JUDGMENT KOTVAL C. J. - These two appeals have been heard together by consent because they involve common questions of law and fact. This judgment will cover the disposal of both the appeals. 2. We are concerned in these appeals with a petition by the Official Trustee of Maharashtra seeking directions from this Court in regard to the properties of an extinct trust viz. the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Trust which was revoked and extinguished by Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy (Repeal and Distribution of Trust Properties) Act, 1959 (Bombay Act IX of 1960). The circumstances under which the Official Trustee is seeking directions are as follows: 3. On July 20, 1911, by Letters Patent issued by His Majesty King George V, Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim was created a Baronet. The said Letters Patent are not before us and it was stated on behalf of the present Baronet, the original claimant No.8 that they are not traceable. After the creation of the Baronetcy, in order to provide for the upkeep, and maintain the dignity of the Baronetcy an Act came to be passed by the Governor-General of India in Council, being Act No. IV of 1913 intituled the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Act, 1913. By this Act considerable immoveable property and a large sum of money were set apart for the maintenance of "the dignity, state and degree" of the said Baronet and a trust was created of these properties. The first Baronet passed away on May 29, 1934. He left behind a will dated October 22, 1916, to which reference will be made in connection with the several claims of his heirs. After the death of the first Baronet his eldest son Mahomedbhoy assumed the title and became the second Baronet. He held the title till his death on March 31, 1928. He was succeeded by his son Husseinali who became the third Baronet. The third Baronet migrated to Pakistan some time prior to 1949. The exact date is not known. Consequent upon his migration his properties were dealt with under the provisions of the then operative Bombay Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1949 and on September 29, 1949, the third Baronet was declared an Evacuee and his properties vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The orders in this respect are at Exh. A both dated September 29, 1949. 4. Consequent upon his migration his properties were dealt with under the provisions of the then operative Bombay Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1949 and on September 29, 1949, the third Baronet was declared an Evacuee and his properties vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The orders in this respect are at Exh. A both dated September 29, 1949. 4. On March 4, 1952, Husseinali the third Baronet, passed away in Pakistan and was succeeded by his son Mohamedbhai as the fourth Baronet. He is the title-holder at present and is the original claimant No.8. On the date on which he succeeded as the fourth Baronet, Mahomedbhai was a resident of India but shortly thereafter he left for Pakistan and, therefore, his interest in the trust properties was also affected by the Jaw governing evacuee property. On June 16, 1952, the fourth Baronets interest in the properties of the trust declared under the Baronetcy Act was notified as evacuee property. The order passed in this behalf as well as the notification under section 7 (3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, are collectively at Exh. C. Against these orders vesting his beneficial interest in the trust properties in the Deputy Custodian the fourth Baronet preferred an appeal to the Custodian General at Delhi, but that appeal was dismissed on August 26, 1960, on the ground that it was barred by time. 5. Before the appeal came to be dismissed other events of considerable importance took place. Consequent upon the fourth Baronet having migrated to Pakistan along with his son Zoolficar Ali (Claimant No.8) who will normally be entitled to succeed to the Baronetcy, the Legislature of the then State of Bombay passed an Act repealing the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Act of 1913. The disputes, which are before us, and in regard to which the Official Trustee is seeking our directions, principally arise out of the provisions of that Act. It is intituled the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy (Repeal and Distribution of Trust Properties Act, 1959 (Bombay Act IX of 1960) assented to by the President on January 23, 1960, and came into force on March 15, 1960. 6. In order to understand the provisions of the Repealing Act, it is necessary to go back to the provisions of the Act which it repealed viz. 6. In order to understand the provisions of the Repealing Act, it is necessary to go back to the provisions of the Act which it repealed viz. the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Act, 1913 and to see what exactly was the change sought to be brought about by the Repealing Act. The Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Act passed on February 27, 1913, remained in full operation until the repealing Act. The Baronetcy Act recites in its preamble that it was passed for the purpose of settlement of certain properties belonging to Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim, Baronetcy" so as to accompany and support the title and dignity of a Baronet lately conferred on him by His Majesty King George V" to hold to him and the heirs male of his body lawfully begotten and to be begotten and "for other purposes". The preamble also recites that Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim was desirous of settling in perpetuity certain property on himself and the heirs male of his body who may succeed to the title of Baronet and therefore he had set apart, properties of the aggregate market value of about Rs. 20 lakhs upon trust and for the purposes declared in the Act. It is also recited that the Act was being passed at the desire of the Baronet and because he had asked that it should be passed. 7. So far as the provisions of the Act itself are concerned, section 2 names the trustees. They were all State Officials except the Baronet for the time being holding the title. The trustees were created into a corporation with perpetual succession and a common seal under the style and title of "The Trustees of the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy". They were to execute the trusts, powers and purposes of the Act. Section 3 enjoined that the heirs male of the body of Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim who shall succeed to the title shall take upon themselves respectively the name of "Currimbhoy Ebrahim" in lieu and place of any other name or Dames whatever and they shall always subscribe themselves accordingly. They were to execute the trusts, powers and purposes of the Act. Section 3 enjoined that the heirs male of the body of Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim who shall succeed to the title shall take upon themselves respectively the name of "Currimbhoy Ebrahim" in lieu and place of any other name or Dames whatever and they shall always subscribe themselves accordingly. Section 4 of the Act provided that in the event of any person to whom the title descends refuses or neglects to use the name "Currimbhoy Ebrahim" as provided, or discontinue to use the name, he shall not be entitled to t he benefits of the trusts created by the Act and they shall during the remainder of his natural life be suspended. Section 4 makes a further important provision as to what the corporation should do with the trust properties in the event of such suspension. It says that the properties and the income therefrom shall be accumulated for the benefit of the male issue of the said Baronet that may subsequently be born and succeed to the said title and "in default of any such male issue the whole of the said property shall devolve upon such person as would be entitled to the same if there had been a total failure of issue male of the said Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim." This is one of the sections of the Act upon which the fourth Baronet now relies to claim the properties after the repealing Act has come into force. We will show a little later how that claim arises. Sections 5, 6 and 7 are sections which provide for the management of the property by the Corporation and declare the right of the Baronet for the time being to use and occupy free of rent as his residence certain properties described in the second part of the First Schedule of the Act. The substance of these provisions is that the income from the trust property shall be collected by the Corporation and after defraying certain expenses and setting apart an amount for a sinking fund and a repairing fund the residue shall be held for the benefit of the Baronet for the time being. 8. Other important sections which need mention are sections 16, 21 and 27. Section 16 controls the power of the trustees of the Corporation to transfer the trust property. 8. Other important sections which need mention are sections 16, 21 and 27. Section 16 controls the power of the trustees of the Corporation to transfer the trust property. The power is conferred upon them but it is subject to the approval of the Governor-in-Council. By section 21 the Baronet for the time being has been given power to appoint jointures in lieu of maintenance and other claims of certain women of the family. One of the claimants before us who claims under this section of the Act is Lady Amira Currimbhoy (Claimant No.7) the second wife of the third Baronet, who is the mother of Mahomedbhai, the fourth Baronet (Claimant No.8). Section 27 of the Act made provisions as to devolution upon the failure and in default of the heirs male of the body of the first Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim. The provision made was that the Corporation shall continue to hold the trust property and funds "which may then be vested in them by virtue and operation of this Act upon trust for the heirs of the last Baronet absolutely and shall also stand possessed of the said hereditaments and premises particularly described in the second schedule -- upon trust for the heirs of the last Baronet for all the then residues of the terms granted by the leases by which the same are demised." This is another of the sections of the Act upon which the fourth Baronet has relied to claim the trust properties for himself consequent upon the revocation and extinction of the trusts by the repealing Act. We will indicate presently how this claim arises. 9. Then we turn to the repealing Act. It is prefaced by a long preamble, most of the paragraphs of which were the subject of some comment by one or the other of the several parties before us. The preamble recites the facts, as we have stated them above and this recital comprises of 9 paragraphs which for convenience of reference we have numbered and in our references hereinafter we shall refer to the said numbers of the paragraphs. The first two paragraphs refer to the passing of the Baronetcy Act and the creation of the Corporation under the style and title of "The Trustees of the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy". The third paragraph refers to certain amendments of the Baronetcy Act. The first two paragraphs refer to the passing of the Baronetcy Act and the creation of the Corporation under the style and title of "The Trustees of the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy". The third paragraph refers to certain amendments of the Baronetcy Act. In the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs the facts regarding the migration of the third Baronet to Pakistan and of the declaration of his property as an evacuee property and his subsequent death leaving behind his widow Amina, now the Dowager Lady Currimbhoy Ebrahim, and his son Mahmud Currimbhoy, the fourth Baronet, are referred to. Paragraphs 7 and 8 refer to the fourth Baronet and recite that he too has continued to remain in Pakistan and, therefore, he was declared an evacuee and the beneficial interest of the said Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim the fourth and present Baronet in the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Trust vested in the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property. Paragraph 9 is rather important for the purposes of the present appeals. It recites "AND WHEREAS, in consequence of the aforementioned recitals, difficulties have arisen in the administration of the trusts declared by the Baronetcy Act; and whereas for that and for other diverse good reasons it is expedient to repeal the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Act, 1913, to revoke the trusts, powers, provisions and declarations therein declared anti expressed for the purpose of supporting the title and dignity of Baronet, to dissolve the Corporation constituted Trustees for executing the powers and purposes of the Baronetcy Act, to vest all the properties which are subject to the settlement created by that Act … , which now vest in the Corporation, in the Official Trustee to hold the same for the purpose of the distribution thereof to persons rightfully entitled thereto in accordance with law; and to provide for matters connected with the purposes aforesaid." 10. The Act consists of 13 sections not all of which are relevant for the points raised in these appeals. It is principally with sections 3 and 4 that we are concerned. The Act consists of 13 sections not all of which are relevant for the points raised in these appeals. It is principally with sections 3 and 4 that we are concerned. By section 3 (a) and (b) all "the trusts, powers, provisions, declarations and purposes by and in that (the Baronetcy) Act declared and expressed shall be, and are hereby revoked and extinguished;" "the Corporation shall be and is hereby dissolved and shall cease to function, and the Trustees shall cease to hold office as such Trustees." Clause © of section 3 provides "the trust properties, in so far as they consist of immovable property shall by force and virtue of this Act vest in, and in so far as they consist of any moneys, investments, securities or other movable property shall stand transferred to, the Official Trustee, and be handed over to him (anything in Official Trustees Act, 1913, notwithstanding), and the Official Trustee shall hold and stand possessed of the same for the purposes, and with and subject to the powers and provisions, hereinafter expressed." 11. Section 4, sub-section (1) states how the properties shall be dealt with after they vest in the Official Trustee. Actually there is hardly any provision made which can be said to be an effective provision or one which can provide any guidance to this Court. All that sub-section (1) of section 4 says is that "As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the Official Trustee shall take possession or charge of the trust properties and make an inventory thereof, and hold the trust properties Upon trust 10 distribute the same amongst the persona rightfully entitled thereto according to law, and until such distribution to manage the said trust properties, in accordance with the provisions of this Act." (The italics are ours.) Under this sub-section, therefore, the property has to be held by the Official Trustee for distribution amongst the persons "rightfully entitled thereto according to law". It is this phrase in sub-section (1) of section 4 which has given rise to all the disputes that have arisen between the respective claimants and regarding which the Official Trustee has asked for directions. Section 5 prescribes that a notice should be issued asking all claimants to submit their respective claims in regard to the trust properties. It is this phrase in sub-section (1) of section 4 which has given rise to all the disputes that have arisen between the respective claimants and regarding which the Official Trustee has asked for directions. Section 5 prescribes that a notice should be issued asking all claimants to submit their respective claims in regard to the trust properties. Section 6 deals with the submission of claims and the particulars to be stated therein. Section 7 then deals with the disposal of the claims by the Official Trustee. If he finds that any claims are justified and are uncontested he is directed to distribute the trust property in accordance with such claims but if after enquiries he finds that any claim is not justified or is contested, in whole or in part, he has to apply to the High Court for orders and directions. It is under this section that the Official Trustee has moved this Court. Sub-section (4) of section 7 deals with a claim under special circumstances viz. where any person entitled to trust properties has been or is declared an evacuee. This sub-section and its applicability have also given rise to questions of considerable difficulty in this appeal firstly as to interpretation and secondly as to its effect upon the rights of the forth Baronet. We will deal with this sub-section separately when we come to deal with the .points argued on behalf of the Custodian who has filed Appeal No. 34, of 1963. 12. Now it will be seen that the Baronetcy Act vested the properties of Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Trust in several Trustees who were constituted into a Corporation, but all this was done, as the preamble of the Act itself shows at the express desire of the first Baronet. We would mention at this stage a point which is undisputed so far as these appeals are concerned viz. that all the parties before us agreed that though the trust was created by virtue of legislation it was nonetheless a trust created at the instance of a private party and should be treated as such by the Court whatever be its decision. that all the parties before us agreed that though the trust was created by virtue of legislation it was nonetheless a trust created at the instance of a private party and should be treated as such by the Court whatever be its decision. In other words, it is common ground between all the parties to the ap1eal that the Baronetcy Act must be taken as having created nothing more or less than a private trust and that though it came into being as a result of legislation that fact cannot have any influence upon the points arising in the appeals. We say this here because in deciding certain important points arising before him the learned single Judge answered those points by saying that the trust was a creature of the Legislature and that, therefore, the author of the trust must be deemed to be the Legislature and not the first Baronet. The entire arguments before us were on that footing and we must, therefore, take it for the purpose of this argument that what the Baronetcy Act created was no more and no less than a lawful private trust. No doubt in the course of his arguments which were confined only to the constitutional questions that arise in these appeals, the learned Advocate-General did point out that the aid of the Legislature had to be sought by the first Baronet in making the provisions as to succession which so to say created an estate in tail male which in the absence of legislative sanction would have been illegal because it would militate against the rule against perpetuity. It was, therefore, necessary to take aid of the Legislature and get over the bar imposed by the rule against perpetuity. Nevertheless, even the learned Advocate-General did not dispute the position that the trust was created at the instance of the first Baronet and represented only his intention to place in trust his own property. It is such a trust which was revoked and extinguished by the provisions of the Repealing Act. 13. Before the learned single Judge the Repealing Act was in the first place attacked upon Constitutional grounds and the attack was four-fold. It was urged that the Act was bad because it worked discrimination against claimants Nos. 8, 7 and 6 viz. It is such a trust which was revoked and extinguished by the provisions of the Repealing Act. 13. Before the learned single Judge the Repealing Act was in the first place attacked upon Constitutional grounds and the attack was four-fold. It was urged that the Act was bad because it worked discrimination against claimants Nos. 8, 7 and 6 viz. the fourth Baronet; his mother, Amina, Lady Currimbhoy Ebrahim and his son Zoolficar Ali and that, therefore, it infringed Article 14 of the Constitution. The Act was also challenged under Articles 19 and 31 as affecting the fundamental right to property and alternatively as depriving the fourth Baronet of his rights in the property. The Act was also challenged on the ground that the Legislature of the then State of Bombay which passed the Act was not competent to do so and all these challenges have been negatived by the learned single Judge. The same Constitutional questions have been raised before us in appeal. 