RSA-1962-2023 (O&M) [1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA-1962-2023 (O&M) Date of decision: 17.04.2026 Jagdish Singh Through his LRs ...Appellant Versus Manjit Singh ...Respondent Reserved on: 09.04.2026 Pronounced on: 17.04.2026 Pronounced fully/opera2ve part: Fully CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by: Mr. Hitesh Verma, Advocate for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The plain-ff of the case, having remained unsuccessful before both the Courts below, has filed the present regular second appeal (through his LRs) against the judgment & decree passed by the learned first appellate Court, whereby the judgment of the learned trial Court dismissing his suit for par--on and separate possession was affirmed. 2. The case set up by the plain-ff was that the suit proper-es, comprising two houses described in the plaint, were owned by his father Ajmer Singh, and a6er the death of Ajmer Singh and therea6er their mother, the plain-ff and the defendant, being sons and legal heirs, became co-owners in equal shares. On that premise, the plain-ff sought par--on of the suit proper-es by metes and bounds, separate possession of his alleged half share, and a consequen-al decree of permanent injunc-on restraining the defendant from aliena-ng or altering the suit property to his prejudice. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant, who did not dispute the rela-onship between the par-es or the source of -tle of the proper-es, but specifically pleaded that the proper-es had already been par--oned orally between the par-es long ago through a family arrangement, which had therea6er been fully acted upon. According to the defendant, one YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.17 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1962-2023 (O&M) [2] house fell to his share and the other to the share of the plain-ff, and since about 1996, both par-es had been residing separately in their respec-ve por-ons as exclusive owners. The defendant further pleaded that the suit was also bad for par-al par--on, inasmuch as other proper-es le6 by Ajmer Singh had not been included in the suit. 4. Upon the pleadings of the par-es, the learned trial Court framed the necessary issues. The par-es led their respec-ve evidence. However, though the plain-ff entered the witness box, he did not submit himself for cross-examina-on. His examina-on-in-chief, therefore, remained incomplete. The plain-ff therea6er examined his son / a?orney as a witness. On the other hand, the defendant examined several witnesses, including himself, to prove the factum of earlier oral par--on, separate possession, and independent enjoyment of the respec-ve proper-es. 5. The learned trial Court, on apprecia-on of the material on record, dismissed the suit. The appeal preferred by the plain-ff also came to be dismissed by the first appellate Court of learned Addi-onal District Judge, who concurred with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. It is against those concurrent findings that the present second appeal has been filed. 6. Assailing the above concurrent findings, Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the first appellate Court merely endorsed the findings of the trial Court without independent appraisal of evidence, rendering the judgment unsustainable. Reliance is placed upon H. Siddiqui (D) by LRs vs. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240. It is further argued that in the absence of a wri?en par--on deed, the alleged oral par--on could not have been accepted. 7. However, upon a specific query by this Court, learned counsel for the appellant fairly concedes the following facts:
both the suit proper-es are situated in the same town (Bathinda); YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.17 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1962-2023 (O&M) [3]
no specific measurements, area, or valua-on of either property have been pleaded;
both par-es are in separate possession of the respec-ve proper-es; and
another joint property, namely agricultural land situated in village Jodhpur, exists but has not been included in the suit. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and having gone through the judgments of the Courts below as well as the record, this Court is of the considered view that the present appeal does not raise any substan-al ques-on of law so as to warrant any interference under Sec-on 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. At the outset, it requires no-ce that the jurisdic-on of this Court in a regular second appeal is confined to examining substan-al ques-ons of law arising from the case. Pure findings of fact concurrently recorded by the Courts below are not liable to be reopened merely because another view may also be possible. Interference is jus-fied only where the findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or vi-ated by a patent misreading of material evidence or erroneous applica-on of law. In the present case, none of these infirmi-es is shown to exist. 10. The primary conten-on of the appellant that the first appellate Court has failed to independently assess the evidence does not merit any acceptance. A perusal of the judgment of the first appellate Court shows that it has duly considered the pleadings, evidence and findings recorded by the trial Court and therea6er concurred with the same. Mere concurrence with the trial Court does not imply non-applica-on of mind, par-cularly when such concurrence is based on re-appraisal of the record. 11. The reliance placed upon H. Siddiqui (supra) is misplaced in the facts of the present case, as no failure of duty on the part of the first appellate Court is demonstrated. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.17 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1962-2023 (O&M) [4] 12. On merits, the first circumstance, which goes to the root of the ma?er is that the plain-ff did not complete his tes-mony by offering himself for cross-examina-on. It is a se?led principle of evidence that a statement made in examina-on-in-chief does not a?ain eviden-ary value unless the witness is available for cross-examina-on by the opposite side. Cross-examina-on is not a mere formality; it is an integral part of tes-ng the truthfulness, completeness and reliability of the version put forth. Once the plain-ff failed to appear for cross-examina-on, the Courts below were fully jus-fied in holding that his affidavit could not be read as substan-ve evidence. The consequence was that the plain-ff was le6 without his own legally admissible tes-mony in support of the pleaded case of con-nued jointness and en-tlement to par--on. 13. The plain-ff a?empted to fill this lacuna by examining his son as a?orney. However, the tes-mony of the a?orney did not materially advance the plain-ff’s case. Rather, in cross-examina-on, he made admissions, which substan-ally for-fied the defence version. He admi?ed that the plain-ff and his family had been residing in the house described in part ‘B’ since its construc-on in the year 1996. He further admi?ed that the defendant had carried out renova-on of the house at College Road in the year 2009 and that the expenditure thereon had been borne by the defendant alone. Significantly, his tes-mony also reflected that it was possible that a6er par--on the value of one house had increased. These admissions were not insignificant or stray. They went to the very founda-on of the controversy and clearly indicated that the par-es had long been in separate possession and that a family arrangement or par--on had already been acted upon. Admissions, par-cularly those opera-ng against the interest of the party making them, cons-tute substan-ve evidence and may, by themselves, furnish a sound basis for recording findings. The Courts below were, therefore, jus-fied in a?aching due weight to such admissions. 14. The defence version, in contrast, stood supported by consistent oral evidence. The defendant examined witnesses who deposed about the oral par--on having been effected by the mother of the par-es YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.17 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1962-2023 (O&M) [5] in the presence of rela-ves, and about the par-es having therea6er remained in separate possession of their respec-ve houses. The defendant also led evidence regarding renova-on carried out by him in the por-on claimed by him, and produced documents such as iden-ty card and ra-on card to show his residence and enjoyment in his own right. The Courts below have no-ced that this evidence withstood cross-examina-on and that nothing substan-al could be elicited to discredit it. Once such evidence is read alongside the admissions emerging from the plain-ff’s side, the conclusion drawn by the Courts below that an oral par--on or family arrangement had already taken place cannot be said to be either conjectural or perverse. 15. There is yet another aspect of the ma?er, which weighs against the appellant. Both the Courts below have relied not merely on oral asser-ons, but on the conduct of the par-es over a prolonged period. It has come on record that both sides had been residing separately in different houses since about 1996, without interference from the other. Long- standing separate possession, separate enjoyment, and independent expenditure on repair and renova-on are highly relevant circumstances in cases of family se?lement and oral par--on. In ma?ers concerning par--on within a family, direct documentary evidence is o6en unavailable, and the arrangement is frequently inferred from the conduct of the par-es and the manner in which they have dealt with the proper-es over -me. Therefore, the inference drawn by the Courts below from the proved conduct of the par-es is not only plausible but also legally sound. 16. In fact, even according to the plain-ff’s own pleading, there had earlier been an oral par--on between Ajmer Singh and his brother Sher Singh. This circumstance was also rightly no-ced by the Courts below while examining the probabili-es of the case. Though this fact by itself may not conclude the controversy, it lends support to the defence plea that in the family in ques-on, par--on by oral arrangement was not unknown. Hence, the plea of oral par--on raised by the defendant cannot be brushed aside as inherently improbable. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.17 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1962-2023 (O&M) [6] 17. The ma?er does not rest there. The learned first appellate Court has also recorded a finding that the suit suffered from the defect of par-al par--on. During evidence, it surfaced that other proper-es le6 by Ajmer Singh existed at village Jodhpur, yet the plain-ff chose not to include them in the suit. In a suit for par--on, the general rule is that the whole of the joint estate ought to be brought into the hotchpotch, unless there is a legally sustainable reason for exclusion. A co-sharer cannot ordinarily seek par--on of selected items alone while leaving out other joint proper-es, for that would lead to mul-plicity of proceedings and inequitable division. The finding of the appellate Court that the suit was bad for par-al par--on thus furnishes an addi-onal and independent reason to non-suit the plain-ff. The reliance placed by the learned appellate Court on the principle enunciated in Kenchegowda (since deceased) by LRs v. Siddegowda alias Motegowda, (1994) 4 SCC 294, is apposite in the facts of the present case. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to convince this court that any material evidence has been ignored by the Courts below or that any admissible evidence has been misread in a manner affec-ng the ul-mate conclusion, nor has it been shown that the findings are such as no reasonable person ac-ng judicially could have arrived at. The judgments under challenge reveal proper apprecia-on of the pleadings, evidence and surrounding circumstances. Merely because the appellant desires this Court to take a different view of the same evidence would not jus-fy interference in second appeal. 19. In fact, the concessions made by learned counsel for the appellant during the course of hearing further for-fy the defendants case. The admi?ed posi-on that both par-es are in separate possession of dis-nct proper-es, coupled with the absence of any pleadings regarding measurements or valua-on, clearly indicates that the suit was not founded on a definite or enforceable claim of jointness. 20. The conten-on that oral par--on cannot be accepted in the absence of a wri?en instrument is thus wholly untenable and contrary to se?led legal principles governing family arrangements. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.17 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1962-2023 (O&M) [7] 21. This Court is, therefore, sa-sfied that the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below are findings of fact based on evidence and sound legal principles. No substan-al ques-on of law arises therefrom. The appeal, in substance, seeks a reapprecia-on of evidence, which is impermissible within the limited scope of jurisdic-on under Sec-on 100 CPC. 22. Consequently, finding no merit in the present appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. The judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are affirmed. There shall be no order as to costs. No merit. Dismissed. 17.04.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No Uploaded on: 17.04.2026 YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.17 16:03 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document