IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA No.1528 of 1993 (O&M) Reserved on:-04.05.2026 Pronounced on:- 20.07.2026 Uploaded on:- 20.07.2026 Nihal Singh and another …..Appellants. Versus Sandeep Kumar Dahiya and others .....Respondents. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM AGGARWAL ***** Argued by: Mr. Vishal Aggarwal, Advocate for the appellants. None for respondents No.1 and 2 despite service. Service to remaining respondents dispensed with vide order dated 16.08.1993. VIKRAM AGGARWAL, J. CM-5311-C-2026 This is an application moved under Section 151 CPC, seeking permission to place on record the copies of the judgment and decree dated 27.05.1993 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Sonepat, in Civil Appeal No.236 of 04.11.1992/14 of 14.03.1989 and Civil Appeal No.233 of 04.11.1992/17 of 16.03.1989 and the judgment and decree dated 23.02.1989 passed by the Court of Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Sonepat, in Civil Suit No.131 of 1983. YAG DUTT 2026.07.20 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. RSA No.1528 of 1993 (O&M) -2- 2. For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is duly supported by an affidavit, the same is allowed and the aforesaid documents annexed with the application are taken on record, subject to all just exceptions. RSA-1528-1993 (O&M) This is defendants’ appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27.05.1993 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Sonepat, dismissing the appeal against the judgment and decree dated 23.02.1989 passed by the Court of Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Sonepat, vide which the suit of the plaintiffs was partly decreed on the basis of a compromise. 2. For the sake of convenience and clarity, parties shall be referred to as per their original status. 3. The plaintiffs instituted a suit for possession through their mother and natural guardian, Smt. Phool Dahiya, against the defendants on the ground that the sale deeds dated 03.07.1981 and 11.01.1982 executed by their father, Satbir Singh (defendant No.3), in favour of defendants No.1 and 2, were without consideration and legal necessity and, consequently, were not binding upon their coparcenary rights. 4. The case set up by the plaintiffs was that the suit property was ancestral coparcenary property in the hands of defendant No.3 and that they had acquired an interest therein by birth. It was pleaded that defendant No.3 had alienated the suit land in favour of defendants No.1 and 2 for a purported sale consideration of Rs.3,500/-, though no consideration had, in YAG DUTT 2026.07.20 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. RSA No.1528 of 1993 (O&M) -3- fact, been paid. It was further pleaded that the alienation was not supported by any legal necessity or benefit of the estate and, therefore, could not bind the plaintiffs’ interest in the ancestral property. It was also asserted that under the customary law applicable to the parties as well as under Hindu Law, defendant No.3 had no authority to alienate the ancestral property so as to prejudice the rights of the plaintiffs. Despite repeated demands, the defendants failed to acknowledge the plaintiffs’ rights or restore possession of the suit property, as a result of which, the suit was instituted. 5. Defendant No.3 failed to appear and was proceeded against ex-parte. Subsequently, he was given up by learned counsel for the plaintiffs. Defendants No.4 to 8 initially filed a written statement but thereafter did not contest the proceedings and were also given up by the plaintiffs. 6. The suit was contested by defendants No.1 and 2, who filed their separate written statements raising substantially identical pleas. Preliminary objections regarding maintainability, locus standi and alleged collusion between the plaintiffs and defendant No.3 were taken. It was further pleaded that certain pre-emption suits concerning the suit property were pending and that the plaintiffs were bound by the acts of their father. On merits, the defendants asserted that the sale had been effected for a valid consideration of Rs.13,500/- and not Rs.3,500/-, as alleged. They further pleaded that substantial expenditure had been incurred towards stamp duty, registration charges, execution of the sale deeds and improvement over the suit property. The competency of Smt. Phool Dahiya YAG DUTT 2026.07.20 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. RSA No.1528 of 1993 (O&M) -4- to institute the suit as the natural guardian of the minor plaintiffs was also questioned on the ground that the father was alive and was the natural guardian under the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. It was also submitted that defendant No.3, being the Karta of the joint Hindu family, was competent to alienate the suit property and that the sale was legal, valid and binding upon the plaintiffs. Accordingly, dismissal of the suit with special costs under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure was prayed for. 7. In the replication averments made in the written statement were denied and those made in the plaint were reiterated. 8. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:- “1. Whether the land in suit is ancestral of the plaintiffs qua defendant No.3? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs and defendant No.3 are Jats and are governed by customary law in the matter of alienation? OPP 3. If so, what is the custom? OPP 4. Whether the sale-deed dated 3.7.1981 is liable to be set aside, as alleged in the plaint? OPP 5. Whether the impugned sale in the legal necessity and consideration? If so, to what effect? OPD 6. Whether the suit is maintainable or not, as alleged? OPD 7. Relief.” 9. Parties led their respective evidence. 10. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 23.02.1989 YAG DUTT 2026.07.20 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. RSA No.1528 of 1993 (O&M) -5- partly decreed the suit. The suit qua the share of defendant No.1, was decreed in terms of the compromise dated 09.12.1983, whereas the suit against the minor vendee, Krishan Kumar, was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the parties preferred separate appeals. The first Appellate Court dismissed both the appeals vide judgment and decree dated 27.05.1993 affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants was heard. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that Ex.C1 could not be construed to be a lawful compromise, as the same was merely an application and not a written compromise executed between the parties. It was further argued that there is no evidence on record to suggest that the alleged compromise was ever acted upon. Rather, the defendants had, at the earliest opportunity, moved an application seeking cancellation of the alleged compromise on the ground that the same had been obtained by fraud. It was also submitted that although the said application was subsequently withdrawn, the compromise itself was never acted upon and therefore, the same could not have been made the basis for passing the impugned decree. 13. It was further argued that despite the alleged compromise, the plaintiffs continued to contest the suit for nearly six years, which itself demonstrated that the compromise had no efficacy. Lastly, it was contended that a compromise could not be accepted in fragments and had either to be accepted in its entirety or rejected altogether. 14. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel YAG DUTT 2026.07.20 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. RSA No.1528 of 1993 (O&M) -6- for the appellants. 15. As regards the scope of second appeal, it is now a settled proposition of law that in Punjab and Haryana, second appeals preferred are to be treated as appeals under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 and not under Section 100 CPC. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pankajakshi (Dead) through LRs and others Versus Chandrika and others, (2016)6 SCC 157, followed by the judgments in the cases of Kirodi (since deceased) through his LR Versus Ram Parkash and others, (2019) 11 SCC 317 and Satender and others Versus Saroj and others, 2022(12) Scale 92. Relying upon the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, no substantial question of law is required to be framed. 16. Since the validity of compromise constitutes the principal challenge raised by the appellants, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant findings by the first appellate Court on the said aspect: “Before parting with this judgment reference to the compromise Ex.C.1 dated 9.12.1983 is also required to be made. That compromise in writing and signed by the parties or by the guardian of minor defendant was filed in court and statements of the parties were also recorded but the case was adjourned to some other date for consideration. Before the validity of the compromise came up for consideration, some persons who had filed pre-emption suits applied for being impleaded as defendants and by impleading them as defendants the court directed the defendants to file their written statement because atleast the newly added defendants were to contest the suit. Meanwhile an application was YAG DUTT 2026.07.20 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. RSA No.1528 of 1993 (O&M) -7- moved on behalf of the defendant-vendees that the compromise was not valid and it was a product of fraud and mis-Representation and that regarding minor no permission of the court for compromise had been obtained. The trial court framed issue in this regard and after recording evidence of both the parties held that compromise was not at all a product of any fraud or mis-representation on the defendant-vendee and on that account the issue was returned against the minor defendant-vendee, but as regards minor the compromise was not held to be valid on account of some technical defect. Otherwise also, a minor on attaining majority can avoid the consent decree and that fact also might have weighed on the mind of the trial court and on that account as regards the share of minor vendee it was held that compromise was not binding on him. I do not find anything wrong with the finding of the trial court regarding validity of the compromise. The compromise was in writing and signed by the parties and it was not at all found to be a product of fraud or mis-representation. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs played any fraud or mis-represented any fact to the defendant-vendees before they entered into compromise.” 17. A perusal of the aforesaid findings leaves no manner of doubt that both the Courts below have examined the issue relating to Ex.C1 in the correct prospective. The challenge to the compromise on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation was specifically gone into after framing an issue and appreciating the evidence led by the parties. The said plea had been concurrently rejected by both the Courts below. Merely because the compromise was in the form of an application would not render it invalid. YAG DUTT 2026.07.20 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. RSA No.1528 of 1993 (O&M) -8- It has to be kept in mind that pleadings in trial Courts are, at times, not upto the mark. Under such circumstances, it is the intention of the parties which is to be seen. After issues having been framed and evidence having been led in this regard, the intentions were more than clear as a result of which the trial Court held that the compromise was genuine and the said finding was upheld by the appellate Court. Thus the findings of facts and law in this regard, do not suffer from any illegality and perversity warranting interference by this Court. 18. The mere fact that the compromise was held to be unenforceable qua the share of the minor defendant, owing to non- compliance with the statutory requirement of obtaining the requisite permission of the Court, does not render the compromise invalid qua the remaining parties. 19. Under these circumstances, no fault can be found in the impugned judgments and decrees and the appeal is, therefore, found to be devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (VIKRAM AGGARWAL) July 20, 2026 JUDGE Yag Dutt Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether Reportable: Yes/No YAG DUTT 2026.07.20 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment.