1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 1924 of 2025 1 - Cholamandalam Ms General Insurance Company Limited, Head Office Adress Raipur Branch Ward No. 25 Guru Govind Singh Ward 2nd Floor Simran Tower Pandri Road Opposite L.I.C. Building Raipur C.G. Through Its Authorized Officer. ... Appellant versus 1 - Heera Bai W/o Gour Sing Yadav, Aged About 52 Years R/o Village - Pachri Post - Nartora P.S. - Patewa District Mahasamund C.G. 2 - Gour Singh Yadav S/o Subedar Aged About 62 Years R/o Village - Pachri Post - Nartora P.S. - Patewa District Mahasamund C.G. 3 - Govardhan Deewan S/o Adesh Singh Diwan, Aged About 25 Years R/o Village - Chindouli P.S. - Patewa District Mahasamund C.G. 4 - Lal Kumar Dadsena S/o Santram Dadsena Aged About 25 Years R/o Village - Pachri Post - Nartora P.S. - Patewa District Mahasamund C.G. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant/Insurance Company : Mr. Shrivansh Gopal, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, Adv. Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 16.02.2026 1. Heard on I.A. No.3/2025, an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the Insurance Company against the award passed by the learned Second Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mahasamund (C.G.) in Claim Case No.19/2022 dated 12.10.2023 whereby, learned Tribunal has passed an award to the tune of Rs.14,46,040/- with interest @ 6% per annum on account of death of Shri Bhupendra Diwan in a motor accident. 3. The Insurance Company has preferred this appeal with delay of 557 days. 2 4. Mr. Gopal, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company would submit that the award was passed on 12.10.2023. He would further submit that relevant documents were sent to the Head Office and thereafter, sanction was accorded and the appeal was preferred. He would further submit that there is delay of 557 days and that may be condoned. 5. Heard learned counsel for the Insurance Company at length and perused application for condonation of delay. 6. A perusal of application for condonation of delay would reveal that award was passed on 12.10.2023 and this appeal was preferred with delay of 557 days on 12.08.2025 In the application, it is nowhere stated that as to when the documents were forwarded to the office of Insurance Company and when approval was accorded, thus, in my opinion, the appellant failed to state sufficient cause of delay in application for condonation of delay. 7. Law as regards scope and jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act is well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments and some judgments are as under : (i) In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, Hon. Supreme Court in para 7 has held as under:- “7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly 3 disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.” (ii) Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, has held in para 6 as under:- “6. law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” (iii) As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlilk Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs., Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448 has held as under: “26. Basically the laws of Limitation are founded on public policy. In Halsbury’s Laws of England,4th Ed., Vol.28,p.266,para 605, the policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.- The courts have expressed at least three different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (i) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (ii) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispute the stated claim, (iii) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” 27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as ‘statutes of peace’. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This court in Rajender Singh and others vs. Santa Singh and others [(1973) 2 SCC 705] has observed : (SCC p.712, para 18) 4 “18. The object of law of Limitation is to prevent disturbance and deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches”. 28. In Motichand vs. Munshi [AIR 1970 SC 898], this court observed that this principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time law of Limitation are a means to ensuring private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. 29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. (iv) Hon. Supreme Court in a recent decision Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under:- “24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported 5 in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286, in para 26, summarized the judgments and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law,as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented 6 approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 10. Considering inordinate delay of 557 days and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I do not find any good ground to allow the application for condonation of delay, accordingly, I.A. No. 03/2025 is hereby rejected. Consequently, appeal also fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Rekha