JUDGEMENT :- This Second Appeal has got to be allowed on the narrowest possible ground that the decrees passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the lower Appellate Court have been passed without reference to the relevant legal provisions. 2. The facts of the case are as follows :- It is unnecessary to set out the numbers of the suit lands. The suit lands are eight in number. Land Serial Nos.1 to 6 and 8 from one parcel of land and land serial No.7 forms the second parcel of the land. For the sake of convenience, I will refer the said lands as the lands of first parcel and the lands of second parcel. So far as the lands of the first parcel are concerned, there is no dispute that initially, that is to say, in and before the year 1922, those lands belonged to one Godabai. It is the contention of the present respondents, who were the original defendants Nos.1 to 8, that Godabai gave those lands to them for vahivat and they had been in vahivat of the same since that year. On 12-1-1928 Godabai executed a gift-deed in respect of the said lands of the first parcel in favour of one Laxman. Godabai's daughter's name was Aubai and Laxman was the husband of said Aubai, that is to say, the son-in-law of Godabai. Contention of defendants Nos.1 to 8 is that the said gift-deed is hit by the provisions of the Khoti Settlement Act , 1880. The crux of the question is as to whether this contention has any substance at all. 3. To continue the chronology of events, Godabai died some time in the year 1936. At about the same time in the father of the plaintiff, who is the appellant before me, came to reside in the village in which lands are situate. I am stating this position because there is no dispute about these facts. Laxman died some time before 1958. On 2-1-1948 Aubai executed the sale-deed, Ex.75, in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit lands, parcel No. 1. The sale-deed purported to have been executed by her as the guardian of her sons. I am stating this position because there is no dispute about these facts. Laxman died some time before 1958. On 2-1-1948 Aubai executed the sale-deed, Ex.75, in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit lands, parcel No. 1. The sale-deed purported to have been executed by her as the guardian of her sons. It is, however, common ground in these proceedings: (a) that she had another step son, that is to say, the son of Laxman from another wife, (b) that all her sons, including the step son, were major on the date of the sale-deed; and © that the sale-deed did not purport to have been executed by her on behalf of herself as also on behalf of the step son in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No.9. It would be inarguable that if the sale-deed, Ex.75. stood all by itself, it could convey no title whatsoever to the vendees, that is to say, to the plaintiff and defendant No.9 and the present suit filed by the plaintiff would be devoid of any substance or basis in title. However, as will be presently pointed out, on 25th June, 1971 a document styled as a release-deed was executed by all these sons of Aubai including her step son as well as by herself releasing all their right, title and interest in the suit land parcel No.1. One of the main questions arising in this appeal is the legal effect of this document. Contention raised by Mr. Abhyankar is that this really amounts to a deed of ratification. I have to examine the correctness of this contention. 4. To revert back to the chronology of events. I may refer to the transaction relating to the suit lands parcel No.2. The plaintiff contended that he and defendant No.9 had purchased the said land Parcel No.2 from one Savitribai, who, according to the plaintiff, was the owner of the lands on that date. The sale-deed is at Ex.76. The validity of this sale-deed is also challenged by the defendants on the ground that the same is hit by the provisions of the Khoti Settlement Act. I shall have to examine the correctness of the defendants' contention in this behalf. The plaintiff contends that after the sale-deed he and defendant No.9 in whose favour both the sale-deeds were executed by the vendors remained in possession of the suit lands. I shall have to examine the correctness of the defendants' contention in this behalf. The plaintiff contends that after the sale-deed he and defendant No.9 in whose favour both the sale-deeds were executed by the vendors remained in possession of the suit lands. His grievance is that on 5-7-1966 Defendants Nos.1 to 8, who are respondents Nos.1 to 8 before me, obstructed the possession of the plaintiff and defendant No.9 in respect of all the suit lands and hence the present suit, out of which the present appeal arises, was filed by the plaintiff against the defendants for a declaration that the suit properties were of the ownership of himself and defendant No.9 and also for injunction restraining defendants Nos.1 to 8 from interfering with their possession of the suit lands. 