Respondents. Judgement PRAKASH NARAIN, C.J. : - By these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution a challenge is made to the vires of Sections 4, 6 and 58 of the Post Office Act, 1898, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and as a consequence thereof to declare that certain searches and seizures made were illegal and the respondents are liable to return the articles seized. A further prayer is made that the searches and seizures being illegal and contrary to Section 165 of the Criminal P.C., the prosecutions launched as a result of the said searches and seizures be quashed and the articles seized be ordered to be returned to the petitioners. 2. Section 4 of the Act is claimed to be ultra vires Arts.14 and 19(1)(a) and (g) of the Constitution. Section 58 is challenged as it has to be read along with Section 4 of the Act, the alleged violation of which resulted in searches and seizures and prosecutions. 3. The facts of the cases are these. The Post Master General Delhi Circle, came to know that allegedly M/s. Inland Commercial (TPT) Service, hereinafter referred to as the firm, was running a parallel postal service in violation of Section 4 and other provisions of the Act by receiving and collecting letters from various parties and individuals against payment and despatching the same to the addressees at their respective destinations in Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Nagpur etc., where postal communication exists. Accordingly, a report was lodged with the Police by the Senior Superintendent of Post Office, Delhi Division, Delhi, by communication dated November 29, 1978. The Police after getting permission from the District Magistrate, Delhi, as required by Section 155(2) of the Criminal P.C., raided the premises of the firm on December 12, 1978 and seized documents showing that the firm was actually running a parallel postal service. After completing the investigations the Police authorities launched a prosecution against the firm and the matter is sub judice. In October 1, 1980, it again came to light that the said firm was still carrying on with its activity of allegedly running a postal service. At about 4.00 A. M. on Oct. 1, 1980 representatives of the firm were seen taking about 21 parcels containing registered letters and parcels booked by the firm from its customers in two 3 wheeler scooters to Palam Airport for booking by air freight. At about 4.00 A. M. on Oct. 1, 1980 representatives of the firm were seen taking about 21 parcels containing registered letters and parcels booked by the firm from its customers in two 3 wheeler scooters to Palam Airport for booking by air freight. The Police apprehended these people and also seized certain articles. Out of the 21 parcels/packets seized three packets contained 273 letters which were destined for various stations like Bombay, Calcutta, Gauhati and Siliguri. The Police prepared a list of these letters and articles. The police carried out some investigation and then applied to the area Magistrate for making further investigation. Enquiries by the postal authorities revealed that the firm was running three branches in Delhi where registered articles were booked for onward transmission at the rate of Rs. 1/- per article and parcels were booked at a fee of Rs. 10/- per kg. Further enquiries revealed that M/s. Delux Airways was also a branch of the said firm. On the night of October 31, 1980, the Police conducted raids in the several premises of the firm. As a result several articles and registered articles were recovered. Inasmuch as by reason of one search and seizure prosecution is pending and with regard to other searches and seizures investigation is going on, letters and articles seized in the raids have been detained. The petitioners in Civil Writ No.90 of 1981 are customers of the firm and claim return of the said letters and articles by preferring the aforesaid challenge. In other petition the firm as one of the petitioners has raised the same pleas. 4. In Writ Petition No.13 of 1981 petitioner No.1 is the firm, petitioners 2 to 5 are the partners of the firm and petitioners 6 and 7 are said to be the customers of the firm. In Writ Petition No.90 of 1981 the petitioners are customers of the firm which has been made respondent No.5. 5. By way of return to the rule nisi affidavits have been filed on behalf of the Central Government, the postal authorities, the Delhi Administration and Officer-in-Charge of Crime Branch, namely, the Police. Their stand is common. It is contended that the firm was allegedly carrying on a rival postal service in violation of the provisions of the Act. 5. By way of return to the rule nisi affidavits have been filed on behalf of the Central Government, the postal authorities, the Delhi Administration and Officer-in-Charge of Crime Branch, namely, the Police. Their stand is common. It is contended that the firm was allegedly carrying on a rival postal service in violation of the provisions of the Act. They challenge the correctness of the contentions that the provisions of the Act are ultra vires any provision of the Constitution. It is submitted that the petitions have been filed as a counter-blast to the prosecution and at the instance of the firm. 6. Before we proceed to examine the contentions raised it would be appropriate to read the relevant provisions of the Act and the Constitution. S.4 of the Act reads as under : - "4. Exclusive privilege of conveying letters reserved to the Government : - (1) Wherever within India posts or postal communications are established by the Central Government, the Central Government shall have the exclusive privilege of conveying by post, from one place to another, all letters except in the following cases, and shall also have the exclusive privilege of performing all the incidental services of receiving, collecting, sending, despatching and delivering all letters, except in the following cases, that is to say : - (a) letters sent by a private friend in his way, journey or travel, to be delivered by him to the person to whom they are directed, without hire, reward or other profit or advantage for receiving, carrying or delivering them; (b) letters solely concerning the affairs of the sender or receiver thereof, sent by a messenger on purpose, and © letters solely concerning goods or property, sent either by sea or by land to be delivered with the goods or property which the letters concern, without hire, reward or other profit or advantage for receiving, carrying or delivering them: Provided that nothing in this section shall authorise any person to make a collection of letters excepted as aforesaid for the purpose of sending them otherwise than by post. (2) For the purposes of this section and S.5 the expression "letters" includes postcards." 