14. Apart from these Constitutional questions, five questions arose before the learned single Judge as under: 1. Whether on repeal of the Baronetcy Act and the coming into force of the Repealing Act the Official Trustee holds the properties in trust for the benefit of the fourth Baronet as contended by the claimants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 or alternatively in trust for the legal representative of Husseinali, the third Baronet or whether the properties have by virtue of a resulting trust reverted to the estate of the first Baronet; 2. Whether the distribution of the properties should be made as if the inheritance opened on the date of the Repealing Act i.e. March 15, 1960, or whether it must be deemed to have opened on the date of the death of the first Baronet i.e. May 29, 1924. 3. Whether the properties are governed by the provisions of the will dated October 22, 1916 of the first Baronet or should the properties go by intestate succession? 4. If in the event of the properties going by intestate succession whether the parties were governed by the Hindu Law which applied to succession among the Khojas in 1924 or should the succession be governed by the Muslim Personal Law as provided by the Shariat Act of 1937; and 5. 4. If in the event of the properties going by intestate succession whether the parties were governed by the Hindu Law which applied to succession among the Khojas in 1924 or should the succession be governed by the Muslim Personal Law as provided by the Shariat Act of 1937; and 5. Whether the Custodian of Evacuee Property is entitled to such share in the trust properties as the fourth Baronet may be held entitled to or to any part thereof. The learned single Judge held that upon the passing of the Repealing Act the properties reverted to the estate of the first Baronet by virtue of a resulting trust and that they would pass by succession according to the Muslim Personal Law to the heirs of the first Baronet on his death on May 29, 1924. He negatived all the remaining contentions. We shall deal with the reasons why the learned Judge so held when we come to deal with the individual contentions advanced on behalf of the several claimants. 15. The principal arguments before us in these appeals have been advanced on behalf of the fourth Baronet and his mother and sun, claimants Nos. 8, 7 and 6 respectively by Mr. Peerbhoy. The arguments naturally fall into two main parts viz. the attack against the Constitutionality of the Repealing Act and the arguments going to show who arc the persons rightfully entitled according to law to take the properties upon the revocation and extinguishment of the Trusts created by the Baronetcy Act. We shall deal with the Constitutional points first. 16. Mr. Peerbhoy has first of all referred to the Baronetcy Act and pointed out that by that Act the fourth Baronet and his predecessors who held the title were only entitled to the beneficial interest in the usufruct or income arising from the trust properties. So far as the corpus of the trust properties is concerned the only provision made by the Baronetcy Act was in section 27 "Upon failure and in default of heirs male of the body of Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim" and even then Mr. Peerbhoy points out that the property was to be held in trust for the heirs of the last Baronet "for all the then residues of the terms granted by the leases by which same are demised", i.e. they were ultimately to vest in the heirs of the last Baronet. Peerbhoy points out that the property was to be held in trust for the heirs of the last Baronet "for all the then residues of the terms granted by the leases by which same are demised", i.e. they were ultimately to vest in the heirs of the last Baronet. Therefore on the date on which the Repealing Act was passed the son of the fourth Baronet, claimant No.6 Zoolficar Ali had a right to succeed to the properties in the event of the failure of the Baronetcy or if the Baronetcy continued he had the chance of succeeding as the Baronet himself. The Repealing Act, however, put an end to the trusts as well as the Corporation consisting of the Trustees, revoked and extinguished the trusts and dissolved the Corporation. He referred to the recitals in the preamble as to the reason why and the purpose for which all this was being done. One of the reasons disclosed was in the ninth paragraph of the preamble of the Repealing Act. It says that the Act was being passed because "in consequence of the aforementioned recitals, difficulties have arisen in the administration of the trusts declared by the Baronetcy Act and whereas for that and for other diverse good reasons it is expedient to repeal." Mr. Peerbhoy, therefore, urged that in terms the Act says that it was necessary to repeal the provisions of the Baronetcy Act because difficulties had arisen in the administration of the trusts, but the operative provisions of the Act had nothing whatsoever to do with solving the difficulties or any particular difficulty hut is only concerned with extinguishing and revoking the trusts and dissolving the Corporation and vesting the entire trust property in the Official Trustee. He says that this was a peculiar and totally unjustified manner in which to solve the so-called difficulties which had arisen in the administration of the trusts. He urged that the operative provisions of the Act do not in the first place conform to the very purpose of the Act but go far beyond it and in the second place in so far as they have gone far beyond it, they have worked a discrimination against the fourth Baronet and his heirs as compared to other similar enactments whereby similar other Baronetcies were put an end to and their respective Acts repealed. In particular, he referred to two Acts viz. In particular, he referred to two Acts viz. the Sir Chinubhai Madhavlal Ranchhodlal Baronetcy (Repealing) Act, 1956, also passed by the Legislature of the then Bombay State as Bombay Act No.1 of 1957 and the Sir Sassoon Jacob David Baronetcy (Repealing) Act, 1957, passed by the same Legislature as Bombay Act No. XXXVI of 1957. 17. Both these Acts revoked and extinguished the trusts created by the original Acts which constituted the Baronetcies namely the Sir Chinubhai Madhavlal Ranchhodlal Baronetcy Act, 1924 and the Sir Sassoon Jacob David Baronetcy Act, 1915. He also pointed out that those Acts were for all intents and purposes repealed and that the second section of both the Repealing Acts were virtually the only operative provisions of those Acts. All that the two sections provide is that the Trusts created by the respective Acts are "hereby revoked and extinguished" and all the properties, movable and immovable, are directed to be handed over to the respective Baronets subject to the provisions of the respective Acts. The other provisions of the Acts are hardly restrictive of the absolute rights in which the respective trust properties were vested in the two Baronets. Moreover other provisions are made to ensure the validity of rights, liabilities and obligations incurred prior to the repeal, to validate all contracts, suits and legal proceedings. Beyond that Mr. Peerbhoy pointed out that those two Acts did nothing else, whereas the Repealing Act in the case of Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim goes far beyond those provisions. After the trusts are revoked and extinguished and the Corporation was dissolved the property is not made to pass to the Baronet for the time being as in the other two cases but, on the other hand, section 4 (1) declares in somewhat vague terms that the trust property shall be held upon trust to distribute the same amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law. Sections 5 and 6 say that the Official Trustee shall invite claims and the question of sub. Mission of claims and what particulars are to be stated in those claims, are all provisions which create a discrimination against the present Baronet, for he urged that this is nothing more or less than inciting members of his family and other people to come and put in claims against him who should be the only rightful owner if once the trusts are revoked and extinguished. In the two other Acts the trusts were simply revoked and extinguished and the property handed over to the Baronet for the time being. Why then this discriminatory treatment in the case of this Baronetcy alone. He has further pointed out that even assuming that the fourth Baronet was an evacuee under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and validly adjudicated as such, still what vested in the Custodian as a result of that declaration was only the beneficial interest of the fourth Baronet in the trust properties i. e. his right to receive the income from the properties in the hands of the trustees, but no part of the corpus of the property had vested in the Custodian and nonetheless the Repealing Act makes provision for the distribution also of the corpus. To that extent again Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim is being treated on a footing entirely different and highly discriminatory than the other two Baronets were treated under the other two respective Acts. There is a denial of equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. 18. The provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have been expounded and interpreted in several cases by the Supreme Court of India and so far as the meaning of the key phrases in the Article "equality before the law" or the "equal protection of the laws" are concerned, there is no doubt or difficulty. The pronouncement in Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India (1), laid down the ambit of those expressions. As to the meaning and effect of the guarantee contained in that Article the Supreme Court accepted the statement by Willis in his Book on Constitutional Law and they quoted with approval the following passage (p. 877): "The guarantee of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws. It forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. It does not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The inhibition of the amendment was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation. It does not take from the States the power to classify either in the adoption of police laws, or tax laws, or eminent domain laws, but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and nullifies what they do only when it is without any reasonable basis. Mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required. Similarity, not identity of treatment, is enough." After referring to this passage and pointing out that Article 14 of the Constitution corresponds to the "equal protection" clause in the 14th Amendment in the American Constitution, the Supreme Court held "It must be admitted that the guarantee against the denial of equal protection of the laws does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons within the territory of India in spite of differences of circumstances and conditions." (See per Mukherjea J., at page 911). 19. The two cases upon which Mr. Peerbhoy relied namely, (1) Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar (2) and (2) Ram Krishan Dalmia v. Tendolkar J. (3) do not lay down any different construction of the Article but on the other hand, both these cases rely upon the decision in Chiranjitlals case (1). In Budhan Choudhrys case (2) the Supreme Court held that it is well settled that while Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation and that in order to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (ii) that such differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis; namely geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. Further Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law relating to procedure. The same tests were reiterated in Ram. Krishan Dalmias case (1). 20. In the light of these principles we turn to consider whether the Repealing Act in such differences which it has made so far as Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim is concerned as compared to the other two Baronetcy Repealing Acts has worked a discrimination against the former. Now, in the first place, the Baronetcy Act and the Repealing Acts which related thereto were all pieces of legislation which dealt with the rights to which one private citizen was entitled for the time being. They were so to say private Acts which necessarily, therefore, concerned themselves with the facts, conditions and circumstances peculiar to those particular individuals. They were not like other public Acts, applicable to or operative against a class or a number of individuals. Even so, it is not permissible to work a discrimination even against an individual unless there are circumstances or conditions specially applicable to one individual and those circumstances have a reasonable connection with the object and purpose of the legislation passed upon them. We do not think that the legislation would be bad on the charge of discrimination. 21. On the question whether one individual Can possibly form a class by himself it seems to us that the decision in Chiranjitlal Chuwdhurys case (2) cited above is decisive. In that case the legislation impugned was directed only against a particular company, the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., and it was urged that there was no classification, for it was only one legal person that was dealt with as a class. At p. 911 Mr. Justice Mukherjea answered the point thus: " …… I am unable to accept the argument of Mr. Chari that a legislation relating to one individual or one family or one body corporate would per se violate the guarantee of the equal protection rule. At p. 911 Mr. Justice Mukherjea answered the point thus: " …… I am unable to accept the argument of Mr. Chari that a legislation relating to one individual or one family or one body corporate would per se violate the guarantee of the equal protection rule. There can certainly be a law applying to one person or to only group of persons and it cannot be held to be unconstitutional if it is not discriminatory in its character. The legislature undoubtedly has a wide field of choice in determining and classifying the subject of its laws, and if the law deals alike with all of a certain class, it is normally not obnoxious to the charge of denial of equal protection, hut the classification should never be arbitrary. It must always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which the classification is made; and classification made without any substantial basis should be regarded as invalid." 22. Therefore, in the first place, even though a legislation may be directed only against an individual it is not necessarily discriminatory. So long as the classification is not arbitrary, but is made upon a "substantial basis", the legislation could be upheld. 23. If one compares the earlier Baronetcy Repealing Acts namely the Sir Chinubhai Madhavlal Ranchhodlal Baronetcy Act and the Sir Sassoon Jacob David Baronetcy Act with the Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy (Repeal and Distribution of Trust Properties) Act, the important differences appear. None of the special circumstances which are recited in the nine paragraphs of the preamble in Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Repealing Act are to be found in the former Acts. One important and distinguishing circumstance was that both the third and the fourth Baronets had left India for Pakistan leaving the trust properties, which were intended to support the dignity of the title, behind in India. Obviously the very purposes for which the Baronetcy Act had intended the trust properties to be used were thereby frustrated. The Act recites these circumstances in the eighth and ninth paragraphs of the preamble and it is with specific reference to this fact that the provisions of section 7 (4) were enacted. We will presently refer to that section in detail and attempt to construe it; suffice it to say here that Mr. Peerbhoy on behalf of the claimants Nos. The Act recites these circumstances in the eighth and ninth paragraphs of the preamble and it is with specific reference to this fact that the provisions of section 7 (4) were enacted. We will presently refer to that section in detail and attempt to construe it; suffice it to say here that Mr. Peerbhoy on behalf of the claimants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 gave it a certain interpretation whereby the property continued as the property of the 4th Baronet, whereas Mr. Cooper on behalf of the Custodian of Evacuee Property gave it an interpretation whereby the entire trust properties would be vested in the Custodian. The very fact that this provision was incorporated into the Act shows the basis upon which the Legislature proceeded, the basis being that the Baronet for the time being and his predecessor were both evacuees and were not available in India and, therefore, the very purpose and object of the original Baronetcy Act was not being fulfilled and was likely to be frustrated. That in itself could well have formed a reasonable basis for the classification. The Act moreover recites various other circumstances and from its provisions the basis of the classification is further made clear. The entire properties comprised in the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Trust as indicated in the Baronetcy Act were in Bombay. The Trustees who were formed into a Corporation were officials resident in Bombay and the entire management of the trust properties was in the hands of the Baronet for the time being associated with the other Trustees. In terms he was made the managing trustee. If then the managing trustee himself left the State and indeed the country and there was no prospect of his being able to manage the trust properties as prescribed by the Baronetcy Act, the State Legislature may well have considered that it was futile to continue the provisions of the Baronetcy Act. At any rate, the classification had a reasonable relation to the purpose which induced the Act. We do not say that it must fully justify all the provisions of the Act. That is not necessary so long as it can be said that there is some real substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which a classification is made. We do not say that it must fully justify all the provisions of the Act. That is not necessary so long as it can be said that there is some real substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which a classification is made. The Act was not a uniform public law governing all Baronetcies but was with reference to the particular circumstances of an individual Baronetcy and the Repealing Act can, therefore, have regard to the special circumstances affecting that Baronetcy. That the Repealing Act has, in our opinion, done in the instant case. 24. Having revoked and extinguished the trusts and dissolved the Corporation under section 3, clauses (a) and (b), the Legislature could not have left matters at that. Some provision had to be made for the management of the trust properties which were subject to the trust and as to who was to be entitled to them. These provisions were made in clause (c) of section 3 and in section 4 (1). By section 3 (c) the trust properties were to be vested in or transferred to the Official Trustees and section 4 (1) provided for their devolution. 25. Considerable comment was made upon the provisions of section 4 (1) in so far as it provides that the trust properties shall be held by the Official Trustee "upon trust to distribute the same amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law ... ". It was said that this is hardly any provision at all for it leaves the matter at large and indicates nothing as to who is to be entitled and how the property is to be distributed. No doubt the Legislature in this respect could have spoken with more clarity and particularity, but we have to take the provisions such as they are and to consider whether there was any discrimination against the persons whose rights are being affected. As we have said, if the trusts created by the Baronetcy Act failed in that purpose, in so far as the principal beneficiary thereof and the possible beneficiary, his son, had left India and the managing trustee had also left India, the Legislature could well decide that it was no longer necessary to keep the Baronetcy Act in force and to repeal it. Having repealed it, it was not for the Legislature to indicate to whom the properties should go. Perhaps if the Legislature had indicated its mind in the slightest degree, the same claimants could well have urged that they had been discriminated against and it was for that reason that the Legislature merely said that the trust property shall be liable to be distributed amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law. Apart from that the learned Advocate-General pointed out that a number of questions of extreme difficulty and complexity would have arisen-and indeed upon the judgment of the learned single Judge have arisen. They are questions raised by the claimants as to whether the property should revert to the estate of the first Baronet and, if so, whether it should be governed by the Will of the first Baronet or go by intestacy. There were questions raised by the claimants as to whether, if the property is to go by intestacy, the succession should open as on the death of the first Baronet or the third Baronet or on the date of the Repealing Act. There were also questions raised by some of the claimants as to whether the parties being Khojas were governed prior to a certain date by Hindu law or whether they should be throughout held to be governed by the Muslim personal law. Having regard to these questions which the Legislature must have foreseen would arise, it seems to us that they could reasonably take the view that they should not undertake by the legislation a decision on these questions or lay down the principles upon which those questions could be, decided. Hence the general provision deliberately made that the properties may be distributed amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law. There is no discrimination involved in making that provision, in our opinion, and there appears a reasonable nexus between that provision and the, object and purpose of the Act. 26. At the fag end of the arguments in these connected appeals in pressing the appeal on behalf of the Custodian (being Appeal No. 34 of 1963) Mr. There is no discrimination involved in making that provision, in our opinion, and there appears a reasonable nexus between that provision and the, object and purpose of the Act. 26. At the fag end of the arguments in these connected appeals in pressing the appeal on behalf of the Custodian (being Appeal No. 34 of 1963) Mr. Cooper on his behalf relied strongly upon the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 7 and he put a certain construction upon that section the result of which was he urged, that the Custodian would become entitled to take the entire trust properties to the exclusion of all the claimants in both the appeals. In other words, the beneficial interest of the fourth' Baronet had already and admittedly vested in the Custodian but upon a particular interpretation which is placed upon sub-section (4) of section 7, he urged that even the corpus of the trust properties would pass to the Custodian, Mr. Peerbhoy, on the other hand, on behalf of the claimants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 put forward a different construction resulting in the corpus of the trust properties reverting to the fourth Baronet himself. We need not at this stage go into this question. We shall deal with it separately when we consider the Custodian's appeal, but we may say for the present that upon a proper construction of sub-section (4) of section 7, we can see no discrimination arising under Article 14. 27. It is now well settled that where a certain result is achieved by a legislation which in itself is not discriminatory, even if other methods are open and possible to achieve that result, the legislation will not be struck down for the reason that those other methods were not followed, for the Legislature is the sole judge of the method to be adopted [See Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1)]. In considering this question of "equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws", we are not only confined to the provisions of the Act, but we may legitimately turn to look at all the surrounding circumstances and particularly the documents which preceded the passing of the impugned legislation. In considering this question of "equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws", we are not only confined to the provisions of the Act, but we may legitimately turn to look at all the surrounding circumstances and particularly the documents which preceded the passing of the impugned legislation. Having regard to the purposes set forth in the Baronetcy Act and the facts" which have transpired since then, namely that the third and the fourth Baronets having left this country and have been adjudicated evacuees, we think that the provisions of the Repealing Act are not discriminatory in nature against claimants Nos. 6, 7 and 8, and they do not infringe the provisions of Article 14. 28. Then we turn to the attack against the Act under Article 19 of the Constitution. Mr. Peerbhoy urged that the Repealing Act affects the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property of the fourth Baronet, at least to the extent of the beneficial interest which accrued to him under the Baronetcy Act. It is argued that even though the property has vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property the possession of the Custodian was only temporary and upon the property ceasing to be subject to evacuee property law his heirs and successors could claim to be entitled to the same. These rights are affected by the passing of the Repealing Act. 29. To this contention the learned Advocate-General took a preliminary objection urging that the point was virtually given up in the Court below. It is no doubt true that it was conceded that the fourth Baronet not being a citizen was not entitled to the protection of or to urge any plea under Article 19 directly. Mr. Peerbhoy, however, replied to this objection by saying that though he may have given up the plea that Article 19 was directly applicable, nonetheless nothing precluded claimants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 from showing that the law under which this property was being affected is a void law. He relied upon a decision of this Court in State v. Yusuf Abdul Aziz (2) where a similar point was raised. 30. Chief Justice Chagla answered the point at p. 738 as follows: .... A person who is not a citizen cannot come to this Court for assistance, invoking his right under Article 15 (1). He relied upon a decision of this Court in State v. Yusuf Abdul Aziz (2) where a similar point was raised. 30. Chief Justice Chagla answered the point at p. 738 as follows: .... A person who is not a citizen cannot come to this Court for assistance, invoking his right under Article 15 (1). But we do not think it right to say that Mr. Peerbhoy's client has come to this Court for enforcement of the fundamental right under Article 15 (1). Mr. Peerbhoy's contention is that inasmuch as the law discriminated against citizen and citizen on grounds only of sex, the law is void under Article 13, and as he is being prosecuted under a void law, his prosecution is bad and he cannot be convicted of an offence under a void law. To that extent even a non-citizen may rely on any of the fundamental rights, not indeed for the purpose of enforcing those rights, but merely in order to point out to the Court that a particular law being in violation of any of these fundamental rights is bad, inoperative and no penal consequence can follow from the breach of such a law. If Mr. Peerbhoy could satisfy us that this particular piece of legislation does discriminate contrary to what is provided under Article 15 (1), then undoubtedly it would be our duty to say that section 497 is bad and as Mr. Peerbhoy's client is being prosecuted under a void law, the prosecution must be quashed." That is precisely the line of argument which Mr. Peerbhoy has adopted in the present case. He says that though his clients may not be entitled directly to take advantage of Article 19 nonetheless they are entitled to show that the particular law under which their property is being dealt with is a void law. 31. No doubt Yusuf Abdul Aziz's case (1) was a case where Article 15 (1) was invoked and here it is Article 19 (1) (f) that is being invoked, but we do not think that for the purpose of the point before us the invoking of a different fundamental right will make any material difference. In that case Yusuf was being prosecuted for having committed adultery with the complainant's wife while the complainant was in jail on a conviction for breach of trust. In that case Yusuf was being prosecuted for having committed adultery with the complainant's wife while the complainant was in jail on a conviction for breach of trust. What was argued on behalf of Yusuf was that section 497, Indian Penal Code was void, under Article 14, because it discriminated against men and in favour of women. The man was punishable for adultery but not the woman. Therefore the law operated unequally. In answer to this contention a preliminary objection was raised that Yusuf was not a citizen and, therefore, he could invoke Article 15 in his favour for it applied only to citizens as Article 19 does in the present case. The principle upon which the Division Bench relied was that the moment a law is found to be conflicting or in derogation of any fundamental right, to that extent the law becomes a void law, and even a non-citizen can show that a particular law being in violation of fundamental rights is void "and no penal consequences can follow from the breach of such a law". That principle, it seems, was only assumed as correct in that case and the point was not directly dealt with. There is hardly any reasoning to support it. It was not argued there as it is argued here that if there was a conflict between a penal law and any of the fundamental rights, the penal law is not necessarily void but may under certain circumstances be a valid law. To the extent that the attention of the Division Bench was not directly invited to that point and to certain words which qualify the principles laid down in Articles 13(1) and 13 (2), it seems to us that that decision cannot be followed for holding that every law which contravenes a fundamental right is necessarily void. 32. Our attention was invited afresh to Article 13 (1) and (2). Article 13 (1) deals with "all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution" and it says that in so far as such laws are inconsistent with the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution the laws shall, "to the extent of such inconsistency, be void", (the Italics are ours). Article 13 (1) deals with "all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution" and it says that in so far as such laws are inconsistent with the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution the laws shall, "to the extent of such inconsistency, be void", (the Italics are ours). Sub-Article (2) of Article 13 deals with laws made after the coming into force of the Constitution and it says that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Therefore, the laws under sub-section (1) which are already in existence at the commencement of the Constitution, as well as the laws which are made after the coming into force of the Constitution are void only to the extent of the inconsistency or to the extent of the contravention. This in the first place would be sufficient to show that the assumption made in Yusuf Abdul Aziz's case (1) that a law which contravenes a fundamental right is necessarily void is not justified. 33. But we need not merely found our conclusion that it is doubtful if the decision in Yusuf Abdul Aziz's case (1) is any good law upon a mere consideration of Article 13 itself, for the decision of a Division Bench of this Court is binding upon us unless set aside by a larger Bench or directly or indirectly by the superior Court. There is, however, clear authority of the Supreme Court for a contrary view. In Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay (2), discussing the scope of Article 13 the Supreme Court observed as follows (p. 651): "The meaning to be given to the expression 'void' in Article 13 (1) is no longer res integra. It stands concluded by the majority decision in Keshavan Madhavo Menon v. The State of Bombay (3). The minority view there was that the word 'void' had the same meaning as 'repeal' and therefore a statute which came into clash with fundamental rights stood obliterated from the statute book altogether, and that such a statute was void ab initio. It stands concluded by the majority decision in Keshavan Madhavo Menon v. The State of Bombay (3). The minority view there was that the word 'void' had the same meaning as 'repeal' and therefore a statute which came into clash with fundamental rights stood obliterated from the statute book altogether, and that such a statute was void ab initio. The majority however held that the word 'void' in Article 13 (I), so far as existing laws were concerned, could not be held to obliterate them from the statute book, and could not make such laws void altogether, because in its opinion, Article 13 had not been given any retrospective effect. The majority however hold that after the coming into force of the Constitution the effect of Article 13 (1) on such repugnant laws was that it nullified them and made them ineffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect. It was further pointed out in one of the judgments representing the majority view, that the American rule that if a statute is repugnant to the Constitution the statute is void from its birth, has no application to oases concerning obligations incurred or rights accrued in accordance with an existing law that was constitutional in its inception, but that if any law was made after the 26th January, 1950, which was repugnant to the Constitution, then the same rule shall have to be followed in India as followed in America. The result therefore of this pronouncement is that the part of the section of an existing law which is unconstitutional is not law, and is null and void. For determining the rights and obligations of Citizens the part declared void should be notionally taken to be obliterated from the section for all intents and purposes though it may remain written on the statute book and be a good law when a question aris68 for determination of rights and obligations incurred prior to 26th January, 1960, and also for the determination of rights of persons who have not been given fundamental rights by the Constitution." 34. To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (4). To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (4). There the fundamental right alleged to have been infringed was the right to practise any profession, or to carryon any occupation, trade or business under Article 19 (1) (g) and the Supreme Court pointed out at p. 598 that: "Article 13 (1) by reason of its language cannot be read as having obliterated the entire operation of the inconsistent law or having wiped it out altogether from the statute book. Such law existed for all past transactions and for enforcement of rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution, as was held in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case (3). The law continued in force, even after the commencement the Constitution, with respect to persons who were not citizens and could not claim the fundamental right." and a little later they pointed out that: "The true position is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed for the time being, by the fundamental right." The Division Bench in Yusuf Abdul Aziz's case (1), was dealing with an offence arising under the Indian Penal Code which is a pre-Constitution law and will be governed by Article 13 (1) of the Constitution. Therefore, so far as the decision in Yusuf Abdul Aziz's case (1), is concerned, there is direct conflict with the view taken in the two cases to which we have referred above and to that extent we do not think we can follow it. 35. The learned Advocate General also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in M. P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh (2). There again the Supreme Court cited with approval at p. 1470 the statement of Cooley on Constitutional Law at p. 201 that "a finding of unconstitutionality does not destroy the statute but merely involves a refusal to enforce it". After referring to Wilkerson v. Rahrer (3) and to Behram Khurshid Pesi. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh (2). There again the Supreme Court cited with approval at p. 1470 the statement of Cooley on Constitutional Law at p. 201 that "a finding of unconstitutionality does not destroy the statute but merely involves a refusal to enforce it". After referring to Wilkerson v. Rahrer (3) and to Behram Khurshid Pesi. kaka's case (4) and The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (5) and other authorities, the Supreme Court summarised the result of the authorities at p. 1474 as follows: "…….Where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest, assuming of course that the two portions are severable, it cannot be held to have been wiped out of the statute book as it admittedly must remain there for the purpose of enforcement of the valid portion thereof, and being on the statute book, even that portion which is unenforceable on the ground that it is unconstitutional will operate proprio vigore when the Constitutional bar is removed, and there is no need for a fresh legislation to give effect thereto." In this case the Supreme Court was not considering the bar resulting from a conflict with any fundamental right, but only with Article 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution. It was a case of sales tax and of a post-Constitution law. At pages 1475 and 1476 the Supreme Court themselves emphasised this distinction and pointed out that the case before them was not a case which turned on the construction of Article 13 of the Constitution, but that they were concerned with an infringement of Article 286 (2). Nevertheless they reiterated the same principle. Having regard to the positive words of Article 13 (1) "to the extent of such inconsistency" the principle can be deduced directly from its express language. 36. Mr. Peerbhoy relied upon a decision in Deep chand v. State of U. P. (6), where the difference between the provisions of clause (1) and clause (2) of Article 13 was pointed out and the Supreme Court stated the principle as follows (pp. 655.56): " .. 