HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD SECOND APPEAL No. - 556 of 1982 Arjun …..Appellant(s) Versus Bhagirath …..Respondent(s) Counsel for Appellant(s) : Amit Verma, G.n. Verma, Kamleshwar Prasad, Nipun Singh, Pramod Kumar Jain, Seema Agarwal Counsel for Respondent(s) : A.n. Bhargawa, B.p.singh, J. Verma, Manoj Kumar Singh, R. Shome, Rajesh Kumar Singh, Ranjeet Sharne, Siddhartha Verma, Sushil Kumar Pandey, V.k. Rathi, Yogesh Tiwari Court No. - 36 HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J. 1. This Second Appeal is of the year 1982. 2. This Second Appeal was admitted on 17.02.1982 that grounds mentioned in the memo of appeal appears to be substantial questions of law in the present case. 3. Sri Nipun Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Hemant Tyagi, learned counsel for the appellant fairly submitted that no question of law was mentioned in the memo of present second appeal. The grounds mentioned in memo of appeal are not substantial questions of 2 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 law. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that substantial questions of law, which arose for consideration are as follows:- “i. Whether the injunction suit could be decreed by the first appellate court without there being any relief of declaration particularly when the title of the plaintiff was under cloud, based on alleged oral settlement? ii. Whether without proving the oral settlement, as alleged claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint, which is the basis of the suit, first appellate is justified in decreeing the suit? iii. Whether the first appellate court has completely misread and wrongly interpreted the sale deed dated 06.06.1970 in order to reach to an erroneous conclusion of having any oral partition taken place between the parties? iv. Whether the findings returned by the lower appellate court regarding the oral family partition are perverse, erroneous and based on complete mis-appreciation of evidence and the same would vitiate the judgment of first appellate court ?” 4. The law in regard to framing of question of law for adjudication in a Second Appeal is being reiterated by Supreme Court in Nek Pal & Ors. Vs. Nagar Palika Parishad & Ors, 2024 INSC 574. Said order in its entirety is reproduced hereinafter:- “1. Leave granted. 2. Our attention is invited to the impugned judgment of the High Court in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, "the CPC"). Following is the relevant part of the impugned judgment: "Since no substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission of the appeal on 30.5.2003, hence having heard the matter partially and during the course of arguments, in the presence of learned Counsels of both the parties, this Court confined itself to adjudicate the following substantial questions of law: Whether the alleged transaction of the disputed property was void ab initio being the violation of Section 7 of Hindu Public Religious Institution (Prevention of Dissipation of Properties) Act, 1962. Whether the property was owned by Dera Baba Dargah Singh and was of the religious charitable nature. If it is so, 3 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 whether it could have been transferred by the self claimed manager Jaswinder Singh in the nature and manner it was transferred? Whether both the lower courts have rightly decreed the suit on the basis of Khasra, Khatauni and 'Kisan Bahi' which were issued by the revenue officials in favour of the lease holders." 3 . The aforesaid paragraph indicates that at the time of admitting the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, substantial questions of law were not formulated. Unless substantial questions of law are formulated at the time of admission of the appeal or any time subsequent thereto, a second appeal cannot be finally heard. The reason is that a second appeal can be finally heard only on a substantial question of law formulated earlier. In fact, the act of finally hearing a second appeal without framing any substantial question of law is itself illegal. There is nothing on record to show that the High Court formulated the substantial questions of law and gave an opportunity to the parties to argue on the basis of those substantial questions of law. All that the High Court says is the Court has confined itself to three substantial questions of law. The High Court did not put the rival Advocates to the notice before the commencement of hearing that it was proposing to hear the appeal on specific substantial questions of law. The High Court could have framed substantial questions of law and heard the appeal after few days so that the Advocates had a notice that the appeal will be heard on specific substantial questions of law. 4. Therefore, the procedure followed by the High Court is completely illegal and contrary to Section 100 of the CPC. Only on this ground, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 13th November, 2017 and restore Second Appeal Nos.34/2003 and 48/2003 to the file of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital. All contentions of the parties on merits of the Second Appeals are kept open. 5. A copy of this order shall by forwarded by the Registry to the Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court of Uttarakhand. The Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court shall list the restored Second Appeals before the roster Bench on 27th August, 2024. The parties, who are appearing today, shall be under an obligation to appear before the High Court on that date. The High Court need not issue a notice to those parties. 6. If the High Court wants to frame substantial questions of law as indicated in the impugned judgment or if the High Court desires to frame additional substantial questions of law, it is open for the High Court to do so. After completing the said exercise, the High 4 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 Court shall fix a date for hearing of the Second Appeals taking into consideration the fact that the Second Appeals are 21 years old. 7. We also clarify that till the date of the impugned judgment if any interim relief was operative in the restored Second Appeals, the same shall continue to operate. 8. The Civil Appeals are partly allowed on the above terms. 9. Pending applications, including the application for impleadment, stand disposed of accordingly.” 5. In the above background of position of law, Court heard learned counsel for the parties in order to ascertain as to whether there is any question of law involved in the present second appeal or not and if answer is in affirmative, questions of law(s) has to be framed and thereafter granting opportunity of hearing to both parties, the second appeal will be heard finally and in case answer remains in negative, fate of second appeal would be dismissal, therefore, present second appeal is listed today under the heading of ‘For Orders’. 6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of appellant has referred a copy of plaint annexed along with Miscellaneous Application filed on 22.11.2013, that plaintiffs/respondents have filed a suit for injunction simpliciter despite their title was disputed, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. 7. Learner Senior Counsel further submitted that Learned Trial Court has framed following 9 issues:- “1- क्या वाद ग्रस्त भूमि ए.1 ए.2 एच ई के स्वाी शीशरा व छज्जू थे? 2- क्या वादग्रस्त भूमि बी ई एफ डी वादीगण को पारिरवारिरक मिवभाजन (फै मिली सेमि%लेन्% ें मिली) और वादीगण उसके स्वाी व कामिबज हो गये? 3- क्या वाद ग्रस्त भूमि प्रतितवादीगण 1 ता 3 के पूव-ज रूढा ें अन्तग-त धारा 9 जींदारा खात्ा अतिधमिनय ें मिनमिहत हो चुकी है? 4- क्या प्रतितवादीगण 1 ता 3 के पूव-ज रूढा को वादग्रस्त भूमि पर धारा 7 ए ए जींदारा खात्ा अतिधमिनय के अन्तग-त अतिधकार प्राप्त हो गये हैं? 5 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 5- क्या वाद का ूल्यांकन क मिकया गया है और न्याय शुल्क का भुगतान अपया-प्त है? 6- क्या वाद अवतिध से बाहर है? 7- क्या वाद पत्र का ानतिचत्र गलत है? 8- क्या वाद ें धारा 38 ता 41 मिवमिनर्दिदष्ट अनुतोष अतिधमिनय बाधक है? 9- अनुतोष?” 8. The plaintiffs/respondents have claimed that predecessor in interest of Sri Sheeshram and predecessor in interest of appellants/defendants belongs to same generation and they remained in possession on part of land in dispute and subsequently in pursuance of an oral family settlement they took possession of all three parts. However, when allegedly appellants/defendants tried to disturb their possession, present suit was filed. 9. Learned Trial Court after considering the materials on record decided issue nos.1 and 4 against the respondents/plaintiffs and in favour of appellants/defendants and claim of family settlement was rejected. 10. The decision on issue numbers 1 and 4 being relevant are reproduced hereinafter: “ मिववेचना वाद मिबन्दु 1 ता 4:— वाद मिबन्दु 1 ता 4 आपस ें एक दूसरे से संबंतिधत है। अतः इनको मिनधा-रण हेतु एक साथ लिलया गया है। वादीगण ने ईश्वर दयाल को वादी साक्षी 1, – खजान सिंसह को वादी साक्षी 2 के – रूप ें प्रस्तुत मिकया है। प्रतितवादीगण ने प्रतितवादी साक्षी 1 अजु-न एवं प्रतितवादी – साक्षी 2 रिरडकू को प्रस्तुत मिकया है। वादीगण मिववामिदत सम्पलिH ए .1 ए .2 एच 0 ई 0 दोनों पक्षों के वारिरसान शीशरा व छज्जू को होना अभिभकथन करते हैं। वादी साक्षी– 1 ईश्वर दयाल ने अपने प्रतितपरीक्षण ें स्वीकार मिकया है मिक उसको मिववामिदत सम्पलिH का खसरा नं 0 नहीं ालू और उनें बड़ों ने कोई लिललिखत ें इजाजत नाा नहीं लिलखा रखा और उसने न कोई ाल के कागजात देखे है। इस साक्षी ने आगे प्रतितपरीक्षण ें स्वीकार मिकया है मिक वह लोग छज्जू हर से 25–30 – साल से अलग अलग है , 6 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 परन्तु कोल्हू इकट्ठा है। और इनदोनों का बं%वारा हो चुका था और के वल मिववामिदत सम्पलिH ुश्तरका रह गई थी। यमिद शीशरा व छज्जू के वादी साक्षी– 1 के अनुसार बं%वारा काफी सय पहले हो चुका था तो इस सम्पलिH ुश्तरका छोड़ने का प्रश्न नहीं उठता और इन परिरस्थिस्थतितयों ें वाद ें आंभिशक मिवभाजन का सिसद्धान्त लागू हो जाता है। वादी ने इन सम्पलिH को ौलिखक बं%वारा का होना 8–9 साल पहले होना अभिभकभिथत मिकया है। परन्तु ौलिखक बं%वारा का कोई गवाह प्रस्तुत नहीं मिकया गया है। वादी साक्षी– 2 खजान सिंसह के सय कोई बं%वारा नहीं हुआ और न बं%वारा का कोई दस्तावेज लिलखा गया। वादीगण ने ए 1, ए 3 सी 1 व सी 2 भूमि प्रतितवादीगण के पूव-ज रूठा से 6–6–1970 को मिवक्रय पत्र ( प्रदश-– 1) द्वारा खरीदी थी। इस मिवक्रय पत्र ें भी ौलिखक बं%वारा का कोई उल्लेख नहीं है। इस मिवक्रय पत्र ें तितहाई मिहस्सा बेचने का उल्लेख मिकया गया है। इस मिवक्रय पत्र की तफसील ें कु ल प्ला% सिजसकी तितहाई मिहस्सा बेचा गया है दी गयी है यमिद दोनों पक्षों ें बं%वारा हो गया होता तो इस मिवक्रय पत्र ें बं%वारा का उल्लेख होता और चौहददी ें वादीगण की सम्पलिH सिजसको वह अपनी बताते हैं लेने का उल्लेख होता। यह परिरस्थिस्थतित यह दशा-ती है मिक वादीगण और उसके पूव-जों का इस सम्पलिH ें कोई स्वामित्व व धारण नहीं था। इसके अतितरिरक्त वादीगण ने सम्पलिH ए 3, ए 2 बी3 व बी2 को दुगा- व रिरडकू के मिहस्से ें आनाबताया है और उसको मिववामिदत सम्पलिH का ालिलक एवं कामिबज – बताया है। परन्तु प्रतितवादी साक्षी 2 रिरडकू ने अपने साक्ष्य ें अपना कोई वास्ता और ताल्लुक इस सम्पलिH ए 3 ए 2 बी2 व बी3 से नहीं बतलाया और पूरी सम्पलिH प्रतितवादीगण 1 ता 3 की बताई है। कोई भी व्यमिक्त अपना अतिधकार आज के युग – ें सम्पलिH से छोड़ना नहीं चाहता है। प्रतितवादी साक्षी 2 का ए 3, ए 2 बी3 व बी2 सम्पलिH को अपनी न बताना और इसका पूण- ालिलक प्रतितवादीगण को बताना यह दशा-ता है मिक इस सम्पलिH पर वादीगण या उसके पूव-जों का कोई ताल्लुक और वास्ता नहीं था। वाद पत्र के ानतिचत्र ें स्पष्ट होता है मिक ए 1 ए 3 बी 1 व सी 2 पर कानात वादीगण 1 व 2 है। जो मिक उन्होंने प्रतितवादीगण से 1970 ें खरीदी है। वादीगण बी बी 1 डी बी 3 को अपनी जगह बं%वारे से पहले होना बताते हैं। परन्तु इस स्थान पर कोई ताीरात न होना तथा बी डी मिदवार ें कोई दरवाजा , रोशनदान लिखड़की आमिद न होना यह दशा-ता है मिक वादीगण का बी बी 1 डी बी 3 पर कभी कोई कब्जा धारण व स्वामित्व नहीं रहा है। अन्यथा वादीगण इस स्थान पर कोई न कोई ताीरात अवश्य रखते। 7 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 प्रतितवादीगण ने मिववामिदत स्थान के लैन्ड एक्वीजशन की काय-वाही के कागजात ( प्रदश- 1) पर दालिखल मिकया है। सिजसें रूडा की आपलिHयां सही ानी गयी और भूमि एक्वायर नहीं की गयी। यह आदेश 1–5–1975 – का प्रदश- ए 1 पर है। लैन्ड एक्वीजीशन की काय-वाही ें वादीगण या उसके पूव-जों द्वारा कोई काय-वाही न करना यह दशा-ता है मिक वादीगण का इसी भूमि पर कोई स्वामित्व व धारण नहीं था और प्रतितवादीगण के पास उनके धारण ें मिववामिदत भूमि थी। प्रतितवादी साक्षी– 1 अजु-न एवं प्रतितवादी साक्षी– 2 रिरडकू के बयान से स्पष्ट होता है मिक जींदारा खात्ा के वक्त प्रतितवादीगण के पूव-जों का मिववामिदत भूमि पर धारण था और मिववामिदत भूमि धारा 9 एवं धारा 7 ए ें उनें मिनमिहत हो चुकी थी। अतः उपरोक्त मिववेचना से तथा दोनों पक्षों के मिवद्वान अतिधवक्ताओं के तक] को ध्यान पूव-क सुनने के पश्चात ैं इस मिनष्कष- पर आता हूँ मिक मिववामिदत भूमि ए 1, ए 2 एच ई के स्वाी शीशरा व छज्जू नहीं थे और बी ई एस डी भूमि ौलिखक मिवभाजन ें वादीगण को नहीं मिली और न वह ालिलक एवं कामिबज हुए। वाद मिबन्दु 1 व 2 तदनुसार वादीगण के मिवपरीत नकारात्क रूप से मिनधा-रिरत मिकये जाते हैं। मिववामिदत भूमि प्रतितवादीगण 1 ता 3 के पूव-ज रूढा के अन्तग-त धारा 9 जींदारा खात्ा अतिधमिनय ें मिनमिहत हो चुकी है और उनको धारा 7 ए के अतिधकार प्राप्त हो चुके हैं। वाद मिबन्दु 3 व 4 तदनुसार प्रतितवादीगण के पक्ष ें स्वीकारात्क रूप ें मिनधा-रिरत मिकये जाते हैं। वाद मिबन्दु सं० – 5:— इस वाद मिबन्दु का मिनधा-रण ेरे मिवद्वान पूवा-तिधकारी द्वारा नकारात्क रूप ें 20.05.1978 को मिकया जा चुका है। वह मिनण-य का भाग बनेगा। – वाद