7. Section 6 reads as under : - "6. (2) For the purposes of this section and S.5 the expression "letters" includes postcards." 7. Section 6 reads as under : - "6. Exemption from liability for loss, misdelivery, delay or damage - The Government shall not incur any liability or by reason of the loss, misdelivery or delay of, or damage to, any postal article in course of transmission by post, except in so far as such liability may in express terms be undertaken by the Central Government as hereinafter provided; and no officer of the Post Office shall incur any liability by reason of any such loss, mis-delivery, delay or damage, unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by his wilful act or default." 8. The relevant portion of S.58 reads as under: - "58. Penalty for contravention of S.4, - (1) Whoever - (a) conveys otherwise than by post, a letter within the exclusive privilege conferred on the Central Government by S.4, or (b) performs any service incidental to conveying, otherwise than by post, any letter within the exclusive privilege aforesaid, or © sends, or tenders or delivers in order to be sent, otherwise than by post, a letter within the exclusive privilege aforesaid, or (d) makes a collection of letters excepted from the exclusive privilege aforesaid for the purpose of sending them otherwise than by post, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to fifty rupees for every such letter, (2) …… …… …… …." 9. Article 14 of the Constitution lays down : - "14. Equality before law. - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." 10. The relevant portions of Art.19 read as under : - "19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. - (1) All citizens shall have the right - (a) to freedom of speech and expression; … ….. ….. ….. (g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The relevant portions of Art.19 read as under : - "19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. - (1) All citizens shall have the right - (a) to freedom of speech and expression; … ….. ….. ….. (g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. (3) to (5) …… …… …… …… (6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,- (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise." 11. It is common ground that the Act came into force prior to the Constitution and is an existing law within the meaning of Art.13 and Art.19(6). 12. We may also notice some provisions of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 as some argument has been advanced with the aid of those provisions. S.7(2)(a) permits the air-lines to carry freight as a commercial activity. S.45 speaks of the power to make regulations. S.45(2)(g) in terms speaks of power to make regulations to carry goods and passengers. In other words the airlines are permitted to carry on commercial activity of carrying goods as freight. S.7(2)(a) permits the air-lines to carry freight as a commercial activity. S.45 speaks of the power to make regulations. S.45(2)(g) in terms speaks of power to make regulations to carry goods and passengers. In other words the airlines are permitted to carry on commercial activity of carrying goods as freight. According to the petitioners letters, packets and parcels would be goods which air-lines can carry by way of commercial activity. 13. The word "letter" has not been defined in the Act though the term "postal article" is defined by S.2(i). Indeed, on a reading of S.2(i) it becomes apparent that a "letter" (in which postcard is included by virtue of S.4(2) of the Act) is only one of the many articles which are transmissible by post. Therefore, in order to understand the scope of Ss.4, 6 and 58 of the Act we must understand first what the word "letter" means. Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary (Revised Edition) gives the meaning of the word "letter" as: "a conventional mark primarily used to express a sound of speech: often loosely applied to the sound itself: a written or printed message". (Emphasis supplied) 14. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives the meaning of the word "letter" as: - "Something written, Anything written, an inscription, document, texts: a missive in writing; an epistle". 15. The Post Office Act, 1953 of England defines the word "letter" to include a packet but not a parcel or newspaper. As would be apparent, it is an artificial definition given by the British Parliament as neither the dictionary meaning nor the meaning of the word "letter", as commonly understood, would include a packet. 