36. Mr. Peerbhoy relied upon a decision in Deep chand v. State of U. P. (6), where the difference between the provisions of clause (1) and clause (2) of Article 13 was pointed out and the Supreme Court stated the principle as follows (pp. 655.56): " .. The combined effect of the said provisions may be stated thus: Parliament and the Legislatures of States have power to make laws in respect of any of the matters enumerated in the relevant lists in the Seventh Schedule and that power to make laws is subject to the provisions of the Constitution including Article 13 i.e. the power is made subject to the limitations imposed by Part III of the Constitution. The general power to that extent is limited. A Legislature, therefore, has no power to make any law in derogation of the injunction contained in Article 13. Article 13 (1) deals with laws in force in the territory of India before the commencement of the Constitution and such laws in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. The clause, therefore, recognises the validity of the pre-Constitution laws and only declares that the said laws would be void thereafter to the extent of their inconsistency with Part In; whereas clause (2) of that article imposes a prohibition on the State making laws taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Part III and declares that laws made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. There is a clear distinction between the two clauses. Under clause (1), a pre-Constitution law subsists except to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III: whereas, no post-Constitution law can be made contravening the provisions of Part III, and therefore the law, to that extent, though made, is a nullity from its inception. If this clear distinction is borne in mind much of the cloud raised is dispelled." 37. The same distinction was drawn in a recent decision in Mahendra Lal v. State of U. P. (1), where Bhikaji Narain's case (2) was referred to with approval. In para. 22 of the A.I.R. Report Mr. Justice Wanchoo pointed to the opening words of Article 13 (2). The same distinction was drawn in a recent decision in Mahendra Lal v. State of U. P. (1), where Bhikaji Narain's case (2) was referred to with approval. In para. 22 of the A.I.R. Report Mr. Justice Wanchoo pointed to the opening words of Article 13 (2). "The State shall not make any law" and observed that that is what makes for the difference between clause (2) and clause (1) of Article 13. He observed (p. 1030): " .. Now contravention in the context takes place only once when the law is made, for the contravention is of the prohibition to make any law which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights. There is no question of the contravention of Article 13 (2) being a continuing matter. Therefore, where there is a question of a post-Constitution law, there is a prohibition against the State from taking away or abridging fundamental rights and there is a further provision that if the prohibition is contravened the law shall be void to the extent of the contravention. In view 9f this clear provision, it must be held that unlike a law covered by Article 13 (1) which was valid when made, the law made in contravention of the prohibition contained in Article 13 (2) is a still born law either wholly or partially depending upon the extent of the contravention. Such a law is dead from the beginning and there can be no question of its revival under the doctrine of eclipse." 38. In view of these clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court we cannot see our way to follow the decision in Yusuf Abdul Aziz'e case (3), because that was clearly a case of pre-Constitution law and, therefore, would not 'be void from the inception even though it contravened the article. It would merely be eclipsed, to the extent of that conflict, by the fundamental right. 39. Having discussed the effect of Article 13 and shown why we are unable to follow Yusuf Abdul Aziz's case (3" however does not provide any solution to the question that has been raised. What is being argued here is that claimants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 are admittedly foreigners or, at any rate, non-citizens and they cannot take advantage of the provisions of Article 19 at all, for Article 19 commences with the recital "All citizens shall have the right ....". What is being argued here is that claimants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 are admittedly foreigners or, at any rate, non-citizens and they cannot take advantage of the provisions of Article 19 at all, for Article 19 commences with the recital "All citizens shall have the right ....". Obviously, therefore, the preliminary condition of Article 19 (1) is not fulfilled in this case. Nonetheless, it is urged that these claimants can show that the law is void, although they may not be able to claim the fundamental rights themselves. The whole of this theory is founded upon the remarks of the Division Bench in Yusuf Abdul Aziz's case (1), and we have shown that the ratio of that case can no longer be binding on us in view of the several subsequent pronouncements of the Supreme Court. 40. Viewing this doctrine on its own, it seems to us that the argument which Mr. Peerbhoy has advanced comes to this that though his clients are not citizens, though for that reason they cannot take advantage of Article 19 at all, or challenge the Repealing Act as contravening that article, nontheless they can produce the same result by pointing out that the law before the Court is void. It virtually amounts to saying that these claimants can do indirectly what they cannot do directly having regard to the Constitutional provisions in Article 19. We do not think that we can permit by so obvious a device the contention to be raised. In so far as we have come to that conclusion we must emphasise that the provisions of Article 13 (1) and (2) are not called into play at all. We cannot see what connection there is between the distinction drawn,-that a pre;, Constitution law infringing a fundamental right is only temporarily eclipsed and that a law made after the Constitution infringing a fundamental right is void in its inception-and the question whether Article 19 (1) (f) upon its own terms applies or not. Quite apart from the question whether the law is void or voidable, whether it is temporarily eclipsed or still-born, the fact remains that an essential condition to the applicability of Article 19 (1) has not been fulfilled in so far as the person who is claiming to enforce that right is not a citizen. Quite apart from the question whether the law is void or voidable, whether it is temporarily eclipsed or still-born, the fact remains that an essential condition to the applicability of Article 19 (1) has not been fulfilled in so far as the person who is claiming to enforce that right is not a citizen. It seems to us a mere play of words to say that although he is not a citizen he is still entitled to show that the law is void, when in effect he cannot take advantage of that law. In our opinion, therefore, these claimants are not entitled to take advantage of Article 19 for the simple reason that they are not citizens, nor are they entitled to show that the law is void and, therefore, should not be enforced. 41. But assuming that we are not right in this view of the matter, the next question that falls to be considered is whether in fact any case is made out to show that Article 19 (1) (f) has been infringed. We have already shown while discussing the challenge to the Act under Article 14 of the Constitution that in our opinion there is an intelligible nexus between the law made and the purpose to be achieved and that the basis for the classification made in that law is a reasonable basis. Having .regard to the recitals in the preamble of the Repealing Act we have already said that the Legislature could very reasonably have come to the conclusion that there was no useful purpose served in continuing the Baronetcy Act and therefore repealing the same. For the same reasons they could reasonably have come to the conclusion that the trust declared under the Baronetcy Act should be revoked and extinguished and the Corporation consisting of the Trustees should be dissolved. As to the rest of the provisions of the Act all that section 4, sub-section (1) says is that the property shall go to those persons who are "rightfully entitled thereto according to law". Now in so far as that is what the statute says, we cannot see how it can infringe any right to acquire, hold or dispose of property. Now in so far as that is what the statute says, we cannot see how it can infringe any right to acquire, hold or dispose of property. The statute simply says that the property shall go to the person rightfully entitled thereto according to law, i.e. no one's claim if it is just and rightful under law would be ignored and therefore would not infringe any right under Article 19 (1) (f). No doubt if a course of succession or devolution different from the personal law of the parties had been indicated there was something to be said for the contention, but the Legislature went up to a point and then left the matter entirely to be decided by this Court according to law. In the result no doubt there is a very vague and controversial provision of law which has given rise to much difficulty but we can hardly say that that provision infringes the guarantee under Article 19 (1) (f). Apart from this we may also point out that there is nothing which prevents the Legislature from making any law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by clause (f) of Article 19 (1). In our opinion, even though there may be a provision affecting a right to enjoy, hold and dispose of property, the law lays down only reasonable restrictions. 42. We have said this so far upon a consideration of the provisions of the Act excepting section 7 (4) which was invoked in his aid by the Custodian. We have already referred to Mr. Cooper's arguments in that respect and we shall deal with the question whether that section infringes Article 19 or not separately. For the present we may say that in our opinion it does not. [After considering a point not material to this report the judgment proceeds.- ] 43. So far as the challenge to the Repealing Act under Article 31 of the Constitution is concerned, the matter can be briefly disposed of. Article 31 (1) says that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The Constitutional guarantee is, therefore, that a person cannot be deprived of his property unless there is authority for the deprivation in law. Now granting that the Repealing Act deprives anyone of property there is clear authority of law for the alleged deprivation. The Constitutional guarantee is, therefore, that a person cannot be deprived of his property unless there is authority for the deprivation in law. Now granting that the Repealing Act deprives anyone of property there is clear authority of law for the alleged deprivation. So far as sub-Article (2) of Article 31 is concerned, which was principally relied on by Mr. Peerbhoy, it refers to property being compulsorily acquired or requisitioned and lays down the conditions under which that can Le done. Clearly there is no case here of acquisition or requisition of any property. If at all there is any provision affecting property the provision says that the trust properties shall be distributed between the claimants rightfully entitled thereto according to law. That can be hardly said to fall within the ambit of acquisition. The Case so far as requisition is concerned is even worse. Moreover, the new sub-Article (2A) says that where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to Possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property. Obviously here there is no provision whatever for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State. It was feebly suggested that the transfer to and vesting of the trust properties in the Official Trustee was to a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. The argument has only to be stated to be rejected. There is no question of the Official Trustee being a Corporation owned or controlled by the State though he has been constituted into a Corporation sole under the Official Trustees Act. There is nothing to show that there is any Control over the Official Trustee by the State. 44. Then we turn to examine the last of the Constitutional objections to the Repealing Act namely its legislative competence. The argument under this head• has been two-fold. The first argument is directed to showing that the Repealing Act falls within the ambit of entry 44 of List I-Union List-and that, therefore, it was beyond the legislative competence of the Legislature of the then State of Bombay which passed it. The argument under this head• has been two-fold. The first argument is directed to showing that the Repealing Act falls within the ambit of entry 44 of List I-Union List-and that, therefore, it was beyond the legislative competence of the Legislature of the then State of Bombay which passed it. In answer the Advocate-General sustained the legislative competence of the enactment on the basis of the Entry 10 of List III (Concurrent List). Entry 44 of List I relates to "Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not including universities" whereas Entry 10 of List III is concerned with "Trust and Trustees". We have already set forth the provisions of the Repealing Act and we have shown that the preamble recites that "difficulties have arisen in the administration of the trusts declared by the Baronetcy Act and whereas for that and for other diverse good reasons" With that end in view section 3 revoked and extinguished the trusts created by the Baronetcy Act and all powers, provisions, declarations and purposes by and in that Act declared and expressed. By section 3 (b) it dissolved the Corporation comprised of the Trustees under that Act. By section 3 (c) it provided that the trust properties shall vest in and be transferred to the Official Trustee and be handed over to him and that he shall hold and stand possessed of the same, for certain purposes. The purpose is expressed in section 4 (1) to be to distribute the same amongst the persons "rightfully entitled thereto according to law and until such distribution to manage the said trust properties according to the provisions of this Act". The provisions of sections 5 and 6 are merely supplemental to the purpose mentioned in section 4 namely that it provides a machinery by which the distribution contemplated in sub-section (1) of section 4 should take place. Section 7 deals with the actual distribution of the trust property and save and except one case contemplated in sub-section (4) where any person entitled to the trust properties has been or is declared an evacuee the other provisions of that section in substance leave it to the High Court to decide disputes. The Official Trustee has no power to do so and can only himself distribute if the claims are justified and are undisputed. The Official Trustee has no power to do so and can only himself distribute if the claims are justified and are undisputed. Section 8 refers to the powers of the Official Trustee till the trust properties are thus distributed. Section 9 deals with powers of the Official Trustee to invest moneys vested in him. Obviously, both sections 8 and 9 provide for powers until the actual distribution takes place and do not go beyond that. Section 10 clearly provides that the provisions of the Act are not to affect other rights and interests particularly the right of jointure if any. Section 11 grants an indemnity to the Corporation and the erstwhile trustees upon the repeal of the trusts created by the Baronetcy Act. Section 12 protects action taken in good faith. Section 13 excludes the operation of the Official Trustees Act, 1913. It is clear, therefore, that the principal object of the enactment was to get rid of the trusts created by the Baronetcy Act and for that purpose alone the Corporation comprising of the erstwhile trustees is directed to be dissolved. Save this provision in section 3 (b), there is hardly any other provision referring to the Corporation in the Act. No doubt section 3 (b) winds up the Corporation but in the totality of the provisions of the Act, that provision probably is most innocuous and incidental to the other provisions. It is clear to us that the pith and substance of this enactment was to deal with the trust/ the trust properties and the trustees under the Baronetcy Act and that it is only in an incidental manner that the legislation has provided for a Corporation. Since by the Baronetcy Act the Trustees were constituted into a Corporation sole, the Repealing Act had to say that the Corporation is dissolved. We cannot for that reason, however, hold that the legislation is in regard to the winding up of the Corporation. It directly and in substance makes provisions only for the trusts declared under the Baronetcy Act, the trust property and the Trustees constituted by the Act. 45. The Act beyond dispute is a Repealing Act and it repeals the provisions of the Baronetcy Act. It directly and in substance makes provisions only for the trusts declared under the Baronetcy Act, the trust property and the Trustees constituted by the Act. 45. The Act beyond dispute is a Repealing Act and it repeals the provisions of the Baronetcy Act. There can be no doubt that the principal intention behind the Baronetcy Act was the settlement of property to uphold the dignity, state and degree of the Baronetcy and for that purpose to create a trust. As we have already pointed out, the trust with the provisions it contained namely that it was to be for the benefit of successive holders of the title of Baronet, would have offended against the law against perpetuity. Therefore, the Legislature lent its aid and resorted to the device of incorporation of the trust. The incorporation, therefore, was only an aid to the main purpose of establishing a trust for the benefit of successive Baronets. Incorporation was not the main purpose or object of the Baronetcy Act. Much less, therefore, can an enactment which provides for the revocation and extinction of the trusts and dissolution of the Corporation have for its main purpose the dissolution of the Corporation. It is a significant fact that even the Corporation was entitled in the Baronetcy Act as "The Trustees of the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy". In other words, the Corporation itself was constituted of Trustees. In pith and substance, therefore, the enactment clearly falls within entry No. 10 in List III and not entry No. 44 in List I of the Constitution Schedule. 46. The point of some substance is the second part of the contention raised on the score of want of legislative competence. The argument is as follows: Though the State Legislature had the power to legislate it was a legislation falling within the Concurrent field and even acting within that field the State Legislature could not repeal what was an existing law made by another Legislature namely the then Governor-General-in-Council which passed the Baronetcy Act. It was urged that having regard to the provisions of Article 254 the State Legislature with the assent of the President may enact a provision repugnant to a Central law but it has no power to repeal the law made by another Legislature much less a law made by a competent Central Legislature such as .the then Governor-General-in-Council. It was urged that having regard to the provisions of Article 254 the State Legislature with the assent of the President may enact a provision repugnant to a Central law but it has no power to repeal the law made by another Legislature much less a law made by a competent Central Legislature such as .the then Governor-General-in-Council. It was urged that in order to enable the State Legislature to repeal the Baronetcy Act there must be found an express power conferred upon the State Legislature to repeal it because it was not a legislation enacted by it but by an erstwhile Central Legislature. 