IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH **** 128 RSA-1944-2023 Date of decision: 13.07.2026 Charan Singh . . . . Appellant Vs. Balwinder Singh . . . Respondent **** CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA **** Present: - Mr.P.S. Jammu, Advocate, for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. The plaintiff is in Regular Second Appeal against the concurrent judgments & decrees passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirsa and affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sirsa, whereby his suit for recovery of ₹6,14,000/- on the basis of pronote and receipt dated 11.02.2010 has been dismissed. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that once execution of the pronote stood proved through the scribe and attesting witness, the Courts below were bound to draw the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act regarding consideration. It is argued that the Courts below have wrongly discarded the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses and have illegally relied upon the opinion of the handwriting/fingerprint expert examined by the defendant. It is further submitted that the findings recorded by the Courts below are contrary to the evidence on record and deserve interference. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and carefully perused the paper-book. 4. The suit was founded entirely upon the alleged pronote and receipt dated 11.02.2010. The defendant specifically denied execution thereof VIVEK PAHWA 2026.07.14 15:04 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1944-2023 2026:PHHC: 094803 and pleaded that blank signed papers obtained during previous business dealings had been misused. 5. The burden initially rested upon the plaintiff to establish due execution of the pronote and passing of consideration. Although Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act raises a statutory presumption, the same is rebuttable in nature. Once the defendant produces evidence sufficient to create a reasonable probability against the existence of consideration or execution, the burden shifts back upon the plaintiff to establish the transaction by cogent evidence. 6. The Courts below have concurrently found that the defendant succeeded in rebutting the statutory presumption. Such conclusion is not founded merely upon the oral denial of the defendant but upon several circumstances emerging from the evidence. 7. Firstly, the defendant examined a handwriting and fingerprint expert who categorically opined that the questioned thumb impressions on the pronote and receipt did not tally with the specimen thumb impressions of the defendant. The expert opinion remained substantially unshaken during cross- examination. Significantly, although the plaintiff had obtained an opportunity to have the disputed thumb impressions examined through his own expert and the defendant had even expressed willingness to furnish specimen thumb impressions before the Court, no expert evidence was ultimately produced by the plaintiff. The omission assumes considerable significance once the genuineness of the thumb impressions had been specifically disputed from the very inception. 8. Secondly, both Courts have noticed material inconsistencies regarding the alleged passing of consideration. While one witness stated that the amount had been withdrawn from the plaintiff's limit account, the plaintiff himself gave an altogether different version regarding the source of funds. These contradictions go to the root of the alleged transaction and materially affect the credibility of the plaintiff's case. VIVEK PAHWA 2026.07.14 15:04 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1944-2023 2026:PHHC: 094803 9. Thirdly, the evidence led by both parties establishes that their business relationship had admittedly come to an end in the year 2008. Even the plaintiff admitted in his cross-examination that business dealings had ceased prior to the alleged transaction. The balance-sheet produced by the plaintiff also did not reflect the defendant as a debtor. These admitted circumstances were legitimately taken into consideration by the Courts below while examining the probability of advancement of a substantial friendly loan in the year 2010. 10. The appreciation of evidence undertaken by the Courts below cannot be termed either arbitrary or perverse. Rather, the findings are based upon cumulative consideration of documentary evidence, expert opinion, admissions made by the plaintiff himself and inconsistencies in the oral evidence. 11. The submission that the testimony of the scribe and attesting witness ought to have been accepted in preference to the defendant's evidence also does not advance the appellant's case. The evidentiary value of witnesses is essentially a matter of appreciation by the fact-finding Courts. Both Courts have assigned cogent reasons for treating their testimony with caution, particularly in view of their close association with the plaintiff and the surrounding circumstances creating doubt regarding the transaction. Merely because another view may also be possible on appreciation of evidence would not furnish a ground for interference in second appeal. 12. It is equally well settled that expert evidence is advisory in nature and ordinarily cannot by itself conclude the controversy. However, where such opinion finds corroboration from surrounding circumstances, admissions and other evidence on record, the Courts are fully justified in relying upon it. In the present case, the expert opinion has not been accepted in isolation but as one amongst several circumstances which cumulatively rebutted the statutory presumption available to the plaintiff. 13. The scope of interference under Section 100 CPC is extremely limited. Concurrent findings of fact cannot be reopened unless shown to be VIVEK PAHWA 2026.07.14 15:04 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1944-2023 2026:PHHC: 094803 perverse, based on no evidence, arrived at by ignoring material evidence or by applying an erroneous principle of law. 14. In the present case, learned counsel for the appellant has been unable to point out any material evidence ignored by the Courts below or any finding which may be described as perverse. The conclusions recorded are plausible conclusions emerging from the evidence on record and do not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference under Section 100 CPC. 15. No substantial question of law arises for consideration. Accordingly, the present Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (DEEPAK GUPTA) 13.07.2026 JUDGE Vivek Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes Whether reportable No VIVEK PAHWA 2026.07.14 15:04 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document