16. As commonly understood, in our view, a letter is a communication by one person to another sent in writing, print or type. The communication may be dissemination of information, thought, ideas or advice. There can be no exhaustive list of what one person may communicate to another. It may even be a demand or opinion. What is essential is that the communication should he readable and thereby intelligible to and understood by the person to whom the communication is sent. 17. We now turn to the provisions of the Act. There can be no exhaustive list of what one person may communicate to another. It may even be a demand or opinion. What is essential is that the communication should he readable and thereby intelligible to and understood by the person to whom the communication is sent. 17. We now turn to the provisions of the Act. S.4 confers a privilege on the Central Government of (a) conveying of "letters" from one place to another, and (b) performing all the incidental services for the purpose of conveying the letters, viz., of receiving, collecting, sending, despatching and delivering the letters. This privilege is, however, not available to the Central Government in respect of "letters" (i) sent by a private friend in his way, journey or travel, to be delivered by him to the person to whom they are directed, without hire, reward or other profit or advantage for receiving, carrying or delivering them; (ii) solely concerning the affairs of the sender or receiver thereof, sent by a messenger on purpose, and (iii) solely concerning goods or property, sent either by sea or by land to be delivered with the goods or property which the letters concern, without hire, reward or other profit or advantage for receiving, carrying or delivering them. Two questions arise. First, as to what is the meaning of the term "privilege" in this section. Secondly, to what activity the reference has been made in S.4 of the Act. 18. As to what is the meaning of the term "privilege" we may with advantage refer to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Isha Valimohamad v. Haji Gulam Mohamad and Haji Dada Trust, AIR 1974 SC 2061 . The Supreme Court was really concerned with a dispute relating to eviction between a landlord and tenant; the right of the landlord to terminate a tenancy and seek eviction despite the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, as applied to the Gujarat State, and the Saurashtra Rent Control Act, 1951, read with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. On the court repelling the contention that the landlord had a right to terminate the tenancy by giving a notice on the ground of sub-letting and thereby having an accrued right within the meaning of S.51 of the Bombay Act, which, it was contended, would survive the repeal of the Saurashtra Act, an argument was addressed that even if the landlord had no accrued right, he, at least had a 'privilege' as visualised by S.51, proviso (1) (ii) of the Bombay Act. In that context Mathew, J. who spoke for the court, noticed with approval the following: - " 'A privilegium, in short, is a special act affecting special persons with an anomalous advantage, or with an anomalous burthen. It is derived from privatum, which, as opposed to publicum, signified anything which regards persons considered individually; publicum being anything which regards persons considered collectively, and as forming a society'. (see Austin's Jurisprudence, Vol II, 51h Ed. (1911) p. 519). The meaning of that word in jurisprudence has undergone considerable change after Austin wrote. According to Hohfeld: '………a privilege is the opposite of a duty, and the correlative of a no-right.' For instance, where 'X has a right or claim that Y………should stay off the land (of X), he himself has the privilege of entering on the land or in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off.' (see Fundamental Legal Conceptions, (1923) pp.38-39 Authur L. Corbin writes. 'We say that B had a right that A should not intrude and that A had a duty to stay out. But if B had invited A to enter, we know that those results would not occur. In such case, we say that B had no right that A should stay out and that A had the privilege of entering.' (See "Legal Analysis and Terminoi logy". 29 Yale Law Journal 163) According to Kocoureh: 'Privilege and inability are correlatives. Where there is a privilege there must be Inability. The terms are correlatives. The dominus of a privilege may prevent the servus of the inability from exacting an act from the dominus'. 29 Yale Law Journal 163) According to Kocoureh: 'Privilege and inability are correlatives. Where there is a privilege there must be Inability. The terms are correlatives. The dominus of a privilege may prevent the servus of the inability from exacting an act from the dominus'. (See "Jural Relations", 2nd ed., p.24) Paton says : 'The Restatement of the law of Property defines a privilege as a legal freedom on the part of one person as against another to do a given act or a legal freedom not to do a certain act'; (See Jurisprudence, 3rd ed., (1964) P.256)." His Lordship then went on to observe : - "We think that the respondent-landlord had the legal freedom as against the appellants to terminate the tenancy or not. The appellants had no right or claim that the respondent should not terminate the tenancy and the respondent had, therefore, the privilege of terminating it on the ground that appellants had sub-let the premises. This privilege would survive the repeal. But the problem would still remain whether the respondent had an accrued right or privilege to recover possession of the premises under Section 13(1) of the Saurashtra Act on the ground of the sub-letting before the repeal of that Act. The fact that the privilege to terminate the tenancy on the ground of sub-letting survived the repeal does not mean that the landlord had an accrued right or privilege to recover possession under Section 13(1) of that Act as that right or privilege could arise only if the tenancy had been validly terminated before the repeal of the Saurashtra Act." 19. It would thus be apparent that' privilege can be equated to a right. Therefore, when Section 4 of the Act confers on the Central Government a privilege to coiled, send despatch, deliver and thus fulfill the task of conveying letters by post, it is a right which is conferred by the statute on the Central Government. This right, however, is not exercisable vis-à-vis the three exceptions mentioned in Section 4 which we have already noticed earlier. 