5. Defendants Nos.2 to 8 are the sons of defendant No.1. It may be mentioned that defendants Nos.2 to 8 remained absent and were, hence, proceeded ex parte. But that fact is really of no consequence because the suit has been defended by defendant No.1 quite stoutly. His contentions by way of defences were as follows:- His first contention was that even before the year 1922 Godabai had given the suit lands, parcel No.1, to defendant No.1 for his exclusive vahivat. He contended that he was in adverse possession of the said lands parcel No.1 till the year 1950 and that he had become owner of the same by adverse possession after the death of Godabai. Secondly he contended that the two sale-deeds executed by the vendors in question in favour of plain-tiff No.1 and defendant No.9 were void, bad and illegal having regard to the provisions of the Khoti Settlement Act. As a matter of fact it was also con- tended that even the gift-deed executed by Godabai in the year 1928 had been executed in contravention of the provisions of the said Khoti Settlement Act, in that the consent Of the Khot in question was not taken by Godabai for the purpose of gift-deed. The title of plaintiff and defendant No.9 relating to the land parcel No.1. was also challenged by the defendants on the ground that the sale-deed purporting to have been executed by Aubai as guardian of her sons, when the sons had already become major on that date was void and of no legal Consequence. The title of plaintiff and defendant No.9 relating to the land parcel No.1. was also challenged by the defendants on the ground that the sale-deed purporting to have been executed by Aubai as guardian of her sons, when the sons had already become major on that date was void and of no legal Consequence. However, it may be stated that it was the defendants' further contention that the plaintiff and defendant No.9 on the one hand were defendants Nos.1 to 8 on the other were jointly cultivating all the suit lands. It will be thus clear that the contesting defendants have not pleaded their adverse possession against the plaintiff and defendant No.9 as such. No doubt they have contended that defendant No.1 had been in adverse possession of the suit lands from the year 1922 and that he had become owner of the same by adverse possession after the death of Godabai; but adverse possession against the plaintiff and defendant No.9 as such was not claimed by defendants Nos.1 to 8, and as a matter of fact it was specifically stated in the written statement itself that from the year 1950 plaintiff and defendant No.9 on the one hand and defendant Nos.1 to 8 on the other had been in joint possession of all the lands ever: till the date of the suit. 6. On these pleadings issues were framed and parties went to trial. After examining the evidence, the learned trial Judge held that plaintiff and defendant No.9 had not proved their exclusive title to the suit lands nor had they proved their possession of the same. Likewise the plaintiff's contention that defendants Nos.1 to 8 had taken forcible possession of 20 Gunthas out of the suit land S.No.8 was negatived by the learned Judge. The learned Judge seems to have taken the view that the plaintiff had only a joint title to the suit lands along with defendants Nos.1 to 8. In para 17 of his judgment he observed that the plaintiff could not be given any relief in the suit and expressed an opinion that it would be better if the plaintiff filed a suit for partition. The learned Judge further observed as follows: "If defendant No.1 had cared to place on record the relevant documents from the Survey Deptt. In para 17 of his judgment he observed that the plaintiff could not be given any relief in the suit and expressed an opinion that it would be better if the plaintiff filed a suit for partition. The learned Judge further observed as follows: "If defendant No.1 had cared to place on record the relevant documents from the Survey Deptt. For the period prior to 1956 there would not have been such a mess of the evidence." He further observed that the defendants do not deserve any sympathy. Though, therefore, he dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the suit for possession on exclusive title was not maintainable, he refused to pass any order of costs in favour of the contesting defendants. The said decree of the trial Court is dated 24-11-1969. 7. The plaintiff filed an appeal to the District Court. The judgment of the District Court is not produced before me but it is common ground, and this fact is evident from the judgment of the trial Court itself, that the decree passed by the trial Court was set aside by the appellate Judge and the entire suit was remanded to the trial Court for disposal according to law. 8. It is after this order of remand that the above mentioned 'release-deed', Ex.146 dated 25-6-1971, was executed by all the major sons of Godabai including her step son as also by herself stating that Aubai had executed the sale deed. Ex.76 on behalf of herself as well as of her sons including her step son, that, inadvertently, the fact that she had executed the sale-deed on her own behalf as well as on behalf of the step son was not mentioned in the sale-deed and that, hence, they were executing the document releasing all their right, title and interest in the suit lands with effect from the date of the sale-deed. Ex.76, itself. As will be presently pointed out, it is Mr. Abhyankar's contention that this document which is styled as a release deed can be really construed as a ratification-deed and the same has the effect of validating the sale-deed, Ex.75, with retrospective effect. I have to examine the correctness of this contention as well. 9. After the suit was so remanded to the trial Court this document, viz. Abhyankar's contention that this document which is styled as a release deed can be really construed as a ratification-deed and the same has the effect of validating the sale-deed, Ex.75, with retrospective effect. I have to examine the correctness of this contention as well. 9. After the suit was so remanded to the trial Court this document, viz. release-deed Ex.146, was produced by the plaintiff before the Court in evidence and it was relied upon by the plaintiff as a document completing his title. The learned Judge however, took the view that Godabai herself had no title to the suit lands in view of the fact that the gift-deed executed by Godabai in favour of Laxman was hit by the provisions of S.9 of the Khoti Settlement Act. The learned Judge seems to have taken the view that Aubai could claim her title only through her husband Laxman, who in his turn claimed title on the basis of the gift-deed. Ex.66. The learned Judge seems to have taken the view that since the gift-deed itself was hit by S.9 of the Khoti Settlement Act neither Laxman nor his wife Aubai could claim right, title and interest in the suit lands, parcel No.1, which were the subject matter of the said gift-deed. When the release-deed Ex.146, was relied upon by the plaintiff as completing his title the learned Judge observed that it was not necessary to consider the effect of the said document in view of the fact that neither Aubai nor any of her sons had any title to execute Ex.75, in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No.9. It may be mentioned here that issue No.5 raised by the learned Judge, after remand related to the plea of adverse possession of defendants Nos.1 to 8. The issue ran as follows: "Whether defendant No.1 has proved that he had become owner of the suit lands or the share proved by the Plaintiff and defendant No.9 to be of their ownership by adverse possession?" This issue was, however, not pressed before the learned Judge on behalf of the contesting defendants. In this connection the learned Judge observed in para 11 of judgment as follows: "This issue has not been pressed by the Advocate for the defendants. This issue was framed in Appeal No.3 of 1970, by the District Court and hence it was considered. In this connection the learned Judge observed in para 11 of judgment as follows: "This issue has not been pressed by the Advocate for the defendants. This issue was framed in Appeal No.3 of 1970, by the District Court and hence it was considered. Shri Padhye submitted that defendants were claiming adverse possession as against Godabai and Aubai and therefore this issue need not be considered. Hence this issue does not survive." The learned Judge also appears to have taken the view that not only the sale-deed Ex.75 executed by Aubai in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No.9 was hit by S.9 of the Khoti Settlement Act but even the sale-deed Ex.76 executed by Savitribai in their favour was hit by the self-same provisions. Taking this view of the matter, the learned Judge held that the plaintiff and defendant No.9 had failed to prove their title to the suit lands and hence the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial Judge with no order as to costs. 10. In appeal the view taken by the learned Assistant Judge is of a somewhat bewildering character. The learned Judge seems to have negatived the plea of the contesting defendants relating to the effect of the Khoti Settlement Act on the basis of the amendment effected to the Khoti Settlement Act by Bombay Act No.29 of 1939 as well as by subsequent amending Acts, Bombay Act No.27 of 1942 as well as Bombay Act No.26 of 1946. The learned Judge seems to have taken the view that S.9 of the Khoti Settlement Act as it stood in the year 1928 no doubt rendered the gift-deed Ex.66 bad in law because the gift was not executed by Godabai in favour of Laxman with the consent of the Khot. The learned Judge, however, took the view that this requirement of the consent of the Khot was done away with by the subsequent amending Act of the year 1939. According to the learned Judge the amendment related back to the date when the original Khoti Settlement Act came into force in the year 1880. In other words, according to the learned Judge, the Khot's consent which was obviated in the year 1939 must be deemed to have been so obviated at all times including in the year 1928 when the gift-deed Ex.66 was executed by Godabai in favour of Laxman. In other words, according to the learned Judge, the Khot's consent which was obviated in the year 1939 must be deemed to have been so obviated at all times including in the year 1928 when the gift-deed Ex.66 was executed by Godabai in favour of Laxman. According to the learned Judge, therefore, the gift-deed must be deemed to have been validated by virtue of the said amending Act with retrospective effect. 11. However, the learned Judge was of the view that the sale-deed, Ex.75, which was executed by Aubai not on her own behalf but as a guardian of her sons who were already major on the date of the sale-deed, was of no legal consequence. The release-deed, Ex.146, was relied upon on behalf of the appellants and it was contended that whatever the defect in the original sale-deed Ex.75, may be, the same must be deemed to have been removed or corrected by virtue of the said release-deed Ex.146. The plaintiff's contention in this behalf was, however, negatived by the learned Judge holding that the document, Ex.146, could not have any retrospective effect. Somewhat interesting observations were made by the learned Judge in this connection as follows: "A belated attempt after remand is made to get a release-deed at Ex.146 and it is sought to be made out on the basis of the release-deed at Ex.146 that the original document became valid right from the beginning. I, however do not see any foundation for any such proposition. It is not retrospective legislation whereby a subsequent document would validate the first void document. Therefore, it must be said that when the first document was executed there was no authority in the mother, the sons already having attained majority, to execute the sale-deed on their behalf. Therefore, this sale-deed must be held to be void. Any attempt to make the sale-deed valid as long after as in 1971 after remand vide Ex.146 is of little avail. At best the document styled release-deed at Ex.146 would mean that on 25th June, 1971 for the first time the sons ratified the action of their mother. It cannot, however, relate back to the original transaction. It would mean that in year 1971 these sons transferred the land which is not going to help the case of the plaintiff in any manner. They have to prove their title as well as the possession ab initio. It cannot, however, relate back to the original transaction. It would mean that in year 1971 these sons transferred the land which is not going to help the case of the plaintiff in any manner. They have to prove their title as well as the possession ab initio. Therefore, it would appear that the title-deed Ex.75 is not going to advance the case of the plaintiff in any manner." With this reasoning the learned Judge negatived the plaintiff's plea based upon the said document, Ex.146. It may be mentioned here that the learned Judge has made observations in his judgment to the effect that the plaintiff and defendant No.9 had failed to prove their possession of the suit lands. The learned Judge's finding, however, in this behalf is somewhat intriguing in view of the fact that the plaintiff's joint possession of the suit land was not only admitted but in fact asserted by the contesting defendants themselves. The learned Judge seems to have taken the view that the plaintiff was in Bombay at all the relevant times and hence he could not be in possession of the suit land. Moreover, I do not find from his judgment that he has applied his mind to the right of the plaintiff relating to the land parcel No.2. So far as the sale-deed Ex.76 conveying the said land was concerned, the title based upon the sale-deed could not be found fault with by the learned Judge. The trial Court had no doubt found that the sale-deed Ex.76 was bad because, it was, according to the trial Judge, hit by the provision of Section 9 of the Khoti Settlement Act, but the contention relating to the said bar of the Khoti Settlement Act. Was specifically negatived by the learned Judge. So far as the said sale-deed, Ex.76, was concerned it was negatived because it was executed by Savitrabai on behalf of the major sons. No doubt the contesting defendants had contended in their written statement that Savitribai had no title to the said land. But even this question has not been considered by the learned Judge at all. So far as the said sale-deed, Ex.76, was concerned it was negatived because it was executed by Savitrabai on behalf of the major sons. No doubt the contesting defendants had contended in their written statement that Savitribai had no title to the said land. But even this question has not been considered by the learned Judge at all. It appears that, according to the learned Judge, his decision relating to the validity of the sale-deed, Ex.76, would have equal application to the validity of sale-deed Ex.76, and it is with such reasoning that the learned Judge thought that the plaintiff had failed to prove his title to the suit lands, parcels Nos.1 and 2. The appeal filed by the plaintiff was, therefore, dismissed by the learned Judge with costs. 12. In this Second Appeal the question that arises for decision may be formulated as follows:- The first question is as to what is the effect of the provisions of Section 9 of the Khoti Settlement Act. The second question is as to whether the sale-deeds, Exs.75 and 76, are bad on account of any other reason. I may state here that if the legal position in this behalf is found against the plaintiff-appellant, nothing could be said in his favour and the appeal shall have to be dismissed. But the opposite position is equally true. If it is found that the view taken by the Courts below relating to the plaintiff's title is correct, it would follow, in the context of the facts and pleadings in the instant case, that the plaintiff's suit shall have to be decreed. I will refer to this legal position after I have discussed the legal position relating to the validity of the sale-deeds, Exs.75 and 76. 13. As regards the challenge to the plaintiff's title based upon the provisions of the Khoti Settlement Act is concerned, to my mind, the view taken by both the Courts below is so patently erroneous that it smacks of lack of application of mind by the learned Judge to the provisions of the relevant statute with which the Court was concerned, the learned trial Judge seems to have taken the view that Section 9 of the Khoti Settlement Act stands all by itself. Section 9 of the said Act no doubt provides that the occupancy-tenants' right shall be heritable, but shall not be otherwise transferable without the consent of the Khot, except in certain given circumstances. I may state here that the said given circumstances do not obtain in the present case at all and it can be taken for granted that according to Section 9 Godabai, if she was an occupancy-tenant, could not have transferred occupancy tenancy, as such of the suit lands parcel No.1 to her son-in-law, if she had not taken the Khot's consent. But the points in the instant case, which points are missed by both the Courts below by miles, are that in the first place the defendants have not come forth to the Court with the plea that Godabai was an occupancy-tenant. The first para of Section 9 of the said Act is as follows: "9. The rights of Khots, dharekaris and quasi dharekaris shall be heritable and transferable." Not a word has been whispered by any of the contesting defendants either in the written statement or even in the evidence that Godabai was an occupancy tenant and not a Dharekari or quasi-dharekari. I do not mean to state at all that it is proved by the plaintiff that Godabai was a Dharekari or a quasi dharekari. The point is that there is no pleading either one way or the other on that question as regards the status of Godabai. Nobody contends that she was or was not a Dharekari or an Occupancy-tenant. In that view of the matter, in first place the prohibitive effect of Section 9 of the said Act does not come into play at all. Even assuming, however, that Godabai was an occupancy-tenant, what is the effect of transfer made by her? Has the transfer become void and illegal. A casual perusal of Section 6 of the said Act is enough to dispel the view taken by the Courts below in this behalf. Even assuming, however, that Godabai was an occupancy-tenant, what is the effect of transfer made by her? Has the transfer become void and illegal. A casual perusal of Section 6 of the said Act is enough to dispel the view taken by the Courts below in this behalf. The said Section 6 unequivocally provides that if an occupancy right which is not transferable otherwise than by inheritance, has been so transferred, the actual holder of the land shall be deemed to be the tenant thereof, and if he, or this father, or other person from whom he inherits, has occupied or cultivated the land continuously from any particular time provided by that section, he shall have a right of occupancy therein. The learned Judge has, therefore, to see whether the transferee viz. Laxman, had continued to occupy the suit lands parcel No.1 continuously from the year 1928 or not. It does not appear from anything in the judgment, of either Courts that they were alive to this legal position. Both the Courts have proceeded upon the basis that if there is any embargo upon the transfer, the transfer becomes illegal. What the Courts lost sight of is that if a consequence is provided in connection with the embargo, no other consequence can be inferred. In the first instance, the only consequence would be that Laxman would become an ordinary tenant. The further legal consequence would be though an occupancy-tenant could not have been removed by the Khot, the khot would be at liberty to remove an ordinary tenant. This means that the khot could have filed a suit against Laxman for recovery of the said land parcel No.1 and to such a suit Laxman probably would have no defence. But the result is not that Laxman's title to the suit lands even as ordinary tenant was non est. Mr. Phadkar contended that the person who became an ordinary tenant upon the transfer was not transferee but the transferor. To my mind the contention is wholly devoid of any basis. The words employed by Section 6 are 'actual holder' and the moment the occupancy-tenant transfers the land with possession, the transferee is the actual landlord and not transferor. Moreover the entire tenor of the section militates against any such construction as is suggested by him. In this connection Mr. To my mind the contention is wholly devoid of any basis. The words employed by Section 6 are 'actual holder' and the moment the occupancy-tenant transfers the land with possession, the transferee is the actual landlord and not transferor. Moreover the entire tenor of the section militates against any such construction as is suggested by him. In this connection Mr. Abhyankar relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Ramkrishna v. Bapurao, 40 Bom LR 390: (AIR 1938 Bom 284). The following observation made by the District Judge, which has been approved by this Court is enough to reinforce the above view: "The khot could not forfeit the occupancy right and resume the land, because Section 10 did not provide any penalty for the transfer. This position was exhaustively reviewed by Batty, J. in Yesa v. Sakharam ((1905) 7 Bom LR 941). The result of the review was briefly this. The transferee became an annual tenant of the khot, the transferor continued to be a holder of the occupancy right, the khot could not call in the land and evict the transferor in occupation until the occupancy right determined, and after such determination the khot could evict the transferee by putting an end to his annual tenancy after giving him a notice to quit, under Sec.84 of the Land Revenue Code." In this view of the matter, it is futile to contend that the gift-deed executed by Godabai in favour of Laxman was invalid. 14. However, the question does not rest there. Admittedly the legal position was changed by virtue of the amending Act of the year 1939 and the requirement of khot's consent was wholly obviated thereafter. As a matter of fact, relying upon this amendment the learned Assistant Judge has held that the provisions of Section 9 of the said Act do not operate as a bar to the gift-deed. It is not necessary for me to consider the correctness of the reasoning of the learned Judge in that behalf. If it is correct, no fault could be found with Aubai's title at all. But I assume that the reasoning is not correct. The fact, however, remains that if the gift-deed, Ex.66, was not valid on account of any embargo contained in Section 9 of the said Act. The result would be that the document Ex.66 would be of no legal consequence. But I assume that the reasoning is not correct. The fact, however, remains that if the gift-deed, Ex.66, was not valid on account of any embargo contained in Section 9 of the said Act. The result would be that the document Ex.66 would be of no legal consequence. It would be a document just non est. If that was the position, the title of Godabai would continue. Admittedly Aubai was the daughter of Godabai and upon the death of Godabai, Aubai would be her heir. If this is the position, then she was perfectly at liberty to execute the sale-deed Ex.75 in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No.9. Mr. Phadkar, however, contended that it was not open for me to take this view because there has been no pleading on this point. Contention is that the plaintiff had not claimed the title of Aubai by inheritance, and hence, it is not open for me to hold her sale-deed to be valid on the ground that she got the title by inheritance from her mother. To my mind this contention is without any substance. If the plaintiff had not pleaded that Aubai was the heir of Godabai, likewise he has not pleaded any other manner in which Aubai got title to the suit land. The fact that Godabai gifted the lands to Laxman, that Laxman died leaving behind his widow and sons as his heir are all facts which have come in evidence. All that the plaintiff has stated in the plaint is that Aubai executed a sale-deed. It is no doubt found that she had executed a sale-deed not on her own behalf but on behalf of her sons. I have to examine the effect of this position. But from that it cannot be said that want of pleading is an impediment in the way of the plaintiff. Moreover what is required to be pleaded, as per our system of precedural jurisprudence is the fact, not law. To my mind by virtue of what position of law the plaintiff got the title need not have been pleaded. The facts in this behalf are wholly undisputed. In this view of the matter, it cannot be held that Aubai had no title to execute the sale-deed, Ex.75, in favour of plaintiff and defendant No.9. 15. What remains to be considered is the effect of release-deed, Ex.146. The facts in this behalf are wholly undisputed. In this view of the matter, it cannot be held that Aubai had no title to execute the sale-deed, Ex.75, in favour of plaintiff and defendant No.9. 15. What remains to be considered is the effect of release-deed, Ex.146. The trial Court has found it unnecessary to apply its mind to the same, because, according to it, the provisions of the said Act rendered the sale-deed Ex.75 invalid. The learned Assistant Judge has taken the view that the document, Ex.146 could not have retrospective effect. His view is that the document is not legislation. According to him, only a legislation can have retrospective effect and not document. The reasoning no doubt is somewhat humourous, but devoid of legal substance. I fail to see why a document cannot be given a retrospective effect. Mr. Phadkar contended that this document was invalid because it was, in his words, a tailored document. He did not expound this contention. To my question, whether there was any law against tailoring a document his only answer was he did not use the word in literary sense meaning thereby that I understood it in a literary sense. But beyond advancing this cryptic argument, 'take it or leave it' was his attitude. Whatever that may be, I would like to say a few words regarding the legal position in this behalf. The document, Ex.146, is no doubt executed during the pendency of the litigation. I take it that the document either constituted a document of transfer by itself or it may constitute a deed of ratification, as contended by Mr. Abhyankar. To my mind either way, there is nothing objectionable about this document. If the document was to be regarded as a transfer or a document of fresh transfer, it would be bad only if it was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. Such a plea is not raised. Abhyankar. To my mind either way, there is nothing objectionable about this document. If the document was to be regarded as a transfer or a document of fresh transfer, it would be bad only if it was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. Such a plea is not raised. In this connection it is to be noted that if it was a defence plea in the present case that before or during the pendency of the litigation the defendants had perfected their title to the said lands by adverse possession or otherwise, it could perhaps be argued that the document which was brought into effect during the pendency of the litigation after the title had already passed to defendants Nos.1 to 8 was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. But it is not the case of the contesting defendants that they were ever in adverse possession against defendant No.9 and the plaintiff as such. In fact it has been asserted in the written statement, and with added vigour before me by Mr. Phadkar, that the contesting defendants never wished and did not wish to plead adverse possession against the plaintiff and defendant No.9 and they have specifically admitted their 1/2 possession of the suit lands. They pleaded adverse possession against Godabai and Aubai; but that plea also was not pressed and was specifically given up. If this is the position it can never lie in their mouth to say that they had perfected their title by adverse possession so far as the suit lands are concerned. By no stretch of imagination the provisions of S.52 of the T.P. Act can be said to apply and if those provisions do not apply, it is difficult to see on what ground the document, Ex.146, even if it is taken as a fresh transfer, can be found bad. But to my mind the document can, in reality, be construed as a ratification deed. The executants in respect of the said document, Ex.146, have stated in unison that the sale-deed, Ex.75, was in fact executed by Aubai on their behalf. They have stated that certain technical objections had been raised in regard to the validity of the sale-deed on account of the fact that they had become major on the date of the sale-deed. The executants in respect of the said document, Ex.146, have stated in unison that the sale-deed, Ex.75, was in fact executed by Aubai on their behalf. They have stated that certain technical objections had been raised in regard to the validity of the sale-deed on account of the fact that they had become major on the date of the sale-deed. It is clear that the document, though styled as release-deed, has been executed by them with the sole purpose of owning whatever had been done by Aubai by the sale-deed. The document states that the previous sale-deed was executed by Aubai on behalf of them all. She was acting as the agent of all. If she had no previous authority from them for doing so, all of them could come forth subsequently and own the transaction to be their own, meaning thereby-ratify the same. In these circumstances it is difficult to see why the said document cannot be construed as a deed of ratification. The technical defects that were found by the plaintiff in their way were sought to be removed by another way. In this view of the matter to my mind the objection found by the learned Assistant Judge to the effect of this document Ex.146 is devoid of any substance. This is the position relating to suit lands parcel No.1. 16. So far as the suit land, parcel No.2, is concerned, the judgment of the learned Judge is even mere vulnerable. He has not even applied his mind to the question as to whether the sale-deed, Ex.76, suffers from the same defect as Ex.75 or not. It is nobody's case that Savitribai executed the sale-deed on behalf of her major sons. Only defect alleged in that behalf is that Savitribai had no title to the suit land. To my mind the learned Judge has failed to apply his mind to this aspect of the case entirely and hence it is necessary for me to examine the question myself and once I start embarking upon the enquiry in that behalf, I find that there is no justification whatsoever for the view that the title of Savitribai was not proved. There is no dispute that Savitribai had executed the sale-deed. The sale-deed is a registered document. The plaintiff has examined Krishnaji Keshav Prabhu-Desai, who was the Khot. There is no dispute that Savitribai had executed the sale-deed. The sale-deed is a registered document. The plaintiff has examined Krishnaji Keshav Prabhu-Desai, who was the Khot. He has stated that Sakharam Bhavade, husband of Savitribai, had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff in connection with the suit land parcel No.2. The said agreement is produced at Ex.136 in these proceedings. The fact that Krishnaji was himself the Khot is not at all disputed. This is clear from the cross-examination of the witness. The significant fact is that the Khot has himself scribed the agreement, Ex.136, by which the suit land parcel No.2 was to be sold by Sakharam to the plaintiff and defendant No.9. The said witness has also attested the agreement. It is, therefore, futile to contend that Sakharam had no title to the suit land. When the Khot in whom the title vested had himself scribed the document in question, it is futile to contend that Sakharam's title was not recognised by the Khot. If this is the position, Savitribai who was the widow of Sakharam must be held to be having title to the suit land parcel No.2 after the death of Sakharam. The sale-deed, Ex.76, executed by her in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No.9 becomes, therefore, unassailable. It is thus clear that so far as the title to the suit land, parcel No.2, is concerned the plaintiff and defendant No.9 have proved the same to the hilt. 17. The only question that remains is as to why the plaintiff should be non-suited, if he has proved his title. If a person proves his title and files a suit for possession on title, the only conceivable defence to the suit on merits is that title was subsequently extinguished by some supervening event such as the adverse possession of the defendants. In the instant case, a plea for adverse possession was raised by way of issue No.5, but the plea has not been pressed into service and it is contended before me specifically by Mr. Phadkar that he did not want to set up a plea of adverse possession against the plaintiff and defendant No.9 in this litigation. As a matter of fact it is the contention of the contesting defendants themselves that their possession of the suit lands is joint with the plaintiff and defendant No.9. Phadkar that he did not want to set up a plea of adverse possession against the plaintiff and defendant No.9 in this litigation. As a matter of fact it is the contention of the contesting defendants themselves that their possession of the suit lands is joint with the plaintiff and defendant No.9. A plea of adverse possession is, therefore, wholly misconceived. No other supervening event extinguishing the plaintiff's title is relied upon. The plea is contained in issue No.5 which has been framed on the basis of the written statement. But it is explained by stating that adverse possession was claimed against Godabai and not against the plaintiff. But even that plea has been given up. If this is the position, then it is difficult to see how the plaintiff's suit for possession based on title could be dismissed. To my mind, in the context of the facts and pleadings, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge is wholly unsustainable. 18. It was sought to be contended before me that the contesting defendants have led evidence to show that they were in possession of the suit lands till the year 1950. I may state here that I am not at all satisfied even about this factual position. But I propose to express no opinion in that behalf for the simple reason that the position in that behalf is of no legal consequence. Once it is found that defendants Nos.1 to 8 have not pressed into service their contention regarding acquisition of title by adverse possession, the entire question relating to their possession becomes wholly academic. The plaintiff and defendant No.9 have proved their title to the suit land and defendants Nos.1 to 8 have established none. The result must follow that the plaintiff and defendant No.9 are entitled to the possession of the suit lands from defendants Nos. 1 to 8. 19. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the decrees passed by both the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit for declaration of title of himself and defendant No.9 and for injunction in respect of the suit lands mentioned in the plaint and for possession of the rest of the land is hereby decreed. The plaintiff shall be entitled to costs of this litigation in all the Courts. By consent of the parties, status quo to continue for a period of (one) month from today. The plaintiff shall be entitled to costs of this litigation in all the Courts. By consent of the parties, status quo to continue for a period of (one) month from today. Enquiry as regards future mesne profits according to the provisions of law. Appeal allowed.