मिबन्दु सं० 6:— प्रतितवादीगण के मिवद्वान अतिधवक्ता का तक- था मिक वादीगण का मिववामिदत भूमि पर 12 साल से पहले से कब्जा नहीं है। और वाद कालावतिध से बातिधत है। वाद मिबन्दु 1 व 2 के मिनधा-रण ें वादीगण का कब्जा नहीं ाना गया है। अतः वाद कालावतिध से बातिधत है। वाद मिबन्दु 5 तदनुसार स्वीकारात्क रूप ें मिनधा-रिरत मिकया जाता ह। – वाद मिबन्दु सं० 7:— प्रतितवादीगण के मिवद्वान अतिधवक्ता का तक- था मिक वाद पत्र का ानतिचत्र गलत है। परन्तु उन्होंने इस मिवषय पर कोई शहादत नहीं दी है और न कोई कीशन ही जारी कराया है। अतः इन परिरस्थिस्थतितयों ें वाद पत्र का ानतिचत्र गलत नहीं ाना जा सकता है। वाद मिबन्दु 6 नकारात्क रूप ें मिनधा-रिरत मिकया जाता है। वाद मिबन्दु सं० – 8:— प्रतितवादीगण के मिवद्वान अतिधवक्ता का तक- था मिक वादीगण मिववामिदत भूमि पर कब्जा नहीं है। वाद मिबन्दु 1 व 2 के मिनधा-रण ें 8 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 वादीगण का कब्जा मिववामिदत भूमि पर नहीं ाना गया है। अतः वाद मिवमिनर्दिदष्ट अतिधमिनय की धारा 38 ता 41 से बातिधत है। वाद मिबन्दु 8 तदनुसार स्वीकारात्क रूप ें मिनधा-रिरत मिकया जाता है। – वाद मिबन्दु सं० 9:— वाद मिबन्दु 1 व 2 ें वादीगण के मिवपरीत मिनधा-रण होने के कारण वादीगण कोई अनुतोष पाने के अतिधकारी नहीं हैं और वाद खचc समिहत खारिरज होने योग्य हैं। ैं तदनुसार आदेश देता है। आदेश वादीगण का आज्ञापक व्यादेश का वाद खचc समिहत प्रतितवादीगण के मिवरूद्ध खारिरज मिकया जाता है।" 11. Accordingly the suit was dismissed vide a judgment dated 13.10.1978. 12. The respondents/plaintiffs, filed an appeal before the 1st Civil Judge, Muzaffar Nagar which was allowed vide a judgment dated 3.2.1982, and the suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was allowed. 13. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that 1st Appellate Court did not frame points for determination and without setting-aside findings returned by learned Trial Court, took a different view, thus impugned order suffers from multiple illegalities. 14. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that 1st Appellate Court decided issue which was not even being framed by learned Trial Court as to whether the disputed land in suit was solely acquired by the defendants or its co—sharer, still considering the materials on record, the 1st Appellate Court has placed reliance on a ‘Bainama’ executed by Rudha, predecessor in interest of appellants/defendants in favour of plaintiffs/respondents herein that 1/3rd share of entire land was sold in favour of plaintiffs. 15. Much reliance was placed on the contents of ‘Bainama’ and it was held that said document was sufficient evidence to support the claim of 9 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 plaintiffs/respondents herein. In the later part of the order, it was held that land in dispute was divided in three equal parts, therefore, it was held that partition took place and that claim of plaintiffs/respondents was accept to that they were owners of the land in dispute. For reference, decision of said issue is reproduced hereinafter: “ इस वाद ें यह देखना है मिक क्या पूरी मिववामिदत भूमि प्रतितवादीगण के बड़ों की तन्हा थी अथवा क्या इसें तीन मिहस्सेदार थे। जहाँ वादीगण के अनुसार भूमि के 3 मिहस्से थे वहीं प्रतितवादीगण के अनुसार यह पूरी भूमि इसके बड़ों की तन्हा थी यह बात ध्यान देने की है मिक उपरोक्त दोनों ें से मिकसी बात के सथ-न ें कोई प्रत्यक्ष दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य उपलब्ध नहीं है सिजससे यह पता लगे मिक भूमि का स्वामित्व मिकसके पास था। जो दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य इस सम्बन्ध ें उपलब्ध है वह भूमि के स्वामित्व के अप्रत्यक्ष साक्ष्य के रूप ें है। उनें ुख्य रूढा द्वारा वादीगण के पक्ष ें लिलखा गया बैनाा प्रदश- सं 0 1 है। उभयपक्ष इस बैनाें को स्वीकार करते हैं और यह ानते हैं मिक इस बैनाें द्वारा पूरी भूमि का 1/3 मिहस्सा रूढा ने वादीगण के पक्ष ें बेंचा था। ैने इस बैनाें का ध्यान से अवलोकन मिकया है। यद्यमिप इसें पूरी भूमि के स्वामित्व के बारे ें कोई स्पष्ट बात नहीं है लेमिकन इस बैनाें से 2 3 हत्वपूण- बातें साने आती हैं। पहली बात यह है मिक रूढ़ा बैनाें ें बेंची जाने वाली भूमि को तितहाई मिहस्से के रूप ें ाना है। दूसरी हत्वपूण- बात यह है मिक जो भूतित बैनाा द्वारा बेंची गई , उसकी उHर की चौहददी ें स्कू ल बताया गया है और मिकसी रास्ते का कोई सिजक्र नहीं है। तीसरी हत्वपूण- बात यह है मिक बेंची जाने वाली भूमि का क्षेत्रफल 21 गज लम्बा और 7 गज चौड़ा बताया गया है। इन्हीं ुद्दों से यह देखना होगा मिक बेंची जाने वाली भूमि की उस वक्त क्या नवैयत थी। प्रदश- सं 0 1 ें रूढा ने यह स्पष्ट लिलखा है मिक जो तितहाई मिहस्सा वह बेंच रहा है वह एक प्ला% के रूप ें है और रूढा उसका ालिलक और कामिबज है। प्रदश- सं 0 1 ें यह बात कहीं नहीं आयी है मिक रूढा पूरी भूमि का ालिलक था। यह भी ध्यान देने की बात है मिक संयोग से बेची गयी मिहस्से का क्षेत्रफल पूरी भूमि का लगभग 1/3 ही आता है जैसा मिक यह प्रतितवादीगण भी स्वीकार करते हैं और जो कीशन की रिरपो%- 11/ ग से स्पष्ट है। इस प्रकार प्रदश- सं0 1 ें लिलखी गयी उपरोक्त बातें इस बात की ओर इशारा करती प्रतीत होती हैं मिक बेंची गयी भूमि ........ रूढा का स्वामित्व के व 1/3 भाग पर ही था और यह भाग एक ........ रूप ें था। यह परीतिक्षत प्रतितवादीगण से ज्यादा वादीगण के पक्ष ें सथ-न करती है क्योंमिक यमिद रूढा पूरी भूमि का ालिलक होता तो वह इस प्रकार 1/3 भाग को एक प्ला% के रूप ें कभी न बताता और न ही इस प्रकार पूरी भूमि से 1/3 मिहस्सा मिनकालना सम्भव होता। यमिद रूढा पूरी भूमि का ालिलक होता तो 1/3 लिलखने की भी कोई आवश्यकता नहीं थी बस्थिल्क स्वामित्व के रूप से बेचे जाने वाली भूमि की चौहददी और क्षेत्रफल ही लिलख मिदया जाता। इसके अतितरिरक्त बेंची जाने वाली भूमि की स्थिस्थतित भी यही दर्शिशत करती है मिक मिवक्रे ता रूढा पूरी भूमि के के वल उतनी मिहस्से पर कामिबज था जो उसने बेंची अन्यथा एक कोने ें 1/3 मिहस्सा अलग करता ........ साधारण रूप ें स्वाभामिवक नहीं प्रतीत होता। यमिद रूढ़ा पूरी भूमि का ालिलक होता तो बेंची गयी भूमि मिकसीभी एक तरफ से मिनकाली नहीं जाती, इसके लिलए एक मिवशेष कोने को 1/3 मिहस्से के रूप ें चुनना और उसे प्ला% बताना मिकसी भी रूप ें स्वाभामिवक नहीं होता। इस प्रकार ेरी राय ें मिवक्रय पत्र प्रदश- सं0 1 वादी का कथन का सथ-न करता है। ेरे उपरोक्त कथन का सथ-न इस तरह से भी हो जाता है मिक इस मिवक्रय पत्र ें लिलखी गयी चौहददी ें उHर की ओर स्कू ल मिदखाया गया है। प्रतितवादीगण ने अपने बयान तहरीरी ें स्वीकार मिकया है मिक उHर की ओर एक रास्ता चलता 10 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 है। वकील कीश्नर के रिरपो%- 11/ ग ें भी इस रास्ते को मिदखाया गया है और उसकी चौड़ाई लगभग 9 मिफ% मिदखायी गयी है। यह रास्ता पूरब के आ रास्ते से होकर पतिश्च ें इस भूमि के भीतर पीछे के मिहस्से ें गया है तथा इसका कोई सम्बन्ध मिकसी अन्य भूखण्ड से नहीं प्रतीत होता। कीश्नर का उपरोक्त नक्शा यह दर्शिशत करता है मिक इस ........ द्वारा मिववामिदत भूमि का पतिश्ची भूखण्ड आ रास्ते से जोड़ा गया है। यमिद यह पूरी भूमि एक ही व्यमिक्त की स्वामित्व ें होती तो मिनतिश्चत रूप से इस प्रकार का कोई रास्ता छोड़ने की आवश्यकता नहीं थी। मिवक्रय पत्र ें वर्शिणत उपरोक्त चौहददी से यह सिसद्ध होता है मिक मिवक्रय पत्र लिलखते सय यह रास्ता ौजूद नहीं था। यमिद यह रास्ता ौजूद होता तो उसका हवाला अवश्य मिदया जाता और रास्ते की भूमि छोड़कर ही वादीगण को भूमि बेंची जाती। स्वयं प्रतितवादीगण को भी यही कहना है मिक रास्ते की भूमि छोड़ कर ही भूमि प्रतितवादीगण को बेंची गयी है। लेमिकन मिवक्रय पत्र ें लिलखी चौहददी प्रतितवादीगण के इस कथन को झूठा कर देती हैं। उपरोक्त चौहददी यह स्पष्ट करती है मिक बेंची जाने वाली भूमि ें वत-ान रास्ता भी शामिल था। वादीगण ने अपने वाद पत्र ें यह कहा है मिक पहले यह रास्ता वादीगण की ओर से चलता था लेमिकन यह भूमि खरीदने के बाद उन्होंने दतिक्षण का रास्ता अपनी भूमि ें चला लिलया और दुगा- व रिरडकू की सहतित से इतना ही रास्ता उHर की ओर इस भूमि ें छोड़ मिदया। इस बात का स्पष्ट मिवरोध प्रतितवादपत्र ें नहीं मिकया गया है। वादीगण की ओर से इस कथन से इन्कार अवश्य मिकया गया है। वादीगण का उपरोक्त कथन ेरी राय ें स्वयं प्रतितवादीगण के प्रतितवाद पत्र से ही सिसद्ध हो जाता है। प्रतितवाद पत्र के पैरा 9 ें प्रतितवादीगण ने ए.बी.सी.डी. भूमि पर वादी का स्वामित्व स्वीकार मिकया है। यह ध्यान देने की बात है मिक यह पूरी भूमि ए.बी.सी.डी. रास्ते की भूमि 9 मिफ% छोड़ने के बाद की है। यह भी ध्यान देने की बात है मिक इस ए.बी.सी.डी. भूमि ें वादीगण द्वारा वर्शिणत दतिक्षण भूखण्ड की लगभग 9 मिफ% भाग शामिल है क्योंमिक ए.बी. की लम्बाई 21 मिफ% ए स्थान से शुरू होती है। यमिद वादीगण दतिक्षणी मिहस्से के ालिलक होते तो उHर की ओर रास्ता ए.1-ए.3 मिफ% छोड़ने के बाद वादीगण के पास के वल 12 मिफ% भूमि बचती चामिहए थी लेमिकन स्वयं प्रतितवादीगण ने यह ाना है मिक वादीगण के पास 21 मिफ% भूमि है। यह परिरस्थिस्थतितयाँ दर्शिशत करती हैं मिक वादीगण ने शेष 9 मिफ% दतिक्षणी मिहस्से से मिलाकर भूमि पूरी कर ली है और यह तब सम्भव हो सकता है जब दतिक्षणी मिहस्सा वादीगण के ही स्वामित्व ें हो। इस प्रकार दतिक्षणी मिहस्से की भूमि जो इस वाद ें मिववामिदत भूमि है, वादीगण के स्वामित्व का आभास मिलता है। यह परिरस्थिस्थतित भी मिक पूरा भूखण्ड ें बराबर के तीन मिहस्से बनाये गये हैं , यही स्पष्ट करता है मिक यह भूखण्ड तीन लोगों ें बां% मिदया गया था और प्रतितवादीगण उसके के वल 1/3 भाग के ही ालिलक थे अन्यथा इस प्रकार स्पष्ट तीन मिहस्से ें भूमि का बं%ना स्वाभामिवक नहीं प्रतीत होता। प्रतितवादीगण की ओरसे भूमि अतिधग्रहण काय-वाही के दौरान अपने पूव-जों द्वारा दालिखल की गयी आपलिH ( प्रपत्र सं 0 38/ क तथा उस पर हुए आदेश पत्र सं 0 39/ ग का हवाला मिदया है और कहा गया है मिक इससे यह स्पष्ट होता है मिक यह पूरी भूमि प्रतितवादीगण के बड़ों की थी। ैने इन प्रपत्रों का भी अवलोकन मिकया लेमिकन ुझे उनें ऐसी कोई बात नहीं मिली सिजससे प्रतितवादी का उपरोक्त कथन सिसद्ध हो। यह प्रपत्र लगभग 30 वष- पुराना है जब वादीगण के अनुसार सभी पक्षकार एक साथ रहते थे इन परिरस्थिस्थतितयों ें यमिद मिकसी एक व्यमिक्त ने अपनी पूरी भूमि के बारे ें आपलिH की हो तो उसके आधार पर यह ाना जाना सम्भव नहीं है मिक के वल वही उसका स्वाी था। जहाँ तक ौलिखक साक्ष्य का ............ है वह भी वादीगण का सथ-न करती हैं। वादीगण ने अपने उपरोक्त कथन के सथ-न ें वादी ईश्वर दयाल के अतितरिरक्त उसी गाँव के एक अन्य व्यमिक्त खजान को उपस्थिस्थत मिकया है जो मिववामिदत भूमि के स%े दतिक्षण ें रहता है। खजान ने वादीगण के कथन का सथ-न मिकया है। 11 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 इसके मिवरुद्ध प्रतितवादीगण की ओर से कोई स्वतंत्र साक्षी नहीं आया है। प्रतितवादीगण के गवाह के रूप ें रिरडकू आया है जो उनका सगा चचेरा भाई है। रिरडकू के बयान ें कई मिवसंगतितयां हैं जो उसे पूरी तरह से अमिवश्वसनीय बना देती हैं। इस बात का कोई हत्व नहीं है मिक रिरडकू ने पतिश्च वाले अपने मिहस्से को अपना होना स्वीकार नहीं मिकया है क्योंमिक यह ाना जा सकता है मिक ऐसा करके उसने अपने पट्टीदार की दद की है, जबमिक उसकी स्वयं की कोई हामिन नहीं हुई। प्रतितवादीगण के मिवद्वान अतिधवक्ता ने अपनी बहस ें यह कहा है मिक यमिद वादीगण की बं%वारे की बात ानी भी जाय तो वादीगण तथा प्रतितवादीगण का मिववामिदत भूमि पर आधा - आधा मिहस्सा होना चामिहए 1/3 मिहस्सा होने का कोई प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। ेरी राय ें मिहस्से की असानता के आधार पर यह नहीं कहा जा सकता मिक पक्षकारों का मिहस्सा ही नहीं बनता। प्रतितवादीगण के मिवद्वान अतिधवक्ता ने यह भी कहा है मिक वादीगण मिववामिदत भूमि को जहरिरया के ......... की नहीं बताते और न ही सम्पलिH का अन्य प्राण बताते हैं। उनके अनुसार यह पूरी भूमि जींदारी मिवनाश अतिधमिनय की धारा 9 ें उनके मिपता दयारा ें मिनमिहत हो गयी थी अतः वे लोग अके ले इसके स्वाी हुए। ेरी राय ें उनका यह कथन भी अमिवश्वसनीय है क्योंमिक वाद पत्र ें यह स्पष्ट लिलखा है मिक यह भूमि %ाउन एरिरया सीाक्षेत्र ें आती है और इस बात से प्रतितवादीगण ने भी इन्कार नहीं मिकया है। यह परिरस्थिस्थतित यह स्पष्ट करती है मिक धारा 9 ें मिनमिहत होने का कोई प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। प्रतितवादीगण के मिवद्वान अतिधवक्ता ने अपने बयान ें दो अन्य बातों का भी उल्लेख मिकया है लेमिकन ेरी राय ें यह बातें भी हत्वहीन हैं। उनके अनुसार मिहन्दू परिरवार ें एक बार बं%वारा होने पर यही ान्यता होती है मिक सारी सम्पलिHयां बं% गयी हैं। अतः उनके अनुसार जब वे 30 साल पूव- बं%वारा होना कहते हैं तो मिववामिदत भूमि बं%वारे से अलग ानना उतिचत नहीं होगा। ेरी राय ें इस ान्यता के बारे ें उनका यह कथन सही है लेमिकन यह ान्यता अस्थिन्त रूप से नहीं होता मिक वादी ने अपने बयान े यह बात सशपथ कही है मिक दोनों बं%वारे उसके साने हुए थे और मिववामिदत भूमि पहले बं%वारे के सय संयुक्त छोड़ी गयी थी। अतः अब उपरोक्त ान्यता का हत्व नहीं रह जाता। प्रतितवादीगण के मिवद्वान अतिधवक्ता ने यह भी कहा है मिक वादीगण के कान की कोई लिखड़की या दरवाजा दतिक्षण की ओर मिववामिदत भूमि पर नहीं खुलता सिजससे यह प्राभिणत होता है मिक दतिक्षण वाली मिववामिदत भूमि से वादीगण का कोई सम्बन्ध नहीं रहा है। मिवद्वान ुस्थिन्सफ ने भी इस बात को ानते हुए मिववामिदत भूमि पर वादी का स्वामित्व ानने से इन्कार कर मिदया है। ेरी राय ें के वल यह परिरस्थिस्थतित भूमि के स्वामित्व के मिनधा-रण के लिलए मिकसी भी रूप ें पया-प्त नहीं हो सकती। जैसा मिक ऊपर कहा है वादी को अन्य साक्ष्य स्पष्ट रूप से मिववामिदत भूमि पर वादी का स्वामित्व सिसद्ध करती है। अतः इस परिरस्थिस्थतित का हत्व नहीं रह जाता है। ेरे सक्ष अन्य कोई ुद्दा नहीं उठाया गया है। ेरे उपरोक्त मिनष्कष] के आधार पर यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है मिक वादीगण मिववामिदत भूमि के स्वाी हैं अतः उनका इस भूमि पर व्यादेश सम्बन्धी वाद तिडग्री होने योग्य है। आदेश अपील सव्यय स्वीकार की जाती है। वादीगण का वाद सव्यय तिडग्री मिकया जाता है तथा प्रश्नगत मिनण-य खस्थिण्डत मिकया जाता है।" 16. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that oral settlement was not even proved by evidence, therefore, 1st Appellate Court has erred in accepting sale deed dated 6.6.1970 to be a sufficient piece of evidence that oral partition has taken place and was effected also. 12 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 17. Learned Senior Counsel lastly submitted that finding returned by 1st Appellate Court were perverse, therefore, present Second Appeal involves above referred questions of law. 18. Learned Senior Counsel has place reliance on a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Dilbagrai Punjabi Vs. Sharad Chandra, 1988 (Supp) SCC 710 and relevant part thereof is reproduced hereinafter: “5. xxx It is true that the High Court while hearing the appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and reverse the conclusion reached by the first appellate court, but at the same time its power to interfere with the finding cannot be denied if when the lower appellate court decides an issue of fact a substantial question of law arises. The court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case. We, therefore, do not discover any defect in the judgment of the High Court, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.“ 19. Per Contra, Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for contesting respondents has supported the impugned order and submitted that 1st Appellate Court was completely justified to reverse the finding returned by the learned Trial Court since it can independently re-evaluate and re- appreciate all oral as well as documentary evidence to decide issues. 20. The finding returned by first Appellate Court was based on correct appreciation of evidence which records a sale deed between Rudha, predecessor-in-interest of appellant/defendants and plaintiffs/respondents which was an important piece of evidence and since it's content specifically discloses that 1/3rd part of entire land was sold, but it does not state that out of entire land, only 1/3rd of it was sold, therefore, it was a clear case that upon the partition 1/3rd part of entire land was given to Rudha. 13 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 21. The evidence that there was an oral partition and its effect also was supported by the said sale deed as well as it was supported by the boundaries of the land in dispute. 22. Learned counsel for contesting respondents also submitted that it was not necessary to frame points for determination if the First Appellate Court has crystallized the issue for consideration, since in the impugned order it was specifically noted that “ इस वाद ें यह देखना है मिक क्या पूरी मिववामिदत भूमि प्रतितवादीगण के बड़ों की तन्हा थी अथवा क्या इसें तीन मिहस्सेदार थे।" " इन्हीं ुद्दों से यह देखना होगा मिक बेंची जाने वाली भूमि की उस वक्त क्या नवैयत थी।" 23. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents refers following finding of first Appellate Court: “ यह परिरस्थिस्थतित भी मिक पूरा भूखण्ड ें बराबर के तीन मिहस्से बनाये गये हैं, यही स्पष्ट करता है मिक यह भूखण्ड तीन लोगों ें बां% मिदया गया था और प्रतितवादीगण उसके के वल 1/3 भाग के ही ालिलक थे अन्यथा इस प्रकार स्पष्ट तीन मिहस्से ें भूमि का बं%ना स्वाभामिवक नहीं प्रतीत होता।" 24. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 25. As referred above, this Court has to decide firstly as to whether this Second Appeal involves any substantial questions of law and if any substantial question of law exists, this Court has to formulate the same. 26. Court takes note of a recent judgment passed by Supreme Court in Rabindranath Panigrahi Vs. Surendra Sahu, 2025 INSC 333 and its relevant paragraphs being 6 and 7 are reproduced hereinafter: “6. The principles governing the scope of Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC are well-settled. To state that, under Section 100 C.P.C a High Court is not to disturb findings of fact, would be now like stating the obvious. [See: Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179; Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546; State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 9215; and Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1210.] Yet recently, this Court lamented that despite numerous judgments spelling out the scope of this power, the High Court repeatedly falls in error. [See: Jaichand v. 14 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864] The present is another such case. 7. In the present case, the questions as framed by the High Court, in our view, do not meet the criteria to be substantial questions of law. For a question to be substantial, reference can be made to the discussion made in, amongst a host of other judgments, Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545, wherein it was held as under: “21. ...“[W]hen a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial : (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314] , SCR pp. 557-58) "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." ” In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2020) 19 SCC 57, it was observed that:- “28. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.” [See: P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar 2023 SCC OnLine SC1483; and Ramachandra Reddy v. Ramulu Ammal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3301]” 27. Now in above background of rival submissions and judgment passed by learned Trial Court and First Appellate Court and discussion on law, Court proceeds to consider as to whether present second appeal has any 15 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 substantial questions of law which can be formulated under Section 100 C.P.C. 28. This first issue is as to whether it was mandatory for the First Appellate Court to frame points for determination or not and for that the Court takes note of a judgment passed by this Court in Smt. Qamrunnisa And Others Vs. Smt. Tamizan And Others, 2026:AHC:79265 and its relevant paragraph nos. 6,7,8 and 9 are reproduced hereinafter: “6. Learned counsel for appellants vehemently pressed the first purported question of law, i.e., whether First Appellate Court was justified in dismissing first appeal without framing points for determination and has placed reliance on a judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Nafees Ahmad and another vs. Soinuddin and others, 2025 INSC 520, however, the Court finds that said judgment is in fact against the submission of counsel for appellants. 7. In Nafees Ahmad (supra) the High Court while considering a second appeal has formulated a similar nature of question of law and held that since First Appellate Court has not framed points for determination, therefore, appeal was returned back for fresh consideration. However, a challenge to it before Supreme Court was allowed and it was held that it is not always mandatory to frame points for determination and it would depend how the judgment was written. For reference entire judgment passed by Supreme Court in Nafees Ahmad (supra) is quoted hereinafter: “1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dated 4-9- 2017 in Second Appeal No.69/2008, by which the Second Appeal filed by the respondents – herein came to be partly allowed and the matter was remitted to the First Appellate Court on the ground that the First Appellate Court failed to comply with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). 3. The High Court, while deciding the Second Appeal, formulated the following substantial question of law:- “Whether it is incumbent upon the Appellate Court to frame the point of determination as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC while deciding the first appeal or not?” 4. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC reads thus: 16 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 “Rule 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.─ The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state ─ (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled,and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.” 5. It appears that the High Court relying upon few decisions took the view that Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is mandatory and the failure on the part of the Appellate Court to frame the points for determination as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC would vitiate the entire judgment and make it wholly void. 6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, we are in complete disagreement with the view taken by the High Court. 7. We propose to follow the dictum as laid by this Court in the case of “G. Amalorpavam And Others v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai And Others” reported in (2006) 3 SCC 224, wherein this Court observed that whether in a particular case, there has been substantial compliance, with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC should be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions, by itself, may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void and may be ignored if there has been a substantial compliance with it. 8. We may elaborate the issue a little further from a different angle. 9. The Privy Council observed in “Mt. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus” reported in AIR 1921 PC 55, at p. 56, as under: “In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants to show reason why the judgment appealed from should be disturbed; there must be some balance in their favour when all the circumstances are considered, to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands. Their Lordships are unable to find that this duty has been discharged.” 10. The Privy Council decision referred to above was looked into by a three-Judge Bench in the case of “Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh and Anr.” reported in (1963) 2 SCR 733, wherein this Court observed as under: 17 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 “With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is the duty of the appellant to show that the judgment under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it is only after the appellant has shown this that the appellate court would call upon the respondent to reply to the contention. It is only then that the judgment of the appellate court can fully contain all the various matters mentioned in Ruel 31, Order 41.” 11. This Court observed in “Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya” reported in (1955) 2 SCR 1, at page 8: “Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: ... Too technical construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.” 12. The provisions of Rule 31 should therefore be reasonably construed and should be held to require the various particulars to be mentioned in the judgment only when the appellant has actually raised certain points for determination by the Appellate Court, and not when no such points are raised. 13. We must also look into the provisions of Rule 30 of Order 41 for the purpose of fortifying our interpretation of Rule 31. Order 41 Rule 30 CPC reads thus: “30. Judgment when and where pronounced. (1) The Appellate ─ Court, after hearing the parties or their pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. (2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall be sufficient if the points for determination, the decision thereon and the final order passed in the appeal are read out and it shall not be necessary for the Court to read out the whole judgment, but a copy of the whole judgment shall be made available for the perusal of the parties or their pleaders immediately after the judgment in pronounced.” 14. Thus, this Rule does not make it incumbent on the Appellate Court to refer to any part of the proceedings in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. The Appellate Court can refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is in the discretion of the Appellate Court to refer to the proceedings. 18 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing what the parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration. It follows therefore that if the appellant submits nothing for its consideration, the Appellate Court can decide the appeal without any reference to any proceedings of the courts below and, in doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged anything which would tend to show that the judgment and decree under appeal were wrong. [See : “Thakur Sukhpal Singh” (supra)] 15. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we allow this appeal. 16. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. 17. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.” 8. In order to consider above submissions including a submission that Trial Court has returned a perverse finding and has not appreciated the evidence on record, Court also takes note of judgment passed by First Appellate Court which has considered the order passed in suit whereby it was decreed and has rejected all grounds, as such, it was a judgment where there was no necessity to frame points for determination since it were not involved. 9. In above background Court also takes note of a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Malluru Mallappa (D) Thru. Lrs. vs. Kuruvathappa and others, 2020 INSC 173 that if First Appellate Court has display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions, the object of Section 96 CPC got satisfied.” 29. As already noted in earlier part of this judgment that First Appellate Court has not framed specific points for determination, but has crystallized the issues for consideration after taking note of all the materials on record as well as respective stand of the parties that “ इस वाद ें यह देखना है मिक क्या पूरी मिववामिदत भूमि प्रतितवादीगण के बड़ों की तन्हा थी अथवा क्या इसें तीन मिहस्सेदार थे।" " इन्हीं ुद्दों से यह देखना होगा मिक बेंची जाने वाली भूमि की उस वक्त क्या नवैयत थी। " 30. The First Appellate Court has made a specific consideration on map and boundaries mentioned in the sale deed, therefore, it was not a case that despite no point of determination was made, first Appellate Court has even failed to apply his mind rather it was a case where issues were 19 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 crystallized, specific consideration was made and reasons were assigned that why an order of reversal can be passed, therefore, this second appeal does not involve question of law that whether due to non-determination of point of determination, the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court renders to be absolutely illegal. 31. Now the Court proceeds to consider as to whether in given set of circumstances a suit simpliciter injunction can be filed or not by the respondents/plaintiff and whether it is a question of law to be framed in present Second Appeal. 32. Plaintiffs have specifically claimed that parties to the suit belongs to same pedigree. There was an oral settlement which was executed and the entire land was divided into three equal parts and accordingly they were in possession. Subsequently, Rudha has sold 1/3rd of the disputed land, being owner of it after parition and since sale deed was on record therefore, plaintiffs have claimed their ownership on disputed plot and only on a ground that there was denial in written statement filed by the appellants/defendants, would not mean that plaintiff cannot file a suit of injunction simpliciter, therefore, in the given set of circumstances, this argument is also not sustainable and there is no question of law that in given circumstances a suit for injunction simpliciter was not maintainable. 33. This Court takes note of judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Ranjeet Alias Bhaiyu Mohite Vs. Nandita Singh & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3252 of 2025, decided on 25.02.2025 and for reference relevant paragraph no.18 of it is reproduced hereinafter:- “18. We are of the considered view that the High Court erred in rejecting the plaint in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because the Appellant had not, at the outset, sought the relief of possession for the small portion allegedly occupied by the Respondents. A plain reading of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) makes it evident that: 'Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person 20 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.' This provision empowers a person in possession of property to file a suit for declaration and protect that possession through an injunction. The requirement to seek "further relief" applies where a plaintiff, already "able to seek" possession or another substantive remedy, omits doing so. Consequently, where the plaintiff is in possession of the bulk of the suit property and only a minor portion is out of his immediate control, a simple omission to claim possession from the start does not, in itself, mandate outright rejection of the entire plaint. Instead, as long as the plaintiff pleads possession of most of the property and seeks declaratory relief along with an injunction to protect that possession, the proviso to Section 34 is not violated. In such a situation, any partial lapse, like failing to claim possession over a small portion, may be cured by a suitable amendment, especially when the suit is at a preliminary stage. As the appellant has sought the consequential relief of injunction therefore the plaint is not barred by section 34 which principle has been thoroughly expounded by this Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594 in the following extract: '21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under: (a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession. 21 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 (c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar [Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202] ). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.” 34. Now this Court proceeds to consider the third issue that whether first Appellate Court has completely misread contents of sale deed dated 6.6.1970 or that a finding returned that oral partition took place was erroneous and perverse. The Court finds that in the order under challenge, First Appellate Court has carefully perused contents of sale deed and returned a finding that since Rudha has sold 1/3rd part of entire land and without any disclosure of any other land, therefore, it was held that there was a prior partition as well as boundaries of the disputed land also confirms that partition has taken place, therefore, it was finding of fact and not on law, therefore, an argument that question of law arose in regard to misrepresentation of sale deed does not hold good and is accordingly rejected. 22 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 35. Now the last issue is regarding finding of oral family partition that whether it was palpably perverse so much as that it involves interpretation of law. 36. In this regard Court takes note of a judgment passed by this Court in Sheikh Mohd.Murtuza Vs. Sheikh Wajid Ali, 2025:AHC:208350. Its relevant paragraph no. 14 is reproduced hereinafter:- “१४. ' मिवतिध के सारवान् प्रश्न' की व्याख्या सिसमिवल प्रमिक्रया संमिहता की धारा १०० ें नहीं की गयी है। इसकी व्याख्या उच्चत न्यायालय द्वारा कई मिनण-यों ें की गई है। ऐसा ही एक मिनण-य चन्द्रभान (ृत) द्वारा मिवतिधक प्रतितमिनधी व अऩ्य बना सरस्वती व अन्य, २ 0 २२ एस.सी.सी. आनलाईन एस.सी. १२७३ है, जहाँ उच्चत न्यायालय के द्वारा पूव- ें पारिरत चुन्नी लाल वी ेहता ऐंड सन्स लिल. प्रतित द सेनच्युरी स्थिस्पनंग एण्ड ैन्यूफै क्चरिंरग कम्पनी लिंल., १९६२ एस.सी.सी. आनलाईन एस.सी. ५७ व हीरो मिवनोथ (अवयस्क) प्रतित शेषाल, (२ 00 ६)५ एस.सी.सी. ५४५ के प्रकरणों ें पारिरत मिनण-यों को संदर्शिभत मिकया और अनुसरण भी मिकया। उक्त के हत्वपूण- अंश को मिहन्दी अनुवाद समिहत मिनम्न उल्लेलिखत मिकया जा रहै हैः- “28. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons (supra), this Court agreed with and approved a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju and Ors.5 which laid down the principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial question of law. 29. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, this Court followed Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons (supra) and other judgments and summarized the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. 30. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out herein below: "21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or as something in academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the 23 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta 551A 235: AIR 1928 PC 172] the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549: AIR 1962 SC 1314] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [AIR 1951 Mad 969: (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)]: (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549: AIR 1962 SC 1314], SCR p. 557) "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be, whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or the question raised is palpably absurd, the question would not be a substantial question of law. उपरोक्त का मिहन्दी अनुवाद मिनम्न हैः - "२८. सर चुन्नीलाल बना ेहता एंड संस ( पूव- ें उल्लेलिखत) के ाले ें, यह न्यायालय रिरम्लपुडी सुब्बा राव बना नूनी वीरजू एवं अन्य ें द्रास उच्च न्यायालय की पूण- पीठ के मिनण-य से सहत हुआ और उसे अनुोमिदत मिकया, सिजसें यह मिनण-य करने के सिसद्धांत मिनधा-रिरत मिकए गए थे मिक कब ' मिवतिध का प्रश्न' एक ' मिवतिध का सारवान प्रश्न' बन जाता है। 24 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 २९. हीरो मिवनोथ बना शेषम्ल के प्रकरण ें, इस न्यायालय ने सर चुन्नीलाल बना ेहता एंड संस ( पूव- ें उल्लेलिखत) और अन्य मिनण-यों का अनुसरण मिकया और सूत्रों को संक्षेमिपत मिकया मिक क्या संदर्शिभत मिवतिध के प्रश्न ात्र मिवतिध के प्रश्न थे या मिवतिध के सारवान प्रश्न थे। ३०. हीरो मिवनोद ( पूव- ें उल्लेलिखत) ाले ें इस न्यायालय के मिनण-य के प्रासंमिगक प्रस्तर मिनम्न हैं: "२१. संशोतिधत धारा १०० सीपीसी ें प्रयुक्त वाक्यांश "मिवतिध का सारवान प्रश्न" को संमिहता ें परिरभामिषत नहीं मिकया गया है। " मिवतिध के प्रश्न" को योग्य बनाने के लिलए सारवान शब्द का अथ- है सारभूत, आवश्यक, वास्तमिवक, उतिचत ूल्यवान, हत्वपूण- या मिवचारणीय। इसे तकनीकी, सारहीन या परिरणाहीन, या ात्र शैक्षभिणक के मिवपरीत सझा जाना चामिहए। हालाँमिक, यह स्पष्ट है मिक मिवधातियका ने " साान्य हत्व के " शब्दों को जोड़कर "मिवतिध के सारवान प्रश्न" के दायरे को परिरभामिषत नहीं करने का मिवकल्प चुना है, जैसा मिक संमिहता की धारा १०९ या संमिवधान के अनुच्छेद १३३(१)(क) जैसे कई अन्य प्रावधानों ें मिकया गया है। सिजस मिवतिध के सारवान प्रश्न पर मिद्वतीय अपील की सुनवाई की जाएगी, वह आवश्यक रूप से साान्य हत्व मिवतिध का सारवान प्रश्न नहीं होना चामिहए। गुरन मिदHा बना रा मिदHा ५५ IA २३५: AIR १९२८ PC १७२] ें, " मिवतिध का सारवान प्रश्न" वाक्यांश, जैसा मिक तत्कालीन मिवद्यान धारा १०० सी.पी.सी. ( सिजसे बाद ें संशोधन अतिधमिनय, १९७३ द्वारा ह%ा मिदया गया) के अंतित खंड ें प्रयुक्त मिकया गया था, सिजस पर मिवचार हुआ और ाननीयों ने ाना मिक इसका अथ- साान्य हत्व का सारवान प्रश्न नहीं, बस्थिल्क एक सारवान मिवतिध का प्रश्न था जो प्रकरण से संबंतिधत था। सर चुन्नीलाल के प्रकरण ें [ १९६२ सप (३) एससीआर ५४९: एआईआर १९६२ एससी १३१४] संमिवधान पीठ ने रिरम्लपुडी सुब्बा राव बना नूनी वीरराजू [ एआईआर १९५१ ैड ९६९: (१९५१) २ एएलजे २२२ (एफबी)] ें द्रास उच्च न्यायालय की पूण- पीठ द्वारा लिलए गए मिनम्नलिललिखत दृमिष्टकोण से सहतित व्यक्त की: ( सर चुन्नीलाल ाला [ १९६२ सप (३) एससीआर ५४९ एआईआर १९६२ एससी १३१४], एससीआर पृष्ठ ५५७) " जब कोई मिवतिध का प्रश्न उतिचत रूप से तक- - योग्य हो, जहाँ उस पर तभेद की संभावना हो या जहाँ न्यायालय ने उस प्रश्न पर मिवस्तार से मिवचार करना और वैकस्थिल्पक मिवचारों पर चचा- करना आवश्यक सझा हो, तब वह प्रश्न, मिवतिध का सारवान प्रश्न होगा। दूसरी ओर, यमिद वह प्रश्न, व्यावहारिरक रूप से सव†च्च न्यायालय के मिनण-य से आच्छामिदत हो या यमिद प्रश्न के मिनधा-रण ें लागू मिकए जाने वाले साान्य सिसद्धांत अच्छी तरह से स्थामिपत हों और के वल उन सिसद्धांतों को प्रकरण के मिवशेष तथ्य पर लागू करने का प्रश्न हो, तो वह मिवतिध का सारवान प्रश्न नहीं होगा।" ३१. मिकसी प्रकरण ें संदर्शिभत प्रश्न, एक मिवतिध का सारवान प्रश्न है या नहीं, यह मिनधा-रिरत करने का उतिचत परीक्षण यह होगा मिक क्या यह सव-साधारण के लिलए हत्वपूण- है या वह पक्षकारों के अतिधकारों को प्रत्यक्ष और ूलतः प्रभामिवत करता है, और यमिद ऐसा है, तो क्या यह इस अथ- ें एक अमिनणˆत प्रश्न है मिक इस न्यायालय द्वारा इसका अंतित रूप से मिनप%ारा नहीं मिकया गया है। यमिद प्रश्न उच्चत न्यायालय द्वारा 25 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 मिनधा-रिरत मिकया जा चुका हो या प्रश्न के मिनधा-रण ें लागू मिकए जाने वाले साान्य सिसद्धांत सुस्थामिपत हैं और उन सिसद्धांतों को लागू करने का ात्र प्रश्न है या संदर्शिभत प्रश्न स्पष्टतः बेतुका है, तो वह प्रश्न मिवतिध का सारवान प्रश्न नहीं होगा।” ( मिहन्दी अनुवाद न्यायालय द्वारा मिकया गया है)” 37. The claim of the plaintiffs is based on an oral partition and that it was acted upon. There was a simple denial on behalf of defendants i.e. appellants, therefore, it has to be considered that on basis of documentary as well as oral evidence, whether any such oral partition took place or not and whether it was acted upon or not. 38. Learned Trial Court has rejected evidence of sale deed only on a ground that no such oral partition was mentioned in the sale deed as well as contents of sale deed does not give a basis that there was an oral partition, whereas the First Appellate Court has considered contents of sale deed and its effect thereof in detail. 39. The Boundaries of the land in dispute mentioned in the sale deed as well as effect of oral evidence also makes clear that an oral partition took place, therefore, it was a case whether on basis of evidence, the view taken by the First Appellate Court was a possible view or not. The possible view was based on correct appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence, therefore, in light of a judgment passed in Dilbagrai Punjabi (supra), on which learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance has failed to show any error on such magnitude which could give rise to a substantial question of law in present case of reversal. 40. The judgment passed by the First Appellate Court cannot be said to be manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law. It was also not a case where dealing with evidence was patently, illegal or settled legal provisions were absolutely ignored as well as it was not a case where finding returned by the First Appellate Court was based on no evidence i.e. no perversity was shown. In this regard Court takes note 26 SAPL No. - 556 of 1982 of Damodar Lal Vs. Sohan Devi & Ors, 2016 (3) SCC 78 and its relevant paragraphs nos.8,9 and 10 are reproduced hereinafter: “ 8. "Perversity" has been the subject-matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam, (2007) 12 SCC 190, it has been held at para 11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect." 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram, (2010) 15 SCC 530, at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." 41. Outcome of above discussion is that question of law proposed by learned Senior Counsel does not pass the test of it being a substantial question of law for the purpose of Section 100 C.P.C., accordingly, present Second Appeal is dismissed. (Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.) September 14, 2026 SB Digitally signed by :- SANDEEP BHATTACHARYA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad