GOKAL CHAND MITAL, Malik Sharief-Ud-Din, C. L. Chaudhry, P. N. Nag, V. B. Bansal, R. L. Gupta, Usha Mehra, S. C. Jain, J. K. Mehra, Sat Pal, D. K. Jain, Mohd. Shamim ( 1 ). On 26th September, 1991 at about 10. 30 A. M. the contemners S/shri B. D. Kaushik, Rajinder Kumar Sharma, Rajiv Khosla, Jugal Wadhwa, R. N. Vats, Jatan Singh and P. S. Rathee, Advocates aided and abetted by others, in large number, stormed the various court rooms when Judges of this Court were discharging their judicial functions. They individually and collectively stood on the chairs, tables and the dias of the Court Masters and acted in a menacing manner, shouted abuses and slogans such as CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDGES H HAI, MURDABAD. They also prevented various lawyers from discharging their judicial functions as Officers of the Court and also stopped the litigants from conducting their cases in the Court. They even prevented some of the lawyers from entering the court premises and the court rooms. In a threatening tone they also shouted at the Judges saying, " STOP THE WORK, WE WILL NOT ALLOW THE COURTS TO FUNCTION AND YOU SHOULD RETIRE TO YOUR CHAMBERS". They also insisted to read a Memorandum dated 21. 9. 91 in the Chief Justice s Court. The Memorandum purported to be issued by Sh. Rajiv Khosla, contemner as Hony. Secretary and typed on the letter head of the Delhi Bar Association, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. Sh. B. D. Kaushik, contemner, the President of the Association read the said Memorandum in the presence of the Chief Justice, the contents whereof scandalized, in any event tended to scandalize and lower the authority of the High Court. This outrageous and unbecoming episode continued to linger and hover in the High Court till almost 12. 30 P. M. ( 2 ). The conscience of this Court was shocked on account of the aforesaid actions of the Contemners alongwith their colleagues and therefore, in exercise of its power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and other provisions and powers available to this Court, a notice was issued on 27. 9. 91 to the aforesaid contemners to show cause why they be not convicted for having committed contempt of this Court and punished according to law. The notices were returnable on 1. 10. 1991. ( 3 ). All the aforesaid seven contemners appeared in Court on 1. 10. 1991. They were asked as to what they had to say to the show cause notice. Initially Sh. B. D. Kaushik stated that he stood by the Memorandum dated 21. 9. 1991, presented to the Chief Justice on 24. 9. 1991 and read in Court on 26. 9. 1991. Shri Rajinder Kumar Sharma sought an adjournment to consult his lawyer. He further said that so far as the contents of the show cause notice were concerned, he did not utter any word against any Judge on that day and sought permission to file a detailed reply subsequently. Sh. Rajiv Khosla also took up the -stand that he will make a statement only after consulting his lawyer. He also sought time to file a detailed reply. Sh. Jugal Wadhwa sought an adjournment and also denied the contents of the show cause notice and each and every allegation of imputation against him. Sh. R. N. Vats sought time to file a detailed reply as-the time was too short. Sh. Jatan Singh also followed Sh. R. N. Vats and also denied the contents of the show cause notice. Mr. Rathee, however, denied service of notice or having refused the notice. Thereafter a copy of the show cause notice along with summons was shown to him in Court. He took up the plea that his eye sight was weak and so he could not read it. The notice was then read over by an Officer of this Court. He replied that he had not fully understood the contents and will reply after consulting his Advocate. ( 4 ). We granted them further opportunity to file their answer to the show cause notice by 12 noon on 3. 10. 1991 and also indicated that the arguements will commence at 1. 45 PM on the same date. ( 5 ). On 3. 10. 91 Mr. Rathee again sought more time as the time was too short. He and other contemners also filed separate interim replies. All of them in brief stated that they had the highest respect for the institution of judiciary, its members, and Judges of this Court. They sought to know the procedure adopted by this Court in dealing with the contempt matter. Arguments were heard in part on that date and proceedings were then adjourned for further arguments to 4. 10. 1991. ( 6 ). On 4. 10. 1991 the events took a sudden turn. Sh. B. D. Kaushik expressed desire to make a statement. He stated that he owned moral responsibility as President of the Delhi Bar Association of the events which took place in various courts on 26. 9. 91, and condemned the same and regretted. He further stated that they will try their level best not to repeat such incidents in future and also assured that there will be no recurrence. All the other contemners stood by the statement made by Sh. B. D. Kaushik. We were, however, of the view that the use of the word regret in the statements of the various contemners was not sufficient to mitigate the offence and that the statements made by the contemners may not bind the other members of the Bar Association who had also indulged in the nefarious activities on 26. 9. 91 along with the contemners. On thier request, they were granted time to adopt a resolution in the general body meeting of the Bar Association and inform the Court at 2 P. M. The proceedings were accordingly adjourned to 2 P. M. on the same date. We recollect that after assembling it was stated on behalf of the Contemners that an urgent meeting of the Bar Association was called in the compound of the High Court itself wherein a resolution had been adopted in the same terms and language as stated by the contemners in Court. It was also stated that the coram of the meeting was only of 50 members and more than 50 members were present in such a meeting. We further recollect that while submissions were being made in this respect on behalf of the contemners, Shri Hari Chand, Advocate stated in the Court that the alleged meeting of the Bar Association was illegal and no such resolution had been adopted. In the background of the aforesaid events the contemners were further questioned as to whether the word regret used in their statements amounted to an apology or not. Initially Sh-B. D. Kaushik stated that he only expressed regrets. However when the remaining contemners admitted in their statements that the word regret used in their statements amounted to an apology, Sh. Kaushik also followed and corrected his earlier statement. After recording of the statements, Sh. R-L-Tandon, Advocate on behalf of all the seven contemners submitted that the statements made by the conteinnersamounted to tendering un-conditional and unqualified apology. He further submitted that it was voluntary and had come from the heart of the contemners and that they fully realized what they had said and that the apology was bonafide. After this no further arguments were addressed on behalf of any of the contemners. ( 7 ) IN the background of what has been stated above, it will be seen that there is no doubt that the contemners along with hundreds of their colleagues stormed the various court rooms and disrupted their functioning. It goes without saying that they were guilty of the grossest possible contempt of this Court. A very civilized behaviour and attitude is expected from the members of the Bar. In fact, they are part and parcel of the administration of justice. The only difference is that while the Judges are on this side of the table, they are on the other. Restraint, tolerance and humility are some of the virtues which need to be reflected in the behaviour and attitude of the lawyer community. They must discharge their duties with dignity, decorum and discipline. They are expected to abide by the rule of law and not violate it by participating in violent acts. If lawyers fail in their duty, faith of the people in the Judiciary will be undermined to a large extent. ( 8 ). We are not to forget that lawyers are the pillars and the custodians of liberty of citizens, not only in this country but everywhere in this tiny planet of the charismatic Universe. We need to remind ourselves of the highest traditions set by the stalwarts in the legal profession. In fact, most of our leaders who participated in the struggle for the independence of this great Country were from this noble profession. It is a profession which cannot brook such a defiant attitude and behaviour of the lawyer community. The whole edifice and infrastructure of justice and Judiciary is likely to crumble, if this wing of the administration of justice behaves in the manner it did on 26. 9. 1991. Therefore, keeping in view the entire background of the legal provisions and the nobility which sh ould flow from e legal profession, we have no hesitation in saying that the contemners along with their other brethren indulged in the most reprehensible activity on 26. 9. 1991. They simply brought down not only the dignity and majesty of this temple of justice but their own profession also and attempted to erode the entire system of administration of justice. In fact, the contempt was so gross and outrageous that we have no hesitation in holding them guilty of the contempt of this Court and convict them accordingly. ( 9 ). We are now left to see as to what would be the appropriate sentence or direction which should issue in such a case. For that purpose, we will have to keep in mind the un-conditional and unqualified apology tendered by all of them. We will do no better than retriind ourselves of the observations made by the Supreme Court in re: S. MULGAOKAR (1978) 3 Supreme Court Cases 339 in para 23 at page 350. We quote: " The contempt power, though jurisdictionally large, is discretionary in its unsheathed exercise. Every commission of contempt need not erupt in indignant committal or demand punishment, because Judges are judicious, their valour nonviolent and their wisdom goes into action when played upon by a volley of values, the least of which is personal protection -for a wide discretion, range of circumspection and rainbow of public considerations benignantly guide that power. Justice is not hubris; power is not petulance and prudence is not pussillanimity, especially when Judges are themselves prospectors and mercy is a mark of strength, not whimper of weakness. Christ and Gandhi shall not be lost on the Judges at a critical time when courts are on trial and the people ("we, the People of India") pronounce the final verdict on all national institutions. "in para 24 it was further observed: " Poise and peace and inner harmony are so quintessential to the judicial temper that huff, haywire or even humiliation shall not besiege; nor, unverscious provocation, frivolous persiflage nor terminological inexactitude throw into palpitating tantrums the balanced cerebration of the judicial mind ( 10 ). At the same time the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of L. D. Jaikwal v. State of U. P. , A. I. R. 1984 SC 1374 can be quoted advantageously: We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and allowe him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge fay making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalise him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a licence to scandalise courts and commit contempt of court with impunity. . . . We firmly believe that considerations regarding maintenance of the independence of the judiciary and the morale of the Judges demand that we do not allow the appellant to escape with impunity on the mere tendering of apology, which in any case does not wipe out the mischief. " ( 11 ). On a consideration of the entire matter, we are of the view that whatever the contemners have done tantamounts to an attempt to erode the majesty and authority of the courts and not of us individually or collectively. The guiding principle before us should be the resurrection of the immense damage inflicted upon the majesty of this symbolic manifestation of democracy and secularism. Just like the chords of a VEENA, if loose, will echo discordant notes and if very much tightened, are likely to break, we should on this first occasion endeavour to strike a balance. ( 12 ). We must realise that they are members of the noble profession and in their misguided zeal, ventured upon the defiant course for which they have offered apology. At the same time we must also keep in mind that simply accepting the apology and discharging the rule may not appear to be warranted in the circumstances of the gross contempt. Therefore, taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, including the outrageous incident and unqualified apology, we do not propose to award the sentence at present and defer it as we would like to further watch their conduct and behaviour for a period of one year from today. In case any of them repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of court or undermining the judiciary, he will be called upon to appear in Court to receive the sentence. But if they maintain orderly, good and disciplined behaviour and do not indulge themselves in the repetition of such acts within the stipulated period, then the rule shall stand discharged on the expiry of the period. ( 13 ). 0f all the unpleasant duties which the Court is required to perform, the most painful duty is to. proceed against the advocates, the Officers of the Court, for contempt of Court. On 26th September, 1991, Shri B. D. Kaushik, the President of Delhi Bar Association, Tis Hazari, Delhi; Shri Rajiv Khosla, Hon. Secretary of the Association; Shri Jugal Wadhwa, Hon. Secretary (Cri. side) of the Association; Shri R. K. Sharma, the Vice- President of the Association; Shri R. N. Vats, Shri JatanSingh and Shri P. S. Rathi, all advocates practising in the Tis Hazari Court, aided and abetted by a large number of advocates practising in the Tis Hazari Courts, invaded various Court rooms in the High Court and prevented the Judges from discharging their judicial functions. Through this premeditated act and behaviour they attempted to destory the very foundation of the glorious history of the judicial institution in India for the last 200 years. ( 14 ). Why we are constrained to take the present action can well be expressed in the words of Lord Morris in Attorney General vs. Times Newspaper, (1974 A. C. 273 at page 302) : "in an ordered community Courts are established for the pacific settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and order. In general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of the Courts should not be imperiled and that recourse to them should not be subject to unjustifiable interference. When such unjustifiable interference is suppressed, it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administering justice are concerned for their own dignity; it is because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the Courts of the land are so flouted and their authority wanes and is supplanted. " In Jennison vs. Backer (1972 All England Reports 997-at page 1006 ), it was observed: "the law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection lose hope. " ( 15 ). THESE principles are reiterated by the Supreme Court in Advocate General, Bihar vs. M. P. Khair Industries ( AIR 1980 SC 946 at page 949 ). ( 16 ). THE Full Bench initiated proceedings on its own motion for Contempt of Court against the abovenamed seven advocates. The statement of allegations was issued to the said advocates, which reads: "on 26th September,1991, between 10. 30 a. m. to 12. 30 p. m. Sarvshri B. D. Kaushik, Rajinder Kumar Sharma, Rajiv Khosla, Jugal Wadhwa, R. N. Vats, Jatan Singh and P. S. Rathee, Advocates, aided and abetted by others, in large number, stormed the various Court Rooms when the Judges of this Court were discharging their judicial functions and committed the following acts which amount to gross interference with the course of judicial proceedings and obstruction of the administration of justice. The aforesaid persons individually and collectively stood on the chairs, tables and the dias of the Court Masters and acted in a menacing manner towards the Judges sitting in the Court. They conducted themselves in a disorderly manner, shouted abuses and slogans such as "chief Justice and Judges Hai Hai, Murdabad". They intimidated the lawyers so as to prevent them form the due discharge of their judicial functions as the officers of the Court. They stopped the litigants from conducting their cases in the Court. They prevented the lawyers who wanted to appear in the Courts from entering the Court rooms-They in a threatening manner shouted at the Judges saying, stop the work, we will not allow the Courts to function and you should retire to your Chambers. "they interfered with the due course of judicial proceedings in the Chief Justice s Court by insisting to read the memorandum dated 21st September,1991,issued by Shri Rajiv Khosia, Hon. Secretary, written on the letter head of the Delhi Bar Association,tis Hazari Courts,delhi. Thereafter, Shri B. D. Kaushik, who is the President, Delhi Bar Association, Tis Hazari Courts read the said memorandum in the presence of the Chief Justice, the contents whereof scandalize, in any event tend to scandalize and lower, tend to lower the authority of the High Court. In exercise of the powers under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and other provisions and powers available to this Court, the aforesaid persons are hereby called upon to how cause why they should not be convicted for having committed contempt of this Court and punished according to law. " ( 17 ). The statement of allegations was communicated to them through a notice returnable on 1st October, 1991. The notice also called upon them to show cause as to why they should not be convicted for having committed contempt of the High Court and be punished according to law. ( 18 ). On 1st October, 1991, Shri B. D. Kaushik, Shri Rajiv Khosla, Shri R. K. Sharma, Shri R. N. Vats, Shri Jugal Wadhwa and Shri Jatan Singh appeared in person, pursuant to the notice. Shri P. S. Rathee, who claimed that he was not served with the notice, also appeared. A copy of the notice was served upon him in the Court itself. On behalf of the contemnors their counsel presented an application for adjournment for eight weeks to file a detailed reply to show cause notice. The statements of all the contemnors in regard to the show cause notice were then recorded. Shri B. D. Kaushik in his statement admitted having read the said contemptuous memorandum in the Court room and did not deny the allegations imputed in the notice. Shri Rajiv Khosla owned the statement made by Shri B. D. Kaushik. Shri Jugal Wadhwa denied the contents of the show cause notice. The other contemnors avoided giving any categorical reply to the contents of the show cause notice and merly sought adjournment. For consideration of their request of adjournment the Full Bench retired for consultation. After due deliberation the Court resumed the proceedings. "the contemnors and their counsel were informed that the Court was unable to accept their request for adjournment for eight weeks, but that the proceedings would be adjourned till 3rd 0ctober,1991, so as to enable the contemnors to file their reply to the show cause notice by 12. 00 noon on that date. It was also directed that the arguments in the matter will commence at 1. 45 p. m. on the same date. ( 19 ). On 3. 10. 1991. Mr. R. K. Sharma filed his affidavit in reply to the show cause notice. Six other contemnors merely filed a reply, unsupported by any affidavit. The arguments were advanced by Mr. R. L. Tandon, Advocate, and the case was adjourned for the following day. On 4. 10. 1991, when the Court assembled, Mr. Tandon, Advocate, submitted that the contemnors wanted to make statements. In their statements Shri B. D. Kaushik and other contemnors expressed regrets for the incidents which took place on 26. 9. 1991. ( 20 ) AFTER the statements were recorded the Bench retired for deliberations. After reassembly certain queries were put to the contemnors. They made the statements mentioning that the regret expressed by them in their earlier statements amounted to apology in their individual capacities . It was made clear to the contemnors that they were free to tender any apology and that it was entirely for the Court to decide whether the apology should be accepted or not. ( 21 ). After the said statements were recorded, Mr. Tandon, Advocate, instructed by all the contemnors stated that the statements made by the contemnors amounted to unconditional and unqualified apology and the same were voluntary and came from the hearts of the contemnors and they fully realise as to what they had said and the apology was bonafide. Mr. Tandon and the contemnors were thereafter asked whether they wanted to further argue the matter. They stated that they did not want to make any further arguments. The Court then passed the order reserving the Judgement. ( 22 ). THE power of the High Court as a Court of Record is recognised by express provisions of the Constitution by Article 215. One of the incidences of the Court being a Court of Record is its plenary power to evolve an appropriate procedure depending on the facts of each case with the only requirement that the procedure should be fair. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat Writ petition (Cri.) 517/1988 popularly known as the Nadiad Police case, the Supreme Court had evolved its own procedure under Article 129 (akin to Article 215), irrespective of the procedure laid down by the Contempt of Courts Act. The position of law is that the High Court or the Supreme Court is free to follow the procedure laid down by the contempt of Courts Act if they find, in their own Judgement, that the procedure was more suitable and fair, but they are not bound by it. We had taken abundant care to see that we strictly comply with the well-known cannons of fair trial, consistent with the nature of proceedings and the gravity of the contempt in the present case. We have served the Statement of allegations on the contemnors so that they know what are their transgressions; we have given them an opportunity by a show cause notice to put in their reply; we have given them opportunity to get the legal advice although they are all lawyers; we have further given them an opportunity to make their statements in the Court; we have permitted them to be represented by advocates. ( 23 ). This is not a case of a spontaneous emotional outburst of a litigant, disappointed by an unfavourable verdict. This is not a case of ill-advised workmen protesting against a judgement gone in favour of the management. This also is not a case of a group of women well-meaning but misguided, who after hearing a judgement of acquittal in a bride burning case, choose to express their frustration through shouting. In these illusstrative cases there is a spontaneous reaction of common people not acquainted with the judicial process and procedure. On the other hand we have here, a group of lawyers, who are the officers of the Court, admitted to the privilege of representing needy litigants and bound by high standards of professional ethics, obstructing the administration of justice and compelling the Judges sitting in the Courts to retire. They formed a conspiratorial group, determined to stop the functioning of the Court in a deliberate act of defiance of the authority of the court. They publicly announced through the memorandum dated 21st September,1991, and through the Presstheir intention to gherao the High Court and stop its working. In order to undermine the authority of this Court they gave a threat of a direct action if the Full court failed to pass a resolution for transferring unlimited original pecuniary jurisdiction from the High Court to Tis Hazari Courts; to shelve the move of bifurcation of Delhi into five judicial districts, shifting of government offices from. Tis Hazari Courts and transfer of the Courts dealing in Food Adulteration cases, DDA/mcd prosecutions, COFEPOSA, FERA and Customs cases from Patiala House Courts to Tis Hazari Courts. Further, they scandalised the Court and lowered the authority of the High Court by calling some-Judges as discredited Judges and calling upon the honest Judges to openly revolt against the discredited Judges. The memorandum further accused that there were a few interested advocates of the Delhi High Court Bar Association who are close aides of the Judges and the strike call was given by such advocates who were the close aides of the Judges ( 24 ). The said allegations in the memorandum are per se contumacious and contemptuous, which are deliberately made to scandalise the High Court and to lower its authority. The conduct and behaviour of the contemnors, aided and abetted by large number of Advocates, on 26. 9. 1991 is highly contumacious. ( 25 ). In the annals of civilized nations there is no parallel to this group vandalism by the officers of the Court, who enjoy a special privilege of audience from the court. The contemnors and their abettors have by this attack on the judicial administration tried to dismantle the pristine glory and majesty of this august institution. ( 26 ). India is respected in the family of nations because democracy has taken firm roots here. Fearless and independent judiciary and a free press are the two main pillars of Indian democracy. Judgements like Keshvananda Bharti and the use of the instrument of public interest litigation by Indian judiciary for socio- economic upliftment of the poor sections of the Society are appreciated the world over. On the national scene higher judiciary is regarded by all sections of the society as the last unfailing sanction against governmental arbitrariness and injustice. It is widely believdd and voiced that if judiciary is destroyed that will be the end of civilised society in India. The contemnors and their abettors by their unprovoked attack have tarnished this image or judiciary. ( 27 ). The misadventure of the section of the Bar is a direct threat to independence of judiciary. If the Judges, the lawyers and the litigants are intimidated, free and impartial justice would be impossible. In a way, attack by the Officers of the Court is more pernicious than any attack by the executive. This results into corroding and destruction of the institution from within. ( 28 ). The seriousness of damage caused by assault by the contemnors and their abettors is too apparent to be emphasised any further. The junior members of the Bar have undergone a traumatic experience which they had never expected. They had joined the profession risking long period of jettison inevitable in the competitive profession. They have great devotion and buoyant spirit and have committed themselves to pursue the legal career as social service. They feel completely uprooted with the prospect of a threat of collapse of the institution at the hands of a very small number of the lawyers community. The comparatively senior members of the Bar who have contributed to the glory of the High Court by dint of their hard labour and legal acumen received a rude shock. ( 29 ). The District judiciary is really bearing the brunt of frequent strikes and stoppages of work. They are under continuous pressure from the organised groups of district lawyers. They may feel that sufficient protection is not made available to them by the High Court although the High Court has a supervisory control over District Judiciary. They are now looking to the High Court for giving the lead. ( 30 ). We can also not ignore the impact of such incidents on the administrative staff of the High Court and the District Court, the litigating public and the Police that have witnessed the onslaught on the courts. They were dazed to see the near complete collapse of the judicial administration on 26. 