47. Reliance was placed in this respect upon the remarks in two decisions of the Supreme Court. One was the decision in Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of Bombay (1). Discussing the provisions of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution the Supreme Court compared them with those of section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act and pointed out that the Article was in substance a reproduction of that section. Then Venkatarama Ayyar J. on behalf of the Court referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion (1), in order to construe Article 254 (2). The remarks which the Supreme Court made in that connection at p. 806 and which Mr. Peerbhoy relied on were: “Discussing the nature of the power of the Dominion Legislature, Canada, in relation to that of the Provincial Legislature, in a situation similar to that under section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act, it was observed by Lord Watson in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney. General for the Dominion (1), that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within its competence would override Provincial legislation covering the same field, the Dominion Parliament had no authority conferred upon it under the Constitution to enact a statute repealing directly any Provincial statute. That would appear to have been the position under section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act with reference to the subjects mentioned in the Concurrent; List. That would appear to have been the position under section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act with reference to the subjects mentioned in the Concurrent; List. Now, by the proviso to Article 254 (2) the Constitution has enlarged the powers of Parliament, and under that proviso, Parliament can do what the Central Legislature could not under section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act, and enact a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing a law of the State, when it relates to a matter mentioned in the Concurrent List. The position then is that under the Constitution Parliament can acting under the proviso to Article 254 (2), repeal a State law. But where it does not expressly do so, even then, the State law will be void under that provision if it conflicts with a later 'law with respect to the same matter' that may be enacted by Parliament. " These remarks were quoted with approval in Tika Ramji v. State of U. P. (2). The proviso to Article 254 (2) gives power to Parliament to enact at any time any law in respect of any matter referred to in sub-Articles (1) and (2) including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. Now the argument is that even in order to enable Parliament to repeal the law made by another Legislature, an express power had to be conferred upon Parliament. The Supreme Court has pointed out that it was only because of the conferment of that power of repeal that Parliament had the power to repeal a State legislation. A fortiori, therefore, does it require a clear express power of repeal to be conferred upon a State Legislature in order to enable it to repeal what was a Central law. Without an express provision giving power to repeal the enactment of another Legislature the State Legislature could not be assumed to have the power to repeal a Central law. Therefore, they could not have passed the Act to repeal the Baronetcy Act which was a Central law. 48. We have already held that the Repealing Act was within the legislative competence of the Legislature of the then State of Bombay, and that it fell within the ambit of Entry 10 of List III. Therefore, they could not have passed the Act to repeal the Baronetcy Act which was a Central law. 48. We have already held that the Repealing Act was within the legislative competence of the Legislature of the then State of Bombay, and that it fell within the ambit of Entry 10 of List III. The power to make that law is referrable to Article 246 (2) of the Constitution which confers the power upon the Legislature of any State to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule. Once, therefore, the legislation clearly falls within the ambit of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Legislature it would require a clear provision to show that it is taken out of that power. It was ruled long ago in the leading case of The Queen v. Burak, (3) at p. 193 that "……. The Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can, of course, do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers." But the Privy Council hastened to add "But, when acting within those limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself. The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question; and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions." Therefore, in so far as we have found that the enactment was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, it is not for us to enlarge constructively any of the conditions or restrictions upon that power. Next we are of opinion that if the State Legislature had the power to enact a law relating to trust it must have the power to repeal a law relating to that trust. Unless the power to legislate which is expressly conferred by Article 246 read with the relevant entry in the Legislative List is controlled or restricted by any express provision, the power of repeal would be implicit. It seems to us almost axiomatio that if a Legislature within its own sovereign sphere is conferred powers of legislation on a particular subject implicit in those powers would be the power to repeal the same legislation. 49. But the further question that has been raised here is that the legislation which is repealed is not the legislation of that Legislature which has repealed it. It was the legislation of the then Governor-General-in-Council which was the Central Legislative Authority and so we turn to examine whether there is to be found in any of the provisions of the Constitution such a power of repeal bearing in mind the principle to which we have just adverted that even in a Federal Constitution the Legislature of a State acting within the sphere of its own power is sovereign and secondly that any limitations of legislative powers must be express [See The United Provinces v. Atiqua Begum (1) and Bhola Prasad v. The King-Emperor (2) and even after the Constitution the same view taken in Makaraj Umeg Singh v. The State of Bombay (3) ]. 50. The provision analogous to Article 254 in the Government of India Act was as pointed out by the Supreme Court section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act. Sub-section (2) of section 107 of the Government of India Act provided that: "Where a Provincial law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Con. 50. The provision analogous to Article 254 in the Government of India Act was as pointed out by the Supreme Court section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act. Sub-section (2) of section 107 of the Government of India Act provided that: "Where a Provincial law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Con. current Legislative List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier Dominion law or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, if the Provincial law, having been reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General has received the assent of the Governor-General, the Provincial law shall in that Province prevail, but nevertheless the Dominion Legislature may at any time enact further legislation with respect to the same matter." The concluding words "nevertheless the Dominion Legislature may at any time enact further legislation with respect to the same matter" would, in our opinion, clearly include a provision repealing the previous legislation. This conclusion is further strengthened by a consideration of section 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which is an analogous provision to Article 372 of the Constitution. It says that notwithstanding the repeal of the Government of India Act all the Jaws in force in British India immediately before the commencement of the Government of India Act "shall continue in force in British India until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority". That again shows that the Legislature under the Government of India Act had the same power. A consideration of the analogous provisions under the Constitution of Articles 254 (2), 372 (2) and (3) (b) and 392 leads to the same conclusion. No doubt the proviso to Article 254 (2) expressly refers to the power of Parliament of enacting at any time any law with respect to any matter referred to in sub-Articles (1) and (2) including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State, but the language of the proviso is significant. It does not say that Parliament shall have the power to repeal, amend, add to, or vary a law so made but what it says is that "nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting such legislation". It does not say that Parliament shall have the power to repeal, amend, add to, or vary a law so made but what it says is that "nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting such legislation". In other words the proviso assumes that Parliament has the power and by way of abundant caution declares that nothing in clause (2) shall prevent Parliament from enacting such a law. Therefore, first of all the proviso does not confer any power on Parliament at all to add to, amend, vary or repeal a law. It is in marked contrast to the language of Article 245 (1) which says that "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India". Here the conferment of the power by the Constitution is clear whereas the proviso to Article 254 (2) couched in negative language, presupposes that the power is inherent in Parliament and so says that "nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law….. ". Therefore, Mr. Peerbhoy is not right when he suggests that because of this express power conferred upon Parliament it must be assumed that a similar power is necessary for a State Legislature to enact a law repealing an enactment not passed by it. 51. Further a consideration of Article 372 (1) and (2) which deal with the subject of "continuance in force of laws existing on the date of the Constitution", which as we have already pointed out is analogous to section 292 of the Government of India Act, puts the matter beyond any controversy. Article 372 (1) says: "Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in' Article 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in ,force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority." Here again the power of repeal is assumed and all that is provided for is the necessary qualification namely the competence of the Legislature to enact a law. We cannot, therefore, accede to the contention that the power to enact and the power to repeal must be separately conferred on a Legislature. We cannot, therefore, accede to the contention that the power to enact and the power to repeal must be separately conferred on a Legislature. Nowhere have the two powers been separated from each other so far as the Constitution is, concerned. Sub-Article (2) of Article 372 deals with the power of the President to make laws in order to bring the provisions of any law in force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions of the Constitution and the power of the President is stated in these words, "the President may by order make such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient". Here again, the power of repeal' shown to be included in the power to make the adaptations and modification. Sub Article (3) (b) of Article 372 provides that "Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed ... …. (b) to prevent any competent Legislature or other competent authority of repealing or amending any law adapted or modified by the President under the said clause. " This is a power analogous to the power conferred in the proviso to Article 254 (2) and the language is once again in the negative i.e. it says that "nothing shall be deemed to prevent any competent Legislature" (which incidentally would include a State Legislature) from repealing or amending any law. The power to repeal in the State Legislature, therefore, is again assumed as inherent. 52. In answer to these contentions founded upon the provisions of Article 372, Mr. Peerbhoy pointed out that in clause (I) the power is "subject the other provisions of this Constitution" and he, therefore, urged that A ole 372 would be governed or controlled by Article 254 and by the proviso sub-Article (2) of Article 254, in which case it would not advance the argument any further. Dealing with this very clause of Article 372 of the Constitution the Supreme Court held in S.I. Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Secy. Board of Revenue (1), at p. 214, that “….... The words 'subject to the other provisions of the Constitution' should, therefore, be given a reasonable interpretation, an interpretation which would carry out intention of the makers of the Constitution and also which is in accord with the constitutional practice in such matters. (P) Ltd. v. Secy. Board of Revenue (1), at p. 214, that “….... The words 'subject to the other provisions of the Constitution' should, therefore, be given a reasonable interpretation, an interpretation which would carry out intention of the makers of the Constitution and also which is in accord with the constitutional practice in such matters. The article posits the continuation of preexist laws made by a competent authority notwithstanding the repeal of Article 295; and expression 'other' in the Article can only apply to provisions other than those dew with legislative competence ..... a pre-Constitution law made by a competent author though it has lost its legislative competency under the Constitution, shall continue a force, provided the law does not contravene the 'other provisions' of the Constitution. In view of this clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, Article 254 which deals with the subject of legislative competency cannot be held to control Article 372, in spite of the use of the expression in that Article of the words "subject to the other provisions of the Constitution". 53. We have pointed to these provisions of the Constitution to show that it is not essential that an express power of repeal should be conferred upon Legislature even if it be the repeal of a legislation passed by another Legislature, but obviously so long as the remarks of the Supreme Court in Zaverbhai case (2) stand, they would be binding upon us, even if they be obiter die The learned single Judge, however, has held that these remarks were me casual observations and not binding upon him and it is in connection with the finding that we have ventured to refer to the several provisions of the Constitution. 54. The finding of the learned single Judge that the remarks in Zaverbhai's case (2) were mere casual observations was, however, strongly attack by Mr. Peerbhoy. Zaverbhai's case (2) was not a case where the proviso Article 254 (2) was applicable and there was no question of repeal involved that case. The case arose out of two different enactments. A Central Act had prescribed a punishment of three years' imprisonment for an offence under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. Peerbhoy. Zaverbhai's case (2) was not a case where the proviso Article 254 (2) was applicable and there was no question of repeal involved that case. The case arose out of two different enactments. A Central Act had prescribed a punishment of three years' imprisonment for an offence under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. The then State of Bombay considered that the maximum punishment of three years provided by that section was not adequate for offences under the Act and with a view to enhancing the punishment prescribed enacted the Bombay Act XXXVI of 1947. The question before the Court was, which was the Act which was to prevail. It was argued that the particular section of the Bombay Act was plainly repugnant to section 7 (1) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. It will be seen, therefore, that it was a case falling within Article 254 (2) of the Constitution and no question of the applicability of the proviso to that clause ever arose. In considering the provisions of Art ic1e 254 the Supreme Court referred to section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act which it observed was analogous. They called it a reproduction. Mr. Justice Venkatarama Ayyar then referred to the case of Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion (1) and indicated that that case was an authority for the preposition that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within its competence would override Provincial legislation covering the same field, the Dominion Parliament had no authority conferred upon it under the Constitution to enact a statute repealing directly any Provincial statute. The learned Judge also referred to the proviso to Article 254 (2) and observed that acting under the proviso to Article 254 (2), Parliament can repeal a State law, but where it does not expressly do so, even then, the State law will be void under that provision if it conflicts with a later "law with respect to the same matter" that may be enacted by Parliament. It is clear that the Supreme Court was not concerned in that case with legislation in the concurrent field. The question was of repugnancy between a Central law and a State law. The remarks, therefore, were not necessary for the decision of the question before the Supreme Court. 55. It is clear that the Supreme Court was not concerned in that case with legislation in the concurrent field. The question was of repugnancy between a Central law and a State law. The remarks, therefore, were not necessary for the decision of the question before the Supreme Court. 55. As to what constitutes a mere casual observation or an obiter dictum in a decision, has been indicated in a Full Bench decision of this Court in Kaikkusroo Phirozshah v. State of Bombay (2). Chief Justice Chagla put the distinction thus (p. 28): "…….We have had occasion recently to point out [Mohandas v Sattanathan (3)] that we must show the same respect for an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court as we used to show to the obiter dictum of the Privy Council. Judicial discipline undoubtedly requires it. But we also pointed out what are the obiter dicta which require to be followed by the High Courts in India. Any considered opinion by the Supreme Court, even on a point which does not strictly arise for decision, must be accepted by the High Courts as laying down a statement of law which must be followed. But with great respect to the Supreme Court, we do not read this particular observation as laying down that the views of the Supreme Court, expressed with great emphasis and after due deliberation, have been set aside by a passing casual observation that Article 19 (1) (f) applied to the facts of that case." In the earlier case to which reference was made, the same learned Judge defined what was an obiter dictum as follows (p. 1160): "But the question still remains as to what is an obiter dictum given expression to by the Supreme Court which is binding upon the Courts in India. Now, an obiur dictum is an expression of opinion on a point which is not necessary for the decision of a case. This very definition draws a clear distinction between a point which is necessary for the determination of a case and a point which is not necessary for the determination of the case. But in both cases points must arise for the determination of the tribunal." 56. Mr. This very definition draws a clear distinction between a point which is necessary for the determination of a case and a point which is not necessary for the determination of the case. But in both cases points must arise for the determination of the tribunal." 56. Mr. Peerbhoy relied upon a decision of a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Union of India v. Firm Ram Gopal (1), to urge that there can be no such distinction between a casual observation and an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court and that every statement in a decision of the Supreme Court would be of equal authority. We need not go into the reasons which impelled the decision of the learned single Judge. Suffice it to say that we are ordinarily bound to follow the two decisions of this Court. Moreover the decision of the Allahabad High Court is not binding upon us. 57. The learned Advocate-General did also advance a considerable argument to suggest that the observations in Zaverbhai's case (2), which we have quoted above, were per incuriam and for that reason we should not follow them. He pointed out that the reference to the case of Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion (3), was incorrect. That case he urged was not a case of legislation falling within the concurrent field at all. It arose under sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1897, which dealt with the general power of legislation conferred upon the Dominion Parliament and the power of the Provincial Legislature under section 92. So far as the concurrent field of legislation is concerned, there was no provision in the British North America Act except in section 95 and that section dealt with only two subjects which were not relevant to the decision in that case. Therefore, the Ontaria case (3) was not at all concerned with the concurrent field of legislation and reference to it in a case where the concurrent field of legislation was involved was inappropriate. 58. Thus the Supreme Court regarded the case as seen from the following remarks:-"concerning a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada within its competence would over-ride Provincial legislation covering the same field". The remarks suggest that it was a decision in a concurrent field of legislation, which was not the case. 58. Thus the Supreme Court regarded the case as seen from the following remarks:-"concerning a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada within its competence would over-ride Provincial legislation covering the same field". The remarks suggest that it was a decision in a concurrent field of legislation, which was not the case. On this ground the learned Advocate-General suggested that the remarks in Zaverbhai's case (2) should be held to be per incurian. We do not think, however, that we need go into that question. It is sufficient for our purpose to show that the remarks which we have reproduced were mere casual observations not binding on us. In that, view we have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Constitution from which we infer that a power of repeal is implicit in a power to legislate on one and the same subject and so long as the particular Legislature remains within the ambit of its legislative power and has legislative competence, it is immaterial that its legislation has the effect of repealing the legislation of another Legislature. 59. We may also refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Ram Krishna v. Janapada Sabha (4), where a tax legislation was repealed after the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935, and while section 143 declared that "the tax may continue to be levied," there was no express power of repeal. The Supreme Court referred once again to the Ontario case (1) and used it to construe the relevant provision namely section 143 (2) of the Government of India Act. Dealing with the argument that the power to pay a tax does not give a power to repeal the legislation, the Supreme Court held at page 1079, para. 14 as under: "It must however be observed that merely because the legislature is empowered under this entry to constitute local authorities and vest them with powers and• jurisdiction it would not follow that these local bodies could be vested with authority to levy any and every tax for the purpose of raising revenue for the purposes of local administration. They could be validly authorised to raise only those taxes which the province could raise under and by virtue of the relevant entries in the Provincial Legislative List. They could be validly authorised to raise only those taxes which the province could raise under and by virtue of the relevant entries in the Provincial Legislative List. This is on the principle that the Province could not authorise local bodies created by it to impose taxes which it itself could not directly levy for the purposes of the Provincial Government. Now comes the question whether the Provincial Legislature was competent, by legislation, to discontinue the levy of the tax by effecting a repeal of the taxing provision contained in the Local Self-Government Act of 1920. There is no doubt that the general principle is that the power of a legislative body to repeal a law is co extensive with its power to enact such a law, as would be seen from the following passage in the judgment by Lord Watson in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Dominion (1), at page 366: "Neither the Parliament of Canada nor the provincial legislatures have authority to repeal statutes which they could not directly enact." But obviously its application in particular instances would be controlled by express constitutional provision modifying the same. We have such a provision in the case on hand in section 143 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. In the context the relevant words of the sub-section could only mean 'may continue to be levied if so desired by the Provincial Legislature, which is indicated by or is implicit in the use of the expression 'may' in the clause 'may be continued until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature'. 60. In accordance with this view the Supreme Court construed the words "may continue to be levied" occurring in section 143 (2) of the Government of India Act to justify the repeal of that legislation. 6l It seems to us further that it can hardly be doubted that a power to legislate would imply a power to amend that legislation and to that extent every amendment made to a legislation does in some measure repeal the previous legislation yet it can hardly be said that the Legislature which is given power to legislate cannot amend its own legislation. That again would show that the power to repeal a legislation is implicit in the power to enact itself. 62. That again would show that the power to repeal a legislation is implicit in the power to enact itself. 62. The Supreme Court considered this position in State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch & Co. (2) and pointed out that the entire theory underlying implied repeals is that there is no need for the later enactment to state in. express terms that an earlier enactment has been repealed by using any particular set of words or form of drafting but that if the legislative intent to supersede the earlier law is manifested by the enactment of provisions indicating a super-session of an earlier law then there is in law a repeal notwithstanding the absence of the word "repeal" in the later statute. If the legislative intend to supersede the earlier law is the basis upon which the doctrine of implied repeal is founded a legislation without stating in express terms that it is repealing another enactment can achieve that object. If the Legislature by passing positive legislation can impliedly repeal another legislation it is not necessary for them to have an express power to repeal. If a Legislature, acting within the scope of its legislative competence, can impliedly repeal another piece of legislation would it make any difference that the legislation repealed was not made by itself? In principle it seems to us that it would not. If we were to confine the power of a Legislature acting within its competence to repealing impliedly only legislation which has been passed by itself we would in effect be cutting down its legislative competence itself which we cannot do. In our opinion, therefore, the proviso to Article 254 (2) does not show that the State Legislature in order to repeal the legislation passed by another Legislature even though it be a central legislation, must have an express power of repeal conferred upon it. So long as it acts within the sphere of its legislative competence it may repeal or affect another statute not made by itself. The legislation before us namely the Repealing Act was therefore not lacking in legislative competence in any way. We accept in this respect the finding of the learned single Judge. So long as it acts within the sphere of its legislative competence it may repeal or affect another statute not made by itself. The legislation before us namely the Repealing Act was therefore not lacking in legislative competence in any way. We accept in this respect the finding of the learned single Judge. We hold that the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy (Repeal and Distribution of Trust Properties) Act, 1959, is not ultra vires of either Article 14 or Article 19 or Article 31 of the Constitution and that it was a piece of legislation enacted by a Legislature competent to do so and within the ambit of its powers. 63. Then we turn to points raised in these appeals other than Constitutional. We have already referred to the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Repealing Act. These sections completely did away with the trusts created by the Baronetcy Act and the Corporation established thereunder. Under section 3 (a) the trusts, powers, provisions, declarations and purposes by and in that Act declared and expressed were revoked and extinguished. The Corporation was dissolved and it was declared "shall cease to function". The Trustees, it was declared "shall cease to hold office as such Trustees". By these provisions, the provisions of the Baronetcy Act were in substance put an end to. Then the Repealing Act made provisions for the future. Clause (c) of section 3 provided that the immovable properties shall vest in the Official Trustee and that the moneys, investments, securities or other movable property shall stand transferred and be handed over to him. It also provided that the Official Trustee shall hold and stand possessed of the same for the purposes and with and subject to the powers and provisions hereinafter expressed. Now upto this stage, nothing more was done by the Repealing Act than to destroy the rights and liabilities created under the Baronetcy Act, but the trust properties remained and they were directed to be held by the Official Trustee for certain purposes. Curiously enough those purposes are nowhere stated in the subsequent provisions of the Act. Now upto this stage, nothing more was done by the Repealing Act than to destroy the rights and liabilities created under the Baronetcy Act, but the trust properties remained and they were directed to be held by the Official Trustee for certain purposes. Curiously enough those purposes are nowhere stated in the subsequent provisions of the Act. The only provision as to what is to happen in future to the trust property is sub-section (1) of section 4 and all that it says is that the Official Trustee shall take possession or charge of the trust properties (which is a repetition of the concluding words of section 3 (c)), make an inventory thereof and hold the trust properties upon trust to distribute the same "amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law". No words that we have come across in recent legislation have caused more difficulty than those words in this legislation, for instead of specifying any positive intent the Legislature has virtually said nothing except that the Courts should find out who are the persons rightfully entitled according to law, and give the property to them. 64. It is on the basis of thebe words in section 4 (1) that the trust properties are now being claimed exclusively for himself by Mohamedbhoy, the Fourth Baronet as well as by each one of the thirty other claimants before the Official Trustee. In view of the fact that the beneficial interest of the Fourth Baronet has vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property, the Custodian on his part claims the entire property including the corpus of the trust properties, for it is his contention that by virtue of certain notifications under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act the entire property now vests in him. That is subject-matter of Appeal No. 31 of 1963. 65. The claims of the several claimants who have been held by the learned single Judge to have been heirs of the first Baronet under the Muslim Personal Law is based upon the equitable doctrine of resulting trust. It was contended on their behalf before the learned single Judge and accepted by him that upon the extinguishment of the trusts by the Repealing Act and the dissolution of the Corporation, the properties must be held to revert to the original settlor viz. the First Baronet. Before us all the parties including claimants Nos. It was contended on their behalf before the learned single Judge and accepted by him that upon the extinguishment of the trusts by the Repealing Act and the dissolution of the Corporation, the properties must be held to revert to the original settlor viz. the First Baronet. Before us all the parties including claimants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 as well as the Custodian have throughout argued the matter as if the trust created by the Baronetcy Act was a private trust created directly by the First Baronet himself and they have also assumed throughout that the repeal by the Legislature was as if it were a repeal by the settlor himself. The question then is whether upon the failure of the trusts created by the Baronetcy Act the trust properties which the Official Trustee is holding upon trust to distribute amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law, should go by way of a resulting trust to the estate of the First Baronet or whether there is to be found expressed or implied any intention in the settlor to give away the properties to the branch in which the Baronetcy has devolved. A considerable part of the time taken in these appeals was taken in a discussion of the principles governing this doctrine of resulting trust and the effect upon that doctrine of the expression of a contrary intention by the settlor. 66. The learned single Judge referred in his judgment to a passage from Scott on Trusts, Vol. 3, Article 411, but since it was contended by Mr. Palkhivala on behalf of claimant No. 30 that the entire passage in that Article of which the passage formed a part, was not referred, we would reproduce the entire passage in Article 411 to show what the principle consists in: "If an owner of property transfers it inter vivos upon a trust which fails either at the outset or subsequently, and he has not indicated what disposition should be made of the property in the event of the failure of the trust, the trustee cannot retain it but will be compelled in equity to restore it to the settlor. In such a case the trustee holds the property upon a resulting trust for the settlor. In such a case the trustee holds the property upon a resulting trust for the settlor. Since the trustee was not intended to have the beneficial interest, and since the beneficial interest was not otherwise disposed of, it reverts or results to the settlor. On the failure of the trust the Court will put the parties in 8tatu quo by restoring the property to the settlor. If, however, the settlor properly manifested an intention that no resulting trust should arise in the event of the failure of the trust, it will not arise, but the property will be disposed of in accordance with his intention, whether that intention is expressed in specific language or not. No resulting trust arises if it appears by evidence properly admissible that in the event of the failure of the trust the property should be transferred by the trustee to a third person, or held upon a different trust, or that it should be retained by the trustee free of trust." In Article 412 the learned author has further explained the basis of a resulting trust as follows (p. 2184): "Where an express trust fails, a resulting trust in favour of the settlor arises not because the settlor actually intended that it should arise but because he did not intend that the trustee should have the beneficial interest and did not make any other disposition of the property in the event that the intended trust should fail ... The resulting trust is rebutted when it is shown that the settlor intended that in the event of the failure of the trust the property should be held in trust for other purposes." 67. In Underhill's Law of Trusts and Trustees, 11th Edn., the same principle is explained in Article 27 at page' 172, but there is a passage quoted at page 173 from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Merchant Taylors' Co. v. Attorney-General (1), which throws a great deal of light upon how this principle is administered in English Courts of Chancery. Lord Justice James stated the rule as follows: "As a general rule of law, it is clear that where there is a gift to trustees merely as trustees, they cannot take any benefit arising from the fact that the expressed trusts do not, whether originally or from any subsequent event, exhaust the whole estate. Lord Justice James stated the rule as follows: "As a general rule of law, it is clear that where there is a gift to trustees merely as trustees, they cannot take any benefit arising from the fact that the expressed trusts do not, whether originally or from any subsequent event, exhaust the whole estate. In ordinary trusts the results are, that there is an implied trust for the donor's heirs or representatives. In most cases of gifts for charitable purposes there is an implied trust for charity. But there is a class of oases-not confined or peculiar, as it seems to me, to gifts to colleges, municipal corporations, or city guilds-in which it is a fairly moot question whether, in a gift of property to trustees, they take as trustees solely for the purposes of the trusts, or take subject only to the due execution of the specified trusts. And, in considering that question where it fairly arises, every surrounding circumstance, the character and position of the donor and donee, the more or less probability of one intention or another, the current of authorities in similar, or nearly similar, oases, are all matters which the Court of construction not only may, but must, look to for aid and guidance." The same principles are to be found stated in Lewin on Trusts, 15th Edn., at pages] 30 and 131 and in Halsbury's Laws of England, Simonds edn., Vol. 38, at pages 861 and 862 in paras. 1451 and 1453. As an illustration of how a resulting trust arises Underhill at page 11 gives the following illustration: "A., by his will, givos property to B., in trust for C., who dies before the testator. Here the trust in favour of C., fails; but, as it is obvious that the testator never intended that B. should have the beneficial interest in the property, equity constructa or implies a trust in favour of A.'s heir, or residuary devisee, or residuary legatee, as the case may require. That is an example of that species of 'constructive trust' which is known as a 'resulting trust,' from the Latin verb resultare, to spring back. Similarly, there is a resulting trust for the settlor where an express trust fails for uncertainty as, for ex. That is an example of that species of 'constructive trust' which is known as a 'resulting trust,' from the Latin verb resultare, to spring back. Similarly, there is a resulting trust for the settlor where an express trust fails for uncertainty as, for ex. ample, because it is impossible to ascertain the beneficiaries." Of course, as we have shown above, the whole of this illustration is subject to the rule that a contrary intention, contrary to the resulting trust is not expressed or implied. 68. In Cook v. Hutchinson (2), at page 225 Lord Langdale, the Master, of the Rolls, adopted the principles laid down by Lord Hardwicke in Hill v. The Bishop of London (3), with the following observations: "Upon this deed a question is made whether there is or is not a resulting trust to the grantor as to the surplus, with respect to which there is no declaration of trust; and for the purpose of determining that question, it is necessary to look carefully to the language of the deed, and to the circumstances of the particular case. In general, where an estate or fund is given in trust for a particular purpose, the remainder, after that purpose is satisfied, will result to the grantor; but that resulting trust may be rebutted even by parol evidence, and certainly cannot take effect where a contrary intention, to be collected from the whole instrument, is indicated by the grantor. The distinctions applicable to cases of this kind are pointed out in the case of King v Denison (1) by Lord Eldon, who adopts the principles laid down by Lord Hardwicke in Hill v. The Bishop of London (2). The conclusion to which Lord Hardwicke comes is, that the question whether there is or is not a resulting trust must. The distinctions applicable to cases of this kind are pointed out in the case of King v Denison (1) by Lord Eldon, who adopts the principles laid down by Lord Hardwicke in Hill v. The Bishop of London (2). The conclusion to which Lord Hardwicke comes is, that the question whether there is or is not a resulting trust must. depend upon the intention of the grant or 'No general rule', he observes, 'is to be laid down, unless where a real estate is devised to be sold for payment of debts, and no more is said; there it is clearly a resulting trust, but if any particular reason Occurs why the testator should intend a beneficial interest to the devisee, there are no precedents to warrant the Court to say it shall not be a beneficial interest.." In this particular case, the father over 80 years of age had executed a deed making a provision for himself during his life and for his wife and children after his death. He then proceeded to make a release and assignment of the property comprised in the deed, to his son "upon the trusts hereinafter declared concerning the same"; but when he actually declared the trusts he did not exhaust the whole of the property and the Court held that though he did not exhaust the whole of the property that was an immaterial circumstance, for having carefully looked through the whole of the deed and considering the relation between the parties and the object and purport of the instrument, the Court came to the conclusion that the father intended to part with all beneficial interest in the property, and that he meant his son to have the benefit of that part of the property of which the trusts were not expressly declared. 69. It may at once be admitted that the case of Cook v. Hutchinson (3) may not be an authority under similar circumstances in India for in England the principle of advancement operates where a near relation to the settlor is concerned. It is equally clear that in India the principle of advancement does not operate and that was settled many years ago by decision of the Privy Council. It is equally clear that in India the principle of advancement does not operate and that was settled many years ago by decision of the Privy Council. Nevertheless it seems to us that the circumstance that a person is a near relation of the settlor cannot wholly be ignored and that it would be one of the circumstances and an important circumstance to be taken into account in the Court discharging its duty to find the true intent of the settlor or the testator. 70. The principles, therefore, to be culled from these authorities regarding resulting trusts and an intention contrary to resulting trust are as follows: (a) When a gift or a trust fails equity presumes that the donee or devisee is not to take the property of which he is only the legal owner, but the property must be held for the benefit of the settlor's "heirs or representatives". (b) The above rule is subject to a contrary intention expressed by the settlor or implied from the terms of the settlement. If the intention is express on the face of a document, no evidence to the contrary is admissible, but, on the other hand, if the intention is to be implied or gathered from the surrounding circumstances, then parol evidence is admissible. (c) The test is to see whether in a gift of property to trustees, they take as trustees solely for the purposes of the trusts or take subject only to the due execution of the specified trust. (d) In determining the settlor's or testator's intentions "every surrounding circumstance, the character and position of the donor and donee, the more or less probability of one intention or another, the concurrent authorities in similar or nearly similar cases, are all matters which the Court of construction not only may, but must, look to for aid and guidance". (e) If there is a near relation such as a son or a wife who is the donee or devisee the presumption is that he or she takes absolutely so far as the law in England is concerned. In India there is no such presumption of advancement but the relationship of the donee or devisee to the settlor is an important circumstance among others to be taken into account. In India there is no such presumption of advancement but the relationship of the donee or devisee to the settlor is an important circumstance among others to be taken into account. [After examining the circumstances existing in the case in the light of the above principles and after considering the provisions of the Repealing Act and the Will dated October 22, 1916, left behind by 1st Baronet, the judgment process.- ] 71. Upon the facts what is the' obvious intention of the settlor in the event of the trusts created by the Baronetcy Act failing 1 in our opinion. upon these circumstances, there can be only one answer and that is that in the event of the failure of the trusts, after his life-time the trust properties should beheld for the benefit of the Baronet for the time being and that because that property was by the Act to go to each one of the heirs male of his body only he did not give to the first one among them Mohamedbhoy, the Second Baronet, anything during his life-time. The intention contrary to a resulting trust is thus clearly manifested. * * * * [After referring to some points not germane to this report, the judgment proceeds.- ] 72. Then we turn to examine whether there is any impediment in law to our giving effect to this doctrine of a contrary intention. First we turn to the provisions of the Repealing Act to see if the Repealing Act has debarred us from giving effect to the doctrine or put any impediment in the way of enforcing that doctrine. The only relevant provisions are sections 3 and 4. We have already referred to these provisions. By clause (a) of section 3 the trusts, powers, provisions, declarations and purposes by and in the Baronetcy Act were revoked and extinguished and by clause (b) the Corporation was dissolved and it ceased to function. Therefore, so far as the trusts and the trustees under the Baronetcy Act were concerned, they ceased to exist. Clause (c) then vested the trust properties in the Official Trustee who was enjoined to hold and stand possessed of the same "for the purposes and with and subject to the powers and provisions, hereinafter expressed". Section 4 (I) no doubt gave effect to a. new trust. Clause (c) then vested the trust properties in the Official Trustee who was enjoined to hold and stand possessed of the same "for the purposes and with and subject to the powers and provisions, hereinafter expressed". Section 4 (I) no doubt gave effect to a. new trust. It says: "As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act the Official Trustee shall take possession or charge of the trust properties and make an inventory thereof and hold the trust properties upon trust to distribute the same amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law" We are not concerned here with the ancillary provision as to management until the distribution takes place. 73. Now the trust properties referred to in this sub section are defined as meaning all properties whether immovable or movable of whatever description which are subject to the settlement created by the Baronetcy Act and which immediately before the commencement of the Repealing Act were vested in the Corporation. The sub-section says that these trust properties shall be held "upon trust" and the purpose is stated to be "to distribute the Same amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law". What then was it that the Legislature had in mind when it, made this provision in sub-section (1) of section 4? Obviously the Legislature did intend to create another trust. It seems to us that there is no escape from the words "hold the trust properties upon trust to distribute the same……" A trust was intended to be created pro tem though much argument was advanced to the, contrary. Mr. Palkhivala urged that it was only for the purposes of distribution. We were not told how nonetheless it ceased to be a trust. The purpose may be ephemeral or temporary, that is to say until the properties are distributed or it may be permanent, but that seems to us hardly material upon the question whether there is a trust or not. We have no doubt that by section 4 (1) the Legislature created a new trust. In terms the sub-section, says so. 74. Then the question is does this provision of the legislation preclude the application of the doctrine of resulting trust or of an intention contrary to a resulting trust? We have no doubt that by section 4 (1) the Legislature created a new trust. In terms the sub-section, says so. 74. Then the question is does this provision of the legislation preclude the application of the doctrine of resulting trust or of an intention contrary to a resulting trust? Normally, if the Legislature had made provision or indicated its intention as to how the property was to be distributed or was to devolve, we may have considered that that was an indication that the doctrine should not apply. But the Legislature has made absolutely no provision 'and not indicated its mind in the slightest degree as to how the property should be distributed. All that it says is "distribute the property amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law". Therefore, it seems to us that although a new trust came into being and was created by the Legislature the purpose of the trust is so stated as not to preclude the application of the doctrine of resulting trust or the doctrine of an intention contrary to a resulting trust. We do not think that there is any impediment to the application of the doctrine so far as the Repealing Act is concerned. 75. Then we turn to consider whether there is anything in any other law preventing the application of the doctrine. In the several arguments that were advanced in opposition, two provisions of law were referred to viz. sections 83 and 94 of the Indian Trusts Act. The principal argument in this respect was advanced by Mr. Bhabha supported by Mr. Pandya and Mr. M. M. Zaveri. The argument is that either section 83 or section 94 applies to this case and that, therefore, the Legislature having crystallised the doctrine of resulting trust or an intention contrary to a resulting trust in the statute itself, the Courts are precluded from giving effect to the general doctrine as we have stated it above. Section 83 runs as follows: "Where a trust is incapable of being executed, or where the trust is completely executed without exhausting the trust-property, the trustee, in the absence of a direction to the contrary, must hold the trust-property, or so much thereof as is unexhausted for the benefit of the author of the trust or his legal representative. Section 83 runs as follows: "Where a trust is incapable of being executed, or where the trust is completely executed without exhausting the trust-property, the trustee, in the absence of a direction to the contrary, must hold the trust-property, or so much thereof as is unexhausted for the benefit of the author of the trust or his legal representative. Two conditions are stated in the opening clause of the section which are conditions without which the section would become inapplicable. They are (a) where the trust is incapable of being executed or (b) where the trust is completely executed without exhausting the trust property. Now what are the circumstances here? The trusts created by the Baronetcy Act were completely revoked and extinguished, and the Corporation which held the trust properties was dissolved. In lieu of that trust which was extinguished and dissolved a new trust came into being with the avowed object of distributing the trust properties amongst "the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law". Can it be said then that this was a case where "a trust is incapable of being executed". Either the first trust was completely extinguished or dissolved and a new trust was created in its place or the old trust continued in the guise of the new. In either case it seems to us hardly a case of incapability of the trust being executed or a trust being completely executed. It must also be noticed here that section 3 (c) says that the immovable property shall vest in the Official Trustee upon the revocation of the trusts by section 3 (a) and the movable property "shall stand transferred to" the Official Trustee who shall hold and stand possessed of it for the purposes of the new trust mentioned in section 4: (1). The language used is "shall vest" and "shall stand transferred to "-thus showing that there is no gap or time lag between the revocation and extinguishment of the old trust and the creation of the new trust with the object of distribution. It can hardly be said that under these circumstances the Baronetcy trust became "incapable of execution" or was completely executed without exhausting the trust property. The present is a unique case where a trust is being revoked and extinguished by a statute which at the same time statutorily creates a new trust with a different mode of distribution. It can hardly be said that under these circumstances the Baronetcy trust became "incapable of execution" or was completely executed without exhausting the trust property. The present is a unique case where a trust is being revoked and extinguished by a statute which at the same time statutorily creates a new trust with a different mode of distribution. The draftsman of section 83 would, we are sure, have been surprised if he were told that he had provided for a case like this. 76. The several ways in which a trust is extinguished are indicated in section 77 and the cases are (a) where its purpose is completely fulfilled, (b) where its purpose becomes unlawful, (c) where the fulfilment of its purpose becomes impossible and (d) where the trust being revocable is expressly revoked. The first three clauses cannot apply to the present case, but it was urged that this was a case where the trust being revocable is expressly revoked. We have already shown that the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Repealing Act are peculiar; possibly if such provisions have been made by a deed of private settlement it would have been inoperative and of no effect, for the purposes of the trust newly created under section 4 (1) seem to be utterly vague and uncertain, but apart from that, the trust properties under the Baronetcy Act were unprovided for after the revocation and extinguishment of the trust and the dissolution of the Corporation and section 4 (1) immediately vested them in the Official Trustee upon trust. The second trust undoubtedly has not become incapable of being executed nor, it seems to us, in spite of the revocation of the first trust can that trust be said to be incapable of being executed. The illustrations to section 83 indicate what is the import of the conditions laid down in the opening clause of section 83 and the illustrations are eloquent. They are as follows: A conveys certain land to B (1) upon trust and no trust is declared; (2) upon trust to be thereafter declared and no such declaration is ever made; (3) upon trusts that are too vague to be executed; (4) upon trusts that become incapable of taking effect; (5) in trust for "C" and "C" renounces his interest under the trust. It was urged by Mr. It was urged by Mr. Bhabha that the fourth illustration covers the present case. The fourth illustration does not, however, make clear what is the meaning of the words "incapable of being executed" except to show that it is incapable of taking effect. In our opinion the meaning is that the trust is there but is incapable of taking effect, i.e. the trust subsists but its purpose has failed, but surely such a case cannot be approximated with a case such as we have here where 8eation 3 (a) provides that the trusts, powers, Provisions, declarations and purposes by and in that Act declared and expressed shall be and are hereby revoked and extinguished. The first clause of section 77 cannot be fulfilled in a case like the present. It contemplates a case where the trust is completely executed. That obviously has not happened in the present case. On the contrary, the trust was presumably extinguished and revoked without its purpose being completely fulfilled and so to say merged in a new trust. 77. Moreover it seems to us that even assuming that section 83 is applicable, the section only refers to a particular case under particular circumstances and it cannot displace the application of the doctrine governing the intention contrary to a resulting trust. The Chapter in which it occurs, viz. Chapter IX, itself says that it deals with the subject "Of certain Obligations in the Nature of Trusts" and does not deal exhaustively with each variety of obligation in the nature of trusts which can arise under different circumstances. The case does not directly fall under section 83 and therefore we do not think that the doctrine of an intention contrary to resulting trust cannot apply. 78. Reliance was placed in this connection on a decision of this Court in Dwarkadas Damodar v. Dwarkada8 Shamji (I), and particularly upon the remark of Scott C. J. at page 347 that "The law as to what are known in ordinary legal language as 'resulting trusts' is stated in section 83 of the Indian Trusts Act" and it was urged that that is the authority for the view that the English doctrines of a resulting trust and a contrary intention cannot apply in India and that we are governed only by the provisions of section 83. Dwarkadas's case (1), in our opinion, is distinguishable. Dwarkadas's case (1), in our opinion, is distinguishable. In that case the daughter of the settlor was the sole heir of the settlor and it was held that she was also the sole beneficiary capable of taking under the settlement. Therefore her life interest under the settlement merged in her reversion on the principle that (p. 350) "….. whenever a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one and the same per. son without any intermediate estate, the less is immediately annihilated; or, in the law phrase, is said to be merged, that is, sunk or drowned, in the greater." Section 83, therefore, was not applied and it was not a case falling under that section. 79. Then we turn to section 94. It runs as follows: "In any case not coming within the scope of any of the preceding sections, where there is DO trust, but the person having possession of property has not the whole ben •• ficial interest therein, he must hold the property for the benefit of the persons having such interest, or the residue thereof (as the case may be), to the extent necessary to satisfy their just demands." The phrase in this section "where there is no trust" invited considerable comment from either side. On one side it was urged that it includes a case where there was a trust, but it was revoked under the power of revocation as in the present case: On the other hand, it was urged that section 94 contemplates a class of cases where there is no trust ab initio and in support of this contention were pressed the illustrations appended to this section. Illustration (a) it was said shows a case where the trust from its very inception was illegal and, therefore, there Was no trust. Illustration (b) is a case of the creation of a trust by mistake and obviously where there is a mistake it is as if a trust is nonest. Illustration (c) in terms refers to a void gift. It is urged that it is in cases 'similar to those that are shown in the illustrations which alone come under the phrase "where there is no trust". On the other side it is argued that even if a valid trust has come into being and is revoked, the case would also fall under section 94. 80. It is urged that it is in cases 'similar to those that are shown in the illustrations which alone come under the phrase "where there is no trust". On the other side it is argued that even if a valid trust has come into being and is revoked, the case would also fall under section 94. 80. While there is much plausibility in the argument that it refers to the case where the trust from the very inception was illegal in view of the illustration pointed out, we do not think that we need examine these rival contentions for even assuming that the opening clause of section 94 applies to the present case, section 94 does not assist anyone in solving the problem before us which ill whether the doctrine of a resulting trust and contrary intention apply. As we have said, section 4 (1) of the Repealing Act merely says "to distribute the property amongst the persons rightfully entitled thereto according to law". Section 94 does not assist us in finding out who are the persons "rightfully entitled according to law". All that it says is that if the conditions in the opening clause are fulfilled, the person holding the property "must hold the property for the benefit of the persons having such interest, or the residue thereof to the extent necessary to satisfy their just demands". The question, therefore, who are the persons having such interest or the residue thereof to the extent necessary to satisfy their just demands, still remains to be determined and to that extent, we think that section 94 does not carry the case any further than section 4 (1) of the Repealing Act. In that view it is not necessary to consider section 94 in greater detail. We do not think that there is any impediment to the application of the doctrine of resulting trust and of an intention contrary to a resulting trust so far as the provisions of law are concerned. 81. Then we turn to consider certain arguments advanced by Mr. Palkhivala. On the application of the doctrines he urged that the doctrine postulates certain fundamental conditions and in the absence of those conditions the doctrine cannot be invoked. He did not rely upon section 83 or any other provision of the Trust Act. 81. Then we turn to consider certain arguments advanced by Mr. Palkhivala. On the application of the doctrines he urged that the doctrine postulates certain fundamental conditions and in the absence of those conditions the doctrine cannot be invoked. He did not rely upon section 83 or any other provision of the Trust Act. The argument runs as follows:- That the doctrine of a resulting trust or the doctrine of an intention contrary to a resulting trust is by itself never the foundation of a right or title. A resulting trust is unheard of where a trust is completely abolished or as in the present case is revoked and extinguished, for both the legal and equitable interests are terminated thereby. Section 3 of the Repealing Act repeals the Baronetcy Act altogether and says that in consequence the trusts are revoked and extinguished. Even the trustees are made to cease to function. Therefore the doctrine cannot ore ate any title in anyone, though it may be used by a party to defend a title already inherent in him or to prevent a title passing which inheres in him. Mr. Palkhivala urged that all the oases show that whenever the doctrine was applied the settlement or trust was subsisting and the idea was that the erstwhile right or presumed right was augmented. So far as the fourth Baronet is concerned, he is by virtue of the revocation and extinction of the trusts in his favour a complete stranger and has no right or title inherent in him and that, therefore, he is not a person who could claim the property by virtue of the doctrine of an intention contrary to a resulting trust. He referred to the same passages to which we have referred in Lewin on Trusts, Scott on Trusts and Halsbury's Laws of England, Simonds edition and suggested for our acceptance four propositions as follows: 1. The claim on the basis of a contrary intention can only be founded upon an effective and independent title or right based on a subsisting Will, settlement or other conveyance. 2. The rule of contrary intention can in no event give the claimant any higher title than what he would have if there had been an express provision (in the present case in the Baronetcy Act.) 3. 2. The rule of contrary intention can in no event give the claimant any higher title than what he would have if there had been an express provision (in the present case in the Baronetcy Act.) 3. The beneficiary under a wholly revoked settlement can in no case claim on the ground of a contrary intention because that would be tantamount to rendering the revocation at least partly nugatory. In the present case it would be tantamount to superseding legislation. 4. If the passing of the Repealing Act in the life time of the first Baronet would have given rise to a resulting trust the position can be no different because the Repealing Act was passed after his death. 82. We are unable to accept these contentions. We have already indicated what in our opinion is a true scope of the doctrine. In the passage from Scott on Trusts in Article 411 it is clearly stated that the doctrines are not two separate doctrines but two aspects of one and the same doctrine namely that where a trust fails one must find what was the intention of the settlor or the presumed intention, if no intention be manifest upon the document. The passage which we have quoted from the judgment of Lord Justice James in Mer. chant Taylor's Co. v. Attorney-General (1), shows that this intention can be gathered from all the circumstances. What the learned Judge stated will bear reproduction: "And, in considering that question where it fairly arises, every surrounding circumstance, the character and position of the donor and donee, the more or less probability of one intention or another, the current of authorities in similar, or nearly similar oases, are all matters which the Court of construction not only may, but must, look to for aid and guidance .•• There is no scope for postulating that a title or right must co-exist in the person claiming under this rule before he can claim under the doctrine. It may be. that in several of the cases which arose in England where this doctrine was applied, the claimant had a right or title in himself upon the circumstances of those cases, but the doctrine as stated in the authorities, does not, in our opinion, require any such pre-existing right or title in the claimant. It may be. that in several of the cases which arose in England where this doctrine was applied, the claimant had a right or title in himself upon the circumstances of those cases, but the doctrine as stated in the authorities, does not, in our opinion, require any such pre-existing right or title in the claimant. Secondly, the argument that the Fourth Baronet is a third person i.e. a person who has no right or title whatsoever is clearly negatived by the passage from Scott on Trusts, which we have already reproduced. The last sentence of that passage expressly and in terms refers to a third person as follows: "No resulting trust arises if it appears by evidence properly admissible that in the event of the failure of the trust the property should be transferred by the trustee to a third person or held upon a different trust, or that it should be retained by the trustee free of trust." Obviously, this "third person" is a person unconnected with any right or title. No authority was cited for the proposition that some pre-existing right or title must be inherent in the claimant as a necessary pre-condition to his claiming the application of the doctrine, but all that was urged was that that was the position upon the facts of the cases decided in England. 83. The case in hand is probably unique in the annals of trusts'. We asked Mr. Palkhivala and he was not in a position to show us that even in England a trust such as this was' ever revoked by an enactment by Parliament and much less that the extraordinary and difficult provisions of sections 3 and 4 were ever made. We do not think, therefore, that the doctrine which we have set forth above will not apply to this case simply because the trusts have been revoked and extinguished by statute. 84. The fourth proposition which Mr. Palkhivala has posed can be clearly answered. The answer would be that there would not be a resulting trust in favour of the First Baronet even if the Repealing Act had been passed in his lifetime since he had expressed an intention contrary to a resulting trust. We have already referred to the case Cook v. Hutchinson (1). Other cases relied upon were Foord In re.: Foord v. Conder (2) and Buddulph v. Williams (3). We have already referred to the case Cook v. Hutchinson (1). Other cases relied upon were Foord In re.: Foord v. Conder (2) and Buddulph v. Williams (3). In the latter case by a deed two persons in the exercise of a joint power of appointment, appointed part of the settled property to trustees upon trust for sale; and it was declared that the trustees should stand possessed of the proceeds Upon the trusts intended to be declared by a deed of even date, but no deed declaring the trusts was ever executed, and there was evidence to show that the deed of appointment was executed with a view to avoid the difficulties of an application to the trustees to exercise the power of sale. Lord Jessel, Maeter of the Rolls, after setting forth the terms of these transactions asked himself "Now, what is the legal effect of that 1" and he answered it as follows (p. 211): “…….. It is emphatically a question of intention. You are to ascertain from the deed whether the appointor, or in this case the appointors, intended to deal with the beneficial interest, and then I suppose those authorities would have some application which say that when you conceive that a single appointor intended to destroy the ownership or the ownerships of the persons entitled under the settlement in default of appointment, there must be an intention to make the money his own, because it could be nobody else ••••••" We cannot find a word in this decision to suggest that a prior right or title inherent in the person claiming on the basis of an intention contrary to a resulting trust is essential. On the other hand, it seems that the cardinal rule reiterated is that one must look to the intention of the settlor and nothing else irrespective of whether the person who gets the property by application of the rule has or has not in him a title. 85. The manner in which the contrary intention of a testator is to be recorded and found is shown by the case of Foord v. Conder (2). In that case a testator by his will made the following bequest, "All my effects including rubber and another shares I leave absolutely to my sister M. J. on trust to pay my wife per annum (three hundred pounds)…….". In that case a testator by his will made the following bequest, "All my effects including rubber and another shares I leave absolutely to my sister M. J. on trust to pay my wife per annum (three hundred pounds)…….". The bequest was more than sufficient to satisfy the annuity and it was, therefore, held that the testator's sister was entitled to the beneficial interest of the balance and Was not a trustee thereof for the next of kin. Here we see the application of the doctrine of an intention contrary to a resulting trust. 86. The sister who was held entitled to the beneficial interest in the balance of the money in her hands though she held it as a trustee, Was held entitled to it because there were several indications which tended to show that there was a contrary intention expressed defeating the presumed intention that the property must result back to the settlor's heirs. The penultimate paragraph of the judgment discusses these several circumstances. 87. The passages to which we have already referred above indicate that upon failure of a trust the presumed intention of the settlor must be that the trustee or legal owner must not keep the trust property for himself unless a contrary intention is indicated. We have discussed the circumstances here and they overwhelmingly indicate that the First Baronet, the settlor in this case intended that these trust properties should go only to the Baronet for the time being and in the event of failure to the Baronet at that and his heirs. Thus a clear contrary intention is established upon the -circumstances here and We think, therefore, that upon application of this doctrine the Fourth Baronet would be entitled to the trust properties absolutely in his own right. 88. The learned single Judge considered that the property would result back to the estate of the First Baronet as upon a resulting trust. But the basis of his decision was a basis which has not been supported by any of the parties appearing before us. One of the reasons which he stated was that "the legal author of the trust was the Legislature and not the First Baronet". Now so far as this position is concerned, we have already shown how the Baronetcy Act came to be passed. One of the reasons which he stated was that "the legal author of the trust was the Legislature and not the First Baronet". Now so far as this position is concerned, we have already shown how the Baronetcy Act came to be passed. The whole foundation of that Act was the intention of the First Baronet to settle the properties for the benefit of the heirs male of his body. That he had to take recourse to legislation and the aid of the Legislature in doing so was due to the fact that by himself he could not create a perpetuity and a perpetual succession to that property as has been created under the Act. Indeed it is so suggested in the preamble and it is for that purpose that the trustees also had to be constituted into a Corporation by a legislation. Thus the intention is still the intention of the settlor though' an Act of the Legislature supervened. This aspect of the settlement was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge. On the other hand, it seems to us that a perusal of the provisions of the Baronetcy Act and particularly of the preamble thereof clearly indicates that the entire Act was passed at the desire of the First Baronet. Nowhere does it appear that the Act was passed contrary to his intention. 89. The second reason which prevailed with the learned single Judge Wall stated by him: "Even supposing that the First Baronet can be looked upon as the settlor of the properties in trust, he has not expressed in any legally effective form his intention with regard to the disposal of the trust properties on the extinction of the trust. It is not open to me to deduce the intention of the First Baronet by speculating on that he might have wished if he were faced with the eventuality of the Baronetcy Act being repealed." It seems to us that the learned Judge felt that since the intention was not expressed on the face of a document in any legally effective form, the intention could not be given effect to. We have already referred to the passage from Underhill's Law of Trusts and Trustees and the judgment of Lord Justice James in Merchant Taylors' Co. We have already referred to the passage from Underhill's Law of Trusts and Trustees and the judgment of Lord Justice James in Merchant Taylors' Co. v. Attorney-General (1), which show on the contrary that it is precisely the duty of the Court to ascertain the intention from: "every surrounding circumstance. the character and position of the donor and donee, the more or less probability of one intention or another, the current of authorities in similar, or nearly similar cases…….." Therefore, in our opinion, the learned single Judge was not correct in observing that it was not open to him to deduce the intention of the First Baronet by speculating on what he might have wished if he were faced with the eventuality of the Baronetcy Act being repealed. Because of this view, which in our opinion, was incorrect, the learned Judge did not go into the several circumstances to which we have already adverted which clearly point to the settlor (the First Baronet) having an intention contrary to a resulting trust. We need not repeat those circumstances, but in our opinion they are so overwhelming as to leave no possible doubt as to the conclusion. Upon this view we think also that in holding as under, the learned Judge was clearly wrong: "It must, therefore, follow that, whatever might have been the unexpressed wishes of the First Baronet, the trust properties must revert to his estate on the extinguishment of the statutory trust created by the Baronetcy Act." * * * * [After rejecting a preliminary objection that the Appeal No. 34 of 1963, was barred by time, and considering the question whether having regard to the provisions of section 7 (4) of the Repealing Act, as it was now held that the entire property belonged to the Fourth Baronet, it should not be handed over to him, but should be declared to have vested in the Custodian, the judgment proceeds.- ] 90. Now it is clear upon the facts that though upon a reading of the definitions in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, the corpus of the trust properties may be evacuee property, it is equally clear that they were never dealt with according to the procedure in section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. Now it is clear upon the facts that though upon a reading of the definitions in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, the corpus of the trust properties may be evacuee property, it is equally clear that they were never dealt with according to the procedure in section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. Therefore, there was never any declaration in regard to the corpus and in so far as such a declaration was lacking an essential condition to the operation of sub-section (4) of section 7 of the Repealing Act was not fulfilled. We may also point out that the two clauses which lay down the to conditions upon which alone sub-.section (4) can come into force are joined by the conjunction "and" thus indicating that both the conditions must be simultaneously fulfilled, before the consequences indicated in the sub-section flow. Since one of the conditions and an essential condition was not fulfilled we do not think that the section and the consequences flowing from that section would be attracted to the corpus of the trust properties which we have now held the Fourth Baronet is entitled to……... 91. In the result, therefore, we confirm the findings of the learned single -Judge on all the constitutional issues arising between the parties and hold that the Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy (Repeal and Distribution of Trust Properties) Act, 1959, is a valid piece of legislation and intra vires of the Constitution. We partially allow Appeal No. 31 of 1963 and set aside the findings of the learned single Judge holding that the trust properties reverted to the First Baronet and instead we hold that the Fourth Baronet, claimant No.8 before the Official Trustee, is entitled to the trust properties remaining after payment therefrom of the costs ordered to be paid by the learned single Judge and by us as we shall presently order. We dismiss Appeal No. 34 of 1963. [The rest of the judgment is not material for this report.] Appeal No. 31 of 1963 partly allowed. Official Trustee's appeal No. 34 of 1963 dismissed.