Judgement JUDGEMENT:- The defendants in O.S. Nos.676 and 678 of 1968 on the file of the District Munsif, Erode, who lost in both the courts below are the appellants. S.A. No. 137 of 1975 arises out of A. S. No. 2 of 1973 on the file of the Sub-Court, Erode, which arose out of O.S. No. 678 of 1968, S.A. No. 1138 of 1975 arises out of A.S No. 3 of 1973 on the file of the Sub-Court, Erode, which arose out O. S. No. 676 of 1978. O.S. No. 676 of 1968 was filed for a declaration of the title of the plaintiffs who were the same in both the suits in respect of 10.26 acres of land situate in Kagam village in Erode taluk and for recovery of possession of those properties. O.S. No. 678 of 1968 was filed for recovery of mesne profits of Rs. 1,795/- in respect of the properties involved in O.S. No. 676 of 1978 for three years before suit. The case of the plaintiffs, Seshadri Iyengar who sued for himself and as joint family manager and Vijayaraghava Iyengar, was that the suit properties originally belonged to their ancestor Thirumalai Ramasami Iyengar. Ramasami Iyengar had two daughters, Chellammal alias Rukmani and Janaki Ammal by his first wife and second wife respectively. The plaintiffs are two of the four sons of Chellammal, the other two sons being Sundaram and Ramaswami who died in 1941 and 1967 respectively. Janaki died prior to 1941 without leaving any other heir except her sister Chellammal, Chellammal died in 1941 and her sons inherited the properties as her heirs. The plaintiffs and their two deceased brothers had filed O.S. No. 46 of 1953 in the Sub-Court, Coimbatore, for declaration and possession in respect of the same suit properties against defendants and 5 and others. The 6th defendant in the present suit was not a party to the prior suit. Defendants 1 and 5 did not contest that suit at a later stage though they originally filed written statements. That suit was decreed on 20-12-1954. Ex. A.1 is the certified copy of the decree passed in that suit. The plaintiffs in that suit filed E. A. No. 146 of 1956 in the Sub-Court, Coimbatore, for transmission of the decree for execution. Ex. A.2 is the order transmitting the decree to the Sub-Court. Erode for execution. In the Sub-Court, Erode. That suit was decreed on 20-12-1954. Ex. A.1 is the certified copy of the decree passed in that suit. The plaintiffs in that suit filed E. A. No. 146 of 1956 in the Sub-Court, Coimbatore, for transmission of the decree for execution. Ex. A.2 is the order transmitting the decree to the Sub-Court. Erode for execution. In the Sub-Court, Erode. E. P. No. 119 of 1956 was filed for delivery of possession of the properties and possession was delivered on 6-6-1956. Exs. A.4 to A.6 are delivery akthakshis. Thereafter, the properties were again leased to the defendants in the former suit. The leases were from year to year. Exs. A.7 to A. 23 and Exs. A.26 to A.33 are the lease deeds. The 6th defendant also had executed the lease deed Ex. 23 dated 15-5-1965. The defendants were paying the rent up to 1967 and had committed default thereafter and later denied the title of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed the suit (O.S. No. 676 of 1968) in these circumstances for declaration of their title to the suit properties and for recovery of possession of the same. Subsequently, they filed O.S. No. 678 of 1968 for recovery of mesne profits of Rs. 1795 for three years before the suit in respect of the suit properties. 2. Defendants 1 to 3 filed written statement in O.S. No. 676 of 1968 contending that the properties originally belonged to one Venkatachala Iyengar in 1912 and that he, however did not enjoy the properties. They claimed to be in adverse possession of these properties from 1912 and denied that they have executed any lease deeds and contended that the decree in the former suit O.S. No. 46 of 1953 will not be binding on them. They further contended that there was no actual delivery of possession of the properties in pursuance of the said decree and that they have perfected their title to the suit properties by adverse possession for over the statutory period. They contended that the properties are inam properties and the lands have been notified under Madras Act 30 of 1963 and the ryotwari pattas Exs. B. 1 to B.3 have been issued to them under Section 8 (1) of that Act and the plaintiffs have lost their title to the properties and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. B. 1 to B.3 have been issued to them under Section 8 (1) of that Act and the plaintiffs have lost their title to the properties and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. They claimed to be in possession of 1/4th share in Items 1 and 2 of the suit properties. Defendants 4 and 5 also raised substantially similar contentions like defendants 1 to 3 in their written statement and contended that they were kudiwaramdars in respect of Items 1 and 2 and that in any event they are entitled to protection under the Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955; 3. The 6th defendant contended in his written statement that he was not a party to O.S. No. 46 of 1953 and is not bound by the decree passed in that suit. He denied that he had executed any lease deed and further contended that 1/6th share in Item 2 is in the possession of one Karuppayee and her three daughters. He however disclaimed any interest in any of the suit properties. The defences similar to those raised in O.S. No. 676 of 1968 were raised in the subsequent suit also and it was contended further that the subsequent suit for mesne profits is not maintainable. Defendants 1 to 5 raised even a plea of limitation and contended that the claim for mesne profits was barred by limitation. 4. The learned District Munsif, Erode, tried both the suits jointly and found that the decree in O.S. No. 46 of 1953 is binding on all the defendants, that actual possession was taken in pursuance of the decree, that the 6th defendant was in possession and is a necessary party, that the inam was a personal inam granted to the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs, that the inam has been enfranchised and the properties ceased to be inam properties, that the Civil Court has jurisdiction, that the patta proceedings were pending before the Inam Abolition Tribunal and that the leases are true. The trial Court also found that O.S. No. 678 of 1968 is not barred by limitation. Upon these findings, the learned District Munsif, Erode, decreed both the suits with costs. 5. In the appeals filed by defendants, some documents were admitted as additional evidence and marked as Exs. B.4 to B. 36. Exs. The trial Court also found that O.S. No. 678 of 1968 is not barred by limitation. Upon these findings, the learned District Munsif, Erode, decreed both the suits with costs. 5. In the appeals filed by defendants, some documents were admitted as additional evidence and marked as Exs. B.4 to B. 36. Exs. B.4 and B.5 are the certified copies of the decree and judgment dated 30-11-1971 passed in C.M. A. No. 148 of 1970 on the file of the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal, Coimbatore dismissing the appeal of the plaintiffs against the order granting ryotwari patta to the defendants. Exs. B.6 and B.7 are the certified copies of the decree and Judgment passed in C.M.A. No. 166 of 1970 on the file of the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal, Coimbatore, dismissing the appeal and confirming the grant of patta to the defendants under Section 8 (1) of Act 30 of 1963. Exs. B.8 to B.36 were produced to show that the defendants were in possession from 1916 onwards. The learned Subordinate Judge, Erode who heard the appeals jointly confirmed the findings of the trial Court that the decree in O.S. No. 46 of 1953 is binding on all the defendants, that actual delivery was taken in execution of the decree and that the lease deeds are true. He found that the defendants have not perfected their title by adverse possession and that the lands have been enfranchised and they have lost the inam character, following the decision in Thiruvaduthural Adheenam v. State of Madras (1970) 1 Mad LJ 523, which has dissented from K. Satyamurthi v. State ( AIR 1971 Mad 385 ) and could not have been notified under Madras Act 30 of 1963 and that the grant of ryotwari pattas to the defendants does not oust the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit. On these findings, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed both the appeals and confirmed the trial court's decrees with costs. 6. Both the courts below have found concurrently that the decree passed in O.S. No. 46 of 1953 is binding on all the defendants, that actual possession was taken in execution of the decree as per the delivery aktakshis Exs. A. 4 to A. 6, that the leases under Exs. 6. Both the courts below have found concurrently that the decree passed in O.S. No. 46 of 1953 is binding on all the defendants, that actual possession was taken in execution of the decree as per the delivery aktakshis Exs. A. 4 to A. 6, that the leases under Exs. A.7 to A.23 and A.26 to A.33 alleged in the plaint are true and that the defendants have not acquired title to the suit properties by adverse possession. These questions cannot therefore be gone into in these second appeals. Patta proceedings were pending before the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal, Coimbatore, during the trial of these suits. Exs. B.4 to B.7 are certified copies of the decrees and judgments passed in C.M.A. Nos. 148 and 166 of 1970 on the file of the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal, Coimbatore and they show that the appeals preferred against the grant of ryotwari patta to the defendants under Section 8 (1) of Madras Act 30 of 1963, have been dismissed. S.T.A. Nos. 54 and 47 of 1972 had been filed against the judgments and decrees passed in C. M. A. Nos 148 and 166 of 1970 respectively. Those two appeals were dismissed by this court on 26-11-1974 confirming the grant of patta in favour of the defendants after these second appeals have been filed. Exs. B.1 to B.3 are the pattas granted to the defendants. The learned Subordinate Judge has found in the appeals before him that the lands have been enfranchised and they had lost their inam character and could not therefore be notified under Madras Act 30 of 1963 and that the grant of patta to the defendants under the provisions of that Act, does not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Thus he has upheld the title of the plaintiffs notwithstanding the fact that the pattas for these lands had been granted under the provisions of Section 8 (1) of Madras Act 30 of 1963 by the Tribunals constituted under that Act. Thus he has upheld the title of the plaintiffs notwithstanding the fact that the pattas for these lands had been granted under the provisions of Section 8 (1) of Madras Act 30 of 1963 by the Tribunals constituted under that Act. Therefore the question for consideration is the effect of the Minor Inams Abolition Act 30 of 1963 on the plaintiffs' case of title and whether in spite of the grant of pattas to the defendants under Section 8 (1) of that Act the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the question of title and the plaintiffs are entitled to have their title to the suit properties declared by the Civil Court and recover possession of the properties with mesne profits. 7. Mr. T.R. Mani, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the decisions of the authorities constituted under Madras Act 30 of 1963 are only for the purpose for which the enactment was passed, namely conversion of the minor inams tenure into a ryotwari tenure and that the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain suits for declaration of title to the erstwhile minor inam lands which had become ryotwari under that Act, notwithstanding the fact that finality is attached to the orders of the appropriate authorities constituted under the provisions of that Act. He relied upon a number of decisions and made an earnest appeal that the decisions of Sethuraman, J. and Balasubrahamanyan, J. which will be referred to hereinafter, are in conflict with my view expressed in two decisions which will be referred to presently and therefore it is desirable that the matter should be placed before a larger Bench so that the conflict may be settled and the subordinate courts may have proper guidance. But most of the decisions relied upon by Mr. T. R. Mani are decisions which had been rendered on matters governed by the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, Madras Act 26 of 1948. I shall consider those decisions. 8. But most of the decisions relied upon by Mr. T. R. Mani are decisions which had been rendered on matters governed by the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, Madras Act 26 of 1948. I shall consider those decisions. 8. A Full Bench of this Court in Swaminatha Odayar v. Asan Muhammad Rowther, (1947) 1 Mad LJ 83 : (AIR 1947 Mad 276) observed :- "The Civil Court has the right to inquire into the question of title to the land forming part of an estate within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act and to give consequential relief, provided that the relief is not in respect of which the Revenue Court has exclusive jurisdiction… … … … … … … the plaintiffs say that the defendant has no title whatever to the land, that they are in lawful possession and that therefore they are entitled to an injunction restraining the first defendant from interfering with their possession. Consequential relief of this nature cannot be granted by the Revenue Court. The Court which has jurisdiction is the Civil Court, and all the questions raised in the pleadings can be tried by the Civil Court." This decision was rendered on matters governed by the Estates Land Act 1 of 1908 and the observations made there are not in my opinion, helpful for deciding the question involved in this case. 9. A Full Bench of this Court has observed in Venkatarama Rao v. Musunuru Venkayya, (1954) 2 Mad LJ 1 : (AIR 1956 Mad 788):- "In our opinion the decision of the Revenue Court as to occupancy right is not a matter falling within its exclusive jurisdiction and therefore it is not res judicata in subsequent civil proceedings………….. We agree with the interpretation of Section 189 (3) of the Madras Estates Land Act adopted by successive Bench decisions already mentioned above, namely, that it is only in respect of disputes or matters exclusively within the jurisdiction of a Revenue Court that its decision would be binding on the parties in a subsequent civil proceeding and not its decision on the disputes and matters falling exclusively within its Jurisdiction." This decision also had been rendered in a matter to which the provisions of Madras Act 1 of 1908 were applicable. 10. 