9. 91. ( 31 ). We are clearly aware that the contempt jurisdiction has to be sparingly used. We normally overlook the small derelictrons and aberrations by lawyers in the Court. But the incidents of 26th September, 1991, are quite unprecedented. We are already seriously agitated and disturbed by the activities of the section of the Delhi Bar Association in the last few years. We have mentioned this only to highlight the fact that we have not rushed with the contempt action and have not taken any step vindictively. ( 32 ). While dealing with the contemnors in exercise of our powers as a Court of Record (Article 215 of the Constitution), we have followed a very fair procedure. The contemnors have been informed of the charges/allegations against them. They were given opportunity to take the legal advice, although being lawyers (and not lay contemnors) they are supposed to know the law and the procedure. They have been given opportunity to make the statements and to file the reply to the show cause notice in their defence. Although strictly not necessary, they have been permitted to be represented through counsel. After recording their statements what is however observed is that initially they have not shown any repentance, but affirmed their contumacious and contemptuous actions, particularly in regard to the scandalous memorandum dated 21st September, 1991, till 4th October 1991, when they tendered apology. ( 33 ). Having observed a very fair procedure and after initiating the contemp proceedings with great caution, we have examined the actions and the conduct of the contemnors in the light of the totality of circumstances. We have come to an unhesitating conclusion that each of the contemnors is guilty of gross contempt of Court. ( 34 ). Now the question arises whether the apology tendered by the contemnors should be accepted or not. It may be noted that the apology has not been tendered by any of the contemnors immediately after the notice was served on them. They had no factual defence and, therefore, if there was genuine repentance the apology should have come at first available opportunity. Even when their statements were recorded in the Court on 1. 10. 1991 they did not offer any apology. As a matter of fact, an application was moved to adjourn the hearing for eight weeks. When this request was rejected and the arguments continued, there were repeated requests by the advocates appearing for the contemnors to adjourn the hearing on one ground or another. It was stated by Shri Rajiv Khosla that he wanted to engage Shri Ram Jethamalani, who was out of station. Till the hearing was concluded on 3. 10. 1991 the tone of the arguments was not of repentance or regret, but was of challenging the proceedings. On the contrary, Shri B. D. Kaushik and Shri Rajiv Khosla affirmed the contents of the memorandum dated 21. 9. 1991 and stated that they stand by it Shri Kaushik admitted that he read the memorandum aloud in Chief Justice s Court. However, the statements recorded in the first part of the day on 4. 10. 1991 were a sudden somersault, Shri B. D. Kaushik stated: " I as President of the Delhi Bar Association own moral responsibility of the events which took place in various courts on 26th September ,1991. I condemn the same. It is regretted. I further state that we will try our level best not to repeat such an incident in future and there will be no recurrence. " ( 35 ). A similar statement was made by each of the contemnors, who were the office bearers of the Delhi Bar Association, Tis Hazari, in their capacity as the office bearers. The statement was made by Shri Jatan Singh and Shri P. S. Rathee, who are not the office bearers of the Association, saying that they stand by the statement of the President of the Delhi Bar Association. ( 36 ). However, in the subsequent statements, S/s B. D. Kaushik, Rajiv Khosla, R. K. Sharma, R. N. Vats and Jugal Wadhwa, all the officebearers of the Association, stated that the apology tendered by them was in their individual capacity. The manner and contents of the apology leave much to be desired. We are not persuaded to accept them as sincere or bonafide. Only Shri R. L. Tandon, Advocate, stated that the apology was sincere and had come from the bottom of their hearts - but not the contemnors, some of the contemnors had earlier expressed regret and condemned the happenings of 26. 9. 1991 in their capcity as the office- bearers. Since alongwith the contemnors at least about 400 members of the Delhi Bar Association, Tis Hazari ,delhi, aiding and abetting the contemnors, had committed gross contempt of this court on 26. 9. 1991, the apology had to be in their individual capecity as well as in their capacity as the office-bearers of the Delhi Bar Association, representing the said about 400 advocates. The call for the gherao was given by the Delhi Bar Association in their memorandum dated 21. 9. 1991. Pursuant to the said call about 400 advocates from Tis Hazari Courts led by their officer - bearers, the contemnors, had "gheraoed" the various Court rooms in the High court and committed several contumacious acts. The subsequent statements made by the contemnors were only in their individual capacity and do not, therefore, correctly reflect the feeling of repentance and apology by about 400 members of the Delhi Bar Association who had participated in the incidents on 26. 9. 1991. ( 37 ). When the court reassembled on 4. 10. 91 we were informed by the President, Delhi Bar Association, that the General Body of Delhi Bar Association had passed a Resolution, ratifying the statement of apology made in the morning session. This claim was immediately refuted in the Court by Shri Hari Chand, the ex- President of the Delhi Bar Association, and other advocates present in the court. ( 38 ). We further note that on 11. 10. 91 Shri Khosla, in his capacity as the Secretary and representing the Delhi Bar Association wrote to the Chief Justice of the High Court a letter for implementation of the memorandum dated 21. 9. 91. We have already held that the memorandum contains highly contumacious language. We further note that the strike in Tis Hizari Courts is still going on. ( 39 ). Even if it is assumed that the apology is sincere, we are not satisfied that we should accept the apology on the facts of the present case and particularly because of the extreme gravity of contempt committed by a group of lawyers in predetermined manner. ( 40 ). We cannot but express our deep displeasure with the prolonged indefinite strikes in district courts and high courts. One of us, Wadhwa J" had in the past eloquently commented on the continued strike by Tis Hazari lawyers after the alleged charge by the police officers in Tis Hazari compound. As citizens lawyers are entitled to democratic protests, but the limits of protests are crossed when the strikes are continued for indefinite period. Such strikes may become illegal in different circumstances. The right to practise and exclusive privilege of audience given by Section 29 and Section 30 of the Act cannot be unreasonably utilised to the detriment of the Society. If the other lawyers are not allowed to appear in the court or obstructed when they are arguing the matter in the Court, that would be a violation of the statutory rights of such advocates under Section 29 and Section 30 of the Advocates Act. Abstention from work without the permission of the client would amount to breach of contract with the client. Where there is deliberate failure to attend the court, it would be contempt of court because that would amount to interfering with the course of justice (Weston vs. Central criminal Court, Law Reports, 1947 1 Q. B. D. 32 (at page 43) ( 41 ). Article 22 (1) guarantees an accused in a criminal case to be represented by a legal practitioner of his choice. This constitutional right is denied to the accused when the legal practioner of his choice is not allowed to appear on his behalf. Article 39 (a) incorporates the principle of easy access to justice and, therefore, provides legal aid to the litigants who have economic or other disabilities. This constitutional guarantee is rendered nugatory by prolonged strikes. If no courts are open for a person who is preventively detained to file a habeas corpus petition, it might amount to break down of the Constitution. Ithas been held (Jay Engineering Works Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1968 Calcutta 407) that strike in the form of a gherao is illegal because it results into wrongful restraint, mischief, annoyance and intimidation, which are criminal offences. Section 29 and Section 30 of the Advocates Act confer exclusive privilege of audience to the lawyers because they are the officers of the Court. This privilege is coupled with duty to ensure that there is orderly conduct of judicial proceedings. Do they not forfeit this privilege of audience before the Courts when the lawyers come in a group and paralyse the orderly working in the Court? ( 42 ). In Kuldeep Rastogi vs. Vishwanath (AIR 1979 Delhi 202 at page 216), after reviewing the case law the Full Bench of this court held that the apology must come at the earliest opportunity and it should be in writing. In that case the contemnors had disobeyed certain orders passed by this Court. They, later on gave an apology to the Court. The Court found the apology did not show that they were really penitent, and the apologies were mere expedient to assuage the court. The Full Bench further held that even if it was an apology, the apology could not be accepted as it would not at all be sufficient atonement. In AIR 1980 SC 946 (REFERRED TO to above) the Court has held that where the conduct is reprehensible the apology should not be accepted. In 1979 Crl. L. J 412 the Division Bench of the Allahabad -High Court has held that where the prestige and dignity of the Court is affected, apology cannot be accepted. In AIR 1985 SC 1726 the Supreme Court has warned that it would be a travesty of justice if its gross contempt goes unpunished. ( 43 ). "with regard to apology in proceedings for contempt of Court, it is well-settled that an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness". (M. Y. Shareef and Anr. vs. The Hon ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur and Ors. ( 1955 (1) SCR 757 at page 764 ). ( 44 ). " The tendency of maligning the reputation of Judicial Officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud. And, when a member of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to browbeating the judge into submission, it is all the more painful. When there is a deliberate attempt to Scandalize which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary;. Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use of disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the present one are often designedly employed with a view to taming a judge into submission to secure a desired order. Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the concerned judge but the entire institution. . It is high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system. " (M. B. Sanghi, Advocate vs. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Ors. JT 1991 (3) SC 318 at Page 320 ). ( 45 ). Having considered all relevant aspects and authorities, we are of the opinion that in the present case the contemnors deserve the punishment of sentence. The contempt committed by the contemnors is gravest. It cannot be imagined that any contempt worse than the present one is possible. It is compounded by the fact that the contempt is not committed by lay contemnors but by the advocates, who are officers of the Court. ( 46 ). For the last 200 years the Judges and the lawyers, in great harmony and cooperation, have built the glorious judicial institution in India. Lawyers have boldly and fearlessly participated in the national movement. Even today most of the lawyers are discharging their social duties honourably and contributing their best for upholding the majesty of Courts. We hope and trust that the incidents which took place on 26. 9. 1991 shall not be repeated. The UN conference on Relationship between Disarmament and Development, 1987 had warned, "we are borrowing this earth from our children as much as we have inherited from our forefathers" In their common endeavour the Bench and Bar should remember that we are borrowing the judicial, system from our children as much as we have inherited it from our forefathers. Why should we protect the judicial system. Manu, the law giver, answers Manusmiriti Vlll-15) :- "dharma protects those who protect it. Those who destroy Dharma get destroyed. Therefore, Dharma should not be destroyed so that we may not be destroyed as a consequence thereof. " ( 47 ). We have the-benefit of reading the judgement by Mylord the Chief Justice. It is held in the said judgement that the contemnors have committed gross and outrageous Contempt of Court. After holding that the contemnors have committed gross and outrageous contempt of Court, we find it difficult to persuade ourselves to the operative part of the order in the saidjudgement. Since we have held that the apology is not bonafide and not acceptable, we direct that the contemnors, viz. S/s. B. D. Kaushik, Rajiv Khosla, R. K. Sharma, Jugal Wadhwa, R. N. Vats, Jatan Singh and P. S. Rathee, should undergo simple imprisonment for one month and shall pay a fine of Rs. 2000. 