( 1 ) THESE appeals arise out of the judgment and decree dated 23 3-1976 passed by the Civil Judge, Coorg, Mercara, in 0 S. No 11 of 1974. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT-1 plaintiff filed the suit for a declaration that he is the owner of the suit schedule property and for possession of the same. He also prayed for grant of future mesne profits. ( 3 ) THE trial court has decreed the suit declaring the plaintiff to be the owner of the suit property and entitled to get possession and granting mesne profits from the date of suit viz. , 15-4-1 and74 till the date of delivery of possession treating the suit land as a vacant land (emphasis is ours) to be enquired separately under Order 20 Rule 12 C. P. C. ( 4 ) THE State, which was added as defendant-3 at the instance of defen- dants-1 and 2, has filed R. F. A. No. 96 of 1976 being aggrieved by that part of the decree relating to mesne profits. Defendant 2 Appayya who is the son of defen- dant-1 Muddayya has filed R. F. A. No. 119 of 1976 and defendant-1 has filed r. F. A. No. 130 of 1976. ( 5 ) THE undisputed facts are that Sy. No 6/46 measuring 15 acres of Yedavare village, Somwarpet Taluk, belonged to the State. It granted the land to the plaintiff and issued patta in his favour on 2-11-1960 as per Ex. P-1. The plaintiff fell into arrears of land revenue. The land was auctioned, by public auction, on 26-2-1964. Defendant-1 was the successful bidder. The auction proceedings were challenged by the plaintiff in an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner. The deputy Commissioner, by his order dated 3-4-1965, set aside the sale and directed re-sale of the property. Defendant-1 filed a revision petition in Rvn. Ptn. 220/66 before the Mysore Revenue Appellate tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal, by its order dated 25-1-1968 (Ex. D-7), set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner and directed a Sale Certificate to be issued. A sale certificate was, accordingly, issued on 20-8-1968 as per Ex. D 8 The plaintiff filed a review petition on 15-7-1968 before the Mysore Revenue appellate Tribunal and the same was allowed on 22-8-1972 (Ex. P-15 ). The revision petition filed by defendant-1 was heard and disposed of by the order dated 23-8-1973 (Ex. P-2 ). A sale certificate was, accordingly, issued on 20-8-1968 as per Ex. D 8 The plaintiff filed a review petition on 15-7-1968 before the Mysore Revenue appellate Tribunal and the same was allowed on 22-8-1972 (Ex. P-15 ). The revision petition filed by defendant-1 was heard and disposed of by the order dated 23-8-1973 (Ex. P-2 ). It set aside the sale confirmed by its earlier order at Ex. D-7 and directed re-sale of the property. ( 6 ) ON 15-4-1974, the plaintiff filed the suit for the aforestated reliefs. ( 7 ) DEFENDANTS-1 and 2 have filed a common written statement. The substantial contentions of the defendants are that defendant-1 came to be in actual possession of the suit schedule property in december 1960 and has been since then in possession and, therefore, had perfected his title by adverse possession. Improvements on the land have been made at great cost by levelling the land, by planting coffee plants and orange trees and also by sinking three tanks and one well. They have also constructed labour lines. Pepper plantation also has been raised. A considerable area of the land has been converted into paddy land and pump-set has been fixed to the water well. ( 8 ) THE trial court raised the following issues : (1) Whether plaintiff proves his title to the suit property ? (2) Whether plaintiff proves that the defendant-1 entered into possession of suit property during the pendency r. P. No. 220/66 (C. L R) in Mysore revenue Appellate Tribunal ? (3) Whether defendants prove that they have perfected their title to suit property by adverse possession ? (4) Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try the suit ? (5a) Whether the Government is a necessary party to the suit ? (5b) If so, whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? (6a) Whether defendants have made improvements on the suit property ? (6b) If so, what is the worth in money value of the improvement ? (6c) Whether defendants are entitled for reimbursement from the plaintiff before they can be dispossessed from the suit property ? (7a) Whether the court fee paid on the plaint is sufficient ? (7b) If not. What is the deficit fee to be paid on the plaint ? (8) Whether plaintiff is entitled to (a) declaration sought ? (6c) Whether defendants are entitled for reimbursement from the plaintiff before they can be dispossessed from the suit property ? (7a) Whether the court fee paid on the plaint is sufficient ? (7b) If not. What is the deficit fee to be paid on the plaint ? (8) Whether plaintiff is entitled to (a) declaration sought ? (b) Possession of suit property and © Mesne profits ? ( 9 ) IT has answered issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. According to it, possession of the defendants is traced to 1968 and not earlier. In view of this finding, it has concluded against defen- dants-1 and 2 on issue No. 3. Issue No. 4 has not survived for consideration. It has held on issue No. 5 that the contention of defendants-1 and 2 that government was a necessary party was no longer available as the State had been made party defendant-3, but any how State was not a necessary party to the suit. So far as the improvements are concerned, it has concluded that improvements had been made, but there was no sufficient material to assess the actual value of the improvements made. It has lastly held that defendants-1 and 2 are not entitled to the value of the improvements in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in maddanappa v. Chandramma, AIR 1965 sc 1812 and A. L Gupta v, M. M. Sur, air 1975 SC 207 . ( 10 ) SRI V. G Sabhahit, learned Government Pleader, argued on behalf of the state in R F A. No 96 of 1976 that the trial court has missed the point in saddling the State with the liability to pay mesne profits. His contention is that such a relief was not originally claimed by the plaintiff against the State, but the state was made a party defendant-3 in view of the contention of defendants-1 and 2 that State was a necessary party and that in any view of the matter the state cannot be regarded to be in wrongful possession of the suit schedule property so as to attract the ingredients of section 2 (12) of the C. P. C. ( 11 ) WE may straight away state that every point raised by Sri Sabhahit is of substance. Section 2 (12) of the C. P. C. reads as follows: "mesne profits" of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession. It is neither the case of the plaintiff nor the case of defendants-1 and 2 that the State Government (defendant-3) was in possession of the suit property right from 2-11-1960, the date on which patta as per Ex P-1 was granted to the plaintiff. On the showing of defendants-1 and 2 themselves, defendant-2 was in possession from December 1960 and has continued to be in possession even till now. Therefore, recovery of mesne profits cannot be directed against the State. Plaintiff never claimed mesne profits against the State by making the State a party defendant. It was because of the contention of defendants-1 and 2 that the state was made party defendant-3. Even thereafter the plaintiff has not amended the prayer column of his plaint for grant of such relief against the State. Hence, to that extent, the decree passed by the trial court as against the State has to be set aside. ( 12 ) IT is undisputed that defendant- 1 has been in possession of the suit schedule property at least from 20-8- 1968, the date of the Sale Certificate in his favour as per Ex. D-8. It is also undisputed that prior to December 1960, the property was the property of the State and it granted patta in favour of the plaintiff on 2-11-1960 (Ex P-1 ). It is in the light of these dates that the contention of the defendants that defendant-2 had perfected his title by adverse possession has to be gone into. In our considered opinion, it is just and proper to go into this question at this stage itself. ( 13 ) THE trial court has laboured to a great extent by referring to the evidence relied upon by the parties in order to conclude that possession of the defendants could be traced only to the year 1968. We are clearly of the view that such labour is not at all called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. Defendant-2 has given evidence as DW-2 that he was in possession since December 1960. We are clearly of the view that such labour is not at all called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. Defendant-2 has given evidence as DW-2 that he was in possession since December 1960. That is also the say of defendant-1, the father of defendant-2 who has examined himself as DW-1. Even if it is, for the sake of arguments, assumed that the possession of defendant-2 did commence from December 1960, that possession did not remain uninterrupted after 20-8-1968 the date on which the Sale Certificate was granted in favour of defendant-1 (Ex. D 8 ). Therefore, the continuity of the possession claimed by defendant-2 has been interrupted and it is well settled that one of the main ingredients of adverse possessionis continuous possession. Sri C. K. Kambeyanda, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting defendants, strenuously contended that it was not the claim of defendant-1 that he was in possession since December 1960; but the case was that defendant-2 was in possession since 1960 and that possession of defendant-2 has continued. We cannot accede to this argument in view of the fact that defendant-1 is a father and defendant-2 is the son. Both of them have sworn that defendant-1 contributed about Rs. 8,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- for the development of the property right from December 1960. It is not the case of defendant-2 that, on successfully securing Sale Certificate Ex. D-8, he did not permit defendant-1 to enter into possession. These facts and circumstances are more ihan sufficient to make us repel this argument of Sri Kambeyanda. When that is so, it becomes immaterial whether defendant-2 had or had not entered into the suit schedule property in December 1960. Defendants have to fail on this issue. ( 14 ) THE next question would be whether the plaintiff does have title to the suit property. Plaintiff got title to the suit property by virtue of the grant made by the Government in his favour and the issue of patta Ex. P-1 on 2-11- 1960. His title could be lost in the eye of law only on the property being sold in public auction on 26-2-1964. Therefore, his title can be said to have been lost only because of the Sale Certificate Ex. D-8 issued in favour of defendant-1 provided that sale remained unaffected in favour of defendant-1. P-1 on 2-11- 1960. His title could be lost in the eye of law only on the property being sold in public auction on 26-2-1964. Therefore, his title can be said to have been lost only because of the Sale Certificate Ex. D-8 issued in favour of defendant-1 provided that sale remained unaffected in favour of defendant-1. But the said sale has been set aside by the competent authorities as is clear Ex. P-2 dated 23-8- 1973. ( 15 ) THE auction sale was held under regulation 96 of the Coorg Land and revenue Regulations, 1899. Regulation- 95 