10. Section 56 of Madras Act 26 of 1948 reads thus :- "56 (1) Where an estate is notified and a dispute arises as to, (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or, (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or © who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer. (2) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-sec. (1) may within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any court of law." Ramachandra Iyer, J. as he then was, has observed in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan ((1959) 1 Mad LJ 195) to which Madras Act 26 of 1948 was applicable, thus :- "Under the Act there is no express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to dispose of suits involving the determination of the question as to who is entitled to the Kudivaram, but it is contended that Section 56 of the Act impliedly bars such suits being entertained……………. Section 56 does not expressly exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court; it confers jurisdiction - an exclusive jurisdiction to the authorities mentioned therein. Section 65 of the Act which deals with the exclusion of Civil Court's jurisdiction does not refer to matters in relation to which jurisdiction is conferred by Section 56. But in view of the fact that the statute creates a right and also a remedy to get an adjudication as to who would be qualified to get the right and makes the adjudication by the statutory Tribunal final the jurisdiction of the Civil Court should be held to be impliedly prohibited in regard to that matter. But at the same time it is clear that the finality that attached to the order of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal should be restricted to only that for which it was intended by the Act, as that jurisdiction is only for the purposes of the working of the Act. But at the same time it is clear that the finality that attached to the order of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal should be restricted to only that for which it was intended by the Act, as that jurisdiction is only for the purposes of the working of the Act. i.e., to enable the grant of patta, etc…………Exclusion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction cannot by implication be held to be more than what is necessary for working out the rights created by the statute. If for instance the determination as to who was lawful ryot of a holding becomes necessary for the grant of a patta under the Act, that would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunals under the Act. A person should not, for the purpose of obtaining a ryotwari patta, be enabled to get a declaration of his title to kudivaram so as to force the Tribunals under the Act to grant the patta to him, as the duty of deciding that question is invested in the Tribunal. If, however, that determination becomes relevant for deciding any other issue between the parties in a civil suit, there can be no exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court … … … … … … … … … But if the relief claimed in a civil court is not what is created or granted by the Act, e. g., the right to obtain a patta, but a civil right, the jurisdiction of the civil court which always existed cannot be held to be ousted as the statute does not either expressly or impliedly extinguish such rights. It may be that for granting of such a relief the question to be decided is as to who was the ryot of a holding. Such a determination would necessarily be incidental and cannot be deemed to be impliedly excluded by Section 56. It may be that for granting of such a relief the question to be decided is as to who was the ryot of a holding. Such a determination would necessarily be incidental and cannot be deemed to be impliedly excluded by Section 56. There is no provision in the Act to stay all suits which involve the determination of the question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding or one to refer that issue to the statutory tribunals for adjudication and to dispose of the suit on receipt of a finding from such Tribunals … … … … … … … … … … It may be that during the course of the suit if the defendant is able to obtain patta from the authorities he can produce that patta as an answer to the plaintiff's claim that he has got superior title against whom decree for possession cannot be granted." The last sentence in the above observation of Ramachandra Iyer, J. as he then was is against the plaintiffs in the present case, for, after the suits the defendants have obtained orders from the appropriate authorities constituted under Act 30 of 1963 for issue of patta in their favour for the suit lands and these orders have been confirmed by the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal, Coimbatore, in C.M.A. Nos. 148 and 166 of 1970 (Exs. B.4 to B.7) and also by this Court in S.T.A. Nos. 54 and 47 of 1972 which have been dismissed on 26-11-1974. The pattas Exs. B. 1 to B. 3 have been issued to the defendants. 11. State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar ((1961) 2 Mad LJ 285) which related to a matter governed by Madras Act 26 of 1948, came up before a Division Bench of this Court. The learned Judges have observed - "Section 11 of the Act (Act 26 of 1948) enables every ryot in the abolished estate to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of his ryoti holding. Section 12 of the Act enables the land-holder in a zamin estate to obtain ryotwari patta in respect of his private lands. Section 13 of the Act relates to the land-holder in an inam estate who can obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of his private lands. Section 12 of the Act enables the land-holder in a zamin estate to obtain ryotwari patta in respect of his private lands. Section 13 of the Act relates to the land-holder in an inam estate who can obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of his private lands. Section 15 of the Act enables the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the land-holder claims ryotwari patta under Sections 12, 13 or 14 as the case may be and to decide in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed. Then there are several provisions in the Act regarding the fixing of the compensation amount payable, and the mode of payment and distribution of the compensation amount to several claimants. In this process of statutory conversion of erstwhile zamin and inam estates into ryotwari villages it was the land-holder who lost his existence as such. Even this land-holder, despite the Act, is not deprived of the holding of his private lands as he had a right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of such lands. The vesting of the entire estate as provided for under Section 3 of the Act free of all encumbrances and the transfer to the Government have got to be understood and interpreted in the light of the object of the enactment and should not be construed as having brought about a total abolition of all rights of ownership of properties lying within the limits of the taken over estate . … … … … …The Act does not create new rights of ownership and the grant of ryotwari patta under the Act is not a conferment of rights by way of grant or conveyance. The obtaining of ryotwari patta by the persons entitled to such patta under the Act can if at all be only in recognition of pre-existing rights of ownership." 12. The defendants in the present case have produced the documents - Exs. B.8 to B.36 to show that they were in possession of the properties from 1916 and have been dealing with the same as the owners of the kudiwaram. They were, even according to the plaintiffs, tenants in respect of the properties and they have executed lease deeds from time to time and those leases have been found by both the courts below to be true. They were, even according to the plaintiffs, tenants in respect of the properties and they have executed lease deeds from time to time and those leases have been found by both the courts below to be true. The Tribunals constituted under Act 30 of 1963 have finally decided that the defendants are persons entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of these lands, evidently in recognition of their pre-existing rights of ownership of the kudiwaram. 