal No.l23 of l990. An identical contention regarding the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and another, Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1990 and Letters Patent Appeal No.l23 of l990. The Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 18. 1990 in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and another, Contempt Appeal No.5 of 1990 and Letters Patent Appeal No. 123 of 1990, while holding that an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would lie against any order or decision passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court, provided such an order or decision is a judgment and satisfies the other requirements of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, has observed as follows: "Various judgments, where recourse to an appeal under the Letters Patent has not been permitted, dealt with cases where the act provided an express prohibition or exclusion of an appeal under any other law. That was the petition in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 256:1962 All.L.J. 1: (1962)2 S.C.J. 179: (1962)2 M.L.J. S.C. 63: (1962)2 An W.R. S.C. 63: (1962)3 S.C.R. 497 , which concerned with the provisions contained in Sec.39(2) of the Arbitration Act and A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1442, dealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act. Sec.l00-A of the Code of Civil Procedure is again one of such instances where recourse to the Letters Patent cannot be had. Since, in our opinion, Sec.l9(l) of the Act cannot be construed to be destructive of the valuable right of an appeal granted by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and there is no provision contained in the Contempt of Courts Act abrogating or excluding the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, we hold that except to the extent of the occupied field covered by Sec.l9(l) of the Act, an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would lie against any order or decision passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the high Court, provided such an order or decision is a ‘judgment’ and satisfied the other conditions laid down in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and does not fall in any of the excluded categories. We, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection relating to the non-maintainability of the appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent on the facts of the instant case". We are in entire agreement with the above view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and another, Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1990 and Letters Patent Appeal No. 123 of 1990. Inasmuch as by the order under appeal, the learned single Judge has declared that the first respondent is entitled to quarry sand in the area in question for a period of 3 1/2 months and directed the respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand for a period of 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993, we are inclined to hold that such an order is a ‘judgment’ for the purpose of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and that the order under appeal satisfies the conditions prescribed in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the present appeal is maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 8. The next question we have to examine is, whether the learned single Judge is right in issuing directions to respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the river in question for a period of 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993, while disposing of Contempt Application No.507 of 1992. It is seen from the order in W.P.No.12459 of 1989, originally, the second respondent in his order dated 16. 1987 granted a lease in favour of the first respondent to quarry sand in Amaravathi river for the period from 7. 1987 to 30.6.1988. The learned single Judge while dismissing W.P.N©. 12459 of 1989 filed by the first respondent, for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents therein not to interfere with his quarry operations in Amaravathi river Poram-boke during faslis 1399 and 1400, directed extension of lease till the end of June, 1990 as a special • case. By the order dated 3. 1990 made in W.P.No. 12459 of 1989, the learned single Judge has further observed that it is made clear that on no account further extension of time would be granted by virtue of the said order and that extension is granted by way of concession as a special case. By the order dated 3. 1990 made in W.P.No. 12459 of 1989, the learned single Judge has further observed that it is made clear that on no account further extension of time would be granted by virtue of the said order and that extension is granted by way of concession as a special case. Again by the order dated 12. 1992, made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 the learned single Judge modified the original order made in W.P.No.12459 of 1989 and directed the extension of lease in favour of the first respondent, for quarrying sand, for the period from 12. 1992 to 35. 1992. The said order made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 was confirmed in W.A.No.1422 of 1992. Since the order in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 has been confirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1422 of 1992, we need not go into the correctness or otherwise of the order of the learned single Judge made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 modifying the period specified in the original order made in W.P.No.12459 of 1989. However, the question is, in the contempt application, which is in the nature of a miscellaneous petition, can the learned single Judge reopen the issue whether the first respondent is en titled to further extension of the lease f6r sand quarrying for 31/2 months from 5. 1993 and grant such relief to the first respondent. As already slated, the case of the first respondent in the contempt application is that, though the second respondent gave an order in favour of the first respondent for quarrying sand on 28. 1992, certain private parlies who were sought to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 in the contempt application,by their acts of omission and commission and by initiating legal proceedings against the first respondent prevented him from quarrying sand in the area in question for the period of 3 1/ 2 months, as per the orders of this Court. The grievance of the first respondent against the third parties is stated in paragraph 13 of the affidavit filed in support of such application 133 of 1992 in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992 in the following terms: “By now the time granted was slowly running out. After 2 1/2 months’ fight in courts and before the police authorities and the Collector, when I was about to quarry sand on 210. After 2 1/2 months’ fight in courts and before the police authorities and the Collector, when I was about to quarry sand on 210. 1992, apprehending that his appeal is likely to be dismissed, the 4th respondent again obstructed my quarrying, along with respondents 5 to 9 and other rowdy people. Actually on the first day some 25 rowdies were taken into custody and then released. Again another fifty persons were taken into custody and released on bail. Now for a third time, the 4th respondent has set up his own people and obstructed my removal of sand”. Again the grievance of the first respondent, against respondents 2 to 4 is expressed in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the affidavit in the following terms: “When I approached the 1st respondent, viz. the Collector of Erode, for relief, he directed me to go to the 2nd respondent, viz. Superintendent of Police, Erode. But the 2nd respondent was not as co-operative as he was earlier and he had directed me to get a Revenue Official, viz. either the Tahsildar or the Sub Collector, to be on the spot in order to enable me to carry on by quarrying operation without any obstruction by other people. 