says that such auction sale can in law be held after the concerned Assistant commissioner forms an opinion that immovable property already attached should be sold. In this case, the sale was for recovery of anears of land revenue. There is no provision which is analogous to section 163 of the Karnateka Land revenue Act, 1964 providing power to government to forfeit the property. Therefore, it will have to be held that, as the auction sale had been held, the suit property must have been under attachment, because a presumption in favour of that arises in view of Section 114 Illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act. When the auction sale is set aside, the title of the plaintiff would remain intact. It is only the title acquired by defendant-1 because of the auction sale, that could displace the title of the plaintiff. Hence- we agree with the conclusion of the lower court that the plaintiff has established his title to the suit property. ( 16 ) SO far as improvements claimed to have been made by defendants-1 and 2 are concerned, the trial court has refused any relief in their favour by applying the principles in the aforecited decisions of toe Supreme Court. Relief in favour of defendant-1 or defendant-2 in this behalf can be available only if the provisions in section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act ere attracted. Defendant-1 was in possession at least from 20-8-1968 under a valid title. His title remained intact until the sale was set aside by the Revenue appellate Tribunal on 23-8-1973. Relief in favour of defendant-1 or defendant-2 in this behalf can be available only if the provisions in section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act ere attracted. Defendant-1 was in possession at least from 20-8-1968 under a valid title. His title remained intact until the sale was set aside by the Revenue appellate Tribunal on 23-8-1973. If the improvements had been made by defendants 1 and 2 during the period between 20-8-1968 and 23-8-1973, it would have been possible for them to contend that they were transferees within the meaning of the said word in Section 51 of the T. P. Act. DW-1 (defendant-1) has stated that the coffee garden in the suit property started yielding in the year 1964. DW-2 (defendant-2) who is the main person concerned with the improvement of the property has stated as follows :"during 1960-63, I spent about Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- for all the improvements for suit land. "he no where in his evidence stated that he had made improvements during any- period after 20-8 1968. Possession of defendants-1 and 2 prior to 20-8-1968 cannot be regarded as that of transferees within the meaning of the said word in section 51 of the T. P. Act. Therefore, the basic ingredients in Section 51 of the t. P. Act have remained unsatisfied. Improvements made by them prior to 20-8- 1968 cannot provide them with any kind of claim to the value of the improvements or the action on purchasing the suit land from the plaintiff as contemplated by Sec. 51 of the T. P. Act. It is for this reason that that part of the claim of defendants-1 and 2 has to be rejected and not for the principle of law laid-down in the aforecited decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 17 ) WE had, in one of the earlier paragraphs, stated how the trial court has granted the decree for future mesne profits. We have also excerpted section 2 (12) of the C. P. C. Plain reading of section 2 (12) of the C P. C. excludes profits due to improvements made by persons in wrongful possession. Possession of defendants-1 and 2 can, in law, be wrongful from 23-8-1973, the date on which the sale was set aside by the Revenue Appellate Tribunal. The suit was instituted on 15-4-1974. Therefore, from the date of suit also they were in wrongful possession. Possession of defendants-1 and 2 can, in law, be wrongful from 23-8-1973, the date on which the sale was set aside by the Revenue Appellate Tribunal. The suit was instituted on 15-4-1974. Therefore, from the date of suit also they were in wrongful possession. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he had in any way effected improvements on the suit property. The trial court has, on evidence found that defendants-1 and 2 had improved the suit property and we agree with that conclusion. Therefore, the plaintiff will not be entitled to the profits due to the improvements made by defendants-1 and 2 in the guise of mesne profits. The mesne profits that the plaintiff will be entitled to fell within the expression "actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits" appearing in Section 2 (12) of the C. P. C. We understand that is actually what is meant by the learned trial Judge by stating in the decree as follows : "treating the suit land as a vacant land" we hereby clarify the meaning of the said words found in the decree of the trial court. ( 18 ) IN view of the foregoing, we allow R. F. A. No. 96 of 1976 filed by the state and modify the decree passed by the trial court, so far as it relates to mesne profits only, by stating that the state is not liable to pay any mesne profits and only defendants-1 and 2 are liable. The rest of the decree passed by the trial court is confirmed subject to the modification regarding the understanding of the words "treating the suit land as a vacant land". We dismiss R. F. A. Nos. 119 and 130 of 1976. We make it clear that defendants-1 and 2 are entitled to remove at their cost their properties concerned with the improvement of land made by them as the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the vacant land. Each party is directed to bear his/its costs throughout. --- *** --- .s