13. In Govindasami Naidu v. Arumugam Pillai (1962) 2 Mad LJ 368) which arose under Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 30 of 1947, Veeraswami, J. as he then was, has observed : "It is well-settled that ouster of jurisdiction of a civil court in regard to matters that are generally within its powers to entertain, cannot be readily inferred and that such jurisdiction could be ousted by express statutory provision in that behalf or it should follow as a necessary implication from the provisions of the Act. Where the civil Court has jurisdiction to grant a particular prayer, which is not within the power of any other forum, the court will have a right to decide all questions incidental to the want of such a prayer, although a different forum has been constituted, to decide such questions for certain purposes contemplated by the relevant statute. In Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan (1959) 1 Mad LJ 195) in which the plea was that Section 56 of the Abolition Act was a bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine matters mentioned therein, it was held by Ramachandra Iyer, J., that a civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit in regard to a matter within its purview cannot be taken away merely because in deciding such matters the Court has to incidentally decide a matter which is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunals constituted under special Acts. The validity of this principle was recognised by a Division Bench of this Court in Adakalathammal v. Channayan Panipunder (1959) 1 Mad LJ 314: ( AIR 1959 Mad 447 ). The validity of this principle was recognised by a Division Bench of this Court in Adakalathammal v. Channayan Panipunder (1959) 1 Mad LJ 314: ( AIR 1959 Mad 447 ). No doubt the Amending Act prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Collector in disposing of applications to determine the character of the land, prescribes also the limitation for such applications, transfer of certain suits and applications under Madras Act (1 of 1908), appeals against the orders of the Collector and the finality of the orders passed by the Tribunal on appeal. But all this, in my opinion, does not detract from the jurisdiction of the civil court to go into and decide incidental matters, such as whether the land is ryoti, in order to grant or refuse the prayer for recovery of possession of the land." This decision, as stated earlier, arose out of Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act 30 of 1947 and would not, in my opinion, be very helpful in deciding the matter involved in the present suit. 14. In Sanjeevi Naicker v. Shanmuga Udayar (1965) 2 Mad LJ 204), Ramamurti, J. has observed :- "………only when the Revenue Authorities can grant a particular relief that their decisions would become final to that limited extent. But if the Revenue Authorities cannot grant a particular relief, namely, relief of possession and declaration of title or relief of injunction, the orders passed or the decisions rendered by the authorities concerned under Section 64-C of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 cannot operate as a bar to the civil Court entertaining the suit and adjudicating upon such disputed questions which are out of the purview of the authorities functioning under the Act." This decision appears to be contrary to the view expressed by Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan (1959) 1 Mad LJ 195), referred to above where the learned Judge has observed that:- "It may be that during the course of the suit if the defendant is able to obtain patta from the authorities he can produce that patta as an answer to the plaintiff's claim that he has got superior title against whom decree for possession cannot be granted." 15. The decision in Muthukumaraswami Pillai v. Srimushnam Vedapatasalai (1968) 2 Mad LJ 463) which arose under Madras Act 26 of 1963 was rendered by Ramaprasada Rao, J. as he then was. The suit out of which that decision arose was for recovery of possession of lands in the occupation of the defendants as tenants under the registered lease deed and for other reliefs. The learned Judge held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and has observed :- "Whether the lands are the private lands or ryoti lands is yet to be decided by the statutory Tribunals constituted for the purpose………… Ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Courts ought not to be lightly inferred. Whereas there is a ban on the adjudication of such issue by Civil Courts when the statutory Tribunals have finally decided that the land is ryoti, there is no such ban in cases where such decisions have not yet been made though initiated by the landlord. There appears to me, to be, no bar for civil Courts to try such suits for possession and rent or mesne profits when the statutory Tribunals have not yet decided the principal matter in controversy. The respondent has instituted this suit and is taking a risk as he is ultimately bound by the decision of the Tribunals. Whatever the land-holder does has to necessarily enure to the benefits of the true owner, as found by the Tribunal ultimately." This decision appears to be in conformity with the aforesaid view of Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was expressed in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan (1959) 1 Mad LJ 195) referred to above and is against the plaintiffs in the present suit for the reasons mentioned above. 16. The Supreme Court has expressed the following view in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) 3 SCR 662 , ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ) "(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the Jurisdiction of the civil Court." 17. After referring to the provisions of Sections 8, 11, 46, 47 and 43 of Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 30 of 1963, in Madras State Wakf Board v. Vellayam Chettiar (1978) 1 Mad LJ 542) I have expressed the view:- "In view of the special provisions in the Act whereunder an appeal could be flied against the order of the Assistant settlement Officer granting patta under Section 11 of the Act before a Tribunal and against the decision of the Tribunal in such matter before a special Appellate Tribunal, it is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the Civil Court will have Jurisdiction to go into the matter when there are rival claimants for the grant of patta". In the present case it has not been contended before me by Mr. T.R. Mani that the provisions of the aforesaid Act 30 of 1963, have not been complied with by the statutory Tribunals which heard C.M.A. Nos. 148 and 166 of 1970 and S.T.A. Nos. 54 and 47 of 1972 in which it had been finally held that the grant of Ryotwari patta to the defendants in respect of the suit lands by the Tribunal and the authority constituted under the Act is proper. Nor has it been contended that the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The said Act 30 of 1963, gives a finality to the decision of the Tribunals constituted under the Act and therefore it is not possible to hold that the Civil Court can once again go into that question and come to a different conclusion. 18. The said Act 30 of 1963, gives a finality to the decision of the Tribunals constituted under the Act and therefore it is not possible to hold that the Civil Court can once again go into that question and come to a different conclusion. 