15. Thus I am being driven from Pillar to post and vice versa and the ultimate result is the fruits of the order of this Hon’ble Court are sought to be taken away from me by the deliberate, wilful and wanton efforts, action and attempts made by all the respondents. At the same time, time is also running short. This Hon’ble Court has given clear mandate that I shall be permitted to quarry sand for 105 days, Le. 3 1/2 months. Now the a uthorities are making out some reason or other and are trying to thwart the effect of this order thus depriving me of the benefit of the special concession at the instance of my competitive contractor, viz. 6th respondent. Thus all the respondents have committed contempt of the orders of this Hon’ble Court. The order of this Hon’ble Court was in full force and virtue on the acts of commission and omission on the part of the respondents and violation thereof has been committed by the respondents in the above manner”. 6th respondent. Thus all the respondents have committed contempt of the orders of this Hon’ble Court. The order of this Hon’ble Court was in full force and virtue on the acts of commission and omission on the part of the respondents and violation thereof has been committed by the respondents in the above manner”. The learned single Judge on a consideration of the materials on record found that respondents 2 to 4 have not committed any contempt in the following terms: “It is seen from the various averments stated in the counter filed by the respondents 1 to 3 that though the permission and protection were granted, in view of the obstructions by some interested persons, the petitioner could not enjoy the fruits of the order that was passed and it is not responsible for the failure to implement the order and it cannot be said that the respondents 1 to 3 have disobeyed the order and committed any contempt proceedings”. The learned single Judge also found that the first respondent could not quarry sand pursuant to the orders of this Court on account of obstructions by the third parties. Even assuming the third parties have interfered with the quarrying operations of the first respondent, and prevented him from carrying on his quarrying operations during the relevant period, the proper course open to the first respondent is to take appropriate legal action against the third parties before appropriate forum. In fact, Bakthavatsalam, J.-while dismissing the W.P.No.15116 of 1991 has observed that it is open for the first respondent herein to take any other suitable action against the petitioner in W.P.No.l5116 of 1991 or the Government for any loss he had incurred in view of the pendency of W.P.No.15116 of 1991. As already pointed out, the first respondent also filed Sub Application 133 of 1992 to implead the third parties who obstructed the 1st respondent from quarrying sand, as parties in the contempt application, but however, the first respondent gave them up subsequently on the ground that they were not parties to the order dated 12. 1992. As already pointed out, the first respondent also filed Sub Application 133 of 1992 to implead the third parties who obstructed the 1st respondent from quarrying sand, as parties in the contempt application, but however, the first respondent gave them up subsequently on the ground that they were not parties to the order dated 12. 1992. In these circumstances, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, there is absolutely no justification for the learned single Judge to grant further extension of lease and direct the respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for a period of 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993 particularly, when the learned single Judge has found that respondents 2 to 4 have not disobeyed any order of the court. Again the order of the learned single Judge dated 3. 1990 made in W.P.No. 12459 of 1989 extending the quarry lease in favour of the first respondent, till 30.6.1990 has become final after the Said order was confirmed in W.A.No.365 of 1990. Similarly, the order dated 12. 1992 made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 extending the period of lease upto 35. 1992 has also become final when the said order was confirmed in W.A.No.l422of 1992. When the said proceedings stand terminated by the final disposal of W.P.No.12459 of 1989 and by the modification order dated 12. 1992 made in W.M.P.No.2822 of 1992 as confirmed in W.A.No. 1422 of 1992, it was not at all permissible in law for the learned single Judge to reopen the issue whether the first respondent was entitled to further extension of lease by 3 1/2 months for sand quarrying, in the contempt application and acceding to the request of the first respondent, which was based on a separate cause of action, i.e., the inability of the first respondent to quarry sand for a period of 3 1/2 months on account of obstruction by third parties and directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for 3 1/ 2 months from 5. 1993. 9. 1993. 9. In Brij Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R-1987 S.C. 943, the Apex Court while laying down the principle that when the writ petition is disposed of finally, it is not open to the court to reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous petition in respect of a matter wh ich provided a fresh cause of action, observes thus: “The High Court’s order is not sustainable for yet another reason. Respondent’s writ petition challenging the order of dismissal had been finally disposed of on 8. 1984, thereafter nothing remained pending before the H igh Court. No miscellaneous application could be filed in the writ petition to revive proceedings in respect of subsequent events after two years. If the respondent was aggrieved by the notice dated 21. 1986 he could have filed a separate petition under Art.226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notice as it provided a separate cause of action to him. The respondents was not entitled to assail validity of the notice before the High Court by means of a miscellaneous application in the writ petition which had already been decided. The High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application as no proceedings were pending before it. The High Court committed error in entertaining the respondent’s application which was founded on a separate cause of action. When proceedings stand terminated by final disposal,of writ petition it is not open to the court to reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action. If this principle is not followed there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning”. Applying the ratio of the above decision of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that when the order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.No. 12459 of 1989 as modified in W.M.P.No. 2822 of 1992 has become final as such in law, it was not at all open to the learned single Judge to reopen the issue in the Contempt Application or for that matter even by way of W.M.P. and consider whether the 1st respondent is entitled to a further extension of lease by 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993 for sand quarrying and granting such a relief to the first respondent on the ground that he could not quarry sand as per the earlier orders of this Court on account of obstruction by third parties, particularly when the learned single Judge has found that respondents 2 to 4 have not disobeyed any order of the court. Therefore, the orderof the learned single Judge directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993 is liable to be set aside. On the facts and circumstances, of the case, we are also not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent that the order of the learned single Judge is in accordance with the equity and good conscience and therefore it is not liable to be interfered with in this Letters Patent Appeal, as the order passed by the learned single Judge is not permissible in law. 10. For all the reasons stated above, we allow the Letters Patent Appeal in part and set aside the directions issued by the learned single Judge to respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand and in area in question for 3 1/2 months from 5. 1993.The order of the learned single Judge discharging respondents 2 to 4 is not disturbed. No costs.