20. What is the right or privilege that has been conferred is the next question. The right or privilege conferred is: conveying the letters by post and doing everything incidental thereto. This right, however, is not exercisable vis-à-vis the three exceptions mentioned in Section 4 which we have already noticed earlier. 20. What is the right or privilege that has been conferred is the next question. The right or privilege conferred is: conveying the letters by post and doing everything incidental thereto. This means that for a charge conveying the letters and giving all other necessary facilities to enable the Central Government to effectively exercise the privilege or right. In plain language, it means to carry on the commercial activity or trade or business or to carry on the occupation of conveying letters. There is no privilege conferred by Section 4 to do anything except to carry on the occupation, trade or business of conveying letters and doing things incidental to such conveying of letters. We are in good company when we say that the privilege envisaged by Section 4 is a privilege to indulge in commercial activity. In Government of India v. Jeevaraj Alva, AIR 1970 Mys 13, a Division Bench of the former Mysore High Court negatived the contention that conveying postal articles by post was a sovereign function. It held, "The postal department is a commercial-cum-public utility department of the Government of India…….". 21. Section 6 of the Act exempts the Central Government and its officers from being answerable for any liability by reason of any loss, misdelivery, delay or damage of or to a postal article in the course of transmission by post, unless the loss, misdelivery, delay or damage was caused on account of some fraudulent or wilful act or default by an officer of the post office. This provision has been made, it seems, because of the exclusive privilege conferred by S.4 and keeping in view the likelihood of accidents or some such events. It is also possible that the Legislature visualised the volume of traffic that may have to be handled as a consequence of which there may be inadvertent loss, misdelivery, delay or damage of or to the postal articles. 22. Section 58, prescribes the penalties for breach of the privilege postulated by Section 4, Clause (a) of sub-section (1) refers to the person who conveys otherwise than by post a letter within the exclusive privilege conferred by Section 4. 22. Section 58, prescribes the penalties for breach of the privilege postulated by Section 4, Clause (a) of sub-section (1) refers to the person who conveys otherwise than by post a letter within the exclusive privilege conferred by Section 4. It means that only that person falls within the mischief of this clause who transmits a letter and for that purpose receives, collects, despatches and delivers by making charges for the services rendered and does not fall within the exceptions in Section 4, Clause (b) applies to those persons who, for hire, reward or profit, render those services which are incidental to conveying letters. Clause © ropes in the person who sends or tenders or delivers letters in order to be sent, otherwise than by post. This clause it is urged, is strictly not referable to the exercise of the privilege of conveying letters or rendering services incidental to such conveying. But on this view we will have occasion to dilate further later on. It could, however, be urged that this clause has been put in so that people do not abet the offence or facilitate the commission of the offence postulated by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Sec.58 commission of which is directly destructive of the privilege conferred by Section 4, Clause (d), sub-section (1) of Section 58 speaks of persons who collect letters for being sent otherwise than by post which collection is a privilege incidental to the privilege of conveying letters, as postulated by S.4. 23. The objection as to the vires of Sections 4 and 58 as well as Section 6 has to be viewed from different angles with regard to the firm and its partners on the one hand and the firm's customers on the other, so far as infringement of Article 19(1)(a) and (g) is concerned. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that sending of a letter by a person is an essential ingredient of the Fundamental Right as postulated by clause (a) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution. The freedom of speech or expression would be meaningless if the speech or the expression cannot be conveyed to some one else. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that sending of a letter by a person is an essential ingredient of the Fundamental Right as postulated by clause (a) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution. The freedom of speech or expression would be meaningless if the speech or the expression cannot be conveyed to some one else. The freedom of speech or expression is not the freedom to speak what a person wants to speak or express, whatever and in any manner a person wants to express, locked up in isolation in a room but so that he can communicate his thoughts and ideas to others. This can be done, amongst others, by sending a communication by the sender to someone else to whom the communication is addressed. The only restriction that can be placed by the State on such freedom is one where the free exercise of the right of speech and expression, in any way, adversely affects the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It is urged that the restriction placed by a reading of Section 4 and Section 58(1)© that a person cannot send a letter except through the post office is a restriction which is unwarranted and is a restriction which does not fall within the ambit of the exceptions postulated by Article 19(2). In this context reference is made to several decisions to which we may advert at this stage. 24. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd, v. Union of India. AIR 1962 SC 305 , the Supreme Court held. "The right to freedom of speech and expression carries with it the right to publish and circulate one's ideas, opinions and views with complete freedom and by resorting to any available means of publication, subject to such restrictions as could be legitimately imposed under Clause (2) of Article 19." The Court further held, "The right to freedom of speech and expression is an individual right guaranteed to every citizen by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. There is nothing in Cl.(2) of Art.19 which permits the State to abridge this right on the ground of conferring benefits upon the public in general or upon a section of the public. There is nothing in Cl.(2) of Art.19 which permits the State to abridge this right on the ground of conferring benefits upon the public in general or upon a section of the public. It is not open to the State to curtail or infringe the freedom of speech of one for promoting the general welfare of a section or a group of people unless its action could be justified under a law competent under Cl.(2) of Art.19…… It was, however, contended on behalf of the State that there are two aspects of the activities of newspapers - the dissemination of news and views and the commercial aspect. These two aspects it is said, are different from one another and under clause (6) of Article 19 restrictions can be placed on the latter right in the interest of the general public so far as it is relevant for the purpose of the argument clause (6) reads thus : Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so tar as it imposes or prevent the State from making any law imposing in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause……..'. It may well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general public restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on business but it is not open to the State to achieve this object by directly and immediately curtailing any other freedom of that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not susceptible of abridgment on the same grounds as are set out in Cl.(6) of Article 19. Therefore, the right of freedom of speech cannot be taken away with the object of placing restrictions on the business activities of a citizen. Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged, it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are Justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged, it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are Justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). For, the scheme of Art.19 is to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and Cl.(1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that the State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. All the greater reason, therefore, for holding that the State cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another freedom. 25. In Romesh Thapper v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 , the Supreme Court held that the freedom of speech postulated by Article 19 (1) (a) includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. The restrictions that can he placed on the exercise of the right postulated by Art.19(1)(a) can only be imposed within the ambit of Art.19 (2) A distinction was drawn between 'public order' contemplated by Article 19 (2) and breach of peace, which would involve disturbance of public tranquillity to a certain degree. 26. In Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106 , another case of liberty of the press vis-à-vis the Government's newsprint policy, it was held that the import control cannot be utilised to curb or control circulation or growth or freedom of newspapers in India. Reiterating its derision in the Bank Nationalisation case ( AIR 1970 SC 564 ) it was noticed that two tests have to be applied to judge the vires of an action. "First, it is not the object of the authority making the law impairing the right of the citizen nor the form of action that determines the invasion of the right. Secondly, it is the effect of the law and the action upon the right which attracts the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief. "First, it is not the object of the authority making the law impairing the right of the citizen nor the form of action that determines the invasion of the right. Secondly, it is the effect of the law and the action upon the right which attracts the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief. The direct operation of the Act upon the rights forms the real test." The decision in Sakal Paper's case was reaffirmed. 27. In Indulal K. Yagnik v. State, AIR 1963 Guj 259 , a Bench of that Court examined the scope of Article 19(1)(a) qua the use of loud-speakers. It was urged that the freedom of speech and expression comprehended the right of making use of all mechanical means for the purpose of conveying one's views. This contention was contested by the State. It was held. "In our judgement, though the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) has many facets, it is but one right. The right of speech and the right of expression are not two separate rights, but, they are two aspects of one and the same right, one being complementary to the other. This fundamental right is not merely a right to make use of one's larynx. It is not merely a right to make use of the human voice box. If this were so, it is quite clear that the right would be a futile right. Nobody would cherish the right to express his views to himself. No dictator has ever succeeded in preventing anyone, from hearing his own views. In order that the right may be effectively exercised and serve a useful purpose the right should be not merely a right to make use of one's speech, but a right to express one's views to others. Thus, the essence of the right does not consist in merely making use of the human voice, but, it lies in the ability to convey one's views to others………There is no reason for confining the right to the freedom of the press……………The essence of the right consists in giving an opportunity to the citizen to reach the minds of his fellow citizens and, thereby, to give him the chance to convert them to his own views. It follows from this that the right includes not merely the right to propagate one's views, but, also comprehends the right to circulate those views to as large an audience as one can possibly reach……" 28. Relying on the above decisions it is urged that one of the modes of expression is to send a letter. Therefore, any impediment on the exercise of that right, unless it falls within the ambit of clause (2) of Article 19, would be destructive of the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). Accordingly, Sec.4, read with Section 58(1)©, is ultra vires the Constitution. 