00 each. ( 48 ). Prestige of the court has to be maintained at all costs otherwise very democratic system as enshrined in the Constitution will suffer. Lord Denning in Morris v. Crown Office, (1970) 2 QB 114, dealing with the argument that sentences imposed were excessive, said as under :- "i do not think they. were excessive, at the time they were given and in the circumstances then existing. Here was a deliberate interference with the course of justice in a case which was no concern of theirs. It was necessary for the judge to show-and to show to all students everwhere- that this kind of thing cannot be tolerated. Let students demonstrate, if they please, for the causes in which they believe. Let them make their protests as they will. But they must do it by lawful means and not by unlawful. If they strike at the course of justice in this land - and I speak both for England and Wales-they strike at the roots of society itself, and they bring down that which protects them. It is only by the maintenance of law and order that they are privileged to be students and to study and live in peace. So let them support the law and not strike it down. " ( 49 ). In that case some students had invaded the court. They were demonstrating to make a protest since they were upset because the programmes to Wales were being broadcast in English and not in Welsh language. The students, young men and young women, had gone to the court by prearranged plan. They came from the university, strode into the well of the court, flocked into the public gallery, shouted slogans and scattered pamphlets, sang songs and broke up the hearing and the judge had to adjourn the matter which he was hearing at that time. When the order was restored, three of the students were sentenced to three months imprisonment for contempt of court. Some were kept in custody until the rising of the court. Some other who tendered apology were imposed a find of pound 50 on each and were required to enter into recognisances to keep peace and the others who did not apologise, each one of them was also sentenced to imprisonment for three months for contempt of court. Mind you, they were students. Here we are dealing with advocates well versed in law who, by fiction of law, are officers of the court. As to what are the charges against the contemners, have been dealt with in detail by my brother Wad. J. in his judgement. There was vulgar and disgusting display of hooliganism, never heard or seen before. This was indulged in by the very persons who are themselves supposed to uphold the majesty of law and the courts. The dignity and solemnity that attaches with any court proceedings were blown to winds. 26 September 1991 will go down as a black day in the annals of this Court. ( 50 ). Whatever may be the motive or provocation, the contemners could not act in the manner they did. Motive or provacation is hardly relevant factor in the present case. It appeared that for a short while the Constitution had been brought to halt with serious and pregnant consequences not difficult to imagine when one wing of the State stopped functioning. Prestige of the court has suffered a severe battering at the hands of these persons. Contempt in this case is serious enough to merit imprisonment and find. I would have even thought of going to the extent of injuncting these contemners from appearing in the High Court and all of the Courts and Tribunals throughout the Territory of Delhi over which this Court has superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution for a certain period. There cannot be any soft peddling on this issue, the apology which these contemners tendered is no apology either in law or on the facts of the case. It was tendered in the presence of hundreds of lawyers which had jampacked the court room and demonstrably it was not an honest apology. My brother Jaspal Singh, J. has given quite a graphic description of how the apology came about. I would unhesitatingly reject the apology. ( 51 ). In the context of what transpired in court, it will be appropriate to quote Salmon, L. J. in Jennison v. Baker (1972) 1 ALL E. R. 997);-"contempt of court is an unfortunate and misleading phrase. It suggests that it exists to protect the dignity of the judges. Nothing could be further from the truth. The power exists to ensure that justice shall be done. And solely to this end it prohibits acts and words tending to obstruct the administration of justice. The public at large, no less than the individual litigant, have an interest, and a very real interest, in justice being effectively administered. Unless it is so administered, the rights, and indeed the liberty, of the individual will perish. Contempt of court may take many forms. It may consist of what is somewhat archaically called contempt in the face of the court, e. g. by disrupting the proceedings of a court in session. . . . " ( 52 ). In this very judgment Edmund Davies, L. j. quotes with approval the following memorable aphorism of his Honour Judge Curtis Releigh, the County Judge :-"the law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope. " ( 53 ). In this case of Jennison v. Baker the landlady was held guilty of the contempt of court by reason of her disobedience to an interlocutory order made against her by the County Court and was committed to prison. She was also asked to pay damages to the tenants who had complained the breach. In spite of court's order the landlady, it appears, employed a muscle-man who by various methods persecuted and terrorised the tenants and, thus, forced them to leave the tenanted premises. Legal process was, thus, subverted. Further observed Edmund Davies, L. J :-". . . . and if indeed it be the case that she has to go unpunished for her contumacy, justice vanishes over the horizon and the law is brought into disrepute. " ( 54 ). Then the question arises: What are the parameteres of the punishment to be awarded in such a case? What these contemners have done, one would not expect even from street hooligans such a conduct. Simply because they are officers of the court and right has been given to them to practice in court do not mean that they have to be dealt with leniency. If anything, they deserved severe punishment and not mere reprimand or even suspension of sentences. I do not find any extenuating circumstances in the present case for me to take a lenient view. As noted above, the mere fact that the contemners are advocates is hardly a reason for awarding lesser punishment. I am quite aware of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana (AIR 1981 S. C. 643) that sentencing an accused person is a sensitive exercise of discretion and not a routine or mechanical prescription acting on hunch. In my view the punishment to the contemners in the present case must be an quintessence for others so that it creates an awe not only in the mind of contemners alone but in the mind of others also and deter them from committing such an act again. ( 55 ). While presiding over a Committee constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 for going into the incident of lathi charge on the lawyers and other incidents in Tis Hazari Courts premises which led to a long strike by the lawyers I had occasion to delve upon the aspect of the strike by the lawyers and conduct of some of them in Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court. I said as under:-"this conduct, by a section of lawyers, to my mind, is highly reprehensible. A certain amount of militancy is discernible these days among sections of the lawyers' community. Militancy has no place in the legal profession committed to the rule of law. Courts are just limping along these days with a terrible backlog of cases. There are many factors for this but one nevertheless being the frequent strikes by lawyers. Strikes by lawyers have become almost a joke these days. Sometimes perhaps, delay suits the lawyers as well as the litigants specially in criminal cases where because of delay in trial, accused are released on bail even though accused of heinous crimes. It cannot be disputed that a person has a right to be represented in courts by lawyer and the role of the lawyers so representing is well- recognised. Strike by the lawyers amounts to denial of justice to litigants. Long delays are notorious and prolonged strike by lawyers has set the clock backwards. In fact, most of the delays are seen by laymen as a means by which the lawyer lines his pocket. Lord Macmillan, a Member of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, declared that the duty of the advocates was five-fold in the discharge of their-off ice- the advocate has a duty to his client, a duty to his opponent, a duty to the court, a duty to himself, and a duty to the State. A Bar Association is not a trade union and strike by the lawyers should be an anathema. Our democracy is built on three pillars-the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Grave doubts are already being voiced -if the judicial system in the country is not breaking down because of delays in delivery of justice. It is the duty of the lawyers to see that the judicial system in the country is strengthened and justice reaches all in the shortest possible time. " ( 56 ). 1 also observed :-"a great deal has been said on the right of lawyers to go on strike, the preponderance of the view being that the lawyers, in view of the obligations of their profession, cannot go on strike. In fact, the view is that it is the negation of the very concept of rule of law. The Law Commission of India is also seized of this matter and unless the lawyers themselves evolve some principles, strikes by lawyers may have to be restricted by an appropriate legislation, may be even by amending the Advocates Act, 1961. In fact, the Bar Council of India and State Bar Councils, which are statutory bodies under the Advocates Act, 1961, should play their pivotal role in preventing strikes by lawyers. . It was heartening to note that many senior advocates in the Supreme Court effectively intervened to discontinue the strike in the apex body. Perhaps, the senior members of the Bar can contribute more in preventing the frequent strikes by lawyers. Earlier Strikes by the lawyers were relatively unknown. But, then at the same time the authorities concerned have also to be responsive and must immediately come forward to resolve the complaints of the lawyers. " ( 57 ). Since then three has been no let up in the strikes by the lawyers. Situation has rather worsened. At times one does hear the voices of reason, but these are drowned in the din of strike calls. I Many a times cause of strikes is quite unrelated to the cause of administration of justice. Time has come for introspection. I can, therefore, only reaffirm my views with a great deal of sorrow. ( 58 ). With these observations I will agree with the order to conviction and sentence imposed by Wad, J. ( 59 ). 26th September 1991 was a sad day when the rule of law, the sheet-anchor of our constitution was given a severe jolt, the majesty of law was blatantly violated and the court was subjected to indignity. All this was done, astonishingly, by lawyers, claiming to be members of Delhi Bar Association led by the Contemners. I wish this Court had been spared this disgrace. The painful events have been aptly described by my brother Judges in their respective judgments which I have had the privilege to read. All agree that the conduct of the contemners amounts to gross contempt of court. I most respectfully concur. There is however difference of opinion on how the lawyers be dealt with for their conduct. ( 60 ). The events leading to the apology and the manner in which it was tendered have been vividly described by Wad, J and Jaspal Singh , J in their respective judgments. The apology to be bona fide must be made at the first available opportunity unconditionally in words which clearly conveys contriteness. As observed by the Supreme Court in L. D. Jaikwal v. State of U. P. AIR 1984 SC 1374 it is one thing to say sorry-it is another to feel sorry". The events of 4th October 1991 show that there was not only dithering but defiance for substantial part of the proceedings. The manner in which the apology was tendered before this court by the contemners to my mind clearly establishes that the apology was not voluntary. It was tendered because of the persuasion of other members of the Bar in order to escape the rigours of law. I It was only a device to escape. It was mockery of the proceedings which added insult to injury. Therefore, I am unable to persuade myself to hold that the apology tendered by the contemners was bona fide. . ( 61 ). Now, coming to question of sentence. Do I deal with the contemners differently than I would have dealt with any other citizen? Treating the contemners in a more lenient way that what other citizens would be dealt with would create a distrust in the mind of the public at large and shake the confidence of the people in courts. Justice has to be even handed. Lawyers belong to a noble and learned profession. They are the vital link between the court and the members of the public. They are also officers of the court. If lawyers themselves bring down the prestige and image of the court, it will impair the majesty of the courts of law irreparably. If the dignity of the court is not safe in the hands of the lawyers, it is not safe anywhere. This is not a case of misguided students who do not know the consequences of their action, nor are we required to deal with the freedom of the Press which requires the court to be magnanimous, gentle and display mercy. If the respect for the court disappears, no respect will be left for any other institution or organ of the State. People have faith in the judicial system and the judiciary. That faith must be strengthened. Timely action is necessary in order that discipline is maintained and administration of justice which is a primary duty of the court is carried on unhampered. In recent times there has been a sharp fall in ethical standards at all levels. Soft attitude towards your own community encourages indiscipline and leads to further erosion of Standards. I am fortified in my view by the observations of the Supreme Court in M. B. Sanghi, Advocate vs. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Ors. JT 1991 (3) SC 318 where Ahmadi, J has observed thus :"when there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned Judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary. Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use of disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the present one are often designedly employed with a view to taming a judge into submission to secure a desired order. Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the concerned judge but the entire institution. The foundation of our system which is based on the independence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against the Presiding Judicial Officers with impunity. It is high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system. An independent judiciary is of vital importance to any free society. Judicial independence was not achieved overnight. Since we have inherited this concept from the British, it would not be out of place to mention the struggle strong-willed judges like Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas,and many others had to put up with the Crown as well as the Parliament at considerable personal risk. And when a members of the profession like the appellant who should know better so lightly trifles with the much endeared concept of judicial independence to secure small gains it only betrays a lack of respect for the martyrs of judicial independence and for the institution itself. Their sacrifice would go waste if we are not jealous to protect the fair name of the judiciary from unwarranted attacks on its independence. "thus, if anything as lawyers the responsibility on the contemners was much greater. Let me hasten to say that this does not mean that the court will be unduly harsh with the contemners simply because they are lawyers. As often-said, the Bench and the Bar are two wheels of the chariot of justice. When the court imposes sentence on members who are part of the same institution it is done with considerable anguish with the hope that such acts aren't repeated in future. Undoubtedly, when the court is required to exercise its contempt jurisdiction it is exercised very spraingly and with circumspection and, therefore, often when lawyers in the heat of the moment transgress the well defined norms, the court ignores such conduct but when lawyers indulge in such gross and pre-planned acts of contempt, they do not deserve to be dealt with lightly. Those who seek to destroy the judicial system neither deserve sympathy nor compassion. It will be useful to reproduce the observations of the Supreme Court in L. D. Jaikwal v. State ofu. P. , AIR 1984 SC 1374 which reads thus:"to pursue a populist line of showing indulgence is not very difficult-in fact it is more difficult to resist the temptation to do so rather than to adhere to the nail studded path of duty. Institutional perspective demands that considerations of populism are not allowed to obstruct the path of duty. We, therefore, cannot take a lenient or indulgent view of this matter. We dread the day when a Judge cannot work with independence by reason of the fear that a disgruntled member of the Bar can publicly humiliate him and heap disgrace on him with impunity, if any of his orders, or the decision rendered by him, displeases any of the Advocates appearing in the matter. " ( 62 ). In the present case as well I do not think that unmerited leniency at the cost of discipline and principle is called for. For the aforesaid reasons, I agree with Wad, J. ( 63 ). Gross and blatant contempt committed by the contemners, aided and abetted by other members of the Delhi Bar Association, undoubtedly deserves severe condemnation and conviction. Saving grace, to some extent, if at all, was self- condemnation of the sin by the contemners individually and collectively on 4th of October 1991. Should it have ended at that stage, I would have taken a lenient view. But, the fond hope that the tide will ebb and better sense prevail, aroused by the expression of regret, apology-unqualified and unconditional and even an assurance for a better future by Mr. Kaushik, President of the Bar Association, supported by all the others, has unfortunately been dispelled by subsequent events. ( 64 ). Out of the large number of advocates who invaded this Court en mass on 26th of September 1991, only seven of them have been booked as it was felt that they were leading the demonstration. Five of them are office-bearers, being the President, Vice- President (Civil), Vice-President (Criminal), General Secretary and Addl. Secretary of the Bar Association. The other two are former members of the Executive Committee of the Association. ( 65 ). The pre-planned invasion was really a step in furtherance of the strike earlier called and organised by the contemners in the District Courts against the proposed alteration to pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Courts and territorial division of Delhi into five districts. The strike is still continuing under their direct control, man-agreement and leadership. ( 66 ). After judgment was reserved on the 4th of October 1991, the contemners have intensified the strike. First, within a week, by reiterating the contemptuous contents of their offensive Memorandum dated 21st of September 1991. Further, by a notice dated 25th of November 1991, with effect from 30th of November 1991, imposing a total ban on appearance of advocates in Tis Hazari Courts. By their overbearing behaviour, the contemners have succeeded in subjugating a large section of right/thinking members of the Bar as well as the subordinate judiciary into pathetic surrender. They have brought to a grinding halt functioning of the District Courts in Delhi. At least this much information has reached us. ( 67 ). Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that in past few years advocates in Delhi have frequently resorted to strikes on one pretext or the other, paralysing Courts for prolonged periods, causing inconvenience to litigants and witnesses, delaying trial of cases, and aggravating the already distressing position of arrears accumulating in all Civil and Criminal Courts. ( 68 ). Advocates form an integral part of our judicial system. Their participation enables Courts to properly dispense justice. They render expert service to the public in general and the litigants in particular and thus discharge main function of the Bar i. e. of cooperating with the judiciary in the administration of justice according to law. ( 69 ). A member of the Bar owes a duty to his client to place his case before the Court. At the same time, he owes a duty to the Court in which he is engaged. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the Court itself into disrepute. Above all, he has the privilege to belong to a noble profession dedicated to the administration of justice. ( 70 ). Indeed, what is expected of an advocate is beautifully stated in the preamble to Chapter II laying down standards of professional conduct and etiquette in Part VI of the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India in the exercise of its rule-making powers under the Advocates Act, 1961. Here, it may be useful to extract the relevant portion. It reads:-"an Advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a privileged member of the community, and a gentleman, bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity may still be improper for an advocate. . . " ( ). Strike by members of the Bar is far from befitting their status. Lawful it may be for anyone else. For Advocates, it is neither lawful nor moral. What was said by Lord Denning M. R. in Morris v. Crown Office, (1970) 2 Q. B. I 14 in the case of students, aptly quoted by some of my brothers, and I need not repeat, applies with greater force to strike by Advocates. ( 72 ) ADVOCATES' strike, unlike any other form of protest, whatever be the cause, affects due disposal of judicial work. It results in disruption of proper functioning of Courts. It impedes free flow of the stream of justice. It directly obstructs or at least tends to obstruct the administration of justice. ( 73 ). The cause agitating minds of members of the Bar may be laudable, sometimes it may even effect the judiciary or the judicial system itself. Expression of their concerns in any other form may be appreciated, but not strike. Suffice it to state just one reason for it. Every wrong has a remedy which can be sought and got in Courts according to law. If advocates abstain from Courts, the entire redressal system will collapse, and the administration of justice will fail. ( 74 ) ON the proposal to alter pecuniary jurisdiction of civil courts and to territorially divide Delhi into five districts, different Bar Associations in Delhi have resorted to strike from time to time. Interestingly. enough, to justify strike on such matters of conflicting interests of their respective members practising in different courts, each Bar Association fashions its demand (s) on professed 'public interest'. ( 75 ) WHAT is in public interest in the context of administration of justice? It demands, at least, expeditious settlement of disputes according to law. Needless to say, to achieve this object, proper functioning of all courts and tribunals without any interference or obstruction is necessary. Advocates' strike, apart from everything else, defeats public interest. ( 76 ) FOR effective and proper administration of justice, provision has been made in Part VI Chapter V of the Constitution of India for a High Court for each State. Every High-Court, by virtue of Article 215, is a court of record and is vested with all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, has been conferred by Article 227 on every High Court. Being a superior court of record, the High Court has the power to punish for contempt of all courts and tribunals subordinate to it as contempt of itself. I It is high time, in the prevailing conditions, to infuse confidence in the minds of public, the subordinate judiciary, and the same majority of members of the Bar, that the High Court will take cognizance of every criminal contempt committed by any one, in any form, related to their respective and complimentary participation in the administration of justice according to law, and punish the same as contempt of itself. ( 77 ) IN this background, I find it unrealistic to isolate for consideration the incident of 26th of September 1991 from the on- going strike at the District Courts by the Delhi Bar Association. The object and effect of the strike, the nature of the contempt, and even the persons responsible for it are all the same. Indeed, the strike there and the incident here formed part of the same design. In these peculiar and compelling circumstances, the subsequent events that have taken place, while our judgment was reserved, cannot be overlooked. They have to be taken into consideration to decide how to tackle the overall situation confronting the High Court. Here, the principles of criminal jurisprudence which direct exclusion from consideration subsequent events do not stand in our way. Contempt is suigeneris. It calls for treatment quite separate from the treatment of ordinary criminal offences in the criminal courts. The exercise of court's power in this special field is not fettered by any such inhibitions. We already have sufficient information about the miscreants and their continuing disruptive activities. We need nothing more. ( 78 ) RESPECT for the administration of justice cannot be said to have been vindicated by the apologies tendered by the contemners only for what they did on 26th of September 1991. By intensification of the strike and by fanning militancy in the subordinate courts, they are persisting in the commission of contempt of this Court. Strike must end for the administration of justice to run. The contemners are in no mood to relent. The fond hope that they will cooperate is frustrated. ( 79 ) NOW, all powers of the High Court should be exerted to restore administration of justice. It is also necessary to take such action as will in future deter every one, the contemners and all the other misguided members of the Bar, from doing any act whatsoever - like strike - which interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any manner in any court or tribunal within the jurisdiction of this High Court. ( 80 ) THEREFORE, I agree with the conclusions arrived at and the sentence imposed by brother Wad, J. . ( 81 ) MEMBERS of the legal profession occupy a very high status in the Society. "the high status, however, carries with it equally high responsibilities. The most unfortunate, painful and unprecedented incidents of 26th September, 1991 show how responsibly the contemners, aided and abated by other lawyers, behaved. From the members of the Bar the Court expects much higher standard of conduct and caution and not what happened on the painful day when the judicial machinery almost came to a standstill. There was a large scale interference with judicial proceedings in this Court. It was not an act of a single disgruntled lawyer who interfered with proceedings in one court on account of something which may have happened on the spur of the moment. It was a group of lawyers who stormed the High Court, went from one court room to another and shouted slogans and created a situation in which no Judge could work and discharge his constitutional functions. Such a situation was created that Judges could not even take up those cases in which parties were present and wanted to argue their cases personally. Almost all the Judges had to retire to their Chambers. There was almost total paralysis of judicial work. The very survival of the judicial system was at stake. The acts of group of lawyers were frontal blow to the institution of judiciary. I had the advantage of reading the proposed opinions of the learned Chief Justice and brother Wad J. With utmost respect I find it difficult to concur with the opinion of learned Chief Justice. ( 82 ) IN response to snow cause notice issued to the contemners, in terms of orders dated 27th September, 1991, firstly, the contemners fully and whole heartedly contested the matter. The orders made and statements recorded on 1st , 3rd and 4th October 1991 are eloquent testimony of the manner in which the regret and so called apology came to be tendered and no further elaboration is necessary. The lengthy application filed in court on 1st October 1991 also speaks for itself. In statements recorded on 1st October 1991, there is no remorse, no regret. The position was same on 3rd October 1991. On 4th October 1991, two of the contemners first filled applications seeking adjournment on the ground of the Senior counsel engaged by them being not available. Upto this stage there is no regret or apology. The regret comes for the first time in statements recorded in pre lunch proceedings on 4th October 1991. When, at last, the apology comes, the statement made is not that contemners tender apology but is that the word 'regret' used in the statement amounts to apology. The manner and the circumstances in which the apology was tendered has been set out in detail in the opinion of brother Wad J. with whom I am in complete agreement but have added a few words in this order bearing in mind, in particular, the aspect of acceptance of apology and adopting a soft line approach. ( 83 ) THE apology was offered by contemners on their finding that the court is taking a serious view of the matter and had indicated the trend of mind. Such an apology can hardly be called an act of contrition. The apology has to be clear, real and sincere. It cannot be accepted as a matter of right. The apology cannot be said to be bonafide simply because it is so stated by counsel for the contemners. The court has to be satisfied on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the apology is bonafide or not and also whether gravity of the contempt calls for its acceptance or not. In the present case apology is far from bonafide. The gravity of the contempt also does not call for acceptance of apology. ( 84 ) THIS court is fully conscious that power of contempt is required to be exercised sparingly, cautiously and carefully and the Judges are not to be hyper sensitive or vindictive. It is our duty, however, to keep the seat of justice sacrosanct and foundation of justice pure. It is not a question of maintenance and protection of dignity of one Judge or all Judges collectively but the question is to ensure the confidence of the public in the administration of justice, the confidence which cannot be allowed to be undermined or impaired if the institution of judiciary is to exist in our democratic system. The contemners are neither laymen nor were their acts spontaneous. The offending acts were deliberate, calculated and pre-conceived. In the memorandum a threat had already been given to gherao this Court. The events of 26th September 1991 show that the court was wrong in assuming that the threat will not be implemented. ( 85 ) HAVING regard to the totality of the circumstances, this court cannot adopt an attitude of unwarranted leniency at the cost of principle. It is always easy to show magnanimity and to pursue populist line of showing uncalled for indulgence rather than to adhere to the nail studded path of duty. Bearing in mind the outrageous conduct of the contemners, the gross contempt which they committed and the fact that the acts were preconceived, the populist line of showing over indulgence and magnanimity would not subserve the ends of justice but would amount to giving a licence to contemners to repeat such incidents. Accordingly, this Court has to perform the painful duty of directing imposition of imprisonment and fine on the contemners. It is necessary to adopt this course with a view to uphold the honour and dignity of institution. I am in complete agreement with Wad J. ( 86 ) I have had the advantage of going through the various judgments proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice and some of my learned brethren and find myself in respectful agreement with their finding that the contemners are guilty of having committed grave contempt of this court. I cannot but help observing that the contemners and their. misguided associates, who created disturbance in the High Court, disrupted its functioning by thronging the courts, raising highly objectionable slogans and monstrous acts of indiscipline, have done greatest disservice to the cause and administration of justice. By their outrageous conduct, they have inflicted grave injury on the dignity and majesty of the court. It should be clearly understood and none should be under any delusion that if such like attempts to undermine the dignity of the court are made, the dignity of the lawyers, who are the officers of the court and are its inextricable and indissoluble part and parcel, is also bound to erode. We wish to impress upon the contemners that by indulging in the highly objectionable acts they tried to chop off the tree of justice on which they are perched. Their profession exists because of the existence of the courts, whose majesty and glory is sought to be preserved and protected by the Constitution and the laws. Lawyers are the pillars of this great institution which should be strengthened by them and not weakened in any manner whatsoever. Members of the legal profession are expected to have a disciplined life. It takes fairly strenuous course of training to attain a mental state, which is conducive for discharging onerous functions. This stage is reached when the mind, language and action have attained a certain degree of maturity, refinement and sophistication. Resort to law of jungle instead of orderly behaviour according to the established laws of the society and rational reasoning is anathema to high ideals of the profession. Problems are never solved nor are grievances redressed by resort to unruly behaviour or conflict and confrontation. Who should know this truth better than a lawyer. His profession will perish if people start settling scores by force and extra legal methods. There is no doubt in our minds that the contemners have exhibited a propensity which is dangerous to the very existence of the rule of law. It has a tendency to undermine and lower the dignity of the court and subvert the administration of justice. The conduct of the contemners undoubtedly obstructed and interfered with the administration of justice. Public is vitally interested in the effective and orderly administration of justice. If one shakes the very foundation of justice it is bound to threaten the existence of an orderly society and enforcement of its rights. Let the contemners and their co-professionals ally themselves for enhancing the image and the respect of the courts. It cannot be gainsaid that there is colossal problem of arrears. Can the backlog of cases be cleared by preventing the courts from discharging their function? Does it not amount to refuelling what all of us seek to eradicate? These are the few points on which the legal community should ponder. ( 87 ) HAVING regard to the nature and gravity of the contempt committed by the contemners, I am inclined to agree with the sentence proposed by learned brother S. B. Wad, J. but the question is should the contemners be asked to serve the term of imprisonment? In this regard it is to be noted that the contemners on October 4, 1991 expressed regret for their conduct. Each one of them stated that his expression of regret tantamounts to an apology. Mr. Tandon, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contemners, under instructions of his clients, categorically and unequivocally admitted that the statements of the contemners amount to an unconditional and unqualified "apology. " He further submitted that the " apology" was voluntary and came from the hearts of the contemners. He stated that the apology was bona fide. He prayed that the apology should be accepted. After making the aforesaid statement neither the learned counsel nor any of the contemners tried to argue the matter to justify their conduct. This conduct of the contemners has the effect of mitigating the gravity of the offence. It seems to me that they have thrown themselves at the mercy of the court. ( 88 ) THE apology has come early enough in the proceedings. On September 27, 1991 notices were issued to the contemners returnable for October 1, 1991 to show cause why they should not be convicted for having committed contempt of the court and punished according to law for their acts as detailed in the show cause notice. On October 1, 1991 contemners appeared and sought time to file their detailed replies to the show cause notice. Time was granted to them and they were directed to file their replies on October 3, 1991. On October 3, 1991 the replies styled as "interim replies to the show cause" were filed by the contemners. However, they requested for further adjournment, which was declined and arguments were addressed by one of the learned counsel for the contemners. On the following day i. e. October 4, 1991 when the court resumed the hearing of the case each one of the contemners expressed regret and condemned the incident of September 26, 1991. They also stated that there will not be no recurrence of the incident in future. At the request of the learned counsel for the contemners the hearing of the case was adjourned to 2 P. M. of the same day. At 2 P. M. the contemners on being questioned by one of us stated that the word 'regret' used in their statement amounted to an apology. I think the apology of the contemners was genuine and stemmed from the feeling of remorse. Therefore our approach should be one which is tempered with mercy. Mercy holds the universe together. It is the might of the mighty. It is the key to the mutual understanding and co-existence of the people in spite of their having diverse socio-economic backgrounds, cultures and faiths. ( 89 ) COURT of Appeal of England in Morris and others vs. Crown Office (1970) 2 Q. B. 114 in somewhat similar circumstances while upholding the sentence imposed by the High Court of Justice on a group of welsh students, who disrupted the proceedings of the sentencing court by shouting slogans, scattering pamphlets and singing songs, suspended the same and observed as under :"i hold, therefore, that a judge of the High Court still has power at common law to commit instantly to prison for criminal contempt, and this power is not affected in the least by the provisions of the Act of 1967. The powers at common law remain intact. It is a power to fine or imprison, to give an immediate sentence or to postpone it, to commit to prison pending his consideration of the sentence, to bind over to be of good behaviour and keep the peace, and to bind over to come up for judgment if called upon. These powers enable the judge to give what is, in effect, a suspended sentence. I have often heard a judge say at common law, for ordinary offences, before these modem statutes were passed : I will bind you over to come up for judgment if called upon to do so. Mark you, if you do get into trouble again, you will then be sentenced for this offence. I will make a note that it deserves six months imprisonment. So that is what you may get if you do not accept this chance. That is the common law way of giving a suspended sentence. It can be done also for contempt of court. " ( 90 ) IN the same judgment at another place place it was held as under:"there must be security for the future. They must be of good behaviour. They must keep the peace. I would add, finally, that there is power in this court, in case of need, to recall them. If it should become necessary, this court would not hesitate to call them back and commit them to prison for the rest of the sentence which Lawton J. Passed on them. Subject to what may brethren will say in a few moments, I would propose that they be released from prison today, but that they be bound over to be of good behaviour, to keep the peace and to come up for judgment if called upon within the next 12 months. " ( 91 ) HAVING regard to the course of action followed in the aforesaid decision and in view of the fact that the contemners have realised their mistake and are penitent, I am of the view that their sentences should remain suspended subject to the condition that they will be of good behaviour, always uphold the dignity of the courts and will not cause obstruction in or interfere with the administration of justice. ( 92 ) THE contemners are also warned that if they indulge in or repeat the acts of misconduct in future in that event it would not be possible for us to take this course of action again and they will be severely dealt with under law. If there is any violation of the above condition within one year from today the contemners can be called up before the court and directed to serve the sentence proposed by S. B. Wad. J. ( 93 ) I have known the respondents from the day they donned their gowns and entered the arena of legal profession. They have grown and flourished under my eyes. During my long inning as subordinate judicial officer, I was a witness to their professional travails and moments of glory. I thought I understood their heart beats. I was wrong. Gold rusted on September the 26th. it has left me a sad man. ( 94 ) WHAT transpired on September 26, need not be recapitulated. Brother Wad's canvas has captured the details. It is, however, the so-called apology and the sentence to be imposed which make me add this short contribution. Was it really an apology? This, I feel, is the mother of all questions and before it is answered, let us have a quick look at the scenario. It is essential for, the court record does not capture it in all its hues. ( 95 ) ON the very first day when the respondents put in appearance in response to the show cause notice, total defiance was in the air. One could not discern even a tiny speck of remorseness. It was made clear to us that the notice was intended to be contested. Every effort was made to get the matter postponed, not to think and ponder, not to reflect and recant, but to arm them further to meet the charge. And this attitude continued till the last day of the proceedings. The legality of the notice was challenged. The allegations were refuted. The liability was denied. We were warned that the matter involved not seven but seven thousand and not less openly that it would lead to a confrontation between the Bench and the Bar. So surcharged was the atmosphere that even one and the only respondent who had filed his affidavit (Mr. Rajinder Sharma) wasted no time in getting up and telling us that he was withdrawing the same. Only the timely stem advise of his counsel made him resume his chair. ( 96 ) IT was, however, October 4 which was a day of farce. There were again requests for adjournment. First on the ground that Mr. Jethmalani, Senior Advocate was not available. Secondly, that one of the respondents had no time to engage a senior counsel and thirdly that a meeting of the General Body of the Delhi Bar Association was to be held. Realising that the court was in no mood to adjourn the hearing, came Mr. B. D. Kaushik with the statement owning "moral responsibility" as the President of the Delhi Bar Association for all that had happened on the 26th. "i condemn the same. It is regretted". He said. The others orchestrated to own it. However, the Bench was prompt enough to spell out is dissatisfaction. Did the word "regret" imply "apology"? Were the contemners merely owning "moral responsibility" over the incident or apologising for their fault in response to the notice? These and such-like questions were shot at the contemners in quick succession. Nothing, however, seemed to move them. They avoided the volleys and parried the question. They refused to budge. "regret" became their only mantra, "a regret is a regret" pontified Mr. Kaushik: "this is the word I had used and the court is free to draw its own inference. I am not going to make any subtraction or addition from my statement. " he said further. Clearly thus the contemners were owning only "moral responsibility". They were not admitting their own role in the entire sordid drama. And, surely, they were making it clear that they were making a distinction between 'regret' and 'apology' and that they were knowingly, deliberately and purposely using the word 'regret' by which they did not mean an "apology". With all respect, what was. and had been made so clear was probably still not obvious to some of us. Probably ;that is why demanded one of us: "you must give us a specific reply. Does your statement convey unqualified apology?", and added another, "say yes or no". And once again followed a barrage of questions on the same pattern asking for an answer to a question which was never there and seeking clarification on what was never unclear. I suspect some must have found it exasperating, others Pickwickian. And, find that some of us were not letting the word "regret" rest in peace, and were still, with respect, at a loss to understand the contextual significance' of the statement made, Mr. Rajiv Khosla rose from his seat to make us wiser. " The meaning of our statement", told he, "depends upon how your Lordships interpret it". And, true to the pattern, his statement again invited a volley of questions. Obviously, their aim was again the same. Finally, after a loss of about 45 minutes which, I suspect, must have left some of us breathless, came the further statement from Mr. Khosla that by the word "regret" he meant "apology". Five more contemners followed suit. The odd contemner out, Mr. Rathee, refused to adulterate the word "regret" or dilute, in any manner, his earlier statement of regret, and all this despite the fact that some of the lawyers had rushed to him and had under the glare of everyone present, coaxed and cajoled him to fall in line with the others. It was only when one of them almost physically lifted him from his seat and directed him to say "yes", that the pearls "yes, My Lords" fell from his teeth. It was then left to the ingenuity of Mr. R. L. Tandon, to polish the pebble and present it as a diamond. ( 97 ) WAS it then, an apology? ( 98 ) APOLOGY is a speech of the heart. Remorse is its seed. It is nourished by atonement and sustained by some spiritual essence. It is a state of grace. Was it then, an apology? The sequence of events and the proceedings lay bare the truth. And-the truth is that it was not an apology but a farce. Its emmed not from the heart but from the teeth. It was all along a war game of attrition and nerves. First defiance, then veiled threats and later owning of "moral responsibility" and expression of regret over the incident. They were all tactical moves. Cool, calculated and deliberate. There was neither any repentence nor any remorse. 'regret' and "apology" were used merely as tools to blur the vision. In the process they impaired further this fragile and precious institution. ( 99 ) I agree with their conviction. ( 100 ) COMING to the point of sentence, I have had the benefit of going through the judgment prepared by My Lord, the Chief Justice. I feel bound by my conscious to take a divergent view. . ( 101 ) WITH respect, the sentencing policy is neither based on, nor inspired by, nor comparable to the strings of a musical instrument. A much deeper thought has gone into its formulation (See: The Philosophy of Punishment, edited by H. B. Acton, Hegal's Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox; Punishment and Responsibility by Prof. Hart; The Modern Approach to Criminal Law by Radzinowicz and Turner; History of Criminal Low by Sir James Stephen; The Modern Approach to Criminal Law by Sydney Smith]. ( 102 ) I also find My Lord quoting certain observations on judicial temper made in a judgment of the Supreme Court in 5. Mulgaokar's case (1978) 3 SCC 339. Words, howsoever attractive or ornamental, taken from a factually different case and shorn of their contextual relevance, almost invariably tend to mislead. And, with utmost respect, this is what seems to have really happened. The observations in question were made in respect of those cases of contempt which do not "erupt in indignant committal or demand punishment". Unfortunately, if I may say so, the observations made buy the celebrated judge in the same very judgment on cases like the present one, seem to have escaped notice. It was observed:" The Court will act with seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardized by a gross and/or unfounded attack on the judges, where the attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process". (emphasis supplied) ( 103 ) THE recipe of the sentence proposed by My Lord, the Chief Justice seems to have come from Morris and Crown Office (1970) 2 QB 114 in which the persons involved were young students less than 21 years of age who had been sentenced to six months imprisonment and had actually undergone, in consequence thereof, six days imprisonment. In appeal due to change in circumstances they were directed to furnish bonds for good behaviour and keeping of the peace. Significantly the sentence of six months awarded by the trial judge was held to be not excessive as it was "necessary for the judge to show_and to show to all students everywhere - that this kind of thing cannot be tolerated. "to what extent the ingredients provided by the judgment have been used and what is the outcome, I would rather not comment upon. ; I leave it to the Connisseur. However, I do feel bound by my sense of duty to say a few words on the following operative portion of the proposed order:"in case any of them repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of court or undermining the judicary, he will be called upon to appear in court to receive the sentence. " (emphasis supplied) ( 104 ) THE use of conjunction "or" clearly implies that what we know as "contempt of court" is different from "undermining the judiciary". As acts "undermining the judiciary" would also, as per the order, invite the passing of sentence, and as, if I am not wrong, the expression is a new addition to Criminology and Penology, there was need to spell out as to what the expression means or implies and which act or acts would constitute it. Have we not dug a grave? Honestly, I do find myself besieged by this and many more such questions. Not surprisingly, therefore, I find myself far removed from the august company of My Lord, the Chief Justice. ( 105 ) THE Bench and the Bar provide a brilliant symbiosis which has served the community well. It is the layer who restrains excess of power, defends liberty and individual values and upholds the rule of law. It is for him to temper the tendency to neglect time honoured values and to help nourish judicial system. It is a great misfortune that the respondents and their supporters forgot their role, discarded the gown and acted in a manner which tended to cause incalculable harm to the judicial system harm itself. It must not be forgotten that weakening of the judicial system will directly lead to the sceptre of a tyrant. I am determined that the respondents and anyone anywhere who may be tempted to follow their example must clearly understand that conduct such as this will never be tolerated but will inevitably meet with stem punishment. They must get their desert. ( 106 ) I agree with the conclusion arrived at and the sentence imposed by Wad, J. ( 107 ) ON 26th September 1991 an unfortunate incident took place in the precincts of the High Court between 10. 30 AM to 12. 30 PM when the contemners aided and abetted by other advocates, in large number stormed the various court rooms when the Judges of this court were discharging their judicial functions. They individually and collectively stood in the court rooms, some of them on chairs and tables and raised slogans and disrupted judicial work of the court. They committed various- acts Which amount to gross interference in the course of the judicial proceedings and obstruction of the administration of justice. The court on its motion on 27th September 1991 issued notice to the seven contemners as mentioned in the show cause notice as to why they should not be convicted for having committed contempt, of this court and punished according to law. They were also required to appear in court in person on 1st October, 1991. The proceedings before the Full Court took place on this day when the contemners filed applications praying for time to enable them to file appropriate and detailed replies to the notice dated 27th September, 1991. They also made the respective statements. It will be relevant to quote the statement of Shri B. D. Kaushik which reads as follows :- Q. You have been issued a show cause notice. What have you to Say ? A. I stand by the memorandum dated 21st September, 1991 which was presented to the Chief Justice on 24th September, 1991 and read in Court on 26th September, 1991. Whatever is written in the memorandum is the correct statement. ( 108 ) SIMILAR statement was made by Shri Rajiv Khosla whereas, the other contemners asked for time to engage lawyers to prepare their defence. They were granted time until 12 O'clock on 3rd October, 1991 to file their affidavits and the hearing was to commence at 2 P. M. on the same day. ( 109 ) THE matter was argued on 3rd October, 1991 when the same was adjourned to 4th October, 1991 for further hearing. Meanwhile, I may refer to the affidavit filed by contemner Shri Rajinder Kumar Sharma on 3rd October, 1991. The relevant paragraphs may be read as follows :- That the deponent is the Vice-president (Civil) of Delhi Bar Association. And the deponent has been practising as an Advocates for the last 16 years, honestly and diligently. The deponent has held the judiciary in the highest esteem. That the deponent has a best record of a good behaviours and treatments. There is no complaint of any Hon'ble Judge against me throughout my career. The same can be verified from the present Hon'ble Full Court, as well as the Bar. That the deponent did not utter any word against any Hon'ble Court. The deponent did not raise any slogan or even made any utterance whatsoever, when the Chief Justice was in his court room and was meeting to a group of lawyers. The deponent did not visit any court room, other than of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, on that day. That the deponent has a great respect for honourable Judges and the deponent has not committed any contempt. The deponent had pacified the lawyers from doing any wrong. The deponent had no intention to do any wrong, but was with a good intention. If any one has done any wrong, the same may be condemned. ( 110 ) THE remaining allegations in the show cause notice were also denied by Shri Sharma. ( 111 ) WHEN the contempt petition was taken up for further hearing on 4th October, 1991 the contemners made the statement to the effect that they own moral responsibility of the events which took place in various courts on 26th September 1991 and condemn the same. The relevant portion of the statement of Shri B. D. Kaushik reads as follows :- I as President of the Delhi Bar Association own moral responsibility of the events which took place in various courts on 26th September 1991. I condemn the same. It is regretted. I further state that we will try our level best not to repeat such an incident in future and there will be no recurrence. Similar statements were made by other contemners. The hearing of the case in view of the regret tendered by the contemners was adjourned to 2 P. M. on 4th October, 1991. The matter was called and it was clarified that the work 'regret' used in statement amounted to apology and the same was in the individual capacity of the contemners. The learned counsel Shri R. L. Tandon also stated at the Bar on behalf of the seven contemners that their statements made in court amount to unconditional and unqualified apology on their behalf. "it is voluntary-it has come from the hearts of the contemners and they fully realise what they have said and it is bona fide. It is humbly prayed that the apology may kindly be accepted. " Shri Tandon chose to make no further submissions and the judgment of the court was reserved. ( 112 ) THE only question which survives for consideration of the court is whether the apology tendered by the contemners can be accepted and on that basis, they are entitled to discharge. There is no doubt that the events which happened in the 'court premises as well as in the court rooms on 26th September 1991 amounted to gross contempt of court and the contemners aided and abetted by other Advocates interfered and obstructed in the administration of justice. The law is also settled that willingness of the contemners to apologies would offer no promise or inducement that if they apologise, the court will take a lenient view of the matter. It will, however, be necessary to refer to some decided cases on the subject to arrive at fair and just conclusion taking into view the circumstances of the present case. ( 113 ) IN Rizwan-Ul-Hasan and another v. State of Utter Pradesh reported as A. I. R. 1953 Supreme Court 185, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the broad proposition of law that the jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a susbstantial interference with the due course of justice. The court will not exercise its jurisdiction on a mere question of propriety. ( 114 ) IN M. Y. Shareef and another v. Hon'ble Judges of the Nagpur High Court and others reported as A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 19, the supreme Court dealt with the case of apology. The case becomes relevant as it related to members of the legal profession. The Supreme Court held that there cannot be both justification and apology. The two things are incompatible. Again an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea, but it is intended to operate as a universal panacea, but is is intended to be evidence of real contriteness. The High Court sentenced the appellant M. Y. Shareef to pay a fine of Rs. 500. 00 or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks and sentenced the other appellant Dr. D. W. Kathalay to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. 00 or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The contemners filed an appeal in the Supreme Court and the appellants tendered an unqualified apology to the court and to the High Court and they were prepared to purge the contempt for which they had been convicted. The court further went on to hold that the apology is a since expression of the regret of what happened in court at the time the transfer application was made and for the allegations made therein and the matter was adjourned for two months with a direction that the apology tendered in the Supreme Court be tendered to the Division Bench before which the contempt is said to have been committed. The learned Judges of the High Court did not accept the apology and held that "a sincere apology does not entitle a contemner as of right to a remission of the sentence. " The Hon'ble Supreme Court was once again seized of the matter and the appeal of the contemners was allowed and unqualified apology given by them to the "supreme. Court was accepted. It may be relevant to refer to the following passage which deals with the contempt by senior members of the Bar:- It has also to be kept in view that condemnation for contempt by a High Court of Senior members of the Bar is itself a heavy punishment to them, as it affects them in their professional career and is a great blot on them. There has been nothing said in the lengthy judgment of the High' Court that these counsel in their long career at the Bar have ever been disrespectful or discourteous to the Court in the Past. This one act of indiscretion on their part in signing the application should not have been viewed in the very stringent manner in which the High Court viewed it in the first instance and viewed it again after we had sent the case back to it. " ( 115 ) IN R. K. Garg, Advocate v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (1981) 3 Supreme Court Cases 166 the Supreme Court dealt with the contemner who hurled his shoe at the Trial Judge in other to effectively overawe him and to bully him into accepting his submission. The High Court awarded him the maximum sentence of 6 months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200. 00. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considering the apology of the contemner reduced the sentence to a period of one month but the fine was enhanced from Rs. 200. 00 to Rs. 1000. 00. During the course of arguments, it was sought to be emphasised about the so called conflict between the Bench and the Bar. indeed, such a feeling is imaginary as there is no conflict between two wings of the same system. Chandrachud C. J. very lucidly referred to the relationship between the Bench and the Bar in the following passage :- Those who are informed of the question and think deeply upon it entertain no doubt that the Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the same mechanism which administers justice to the people. Many members of the Bench are drawn from the Bar and their past association is a source of inspiration and pride to them. It ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestionably true that courtesy breeds courtesy and just as charity has to begin at home, courtesy must begin with the judge. A discourteous judge is like an ill-tuned instrument in the setting of a court room. But members of the Bar will do well to remember that such flagrant violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without which no democracy can survive. " ( 116 ) IN M. B. Sanghi, Advocate v. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana and. Ors. reported as JT 1991 (3) S. C. 318 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the law earlier laid down that an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor it is intended to operate as a universal panacea but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness. The court sought reliance on the judgment in M. Y. Shareef and another (supra ). This case also involved the conduct of an advocate and the conviction and sentence to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. 00 was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court further noticed that when a member of the Bar is required to be punished for use of contemptuous language it is highly painful-it pleases none-but painful duties have to be performed to uphold the honour and dignity of the individual judge and his office and the prestige of the institution. Courts are generally slow in using their contempt jurisdiction against erring members of the profession in the hope that the concerned Bar Council will chasten its members for failure to maintain proper ethical norms. "it timely action is taken by Bar Councils, the decline in the ethical values can be easily arrested. " ( 117 ) THIS Court possesses extra-ordinary powers under article 215 of the Constitution of India to punish for contempt of itself. The reason for the extra-ordinary power to punish criminal contempt in summary proceedings is that the necessity of the administration of justice requires such summary dealing with obstruction to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage. ' There is no doubt that what happened on 26th September, 1991 in this Court was extra-ordinary which justified the issuance of contempt notice to the contemners. It was an attack on the Institution which justified the issuance of contempt notice to the contemners. It was an attach on the Institution which would lower the image of the judicial system and thus cause obstruction in the administration of justice which is a very valued basis for the democracy to survive. I "the court can always ignore "personal attacks or innuendoes by a lawyer against a Judge, with a view to provoking him, aggravate what may be an obstruction to the trial and the Judge in sitting in judgment on such a misbehaving laywer, should not himself give vent to personal spleen or respond to a personal grievance. In such a case the Judge may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow Judges take his place in deciding the contempt matter. ' (DORSEY K. OFFUTT,an Attorney, Pettioner v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States Supreme Court Reports, 99, Law Ed. OCT. 1954 TERM 348 US II) ( 118 ) 1n the recent case on contempt, Delhi Judicial Service Association v. The State of Gujarat and Ors. etc. where the Supreme Court had to deal with an incident in which the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Nadiad was assaulted, hand cuffed and tied with a thick rope like an animal and made a public exhibition of it by sending him in the same condition to the hospital for medical examination on an alleged charge of having consumed liquor in breach of the prohibition law. He was photographed in hand cuffs with rope tied around his body along with the constables which were published in the newspapers all over the country. The Supreme Court was seized of the, matter as the incident undermined the dignity of the courts in the country, Judicial Officers, Judges and Magistrates all over the country were in a state of shock. They felt insecure and humiliated and it appeared that instead of Rule of Law there was Police Raj in Gujarat. There was continued hostility between the police of Nadiad and the Chief Judicial Magistrate which culminated in the said unfortunate incident. The Supreme Court also appointed a commission to look into the matter and the learned Commissioner had adversely commented upon the conduct of the various officers. The factual aspects of the case are as recorded in the judgment of the Court and the same indicate the gravity of the situation and manner in which the Judicial Officer was treated. ( 119 ) THE Court proceeded to deal with the punishment to be awarded to the contemners found guilty of contempt. In determining the punishment, the degree and extent of the part played by each of the contemners have to be kept in mind and in view of this each contemner was dealt with on the basis of the part played by him and some contemners were also discharged for there was no adequate material on record to told them guilty of contempt. ( 120 ) ADVERTING back to the facts of the present case, there is no doubt that the contemners, aided and abetted by other Advocates committed gross contempt in the face of the court. Their conduct amounted to an insult to the Court when it was actually sitting. It is well settled that every citizen has the right to demonstrate but he has no right to indulge in deliberate interference in the course of justice. Let me quote from the observations of Lord Denning in Morris v. Crown Office, (1970) 2 Q. B. 114: (Let students demonstrate, if they please, for the causes in which they believe. Let them make their protests as they will. But they must do it by lawful means and not by unlawful. If they strike at the Courts of justice in this land- and I speak both of England and Wales - they strike at the roots of society itself, and they bring down that which protects them. It is only by the maintenance of law and order that they arc privileged to be students and to study and live in peace. So let them support the law and not strike it down. ' These observations are very apt in the present case. The lawyers are privileged to belong to that class and it is their duty to abide by the highest traditions which have been universally accepted to uphold the dignity of law and maintain public order. They cannot strike at the roots of the system which they are under legal and moral obligation to protect. . ( 121 ) THE contemners have owned moral and personal responsibility of the events which took place in various Courts on 26th September, 1991 and condemned the same. They have tendered unconditional and unqualified apology and their counsel Shri R. L. Tandon did not choose to make any further arguments and submitted that the apology was voluntary and bona fide. Having regard to the entire circumstances of the matter, in particular the unqualified and unconditional apology tendered by the contemners I tend to take a lenient view of the whole episode. I had the benefit of seeing the judgment of brother Anil Dev Singh, J. I agree with the conclusions, both with regard to holding them guilty and deferment and suspension of the sentence and have nothing further to add. ( 122 ) THE work in Tis Hazari Courts as well as in other Courts including the High Court is often paralysed by strikes, thus causing immense hardship to the litigant public as well as obstructing the course of justice. This mode of protest must be avoided to raise the image of the judicial system which is sinking fast in public eye. The absence from Court and proceedings is a clear dereliction of duty towards the client and gross hindrance in smooth administration of justice. The concerned Bar Associations, and particularly Delhi Bar Association which ,as I understand, is the largest Association in Asia have to put their heads together and devise and formulate their responsibilities in this regard. The members of the Bar should refrain from going on strike to avoid inconvenience to general public and thus facilitate administration of justice. ORDER OF THE COURT In view of the majority decision, we make the following order : We do not propose to award the sentence at present and defer it as we would like to further watch their conduct and behaviour for a period of one year from today. In case any of them repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of court or underminig the judiciary, he will be called upon to appear in Court to receive the sentence. But if they maintain orderly, good and disciplined behaviour and do not indulge themselves in the repetition of such acts within the stipulated period, then the rule shall stand discharged on the expiry of the period.