18. Sections 49 and 93 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 19 of 1951, read as:- "49 (1) All Office-holders and servants attached to a religious institution or in receipt of any emolument or perquisite therefrom shall, whether the office or service is hereditary or not, be controlled by the trustee; and the trustee may, after following the prescribed procedure, if any, fine, suspend, remove or dismiss any of them for breach of trust, incapacity, disobedience of orders, neglect of duty, misconduct or other sufficient cause. 2. Any office-holder or servant punished by a trustee under sub-section (1) may, within one month from the date of the receipt of the order by him, appeal against the order to the Deputy Commissioner. (2) A hereditary office-holder or servant may, within one month from the date of the receipt by him of the order of the Deputy Commissioner under subsection (2), prefer an appeal to the Commissioner against such order". "(93) No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of law, except under, and in conformity with, the provisions of this Act". Natesan, J., before whom these two sections came up for consideration in Samba Nataraja v. Kalyanasabesa (1968) 1 Mad LJ 153) has observed having regard to the facts of that case:- "The disciplinary jurisdiction here exercised is not with reference to disobedience of any legal or valid order; nor is there any neglect of any duty which the archaka owed to the institution. It is something wholly outside the Act and the body which punished the plaintiff had no competence in the circumstances to impose any penalty whatsoever…….the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question for the reliefs prayed for. It is something wholly outside the Act and the body which punished the plaintiff had no competence in the circumstances to impose any penalty whatsoever…….the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question for the reliefs prayed for. The relief claimed in substance in that case related to the personal rights of the plaintiff as a trustee or Dikshidar which he had lost by auction and sale of the same pursuant to a fine invalidly levied on him. The learned Judge has observed:- "It has been repeatedly pointed out that the proper tribunals, for determination of disputes as to rights and properties are Courts and a person's right to resort to a Civil Court should not be whittled down unless it is expressly or by necessary implication barred by a statute." The observations made in that decision would not apply to the facts of the present case, where it has not been contended that the Tribunals constituted under Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963 had no competency to decide the question as to whether the defendants are entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of the suit lands. 19. In State of Madras v. Ramalingaswamigal Madam (1969) 2 Mad LJ 281) governed by the provisions of Madras Act 26 of 1948, a Division Bench of this Court has observed :- "………the grant of patta under Sections 12 to 14 of the Act read with the protection of continued possession of the private land with the landlord is only in recognition of the anterior title which is continued with different incidence from the standpoint of revenue and the relationship of landlord and tenant ………the right to secure patta is given under the Act and it could be obtained only under the provisions of the Act. Therefore no suit would lie for the grant of patta………. The finality under Section 64-C of the Act is only in respect of matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act. Unlike in Sections 12 to 14 of the Act for the grant of ryotwari patta to a landholder in respect of private lands, there is no similar express provision for any enquiry and grant of a ryotwari patta to a ryot in respect of a ryoti land. Unlike in Sections 12 to 14 of the Act for the grant of ryotwari patta to a landholder in respect of private lands, there is no similar express provision for any enquiry and grant of a ryotwari patta to a ryot in respect of a ryoti land. It is only by reading Section 11 in the light of proviso (1) to Section 3 (d) of the "Act that an inference could be made that a Settlement Officer is enabled to grant a ryotwari patta to a ryot". This and some other decisions which will be referred to have taken the view that the Act has not provided any machinery for the purpose of deciding a dispute between rival claimants for issue of ryotwari patta under Section 11 and that any decision of the statutory authorities on this aspect has no finality so as to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In Madras State Wakf Board v. Vellayam Chettiar, (1978) 1 Mad LJ 542) referred to above, I have held that the decisions rendered in regard to Section 11 of Madras Act 26 of 1948, would not apply to the facts of that case which like the present one is governed by Madras Act 30 of 1963. 20. In Ramamoorthy v. State of Madras, (ILR (1970) 2 Mad 788) which arose out of a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction against the Government, Natesan, J., repelled the contention that there is extinguishment of all rights of a ryot on the notification of an estate and there is a fresh grant of rights in recognition of the rights taken under the provisions of the Act and has observed:" The Act by Section 11 provides only for the issue of patta in respect of ryoti land. There is no provision in relation to Section 11 for adequate investigation and effective adjudication of the claim of a ryot that a particular land is his ryoti land, and not other land or another claimant's ryoti land……………… A ryot may be denied patta either on the ground that the land is not ryoti or that he is not the ryot and there is nothing specific in the Act to oust the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court in one case and find it for the other ………… Of course, the Civil Court cannot direct the issue or itself grant patta. No suit would lie for the grant of patta. That is a matter within the exclusive competence of the authorities under the Act, for under the proviso to Section 11 despite a finding that the land is ryoti, the ryot may be denied patta." In another decision in Arumugam Chettiar v. Subramaniam Chettiar, (1970) 83 Mad LW 580) which came up before Natesan, J., out of a suit for declaration of the plaintiff's ownership of the suit land acquired by prescription and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession, the contention urged before the learned Judge was that in view of Sections 15 and 64-C of Act 26 of 1948, the suit was not maintainable. The learned Judge held that the sections do not provide for and are not intended to give an adjudication as to the ownership of Pannai land between rival claimants, that the decision of the Tribunal to which finality is attached under Section 15 (b), is with reference to the determination provided for in Section 15 (b) and it is with reference to which land ryotwari patta could be issued and not to which one among the several claimants is entitled to ryotwari patta and that the relief claimed can be had only in the Civil Court and its jurisdiction is not barred. The decision also turned on the effect of Section 11 of Madras Act 26 of 1948. 21. In Velayudhan Pillai v. Sandhose Nadar, (1973) 1 Mad LJ 44: ( AIR 1973 Mad 299 ) Ramanujam, J., has expressed the view that :- "…..if it is shown to be a ryoti land, the grant of patta by the Settlement Authorities to one of the competing claimants will not exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to find out as to who is the lawful ryot in respect of the land in dispute." This view appears to be in conflict with the one expressed by Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan, (1959) 1 Mad LJ 195) and by Ramaprasada Rao, J., as he then was in Muthukumaraswami Pillai v. Srimushnam Vedapatasalai, (1968) 2 Mad LJ 463) referred to above. 22. 22. In C.V. Subayya v. P. Anjayya, ( AIR 1972 SC 1421 ) the Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Settlement Officer must be a decision in respect of one of the matters referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 56 of Madras Act 26 of 1948, and that the question whether the suit lands continued to be communal lands does not fall within the scope of that section on the ground that the rights of the community over communal lands which were not created by the principal or any other landholder cannot be said to have been abrogated by clause © of Section 3 of the Estates Abolition Act. This decision does not appear to be helpful for deciding the matter in issue in the present case. 23. Ismail, J., has observed in Narayanaswami Velalar v. Rangaswami Konar, ( (1973) 86 Mad LW 276) to which provisions of Madras Act 26 of 1948 applied thus: "Simply as a matter of construction without any reference to any decided cases, it will follow that Section 15 (1) of the Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta under Sections 12, 13 or 14, as the case may be and to decide in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal on appeal will be co-extensive with that of the Settlement Officer under Section 15 (1) and therefore the tribunal also has got identical jurisdiction to examine the nature and history of all the lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta and to decide in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed. Then comes the crucial provision, namely, Cl. (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 15. It provides in express and unambiguous language that the decision of the Tribunal on any such appeal shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any court of law. Then comes the crucial provision, namely, Cl. (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 15. It provides in express and unambiguous language that the decision of the Tribunal on any such appeal shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any court of law. When the section refers to the decision of the Tribunal, that must be correlated to the obligation and jurisdiction of the Tribunal or the Settlement Officer, as contemplated by Section 16(1), namely, to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta and to decide in respect of which lands the claims should be allowed. Therefore the decision rendered by the Settlement Officer and Tribunal, as a result of the examination of the nature and history of the land as to its character and the decision as to in respect of which land, the landholder will be entitled to a patta, are all matters entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal. The decision contemplated in S.15 (2) (b) of the Act refers to the determination of these questions entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction and such determination has been rendered final in specific and unqualified terms by that section. The Language of Section 15 (2) (b) as it stands is absolute and unqualified and does not admit of any exception or qualification ……………Therefore, applying that principle, the question for consideration will be, when the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal acts under Section 15 of the Act and determines that a particular piece of land is a private land, is it a determination on a question which had been entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal? If it is a determination on an incidental question, there must be something else which is primary to which this question is incidental, which has been entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal. I am unable to see from the scheme of the Act any primary matter entrusted to the determination of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal to which the determination of the character of the land as private land can be said to be an incidental one. I am unable to see from the scheme of the Act any primary matter entrusted to the determination of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal to which the determination of the character of the land as private land can be said to be an incidental one. As I have pointed out already there had been some loose argument that the primary jurisdiction entrusted to the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal is the grant of patta and the determination whether a particular piece of land is private or not is incidental to the exercise of that primary jurisdiction. I have also expressed my opinion that there is no substance in this argument, because there cannot be a ryotwari patta in the vacuum and the patta must be relatable to a particular piece of land and the grant of patta is merely a mechanical act flowing from the decision as to the character of the land and the particular piece of land in respect of which the claim of the landholder should be allowed. Once that decision has been arrived at, the grant or issue of a patta is simply a matter of course consequent on that decision and therefore the physical or mechanical act of granting patta cannot be said to be the primary matter entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal to which determination of the character of the land can be said to be an incidental one. On the other hand, the language of S.15 (1) of the Act requires the "Settlement Officer" to examine the nature and history of the land and to decide in respect of which land, land-holder will be entitled to a patta and the scheme of the Act makes it indisputably clear that the determination of the character of the land as well as the determination of the entitlement of the landholder to a ryotwari patta in respect of particular piece of land are primary matters entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the tribunal and therefore the decision rendered by them in that behalf acquires the finality contemplated by Section 15 (2) (b) of the Act and such decisions become unimpeachable in any civil court". 24. 24. In Lakshminarayana Ayyar v. Nallachi Ammal ((1974) 1 Mad LJ 424) Kailasam and N.S. Ramaswami JJ., have expressed the opinion that the Legislature did not intend S.56 (1) © to be related to Section 11 of the Act. They have observed that: "If Section 56 (1) © is not to be linked with Section 11 of the Act, then the basis of the contentions of Mr. Sundaram Iyer, learned counsel for the appellants, fails. The contention has been that as the Settlement Officer has already decided the question as to who was entitled to ryotwari patta and that decision has become final by virtue of Section 56 of the Act, the parties are bound by the same and it is not open to the Civil Court to go into that question afresh. From the foregoing discussion it will be clear that the grant of patta by the Settlement Officer to the first defendant is not an order coming under sec. 56 (1) © and thereby the order becoming final under sub-section (2) of that section. Even assuming that Section 56 can be linked to Section 11 regarding the grant of patta to ryotwari lands, still we are of opinion that the decision of the Settlement Officer can be only for the purpose of the Act and that it would not debar a Civil Court from deciding title and possession. Assuming that the grant of patta by the Settlement Officer under Section 11 to one of the claimants and refusal to grant such patta to another amounts to a final decision as to who was entitled to a ryotwari patta and the same is not liable to be questioned in any Court of Law, it would not mean that the person to whom the ryotwari patta has been issued alone has title to the land and the same cannot be challenged. The question of title has necessarily to be gone into by the Civil Court and certainly is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Authorities". It has to be noted that the learned Judges agreed with the following observations of Natesan, J., in Ramamoorthy v. State of Madras (ILR (1970) 2 Mad 788), referred to earlier. The question of title has necessarily to be gone into by the Civil Court and certainly is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Authorities". It has to be noted that the learned Judges agreed with the following observations of Natesan, J., in Ramamoorthy v. State of Madras (ILR (1970) 2 Mad 788), referred to earlier. "In effect, both possession and title of person who is entitled to a ryotwari patta are saved from the effect of the notification under Section 3 (h) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. The interest of the ryot in land in the estate is separate and distinct, he being a co-owner or, as occasionally stated, a co-partner with the landholder. He is not given any compensation, as his ownership of the kudiwaram is not affected by taking over the estate. On the abolition of the estate, his rights of occupancy in the land are not extinguished and transferred to the Government but continued in him. Under the Act, he is entitled to be granted ryotwari patta for his former ryoti holding as the Act makes him a ryotwari proprietor of the holding. Obtaining of ryotwari patta by the persons entitled to the patta under the Act can, if at all, be only in recognition of pre-existing rights of ownership". 25. Ismail, J., has observed in his decision in Minor Andi v. Kada Vaithilinga Konar in S.A. No. 2061 of 1973 reported in 1976 TLNJ 492, that a Bench of this court has held in L.P.A. No. 18 of 1968, that the question of title will have to follow a decision under the provisions of the Act 26 of 1963 to grant patta. In the case before the learned Judge the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was a recent one and it was represented that an appeal has been preferred against that order. The learned Judge has observed that the final disposal of the patta proceedings will be absolutely relevant and material for the disposal of the suit instituted by the plaintiffs. In that view, the learned Judge has remanded the first appeal to the lower appellate court for fresh disposal. 26. In the case which came up before Kailasam, J., as he then was reported in Rathinasabapathi Servai v. Sannasi Ambalagaran. In that view, the learned Judge has remanded the first appeal to the lower appellate court for fresh disposal. 26. In the case which came up before Kailasam, J., as he then was reported in Rathinasabapathi Servai v. Sannasi Ambalagaran. ( (1966) 1 Mad LJ 190) patta had been granted to the Zamindar and the defendants contended that the lands were ryoti lands which were in the possession of themselves and their predecessors-in-title and were not the pannai lands of the zamindar and that the grant of patta to the zamindar was without going into the merits and it was invalid and not final and binding on them. The learned Judge held that decision of the Settlement Officer which had not been appealed against, regarding the nature of the land in a notified estate by the grant of ryotwari patta is final and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into that question. It may be stated here that I have taken a similar view in Shukur v. Sundara Mudaliar, (1976 2 Mad LJ 332) in which reference has been made to the above decision of Kailasam J., as he then was. 27. In Rajesekaran v. Elumalai Gounder ( (1976) 1 Mad LJ 288) in which reference has been made to the decision of Ramanujam, J., in Subbiah Pillai v. Veerabadran, (1977 TLNJ 333), but not to the aforesaid decision of Kailasam, J., as he then was (Rathinasabapathi Servai v. Sannasi Ambalagaran, (1966) 1 Mad LJ 190) -Sethuraman, J., has observed in relation to Section 11 of Madras Act 26 of 1948, as already stated, that the Act has not provided any machinery for the purpose of deciding a dispute between rival claimants for a ryotwari patta under Section 11 and that any decision of the statutory authorities on this aspect has no finality so as to bar the jurisdiction of courts. In another decision in Jumma Mosque, Salavakkarn v. Sulaiman Sheriff ((1978) 2 Mad LJ 99) which arose under Madras Act 30 of 1963, Sethuraman J., has expressed the view similar to the one expressed by the learned Judge in a prior decision in Rajesekaran v. Elumalai Gounder ((1976) 1 Mad LJ 288). In another decision in Jumma Mosque, Salavakkarn v. Sulaiman Sheriff ((1978) 2 Mad LJ 99) which arose under Madras Act 30 of 1963, Sethuraman J., has expressed the view similar to the one expressed by the learned Judge in a prior decision in Rajesekaran v. Elumalai Gounder ((1976) 1 Mad LJ 288). The learned Judge after extracting Section 46 of that Act has observed in his judgment : "Section 43 provides that the decision of a Tribunal in any proceeding under the Act on any matter falling within its Jurisdiction is binding on the parties and persons claiming under them, in any suit or proceeding in a Civil Court, in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties is restricted to any matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal. In the present case the decision which is relied on by the respondents as constituting the bar to the present proceedings is the one decided by the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 (3). Section 11, as already pointed out, provides for the grant of ryotwari patta and the Assistant Settlement Officer has to decide this question in respect of the land over which any claim is made. The jurisdiction of the Assistant Settlement Officer is merely for the purpose of granting a patta and not to decide any dispute as to title. It is his decision, which is the subject matter of the appeal before the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is also restricted to finding out the person in whose favour the ryotwari patta is to be issued. As the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the question of title to the land, as such, I do not consider that the bar enacted in Sec. 43 operates in the present case so as to disentitle the plaintiffs from filing the present suit." It was alleged in that suit for declaration and injunction that the grant of patta in favour of the first defendant was erroneous. No reference has been made in this decision of Sethuraman, J., to the decision of Kailasarn, J., as he then was in Rathnasabapathi Servai v. Sannasi Ambalagaran, ( (1966) 1 Mad LJ 190) or to the decision in Shukur v. Sundara Mudaliar, ((1976) 2 Mad LJ 332) rendered by me. 28. No reference has been made in this decision of Sethuraman, J., to the decision of Kailasarn, J., as he then was in Rathnasabapathi Servai v. Sannasi Ambalagaran, ( (1966) 1 Mad LJ 190) or to the decision in Shukur v. Sundara Mudaliar, ((1976) 2 Mad LJ 332) rendered by me. 28. Balasubrahmanyan, J. has specifically dissented from the view expressed by me in the decision in Shukur v. Sundara Mudaliar, ( (1976) 2 Mad LJ 332) in his decision in Mariammal v. Kumaraswamy Chettiar (1978 TLNJ 528) which relates to Section 11 of Madras Act 26 of 1948. The learned Judge has observed: ".........I must hold the patta issued by the Settlement Officer even under the proceedings under Act 26 of 1948, cannot be regarded as evidence of title at all. The learned counsel brought to my notice the Judgment of a learned single Judge of his Court Varadarajan, J., reported in (1976) 2 Mad LJ 332, in support of his contention that where a patta had been granted under Act 26 of 1948, it is not open to a Civil Court to examine whether the party concerned had no title to the lands or was not entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta. With respect to the learned Judge I do not think that the machinery for the issue of a ryotwari patta under Act 26 of 1948 has the effect which the learned Judge says it has. It may be that the Settlement Officer, an authority functioning under the Act, has jurisdiction to enquire into the matters relevant for the issue of patta and it may be that his decision, so far it goes, may be regarded as final. But when a question arises as to the title to the land in respect of which the Settlement Officer has issued patta, the mere official act of issuing a patta could not, in my view, be regarded as conclusive, or act as a bar to a consideration by a Civil Court of basic questions as to title". 29. But when a question arises as to the title to the land in respect of which the Settlement Officer has issued patta, the mere official act of issuing a patta could not, in my view, be regarded as conclusive, or act as a bar to a consideration by a Civil Court of basic questions as to title". 29. In Madras State Wakf Board v. Vellayam Chettiar ( (1978) 1 Mad LJ 542), I have observed that the decisions in Adakalathammal v. Chinnayan Panipunder (1959) 1 Mad LJ 314 : ( AIR 1959 Mad 447 ) Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar (1961) 1 Mad LJ 168 (169); C.V. Subbayya v. P. Anjayya; (1974) 1 Mad LJ 58: ( AIR 1972 SC 1421 ) and Subbiah Pillai v. Veerabadran (S.A. No. 1090 of 1976): (Reported in 1977 TLNJ 333 (Mad)) arose out of decisions relating to lands governed by Act 26 of 1948 and are not relevant for the purpose of cases governed by Madras Act 30 of 1963. In that decision I have expressed the view that the title to the land vests in the Government on and from the appointed day by virtue of the notification under Section 3 (b) of the Act 30 of 1963 and by the grant of patta under the provisions of that Act, the rights of the person to whom patta was granted to be in possession of the land is recognised by the Government. In making the observation, I relied upon the observations of Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was in Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar (1961) 1 Mad LJ 168 (169) that: "a ryotwari pattadar is treated as the proprietor by being made liable to pay the assessment directly to the Government". In that decision I have further observed: "No doubt when the question of title to the properties is sought to be raised in the present suit for possession, it is open to the respondents to contend that this question cannot be gone into by the Civil Court having regard to the specific provisions contained in Act XXX of 1963 and that the appellant is not entitled to recover possession of the property not having obtained patta for the same under the provisions of the Act". 30. 30. Balasubrahmanyan, J., speaking for himself and Kailasam, C.J. in Karivaradaraja Perumal Temple, Pollachi v. K.S.J. Rajuchettiar ((1978) 91 Mad LW 142) to which the provisions of Madras Act 30 of 1963 applied, has observed : "Mr. Narayanaswami referred to Section 30 (3) of the Act which lays down that the Special Appellate Tribunal shall, subject to the provisions of Section 47-A, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Civil P.C. (Central Act V of 1908) when hearing an appeal. He also referred us to Section 46 of the Act which provides that any order passed by any officer, the Government or other authority or any decision of the Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act, shall, subject only to any appeal or revision provided under this Act, be final. But, we do not regard these provisions in the Act as in any way restricting or limiting our powers as an Appellate Tribunal to determine finally and effectively the question of issue of ryotwari patta or any other matter that may come before us in appeal. Section 46 itself indicates that the orders to be passed by the Special Tribunals and Appellate Tribunal shall not be liable to be questioned in a court of law, thereby implying that while acting under Sec. 30, the High Court does not function as a court of law." The learned Judges including Balasubrahmanyan, J. appear to have taken the view in this decision that the decisions of the Special Appellate Tribunal under Act 30 of 1963 are final and in view of Section 46 of that Act, are not liable to be questioned in any court of law. Having regard to that decision, the observations of Ramachandra Iyer, J. as he then was in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan ((1959) 1 Mad LJ 195) that "It may be that during the course of the suit if the defendant is able to obtain patta from the authorities he can produce that patta as an answer to the plaintiff's claim that he has got superior title against whom decree for possession cannot be granted", the observations of Ramaprasada Rao, J. as he then was in Muthukurnaraswami Pillai v. Srimushnam Vedapatasalai ((1968) 2 Mad LJ 463) that "There appears to me, to be, no bar for Civil Courts to try such suits for possession and rent or mesne profits when the statutory Tribunals have not yet decided the principal matter in controversy. The respondent has instituted this suit and is taking a risk as he is ultimately bound by the decision of the Tribunals. Whatever the landholder does has to necessarily enure to the benefits of the true owner, as found by the Tribunal ultimately", the view expressed by Ismail, J. in Minor Andi v. Kada Vaithilinga Konar in S, A. No, 2061 of 1973: reported in 1976 TLNJ 492 that the final disposal of the patta proceedings will be absolutely relevant and material for the disposal of the suit instituted by the plaintiffs and the view expressed by me in Madras State Wakf Board v. Vellayam Chettiar ((1978) 1 Mad LJ 542) that when the question of title to the property is sought to be raised in those suits for possession, it is open to the respondents in that case to contend that this question cannot be gone into by the Civil Court; having regard to the provisions contained in Act 30 of 1963, the appellant is not entitled to recover possession of the properties not having obtained patta for the lands under the provisions of that Act, and the fact that it has been finally held in S.T.A. Nos. 54 and 47 of 1972 in which the judgments and decrees of the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal, Coimbatore in C.M.A. Nos. 148 and 166 of 1970 that the defendants in the present suit are entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta (Exs. 54 and 47 of 1972 in which the judgments and decrees of the Minor Inams Abolition Tribunal, Coimbatore in C.M.A. Nos. 148 and 166 of 1970 that the defendants in the present suit are entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta (Exs. B-4 to B-7) have been confirmed, I am of the opinion that there is no need to place these second appeals before a larger Bench and that in view of the fact that the defendants have been finally found by the Special Appellate Tribunal to be entitled to grant of ryotwari patta in respect of these lands, the plaintiffs are not entitled to have a declaration of their title to the suit properties and to recover possession of the properties, though no doubt, when the suits were instituted the civil court could not be stated to have had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The result is both the appeals succeed and are allowed and the suits are dismissed, but without costs throughout in the circumstances of the case. Appeals allowed.