29. In our opinion. Section 4 is not at all attracted on its own force to the customers of the firm. In other words, writing or sending a letter by itself does not impinge upon the privilege of the Central Government, as postulated by Section 4 of the Act. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution would only be attracted to the writing and sending of a letter. Section 4, on the other hand, speaks of 'conveying' the letter or performing services to facilitate such conveying. There is no right postulated by Article 19 (1) (a) that a letter written by a person can be conveyed in any manner that the writer likes. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the means of communicating one's thought, dilated upon by the Gujarat High Court in the loudspeaker case, are apposite. The fallacy of the argument is that the means of exercise of the freedom of speech and expression is writing the letter and sending it. So long as some legal means of sending the letter is available to the writer, as opposed to the mode of one's choice, contention that Article 19(1)(a) is violated is untenable. It is nobody's case that there is absolute restriction placed by Sections 4 and 58(1)© on writing or sending of letters. The writer is provided the facility tosend letters. 30. With regard to the firm and its partners, Article 19 (1) (a) is not at all attracted. What they are conveying are letters embodying speech and expression of others and not their own and that too as a commercial venture. As has been said by the Supreme Court in the cases noticed above, the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) is an individual freedom. What they are conveying are letters embodying speech and expression of others and not their own and that too as a commercial venture. As has been said by the Supreme Court in the cases noticed above, the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) is an individual freedom. The firm cannot be heard to say that it is assisting the writer of the letter to exercise the freedom of speech and expression by conveying it otherwise than through the post office. The right which the firm and its partners can claim is the right guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g), i.e., to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Here, clause (6) of Article 19 gets attracted and the restriction placed or the monopoly created is safeguarded by the provisions of Cl.(6). Thus, Art.19(1)(a) or (g) cannot be held to have been impinged, either in the case of the customers of the firm or the firm and its partners. 31. It is urged that clause © of Section 58(1), which makes sending, tendering or delivering in order to be sent a letter otherwise than by post a penal offence, would either be violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution or ultra vires Section 4 of the Act. At first glance the argument may look attractive. On a closer examination, however, it becomes apparent as to what was the legislative intent in enacting cl.(c) to Section 58(1) of the Act. The sending, tendering or delivering in order to be sent a letter, otherwise than by post, is made an offence so that a person does not abet (in some cases incite a person to commit) the offence postulated by clause (a) of Section 58(1), which is directly referable to the privilege postulated by Section 4. The words "otherwise than by post" are the key to the provision. Inasmuch as the conveying by post is the exclusive privilege of the Central Government anyone who assists in that privilege being violated has been made to fall within the ambit of the penal clause. This is not directly or even indirectly an infringement of Article 19(1)(a). If a person cannot convey, it would be meaningless to send or tender or deliver to be sent a letter to such a person. This is not directly or even indirectly an infringement of Article 19(1)(a). If a person cannot convey, it would be meaningless to send or tender or deliver to be sent a letter to such a person. Such sending, tendering or delivering can only be with the object either of violating or to assist or incite in violating the law, which is a valid law so far as it places a restriction on conveying letters. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that at least clause © of Section 58(1) of the Act has to be struck down. 32. Learned counsel then contends that the impact of the ban on conveying or delivering is, in fact, a ban on sending. If a person cannot convey a letter except by post, it means a person cannot send a letter for being conveyed except by post. Therefore, Section 4 would be ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) de hors Section 58. We are not impressed. The decisions relied upon do not lay down any such proposition. What is being banned or in regard to what monopoly is claimed by the State is the commercial activity postulated by Article 19 (1) (g). Such monopoly is completely saved by clause (6) of Article 19. Indeed, the observations of the Supreme Court, quoted by us earlier in Sakal Paper's case ( AIR 1962 SC 305 ), fortify us in coming to this conclusion. Section 4 speaks of a commercial activity. It specifically excludes non-commercial conveyance of letters from its operation. Commercial activity is indulged in by the carrier of the letter or conveyor at the letter and not by the sender of the letter. The sender only comes in by way of an abettor under Section 58. Therefore, the challenge of the petitioners has to be rejected. 33. The next challenge to the provisions of Sections 4 and 58 of the Act is that the privilege or ban is only with regard to letters, including post-cards, and not with regard to any other postal article. It is urged that there is no valid classification or Intelligible differentia to exclude other postal articles. There is no nexus to the object to he achieved by including only letters within the ambit of Section 4 and Sec.58. If newspapers and circulars can be sent otherwise than by post, it is not understandable why letters cannot be sent. It is urged that there is no valid classification or Intelligible differentia to exclude other postal articles. There is no nexus to the object to he achieved by including only letters within the ambit of Section 4 and Sec.58. If newspapers and circulars can be sent otherwise than by post, it is not understandable why letters cannot be sent. Referring to Section 6 it is urged that unreasonableness of Section 4 is heightened for Section 6 indemnifies the Central Government with regard to all postal articles, including letters, whereas Sections 4 and 58 speak of only letters. In this context it is urged that the privilege granted by Section 4 is a meaningless privilege as a public utility service, which the Central Government is called upon to perform, must either be performed for all postal articles or none. If, it is urged earning of revenue is the dominant purpose or objective of the privilege contemplated by Section 4, then the privilege should have extended to all postal articles. The choosing of only letters for the application of Sec.4 and S.58 is on whim and not reason. Thus. Section 4 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 34. Further contention was that it is left to the Government to interpret what that word means and whether a particular article seized is or is not a letter. 35. Reliance was placed first on Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 , in support of the contention that the term "letter" is vague. In this case the Supreme Court after a conspectus of its various earlier decisions spelt out the various principles on which the validity of law is to be tested vis-a-vis Article 14. It is observed (At p.548) : - "A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply. It is observed (At p.548) : - "A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of the validity or otherwise of such a statute the Court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make selection of classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny the Court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. In such a case the Court will strike down both the law as well as the executive action taken under such law, as it did in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ( AIR 1952 SC 75 ), Dwarka Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 SCR 803 : ( AIR 1954 SC 224 ) and Dhirendra Kumar Mandal v. Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, 1955-1 SCR 224 : ( AIR 1954 SC 424 )." 36. We do not see how this rule is attracted in the present case. It is not left to the Government or its discretion to say whether a particular object is or is not a letter. First of all, the question would only arise about an article being or not being a letter if a person is prosecuted under Section 58 of the Act. in that case it is the Court which will decide whether the article concerned is or is not a letter. First of all, the question would only arise about an article being or not being a letter if a person is prosecuted under Section 58 of the Act. in that case it is the Court which will decide whether the article concerned is or is not a letter. Secondly, the term "letter", though not defined by the Act, is not such a vague or indefinite term that at its discretion the Government can call any article a letter. Indeed we have already earlier dealt with this aspect and laid down what is a letter. 37. Reliance on Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602 , by the petitioners is also misplaced. In this case it has been said that the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution has been considered and explained by the Supreme Court in numerous decisions. Referring to Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 , it is observed that in order to attract Article 14 it has to be shown whether the impugned statute applies unequally to persons or things similarly situated or the provisions of the Act enable an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be accorded to persons or things similarly situated. In our opinion, letters which form the bulk of postal articles and subserve the need of the majority in this country who avail of the services of the post offices are a distinct class by themselves. In the context of freight being permissible to be carried by rail, air or sea and by different modes of transport, the privilege is restricted to that article which is required to subserve the need of the many and no restriction is placed on those articles which subserve the needs of only a few. The classification to us appears reasonable. Though the Supreme Court has called postal service as a commercial service, we may recollect the origin of postal service. It first originated in England by what is well known as the penney post. Even prior to that, the postal service had its origin in the provision by the Crown of messengers for the carriage of letters between London and a few of the principal towns in the Kingdom. The first statutory grant of a monopoly was made by an Ordinance of the Protectorate, replaced by an Act passed soon after the Restoration. Even prior to that, the postal service had its origin in the provision by the Crown of messengers for the carriage of letters between London and a few of the principal towns in the Kingdom. The first statutory grant of a monopoly was made by an Ordinance of the Protectorate, replaced by an Act passed soon after the Restoration. Looking at the concept of the egalitarian State sought to be built in India, one may well say that the provision of postal service is not only a commercial activity but also a welfare activity of the State. In that context, it cannot be said that restricting the privilege to letters makes any unreasonable or irrational classification. 38. We may with advantage refer to Chitoor Motor Transport Co. (P) Ltd. v. I.T. Officer, Chittoor. AIR 1966 SC 750. This case was concerned with the validity of Section 10(2)(vib) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The assessee had transferred some assets within 10 years. Section 35 of that Act was invoked to rectify the assessment by including the development rebate allowed and adding it as income of the assessee. In that context it was urged that the provisions of Section 10 (2) (vib), which place an assessee who sells the assets to the Government in a different position than an assessee who sells to another party, are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held that there was no discrimination. The Legislature had directed the giving of a rebate on conditions which are exactly the same for every assessee, one condition being that if the assessee sells an asset before the expiry of ten years from the end of the year in which it was acquired, to a person other than the Government, he would forfeit such rebate. This condition is applicable to every assessee and an assessee has a choice of either selling to a person other than the Government and forfeiting the rebate or selling to the Government and keeping the rebate with himself. The discrimination, if any, arises on the choice made by the assessee. The ratio of the above decision goes in favour of the contention raised on behalf of the State. All citizens are placed in the same situation to avail of the service offered by the post office. The discrimination, if any, arises on the choice made by the assessee. The ratio of the above decision goes in favour of the contention raised on behalf of the State. All citizens are placed in the same situation to avail of the service offered by the post office. Letters they may send through post offices and the other articles they may send through anyone they like. 39. The object to be achieved by grant of the privilege is that every nook and corner of India may be connected by this means of communication. Restricting it to letters is reasonable in a developing State and so has nexus with the object to be achieved. As we have said earlier, the majority of the population of this country is only concerned with the facility to send letters. A very small number comparatively is concerned with sending other articles. The objection of the petitioners, therefore, that the provisions of the Act are ultra vires Article 14 cannot be accepted. 40. This brings us to the question of what was actually seized. The contention of the State is that packets or parcels containing letters were seized. We have already dilated on what is meant by the word "letters". If the articles seized are letters the law must take its course. If the articles seized are not letters, no offence is made out and the firm will not be liable. To contend that the envelopes seized contained documents which are not letters cannot be accepted. A letter is not merely a communication starting, for example, with the words "Dear Sir" and ending with the words "Yours faithfully". If Article 19(1)(a) is sought to be attracted then anything which is an expression of speech or thought or ideas and every article which facilitates or which is in the nature of the exercise of freedom of speech and expression, in other words every communication which amounts to an expression of thoughts, ideas or something which the person sending the communication wants to communicate would be a letter. In this view of the matter, the alleged documents seized or the contents of the envelopes will have to be examined whether the same fall within the ambit of the term "letter" and then only if could be said whether the seizure of the same would be within the ambit of Sections 4, 6 and 58 of the Act. 41. In this view of the matter, the alleged documents seized or the contents of the envelopes will have to be examined whether the same fall within the ambit of the term "letter" and then only if could be said whether the seizure of the same would be within the ambit of Sections 4, 6 and 58 of the Act. 41. Regarding Section 6 of the Act no arguments as such were advanced separately that the same is violative of Article 14 or 19 (1) (a) and (g) of the Constitution. The only contention is that Section 6 covers all postal articles whereas Section 4 covers only letters and there seems to be no logic behind this classification. Section 4 and S.6 operate in different fields. The privilege is restricted to only letters but the exemption from liability is with regard to all postal articles. This is a valid classification. 42. It is not open to the petitioners whether they are the firm, its partners or customers, to contend that their prosecution or the search and seizure is invalid. As stated in the courtier-affidavits filed on behalf of the State, the searches and seizures were under the authority of law. Thereafter the law must take its own course. Indeed, nothing was said as to why the search, seizure or prosecution, if any, should be quashed except on the question of vires of the provisions of the Act with which we have already dealt. 43. The result is that the petitions are dismissed. We discharge the rules issued in the two petitions and vacate the interim stay. The parties are left to bear their own costs.